Dr. Michael Gilmore,
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), revealed a great deal
of previously unknown (at least to me!) information regarding issues with the
LCS in a statement to Congress before the US House of Representatives Armed
Services Committee (1). Here’s some
highlights with my emphasis added. This
is a long post but worth the read.
Regarding survivability, we
see what ComNavOps has been saying all along about the LCS’ lack of shock
hardening and failure to meet even Level 1 standards, contrary to the Navy’s
explicit lies on this matter.
“With respect to survivability, neither LCS variant
is expected to be survivable in high-intensity combat because the Navy’s
requirements accept the risk of abandoning the ship under circumstances that
would not require such an action on other surface combatants. As designed, the LCS lacks the shock hardening, redundancy,
and the vertical and longitudinal separation of equipment found in other
combatants. … Thus far, the results of the LCS Live Fire Test and Evaluation
(LFT&E) program confirm this assessment.”
“…the LFT&E program has already identified over
100 technical improvements that could be applied to improve LCS’s performance
against threat weapons, although, given the ships’ fundamental limitations, none of these improvements will make the
ships’ survivability comparable to that of the Navy’s other surface combatants.”
Moving on, Gilmore calls
into question the very concept of the LCS - that it will free up larger ships
for more important missions.
“… the Navy’s CONOPS require LCS, in some scenarios,
to remain stationed near much slower units who are providing the LCS with
dedicated air defense support to have any reasonable chance of surviving
attacks using ASCMs… Moreover, this CONOPS implies that destroyers and cruisers
will be required to provide this protection to LCSs, which is contrary to the concept that independently
operated LCSs will free up the Navy’s destroyers and cruiser and “allow [them]
to focus on the high-end missions,” which is what the Navy has touted in
the past.”
DOT&E’s overall
assessment is bleak.
“…DOT&E has sufficient data to conclude that both
seaframe variants are not operationally
suitable …”
“Not operationally suitable”
– ouch!
Here’s some failures that
weren’t widely known.
“During this last year, problems with main engines,
waterjets, communications, air defense systems, and cooling for the combat
system occurred regularly …”
It’s distressing that the
listed problems occur regularly given that the ships have been in production
and operation for several years. They’re
no longer first of class problems. At
this point, they’re systemic problems.
Gilmore had this to say
about reliability,
“… when averaged over time, and accounting for both
planned and unplanned maintenance downtimes, LCS 4 was fully mission capable
for SUW missions just 24 percent of the 2015 test period.”
Further,
“Both variants … have a near-zero chance of
completing a 30-day mission (the Navy’s requirement) without a critical failure
of one or more seaframe subsystems essential for wartime operations.”
Crew size comes under fire.
“… the small crew size has limited the Independence variant
from operating with sufficient watchstanders to maintain an alert posture for
extended periods of time.”
The fundamental maintenance
concept for the LCS whereby on-board maintenance is deferred is cited as a
limiting factor in LCS effectiveness.
“An example of this limitation occurred during LCS
4’s operational testing during 2015 and 2016, where the ship’s primary air
defense system, SeaRAM, suffered from seven long periods of downtime (greater
than 48 hours).”
The inherent helplessness of
the LCS was further highlighted.
“During the LCS 3 operational test period, the crew
was unable to repair multiple critical systems, such as the ship’s navigation
data distribution system, the air search radar, and Link 16 tactical link, each
of which resulted in multiple days of downtime while awaiting assistance from
contractors to troubleshoot and repair the systems.”
The LCS air defense
capability is also questioned along with previously unreported revelations
about SeaRAM problems.
“it is unlikely that LCS will be able to meet the
Navy’s requirements for air defens … More recently, limitations in the SeaRAM
system (currently installed on Independence variants)
revealed some significant classified concerns.”
One of the oft called for
“solutions” to acquisition problems is to buy foreign. DOT&E, however, offers some practical
warnings about problems with foreign purchases.
“… the Navy stopped work on the air defense modeling
and simulation test bed because it did not have the intellectual property
rights and detailed technical information for the ship’s air defense radar
(AN/SPS-75). The lack of intellectual property for these foreign radars has
been a problem for both variants of LCS, making it difficult for engineers to
develop high-fidelity models and understand the capabilities and limitations of
these radars or effect changes when problems are found.”
Although the Navy plans to
eventually replace the Freedom variant’s RAM with SeaRAM, DOT&E notes an
issue with the Navy’s related decision not to test the RAM system.
“… the Navy does not plan to test (at all) the
existing Freedom-variant air defense systems installed on LCS 1 through 15.
This is a high risk for deploying crews, given that many Freedom-variant ships
will deploy between now and 2020 when backfits of the SeaRAM system on those
hulls are scheduled to begin.”
Worse, the Navy has
cancelled plans to test the Independence variant’s SeaRAM system.
“The Navy had planned to conduct the first of the
planned operationally realistic live-fire events on the self-defense test ship
in FY16, but postponed the test indefinitely because of anticipated poor performance
predicted by pre-test modeling and analysis of the planned test event
scenario.”
Setting aside RAM issues,
the Freedom variant has additional AAW issues.
“For the Freedom variant, these tests revealed that
because of the limited capabilities of the air defense radar, the crew was
unable to detect and track some types of air threats well enough to engage
them.”
The Independence variant also had threat detection issues.
“For the Independence variant,
although the ships relies on the SeaRAM system, the ship’s air surveillance
radar provided LCS crews with only limited warning to defend itself against
ASCMs in certain situations.”
And more,
“In the Navy’s developmental test events, we learned
that the electro-optical system used to target the seaframe’s gun was unable to provide reliable tracking
information against some targets.”
More,
“…the program decided to cancel all subsequent
live-fire events, including those scheduled for operational testing, conceding that the Independence variant is unlikely to be consistently successful
when engaging some of these threats until future upgrades of the tracking
system can be implemented.”
The LCS’ cyber security is
also problematic.
“Much of my assessment of the two seaframes’
cybersecurity posture and capabilities is classified and covered in detail in
my recent operational test reports. However, I will state that the testing
conducted in FY14 on LCS 3, testing conducted in 2015 on LCS 2, and finally the
most recent test aboard LCS 4 have revealed significant deficiencies in the
ship’s ability to protect the security of information and prevent malicious
intrusion. … the severity of the cybersecurity problems discovered on LCS will
degrade the operational effectiveness of either variant until the problems
are corrected.”
I have repeatedly discussed
the shortcomings of the 57 mm gun and opined that reliance on it to stop swarm
attacks was flawed. Here is DOT&E’s
thoughts.
“The inaccuracy
of the targeting systems, the difficulty
in establishing a track on the target, and the requirement to hit the target directly when using the point-detonation
fuze combine to severely impair effective employment of the gun, and limit
effective performance to dangerously short ranges.”
The electro-optical fire
control has always been a source of puzzlement and DOT&E singled it out for
criticism.
“The ship’s electro-optical/infrared camera, SAFIRE,
is the primary sensor for targeting the 57 mm gun. The system suffers from a
number of shortcomings that contribute to inconsistent tracking performance
against surface and air targets, including a cumbersome human-systems
interface, poor auto-tracker performance, and long intervals between laser
range finder returns.”
The LCS’ single function
limitation is noted.
“LCS will have no capability to detect or defend
against torpedoes unless the ASW mission package is embarked … The lack of
capability implies that a submarine could launch an attack on an LCS, without
the crew knowing that they were under attack …”
The LCS’ single function
limitation requires that multiple LCS be used to accomplish a given mission
and, worse, may require the addition of an Aegis destroyer to provide the AAW
capability that the LCS inherently lacks.
“The original vision, therefore, of a nimble, mission-focused
ship has been overcome by the realities of the multi-mission nature of naval
warfare combined with the multiple threat environments of high-intensity naval
conflicts.
…
Providing additional warships for LCS protection
means stretching already limited battle group air defense assets.”
What about ASW performance? Apparently, the LCS sonar is not optimized
for littoral ASW. Wait, what now? Doesn’t the “L” in LCS stand for littoral?
“LCS’s sonar system is specifically optimized for
deep water and will not be suitable for some very shallow-water environments
such as in the littorals.”
If the LCS does find a
submarine, there’s not a lot it can do about it.
“LCS has no organic capability to engage submarines
and must rely on a single embarked helicopter to deliver torpedoes …”
In summary, Dr. Gilmore’s
assessment of the state of the LCS was brutal and paints a picture of a Navy
that is blind and zealous in its pursuit of hulls in the water regardless of
capability or lack thereof.
__________________________
(1) “Statement By J. Michael
Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Before the US House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee on the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship
Program”, Dec 8, 2016
