ES-3A Shadow

The ES-3A Shadow variant of the basic S-3 Viking airframe was a short-lived but immensely valuable and capable platform optimized for signals capture and analysis.

“The heart of the Shadow is an avionics suite based on the Aries II system of the land-based EP-3E Orion. The Shadow's fuselage is packed with sensor stations and processing equipment, and the exterior sports over 60 antennae. The ES-3A Shadow crew is comprised of a pilot, an NFO, and two systems operators. Advanced sensor, navigation and communications systems allow the Shadow's four-person crew to collect extensive data and distribute high-quality information through a variety of channels to the carrier battle group. This gives the battle group commander a clear picture of potential airborne, surface and sub-surface threats. Missions flown by the detachment include over-the-horizon targeting, strike support, war at sea and reconnaissance.” (1)

The ES-3A was considered a direct replacement for the EA-3B Skywarrior.  The aircraft has 60+ antennae but otherwise shared the same flight characteristics as the base Viking albeit with a slight decrease in top end speed.  It was also capable of providing aerial refueling in addition to its electronic work.

ES-3A Shadow

Two squadrons, VQ-5 and VQ-6, were established in 1991 with one based on each coast of the US.  In total, 16 Vikings were converted to the ES-3A configuration and they were typically operated two aircraft per deployed carrier.  The squadrons were disestablished in 1999.

The ES-3A was an immensely valuable aircraft because it offered the ability to provide over-the-horizon (OTH) detection and classification using passive sensors.  It’s passive nature and relatively small size compared to the E-2 Hawkeye gave it the ability to wander farther afield than the Hawkeye and expand the sensor picture. 

With the current emphasis on stealth and passive sensing using IRST and the like, we could use this aircraft today.  This was another one of the Navy’s penny wise and pound foolish decisions.

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(1)Fas.org website,

https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/es-3_shadow.htm

S-3 Viking Gunship

We’ve seen that the Marines are trying to create a poor man’s gunship out of their KC-130J Super Hercules tankers using the Harvest Hawk add-on kit.  The Marines are also toying around with turning the MV-22 into a mini-gunship.  So, can the Navy get in on this?  Maybe an E-2C/D Hawkeye gunship?  That probably wouldn’t be any sillier than what the Marines are doing but, just for fun, let’s take a look at a study that was done many years ago about turning an S-3 Viking into a gunship.  Taylor Emanuel did the study for his Naval Posgraduate School thesis (1).

To begin with, the author notes that organic fire support capability was being steadily reduced. 

“This study provides analysis that shows a huge reduction in expeditionary fire support capability. The Marine Corps has experienced a 45 percent reduction in cannon artillery, the loss of self-propelled artillery capability, and reductions in tactical aircraft. The Navy has decommissioned all battleship NSFS 16-inch gun platforms and mine threats coupled with limited littoral water depths will probably make NSFS 5-inch guns a non-factor.”

So, even back in the early 1990’s the trend of steadily shrinking fire support was obvious and this trend provides the foundation and justification for his examination of gunship options.  Interesting, isn’t it, that the author saw the inadequacy of the 5” gun for fire support long before the Navy opted to retreat to 25-50 miles offshore?  Those artillery reductions have only gotten worse and have been joined, now, by tank reductions.  The organic fire support situation has only gotten worse - far worse.

The author’s solution is to increase Close Air Support (CAS).

“To offset reductions in organic fire support, more frequent and sustained application of CAS and CAS/TIC [TIC = Troops in Contact]  will be required by joint expeditionary forces.”

He uses four measures of CAS to determine merit:

• target detection/recognition
• lethality
• survivability;
• combat persistence.

That’s not a bad group of measures for CAS.  Of course, just as important, or more so, is the direction of the battle – the ability of the pilot (or observer) to see, assess, and direct the battle.  However, that’s a function of training and doctrine and the author is focused on the platform so he can be forgiven this omission. 

Here is the author’s summary of desired characteristics.

“The sensor suite consists of a turret mounted forward looking infrared and low-light-level television to provide 360 degree battlefield coverage and to cover the entire electromagnetic spectrum. The weapons suite consists of one 25-MM Bushmaster chain gun for area suppression of personnel and use against light armor, one 30-MM Bushmaster II gun for destruction of vehicles and armored vehicles, and eight Hellfire missiles for hard-target kill and forward-firing, non-orbit firing capability. In addition, the platform will be survivable. It will have state-of-the-art self-defense capability coupled with armor plating and redundant systems. Finally, combat persistence will be good. The CBG [carrier based gunship] will be carrier-capable and have at least a 1,500 nautical mile range.”

The platforms that the author examines for CAS suitability are the E-2C, S-3, and V-22.  The specific relevant characteristics of the S-3 Viking in the gunship role are:

• High wing – minimize interference with weaponry
• Good range/endurance
• High speed
• Cabin height over 7 ft – allows full installation and operation of weapons
• Crew of 4 – would result in task saturation according to the author;  four is the minimum viable CAS crew size, according to the author
• Comprehensive sensor suite – FLIR and ISAR already part of the airframe
• High IR signature – means the aircraft would be susceptible to heat seeking weapons
• Low Radar signature – low on a relative basis, not compared to full stealth aircraft
• Good munitions load capacity
• Full weapons load
• 1x 25mm
• 2x 30mm
• 8x Hellfire

Gunship?

As the author points out, the Navy, and carrier groups, lack any real close air support.  As ComNavOps has pointed out, in a peer level assault the carrier's aircraft will be fully occupied trying to establish and maintain air control and protecting the carrier/amphib groups.  They will only sporadically be available for CAS, at best.  

The author’s thesis demonstrated that the S-3 offers the possibility of a dedicated CAS platform though it would not, of course, be as effective as a purpose designed, new aircraft.  Still it’s an interesting concept to think about and once again emphasizes the versatility of the S-3 which has operated in the ASW, ISR, maritime strike, ESM, tanker, and COD roles.  That’s a pretty impressive and versatile aircraft!

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(1)Taylor C. Emanuel, “Gunship Diplomacy: Carrier-Based Close Air Support For Joint Expeditionary Forces”, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, Dec 1994

Return of the Viking

The Navy seems to have a clear need for an organic tanker, a long range fixed wing ASW aircraft, and a long range ECM/ESM aircraft.  Unfortunately, the R&D costs to develop a new multi-role support aircraft would be prohibitive in today’s budget climate.  If only there were an already fully developed and flight proven aircraft just sitting waiting to be put into production.  But, alas, we don’t have …  Hey, wait a minute!  Didn’t the S-3 Viking do all that stuff?  Couldn’t we just put it back into production?  Well, yeah, we could but it’s out of date.  We need a modern aircraft.  Yeah, I guess that won’t work because an old design like that just won’t …  well, it wouldn’t be able to, um …  Actually, what’s wrong with the old design?  None of those roles call for stealth.  None of those roles call for supercruise, Mach+ speed.  None of those roles call for 360 degree sensor fused, integrated, networked, anti-gravity, vertical takeoff, invisibility, and whatever other features the Navy would try to wedge into a new design.  Those roles just call for a flying truck.  This is exactly what CNO Greenert has been preaching. 

For those of you who have forgotten, the S-3 Viking functioned as a tanker, ASW, and ESM (remember the ES-3A Shadow?).  Additional roles are also possible.  A commenter once suggested the need for a long range UAV controller aircraft and the Naval Postgraduate School published a thesis in 1994 that examined the use of an S-3 Viking as a carrier based gunship. 

Not only could we quickly put the Viking back into production but my understanding is that the S-3 fleet has been preserved and could be restored to service with relatively little effort.  In fact, S. Korea is supposedly looking into buying several Vikings for ASW work.  Restored Vikings, if they won’t entirely meet the needed numbers, could be used almost immediately while a Viking production line is being reconstituted.

Check the Viking’s range and speed.  They’re more than adequate for the roles.

Range:  2765 nm

Speed:  max 430 kts, cruise 350 kts

Heck, the tanking role, alone, pretty much justifies this.  Right now, we’re using combat aircraft, Hornets, to act as tankers.  Every Hornet that gets used as a tanker is one less combat aircraft from an already shrunken pool of combat aircraft.  It’s not like there’s no room on the carrier.  The airwings have shrunk to the point that they barely occupy half the capacity of the carrier.

This is exactly the type of procurement that the Navy refuses to consider.  Here’s an aircraft that meets a variety of needs, is a proven design with all the bugs worked out, needs little engineering work, and would cost a fraction of a new design but the Navy won’t consider it because it isn’t a shiny, new toy with all the latest and greatest bells and whistles.  The fact that it can perform all the required missions means nothing to the Navy.  They only want leap-ahead technology. 

C’mon, Greenert.  Stop preaching and start practicing.