Burke Destroyer Adrift

By now I’m sure you’ve heard that the USS Benfold, a Burke class destroyer, was left adrift, without any power, for four days.  Worse, the crew was unable to repair the ship in that time and had to be towed to port where repairs required an additional ten days or so.
 

Benfold lost power on July 24. It was towed to Subic Bay on July 28. Power was restored two days later with all repairs completed by Aug. 7 …[1]

Ships break down all the time and engineering casualties are far from uncommon.  That a breakdown occurred does not bother me as there has been no trend of Burke class engineering casualties that I’m aware of.  So … stuff breaks.  It happens.  No big deal.  However, there are a few disturbing aspects to this incident.
 
Bear in mind that we have no details about what happened.
 
Repair – It is disturbing that the crew was unable to restore even partial power during four days.  A ship that can’t repair itself, at least to a “limp along” capability, is a poorly designed ship.  Was the crew lacking machine shops?  No qualified technicians?  No parts on hand?  Lack of knowledge about their own ship?
 
We know that the Navy has drastically de-emphasized onboard maintenance and has all but eliminated onboard maintenance and machine shops.  This is a disturbing trend for warships that can expect to find themselves damaged at sea and out of reach of immediate assistance.  It is vital that ships be able to repair themselves at least enough to escape the area.  Ships did this routinely in WWII.  We’ve all but lost this capability today.
 
Generators – The Burke class has multiple generators of various types, including emergency generators, physically remote from each other.  Total power failure should be impossible.  Even an explosion should not be able to take out every generator.  I can’t even imagine what kind of failure can result in total power loss especially since there have been no reports of explosions, fire, or any other destructive calamity.
 
We’ll have to wait to find out the details (my guess is that the Navy will classify the news as seems to be their habit now) but this has to be a screaming cry to the Navy’s ship designers to modify the design and damage control procedures to prevent this from ever happening again.  Even if the fuel supply were suddenly contaminated to the point of unusability, I would assume that a Burke has multiple, isolated fuel tanks.  Maybe not?  Again, we’ll have to wait and see.
 
Repair Time – It is also disturbing that it required ten days to repair even after being towed back to port.  Again, with no calamitous event, what go have happened that would require ten days of repairs?  Was the time period due to the complexity of the repair or, alternatively, a lack of repair capability in port (Subic Bay)?

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[1]USNI News website, “USS Benfold Leaves Japan After Returning from Power Failure Repairs”, Heather Mongilio, 17-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/17/uss-benfold-leaves-japan-after-returning-from-power-failure-repairs

Destroyer Modernization

ComNavOps loves to report good news out of the Navy but seldom has the opportunity.  Here is a possible positive development regarding modernization of Burke Flt IIA destroyers.
 
A handful of ships have been designated for modernization under the Navy’s Destroyer Modernization 2.0 program.  Upgrades involve installation of :
 

• SEWIP Block III SLQ-32(V)7
• SPY-6 V4 air and missile defense radar
• Baseline 10 Aegis Weapon System.
• 350t high efficiency super capability chiller that provides the extra cooling needed when adding both the SLQ and SPY array to the legacy hulls

 
The initial set of destroyers chosen for modernization are:
 

• USS Pinckney (DDG-91)
• USS James E. Williams (DDG-95)
• USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93)
• USS Halsey (DDG-97)

 
These ships will receive upgrades incrementally rather than in a single availability.  The intent is for these ships to act as lessons learned prior to implementing fleet wide upgrades beginning in 2029.
 

In the first modernization period, destroyers will receive the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP Block III. According to Moore, these vessels will serve in the fleet “for some time” before returning for a second depot modernization period to receive a modified AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar.[1]

The Navy has also announced that USS Sterett (DDG-104) will be the first ship to receive the entire upgrade set in a single availability sometime in the next five years.
 
The Navy’s explanation for the modernization effort is,
 

“The bottom line here, the real takeaway that I want you to take here, is that we are bridging the gap between our legacy destroyers and the Flight III by delivering decisive combat power to the Flight IIA DDGs,” said Moore [DDG 2.0 modernization program manager Capt. Tim Moore].
 
The $17 billion modernization program aims to bring the fleet’s Flight IIA destroyers up to “Flight III-like capabilities” … [1]

Somewhat puzzlingly, the Navy has also identified some ships to receive only fragmentary upgrades.
 

… the Navy has also identified USS Kidd (DDG-100) to be the first of a “handful of ships” to receive only a SEWIP Block III upgrade and no SPY-6 back fit.[1]

Why the Navy wouldn’t fully upgrade these ships is unknown.  It is also unknown whether they would be included in the eventual fleet wide upgrade effort.
 
It is good that ships are being modernized rather than retired early, as the Navy is so often prone to do.  The question, now, is whether the Navy will follow through on this plan.  One of the concerns is the extended time period for this modernization.  Given that the main effort will not begin until 2029, will it still be a modernization?  In other words, will current equipment still constitute a modernization four-plus years from now?  One can easily envision the Navy, some four to ten years from now, telling Congress that the modernization is no longer adequate and the ships are too worn out to be financially worth upgrading and, therefore, they want new ships, instead.  Why do I think this?  Because that’s exactly what they’ve done in the past, repeatedly.
 
Despite the obvious dangers and doubts, I’ll view this as good news until the Navy proves otherwise.  Now, if they’d just drop the idiotic unmanned vessel nonsense and focus on firepower, I’d have some real positive news to write about!
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Navy Identifies First Destroyer to Receive Full Set of DDG MOD 2.0 Upgrades”, Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, 16-Jan-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/01/16/navy-identifies-first-destroyer-to-receive-full-set-of-ddg-mod-2-0-upgrades

Burke, Zumwalt, and Deck Space

Let me ask you a question  …  Where do you put weapons on a ship?  It’s not a trick question.  The answer is simple and obvious:  you put them on some open area of the deck.  Guns, VLS, RAM/SeaRAM, triple torpedo tube launchers, Mk141 (Harpoon) rack launchers, Naval Strike Missile rack launchers  …  whatever.  They’re all mounted on decks.
 
The concept also applies to most sensors, decoy launchers, electronic warfare emitters, communications antennae, etc.  In some cases the deck space takes the form of a sponson or platform jutting off the side of the superstructure but we realize that the sponson/platform is simply a small section of horizontal deck welded to the side of the superstructure.
 
Here’s another blindingly obvious question (though a seeming mystery to the Navy!):  we want WARships to have as many weapons (and sensors and …) as possible, right?  Therefore, since weapons require deck space to mount and we want as many weapons as possible, it logically follows that we want as much open, available deck space as possible, right? 
 
A good WARship design should maximize deck space in order to maximize its installed firepower and to allow for future weapon additions such as inevitably happens during war when weapons that should have been installed from the start are frantically retrofitted.  Those magnificent Burkes with their single CIWS are going to quickly become loaded with additional CIWS/SeaRAM when war comes.  After all, you don’t want to protect a $2B ship with a single CIWS with a limited field of fire that only covers half the ship, right?  Where are those extra CIWS/SeaRAM going to be mounted?  Any open deck space, of course!
 
Further, the best deck space is the lower, main deck because it minimizes top-heaviness and stability issues.
 
So, a good WARship design should maximize deck space and, in particular, lower/main deck space.
 
We’ve covered this in a previous post where we noted that ship superstructures have grown enormously since WWII and the ‘cost’ has been usable deck space for weapon mounts (see, “ShipSuperstructures”).
 
 
So, having established that a good WARship design emphasizes and maximizes open deck space, let’s take a look at two specific examples:  the Burke and the Zumwalt classes.  How much deck space do they have?
 
 
Burke
 
Displacement = 9,700 tons
Nominal dimensions = 509 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 509 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Burke = 30,540 sq.ft. of deck space
 
The flight deck which is around 92 ft x 60 ft = 5,520 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 25,020 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
Zumwalt
 
Displacement = 15,907 tons
Nominal dimensions = 610 ft x 80 ft
 
The main deck section extends 325 ft from the stern to the forward edge of superstructure where the deck begins to sharply angle in towards the bow.  Allowing for the tumblehome of the hull which narrows the available deck space, we have around 70 ft of width on the deck.  Thus the main deck section is approximately 325 ft x 70 ft = 22,750 sq.ft.
 
The forward, angled section is a triangular shape about 255 ft to the bow and 70 ft wide at the base of the triangular shape.  Using the formula for the area of a triangle (1/2 x base x length) = 8,025 sq.ft.
 
Note that the extreme narrowing of the Zumwalt’s bow makes a significant portion of that area useless for weapon installations.  I would estimate that 10% is too narrow to be useful, making the effective forward deck area closer to 7,945 sq.ft.
 
Thus the nominal, usable total deck area = 22,750 sq.ft. + 7,945 sq.ft. = 30,695 sq.ft.
 
The flight deck which is around 141 ft x 70 ft = 9,870 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 20,825 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
 
 
Note that these calculations are for the apparent footprint of the deck area.  In reality, some portion of the apparent deck footprint consists of the slanted sides of the superstructures so all the deck area calculations are overstated by, perhaps, 5%-10%.  However, not wanting to be bothered with that exact of a determination, we’ll ignore the slanted sides reduction on the deck area and assume that it’s a wash across both ships.
 
 
We see, then, that the Zumwalt’s displacement is 64% (1.6 times larger) greater than the Burke while the deck space is 17% less.
 
 
We built a cruiser size Zumwalt 64% larger than a Burke with 17% less space for mounting weapons.
 
 
When war comes and we start looking to install additional weapons, we’re going to find that the Zumwalt was a poor design that could not readily accept additional weapons … such as close in weapons of which the ship currently has none.
 
 
Just for fun, let’s take a look at a WWII ship with a displacement similar to the Burke:  the Northampton class cruiser at 9,200 tons versus the Burke at 9,700 tons.  The Northampton is actually 500 tons lighter but that’s close enough. 
 
Northampton
 
Displacement = 9,200 tons
Nominal dimensions = 600 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 600 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Northampton = 36,000 sq.ft. of deck space
 
We see, then, that the Northampton, while slightly lighter, has 10,980 sq.ft. more deck space for weapons! 
 
 
 
 
We’ve lost our way in WARship design.
 
 
 
Caveat:  All of this ignores weight margins and stability.  Available deck space is useless if the ship can’t support the added weight and remain stable.  Of course, when war comes, we’ll strip out tons of crew comforts thus freeing up weight and stability for weapons.

A Second Life for Retiring Burkes?

The Burke class will begin retiring soon.  The early Burkes were commissioned beginning in 1991 and are now approaching 30+ years of service with a scheduled 35 year service life.  The Navy does not maintain a reserve fleet so retiring Burkes will likely be scrapped or sold to foreign countries.  With the ever-shrinking size of the fleet, one can’t help but wonder whether we could bestow a second life on the Burkes when they reach the end of their front line service.
 
Let’s consider alternative, second life uses for the early Flt I and II Burkes (lacking hangars) which will be the first to be retired.
 
As a point of interest, we did a similar post for the LCS in which we considered alternate uses for the vessel (see, “LCS Alternative Uses”).
 
Before we go any further, we need to address, and dispense with, the belief that the ships will have reached the end of their life and that no further service is even possible due to physical constraints.
 
Despite the Navy’s dismissive and foolish attitude towards older ships, any ship, even one as poorly maintained as a Navy ship, can have its service life substantially (indefinitely) extended.  Consider a few examples of extended ship service lives that we’ve seen.
 

• WWII LSTs are still in service around the world. 
  
• The Perry class frigates, which the Navy claimed could not be upgraded, have been upgraded and still serve in various foreign navies.
• The WWII cruiser USS Phoenix, launched in 1938, served as the Argentine Belgrano until sunk in 1982.

 
We can renovate anything, if we wish.
 
Consider the example of the B-52 bomber which has been in active service since the 1950’s, some 70 years or so.  We can re-wing, re-instrument, re-fuselage, re-anything.  Similarly, we can replace a ship’s storage tanks, replace internal wiring and piping, replace corroded sections of hull plating, replace engines, upgrade computers, install new weapons and sensors, and so on and it’s still cheaper than building a brand new ship.
 
One valid concern regarding new construction is that we are currently limited not only by new construction budget but also by new construction shipyard capacity.  Congress, the Navy, and the submarine industry, for example, all want to increase submarine production by one additional submarine per year but the shipyard capacity simply doesn’t exist.  Upgrades and renovations suffer from this same constraint but to a lesser extent in that renovation/conversion work can be performed by more facilities than are available for new construction.  Thus, through renovation we can gain ‘new’ ships without having to tie up new construction facilities. 
 
The steady, reliable, additional work demand of constant Burke conversions would also encourage industry to expand their facilities to support substantial additional work.  Thus, we not only gain useful ships for a bargain price, we grow our shipbuilding industry.  Win, win!
 
Of course, there’s always the challenge of developing a sufficient skilled labor pool but we’ve already addressed how to accomplish that.
 
So, now that we understand and recognize that conversions are possible and that there is no actual physical service life limit, what specific alternate Burke uses could we imagine?  Here are a few possibilities:
 
 
ASW Helicopter Destroyer – The aft VLS could be eliminated and converted to a second flight deck with dual hangars each side of the stack housing.  With the existing, main level flight deck this would provide two flight decks and two hangars giving the ship the ability to operate 4-6 SH-60 type helos.  The forward 32-cell VLS could be used for a combination of AAW defense and anti-submarine VL-ASROC (we ought to develop a substantially longer range VL-ASROC!).  Adding Russian-style RBU or Hedgehog type close-in anti-submarine weapons would further enhance the ASW capability.

Concept Drawing of a Burke ASW Helo Destroyer - 
Note the second, raised flight deck in place of the VLS
 and room for two hangars either side of the stack

UAV Carrier – The ship already has a flight deck.  Addition of a half dozen or so small catapults and converting the VLS internal volume to UAV storage/hangar space would allow the operation of substantial numbers of small (Scan Eagle size) UAVs.  Retaining the forward VLS would allow the ship to contribute to AAW efforts and grant the ship a very credible self-defense capability.
 
Fire Support – The aft 40% or so of the Burke’s length is purely dedicated to the flight deck and one VLS cluster.  Eliminating the flight deck and VLS would allow up to 3-4 additional 5” guns to be installed.  Before anyone protests, recall that we mounted five 5” guns on a 376 ft Fletcher destroyer and three aft guns were sited within an 85 ft span!  The Burke is 505 ft long and the aft 40% represents 202 ft. of usable space.
 
Electronic Warfare – Remove the aviation components and, possibly, the aft VLS cluster, and install multiple, massive, high power EW emitters, signal collection sensors, and task force EW command and control facilities and produce an EW equivalent to the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) which coordinates task force fire control.  The Burke could be the task force EW control vessel and main EW source with emitters sized to provide truly powerful active electronic defense.  One would hope this would also make for a very effective anti-drone capability.
 
Fast Minelayer – A Burke could be converted to use the entire aft half of the ship to store and lay mines.  With its forward gun and VLS intact, it would be well equipped to defend itself while minelaying.
 
Scout – Strip a Burke of every protruding piece of equipment to maximize stealth and then add every piece of passive signal intelligence collecting equipment we have to make a hard to detect, highly effective, independent, scout ship.  Once again, retaining the forward VLS would allow for effective self-defense.
 
 
Summary
 
Debating every proposed alternative is not the point of this post.  Some might not be effective but I’ve got to believe that most or all could be.  The larger point is that the Navy will not lay these ships up in reserve.  Instead, they’ll SINKEX or sell them and get no further use out of them.  In this time of declining fleet numbers and a looming war with China, it would be foolish and irresponsible not to get more life out of every ship.
 
My favorites are the ASW Helo Destroyer and the EW version.  It is noteworthy that most of the options could easily retain their forward gun and VLS cluster which makes the ships quite capable of self-defense and able to contribute to fleet area defense, as well.
 
For those who are going to attempt to argue that the conversion costs would be too high, ask yourself what the cost of a brand new class of ship for each of the alternatives would be?  We’re talking billions of dollars!  Even the hideously expensive Australian Perry upgrade was still cheap compared to new construction.  Conversions are a bargain! 
 
Let’s not throw usable Burkes away.

Luck is Not a Strategy

It is being reported that a US Navy ship, the USS Gravely, a Burke class destroyer, was forced to use its CIWS to down a sea-skimming anti-ship missile.  If this continues, there is only one possible outcome.  No defense is perfect and the Houthis only need to win once whereas the Navy has to be 100% perfect. 
 
This is an unsustainable, unwinnable situation.  We’ve got to either leave the area before we lose a ship or we have to engage with total force.  There is no middle ground.  The administration is hanging the Navy out to dry.

It is also disturbing that a (apparently single) missile could get that close.  Something failed.

USS Fitzgerald Returns

USS Fitzgerald, repaired after the Jun 2017 collision, recently completed its first deployment since the incident.  Fitzgerald completed three years, almost to the day, of repairs in Jun 2020.  Contrast this to the USS Yorktown that had extensive battle damage repaired in three days, as we just discussed.  Admittedly, this is peacetime and the urgency is not there but three years to repair a damaged ship does not bode well for war.

Constellation vs. Burke

We’ve compared the Constellation to the Perry class (see, “FFG(X) Vs. Perry”) and the Buckley Class (see, “Buckley Vs. Constellation”) so let’s now compare the Constellation to the Burke.  The Constellation is a frigate so it ought to be around half the size, displacement, and armament of the Burke, right?  Let’s see.  Here’s a brief comparison of size and armament.

  

 

	Burke (Flt IIA)	Constellation		Constellation vs. Burke
Length, ft	509	496		97%
Beam, ft	66	65		98%
Displacement, tons	9500	7400		78%
VLS Cells	96	32		33%

 

 

So, compared to the Burke, we’re building a frigate that’s the same length, same beam, and 80% of the displacement to give us a ship with … 33% of the VLS armament. 

 

All right, let’s consider cost.  We have only a very sketchy idea of what a Burke costs because of the various accounting games the Navy plays but let’s use some recent quoted figures for the Flt IIa over the last several years and call it $1.8B.  We have even less idea what the Constellation will cost but the initial costs are well north of $1B and we know ship costs only move in one direction so let’s say $1.4B.  That puts the Constellation cost at 78% of the Burke which is in line with the fact that the ship is going to be same size as a Burke but just a bit lighter.

 

So, same size ship, 78% of the cost, and … … … … … … 33% of the armament.

 

Is that really value for the dollar?

 

Sitting around the design table at the first meeting, who raised their hand and said, “Hey, this is a great idea” ?

Burke Close In Defense

Here’s a simple awareness post.  Are you aware that our main (and only!) surface combatant has almost no close in self-defense weapon fit?  It consists of a single aft mounted CIWS and … nothing else.

 

As an example, here is a photo, dated 13-Oct-2009, of the USS McCampbell (DDG-85) showing the single aft mounted CIWS and … nothing else.

USS McCampbell - Note the single CIWS aft.

 Again, here is a Jul 2016 photo showing the Spruance and Momsen with no forward CIWS.

Spruance and Momsen without forward CIWS

Lest you think there was some temporary shortage of CIWS and that the ships have since been equipped, here is a photo of USS Nitze (DDG-94) dated 12-Oct-2020 and it shows the same single CIWS configuration.

USS Nitze, DDG-94

Although exact information is hard to come by it appears that DDG-51 to DDG-84 have two CIWS and DDG-85 on have only a single CIWS.  None have RAM or SeaRAM.

Alternatively, SeaRAM appears to have been installed on four Burkes (DDG-64, DDG-71, DDG-75, DDG-78) in place of their CIWS. 

 

Here is a Feb 2021 photo of USS Carney (DDG-64) showing a SeaRAM in place of the aft CIWS mount.

USS Carney with aft SeaRAM in place of CIWS

I don’t know whether the Navy’s experiment with SeaRAM will be continued and expanded or not.  New construction ships do not appear to show any SeaRAM so I’m assuming this is a dead end trend but we’ll see.

So, what’s the problem with only a single close in weapon system?  As we’ve previously demonstrated, naval anti-air engagements are likely to start at the horizon rather than hundreds of miles out as the Navy seems to believe (see, “Detection and Engagement Range”).  That means there will only be time for a few defensive missile launches which, in turn, means that close in weapon systems will assume vital importance.  Given the likelihood of saturation attacks and the number of missile likely to get through the very brief medium range (horizon) ESSM engagement zone, large numbers of close in weapons will be needed.  A single CIWS is going to be quickly overwhelmed.

 

The more recent CIWS versions have a ready magazine of 1550 rounds and a firing rate of 4500 rds/min.  That means the CIWS has a total firing time of 20 seconds before the ammo drum is depleted.  Even if one optimistically assumes, say, 5 seconds per engagement, that’s only 4 engagements before the CIWS is rendered inoperative due to emptying the ammo drum.  Yes, the drum can be replaced but that is a manual operation and time consuming.  Any attack will be over long before reload occurs.  The arithmetic makes it painfully obvious that a ship needs several CIWS to have any chance of survival.

 

Another problem is CIWS coverage area.  As you can see, the aft CIWS covers only the aft 180 deg or so sector.  Our main surface ship doesn’t even have full 360 deg close in defensive coverage!  If a missile approaches from a forward aspect, Burkes have no close in defense whatsoever!  Our main surface warship has no close in defensive coverage for half its aspect??!

 

I wonder if the lack of CIWS installations is the result of the Navy having bet – and lost! – that fully functional AAW lasers would be available by now and that the Navy could, therefore, save money by not installing CIWS?  That’s pure speculation on my part but it certainly fits nicely with the way the Navy thinks, doesn’t it?

 

 

In any case, we need to immediately begin adding CIWS and/or SeaRAM mounts to our Burke class destroyers.  We might also begin considering new forms of close in AAW defense (see, “A New AAW”).

 

USS Wayne E. Meyer Completes Maintenance

Sometimes it’s good to just be reminded of the routine activities of the fleet.  For example, the Burke class destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer, DDG-108, just completed a Dry Docking Selected Restricted Availability at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF).(1)  This is an extensive maintenance period during which the ship’s hull and systems are maintained and modernized.  The maintenance period began 24-Mar-2020 and the dry docking portion was completed on 5-Nov-2020.

 

USS Wayne E. Meyer was commissioned in 2009 so this maintenance period is occurring at around the ten year mark of the ship’s life.

 

I can’t find a detailed description of the work list but the following is a brief description of the similar maintenance period for Wayne E. Meyer’s sister ship, the O’Kane, DDG-77, just to give you a feel for the scope of the work.

 

… major alterations include a bow strengthening modification, advanced galley modifications to enhance meal prep times and serving capacity, two berthing complex renovations, mast preservation, antenna overhaul, and shafts/rudders/propeller reconditioning.  …

 

The projected scope of work is in excess of 80,000 man-days. The predicted manpower requirements are more than 500 people per day. (4)

 

Vigor Marine acted as the prime contractor, apparently a first for PHNSY & IMF.  Following is the contract award announcement which puts the price of the maintenance at around $90M.

 

Vigor Marine LCC, Portland, Oregon, is awarded an $89,336,289 firm-fixed-price contract for the execution of the USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) fiscal 2020 dry-docking selected restricted availability (DSRA).  This availability will include a combination of maintenance, modernization and repair of the USS Wayne E. Meyer.  This is a Chief of Naval Operations scheduled DSRA.  The purpose is to maintain, modernize and repair the USS Wayne E. Meyer.  Vigor Marine LLC will provide the resources capable of completing, coordinating and integrating multiple areas of ship maintenance, repair and modernization for the USS Wayne E. Meyer.  This contract includes options, which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $97,954,544.  Work will be performed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and is expected to be completed by November 2020.  Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) funding in the amount of $89,336,289 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  This requirement was competitively solicited using full and open competition via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with one offer received.  The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-20-C-4464).(2)

 

Vigor Industrial, of which Vigor Marine is a subsidiary, is based in Portland, Oregon and builds tugs, ferries, and barges as well as performing ship maintenance and repair.  According to Wikipedia, Vigor has seven facilities with ten drydocks, more than 17,000 feet of pier space, and over 2,000 employees.(3)  The company traces back to Todd Pacific Shipyards and Kaiser Shipyard, among others.

 

Interestingly,

 

Vigor announced in late 2017 that it had won a $1 billion contract to produce U.S. Army landing craft, the largest contract in its history. The company selected Vancouver, Washington as the production site for the vessels.(3)

 

We’ve often discussed the possibility and desirability of encouraging the growth of smaller shipyards to eventually handle larger naval construction and this might be an example of such a yard.

 

USS Wayne E. Meyer Departing Dry Dock In Pearl Harbor

This availability is an example of the kind of regular maintenance that the Navy so desperately needs and yet is routinely deferring for various [poor and unwise] reasons.  This is good, if routine and unremarkable, news.  My only concern is whether all the required work is being performed.  I’m hearing too many stories of ships coming out of maintenance periods with work left undone.  For example, the Port Royal, which ran aground off Hawaii a few years ago, had just come out of a maintenance period and yet had several broken systems including GPS and navigation.  If all the required work is being completed, this is good news.  If not, this is just a partial band-aid.  

 

 

 

  

 

 

________________________________________

 

(1)https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/110956

 

(2)https://www.hstoday.us/federal-pages/department-of-defense-contracts-for-dec-17-2019-2/

 

(3)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigor_Industrial

 

(4)https://www.navaltoday.com/2015/05/14/uss-okane-starts-biggest-drydocking-period-in-phnsy-history/

Navy Rescinds Ship Service Life Extensions

As we previously noted and discussed, in July of 2018 the Navy arbitrarily extended the design service life of most ship classes by ten years or so (see, “Ship Service Life Extensions”).  The Burke class was extended from 35-40 years (an utterly unrealistic target to begin with, given the Navy’s failure to provide proper maintenance and tendency to early retire ships) to 45-50 years!  I chuckle as I type this but such is the nature of the Navy’s delusions.

Of course, we roundly mocked this flight of pure fantasy.  Given the Navy’s repeated disregard for maintenance and near 100% record of early retirements, arbitrarily extending service lives with no concomitant plan to improve and fund maintenance was obviously just a fictitious ploy to make some plan or admiral look good on paper.  We knew it would never actually happen.

Reality has now reared its head and the Navy is rescinding the service life extensions as a cost savings measure.(1)  Everyone outside the Navy knew it wasn’t going to happen and now the Navy has officially admitted it.  This is why you come to this blog.  You were informed in no uncertain terms two years ago that the Navy’s service life extension plan was pure fantasy and would never happen.  This is just simple confirmation.  If the Navy would just read this blog they could save themselves a lot of effort and embarrassment.  But, I digress …

So, what does this do to the Navy’s plan to grow to a 355 ship fleet?  Do I really need to lay it out for you?

I’ll simply note that the Navy is furiously retiring ships early (Aegis cruisers, the first four LCS, Los Angeles subs, and so on) while claiming to want to build the fleet.  Extending the service lives of Burke destroyers could have aided in that endeavor if their maintenance was properly funded.  Instead, as they always do, the Navy has opted for new hulls over maintained hulls – anything for a new hull even if it’s a useless LCS, an experimental unmanned vessel, a non-functional Ford, or a non-functional Zumwalt.

Do you recall how vital the Burke modernization effort supposedly was?  This will remind you,

The decision to ax the service life extensions for the Arleigh Burke class comes after years of assurances from Navy leaders that the destroyers would be modernized with an eye to growing the fleet over the coming decades. (1)

In its FY20 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Navy said extending the lives of the Arleigh Burkes was an imperative to growing the fleet to a battle force of 355 ships. Instead, the cancellation of the service life extensions means that between 2026 and 2034, the Navy is slated to lose 27 destroyers from its battle force. (1)

The Navy changes its mind more frequently than a girl with multiple prom proposals. 

In testimony that year, Merz [then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems Vice Adm. Bill Merz] said ballistic missile defense [BMD] was the biggest requirement driving the retention of the DDGs to 45 years. (1)

I guess BMD wasn’t really that important, after all?

So, the Navy is set to lose 27 Burkes between 2026-2034.  And we’re going to replace them with … small and medium displacement unmanned surface vessels????  China doesn’t have to build a bigger, stronger navy than us – they just have to wait while we dismantle our navy for them!

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(1)Defense News website, “Destroyers Left Behind”, David B. Larter, 7-Mar-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/07/destroyers-left-behind-us-navy-cancels-plans-to-extend-service-lives-of-its-workhorse-ddgs/

Burkes - The Anchor Around The Navy's Neck

My favorite baseball team went out and traded for a star and gave him a record setting, long term contract.  Now, just a few years later, he’s constantly hurt and contributes little.  Unfortunately, his enormous contract makes him untradeable and we’re saddled with him for another ten years.  In the meantime, we lack the budget to pay for other good players, have had to let promising players go because we couldn’t afford to give them new contracts, and he’s blocking the development and rise of young players in the minor leagues at his position.  Despite having once been a star, he and his contract are an anchor around the team’s neck.

Similarly, the Burke class destroyers are an anchor around the Navy’s neck.  Huh?!  You can’t be serious.  The Burkes are the most (only?) successful surface ship design we have.  Why, the Burke is the star of the Navy team (oh, oh … I don’t like where this is heading!).  How can they be anything but a benefit?

Well, let’s look at the situation.

When the Navy wanted to replace the Ticonderogas, did they look to design a new, optimized cruiser to take full advantage of the desired AMDR radar?  No, they stuck with the Burke because they were afraid of a new design after the recent string of disastrous new designs.  So, we’re now saddled with a Ticonderoga replacement, the Burke Flt III, with a half-AMDR instead of what we really want.

When the Navy wanted to build a better LCS (the new frigate program) did they look to design a new, dedicated ASW vessel, which is what they really needed?  No, they opted for a mini-Burke because it was what they were comfortable with.  The ‘new’ frigate is actually a manifestation of the illusion of the Burke’s ‘safety’ by insisting that the ‘new’ design be an existing design which, by definition, makes it an old design.

When combat comes and the Navy wants to conduct ASW, does anyone really believe that the Navy will risk $2B+ Burkes playing tag with submarines?  Of course not!  That means that for practical purposes we have no ASW capability!  Our star ship is now quite limited in realistic capability by its price.  On a related note, does it make sense to risk the proposed new frigates which will cost around $1.5B (I’m laughing at the Navy’s cost estimate of $800M)?  Of course not, again!  Our desire for mini-Burkes is preventing us from building the ASW corvette we really need and the Burkes are too expensive to risk doing the ASW job which is, supposedly, one of their core capabilities.

USS Burke

Let’s be clear.  The Burkes, at one time, served a very valuable role as the world’s most advanced AAW system.  Now, however, the Burke is at the low end of ship stealth and Aegis and Aegis-clones are everywhere and it’s even debatable whether Aegis is still the world’s premier AAW system.  There’s a plethora of radar manufacturers who claim their radars are superior and for a fraction of the cost.  So, what do the Burkes represent now?  Well, they’re a good AAW system but that’s about as far as we can go with our praise.  Even the Navy recognizes the shortcomings of Aegis and are replacing it with AMDR which they claim is vastly superior.  The Navy is saddled with a vast fleet of decent AAW Burkes and no hope to break out of the mold and produce something better. 

Because they represent something ‘safe’, albeit no longer state of the art, the Burkes are stifling innovation and new designs by the Navy.  Unwilling to risk another Zumwalt or LCS, the safety of the Burke now drags the Navy down and prevents the adoption of new designs.

The Burkes are an anchor on the Navy’s development.

Up Close And Personal

We’ve discussed and noted many times that the Navy/Marine doctrine of conducting amphibious assaults from 25-50 miles off the beach is not feasible and is completely at odds with the need for naval fire support given that the Navy’s only gun is the 5” which has an effective range of 9-15 miles, depending on version.

We need to recognize that  the 5” gun’s limited range means that a fire support ship would have to be within a mile of shore to have any useful range beyond the immediate beach area.  That’s close!  That puts the ship within range of enemy artillery, rockets, and mortars as well as anti-ship missiles.

So, how will the Navy provide fire support?  The short and bitter answer is they can’t.  Even if the Navy wanted to bring its 5” guns (meaning Burkes) into range, they’d be risking high-tech, multi-billion dollar, capital, AAW ships to conduct low tech fire support – not a reasonable risk.  We’ve discussed the need for dedicated fire support ships of both larger caliber (8” – 16”) and small (5”).  Assuming the Navy won’t build such a ship, is there anything they can do to modify a Burke to allow it to operate near shore and give it a better chance of survival and success?

As it happens, there are a couple of simple modifications that would enhance the Burke’s chances.

C-RAM – The Army has adapted the naval Phalanx CIWS to the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) function, apparently successfully.  The addition of three or four C-RAM units to a Burke would enhance its near shore survivability.  Given that the CIWS is a self-contained unit, requiring only ship’s utility hookups, installation of multiple units should be reasonably easy.  This would provide the ship with a degree of protection from artillery, rockets, and mortars.

Counterbattery – Aegis is, theoretically, capable of counterbattery sensing and computing with appropriate software modifications.  This would provide the Burkes with the ability to conduct counterbattery fire against both artillery, rockets, mortars, and anti-ship missiles.

The major near-shore threats to a ship are artillery and small anti-ship missiles and the modifications noted above would go a long way towards providing enhanced protection from both artillery and anti-ship missiles.  Thus, it would be possible to operate Burkes near shore with an enhanced chance of surviving.

Burke DDG - $2B and 1 Gun, Not Exactly Fire Support

Now, this doesn’t mean that this is a good idea.  Risking multi-billion dollar ships that constitute our main AAW defense is still a bad idea but, since the Navy adamantly refuses to build a dedicated, simple, cheap fire support ship, this at least offers a viable, if still unwise, option.

Failing this approach, any Marine assault will be operating without any fire support whatsoever which is one of many reasons why I say that our amphibious assault doctrine is non-executable and pure fantasy.

Chinese Type 055 Update

China’s Type 055 destroyer (cruiser, actually) is intended to be a functional equivalent to the US Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser.  The 055 just made its international debut at a Chinese naval parade. (1)

From China Defense Blog, a second Type 055 was launched in April 2018 and a third and fourth were launched in July 2018. (1)  Two others are known to be under construction.  That’s five Aegis-equivalent ships in a very short period while China continues to build other destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, as well.

What is the US building?  More outdated Burkes.  There are seven Burkes scheduled for commissioning over the next five years.  That’s an average of just more than one per year.  China is building surface warships at two or three times the rate we are.

Let’s take a look at the profile view of the Type 055.

Type 055 Class (Credit Ref 2)

The profile emphasizes not only the stealth shaping of the ship but also a low and greatly reduced superstructure – something ComNavOps heartily approves of in ship design.  In addition to the lower radar signature, the smaller superstructure provides less of a target and makes for a smaller visual signature.  Recall how our Gato fleet submarines in WWII underwent drastic sail reductions to reduce their visual signatures? 

Now, compare the 055 profile to a Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser profile.

Ticonderoga Class

Note the gigantic, blocky superstructure.  There’s nothing stealthy about that!  To be fair, the Type 055 is a brand new design and the Ticonderoga design dates back to the late 1970’s, long before stealth was a design consideration.  The Ticonderoga superstructure also makes for a very unstable, top heavy ship.

How about we do a quick visual comparison of the 055 to our newest surface warship, the Burke class?

Burke Class

We see that the Burke has some degree of stealth shaping but it pales in comparison to the Type 055.  Note the Burke’s large superstructure and great deal of exposed equipment, all of which detracts from the ship’s stealth.  Again, the Burke design dates back to the early 1980’s when stealth was in its infancy, so this is somewhat understandable.  However, that begs the question, why are we still building them?

There’s nothing terribly profound about this post – just a quick update and scan of the Type 055.

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(1)China Defense Blog, “China debuts most powerful destroyer in celebrations”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/china-debuts-most-powerful-destroyer-in.html

(2)China Defense Blog, “DDG 101”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/ddg-101.html

Type 055 Cruiser vs. Burke

Let’s take a brief look at the new Chinese Type 055 cruiser (I can’t bring myself to call it a destroyer) and how it compares to the Burke.

As a reminder, the Navy is retiring the Ticonderoga class and is not directly replacing it.  Navy descriptions of the replacement suggest a wide range of possibilities with most sounding like a collection of buzzwords rather than an actual ship design concept.  The Navy has stated that the replacement cruiser may not be a cruiser at all but, rather, a “family of ships” or a “systems of systems”.

Currently, the Ticonderogas are being replaced by more Burkes, specifically, the Flt III which the Navy has acknowledged is too small to support the required AMDR radar and will, thus, be fitted with a smaller, less capable radar.

In contrast, the Chinese are building a true cruiser, the Type 055, with four already launched and at least two more underconstruction.  Sources suggest at least 8 ships will be built with more being possible. 

Here are some basic comparative specs for the Type 055 and the Burke, per Wikipedia.

                        Burke  Type 055

Length, ft                509       590

Displacement, tons      9,100    13,000
Range, nm               4,400     5,000
Gun                     1x 5”   1x 5.1”
VLS, cells                 96       112

The specs show that the Type 055 is significantly larger although the radar and weapons are reasonably similar in number and capability. 

So, what else can we infer about the Type 055 as compared to the Burke?

Stealth.  One obvious difference is the shape of the ship with the Type 055 being decidedly stealthier than the older Burke, at least by visual observation.  Of course, it’s anyone’s guess what the true degree of stealth of the two ships is but the Type 055 certainly looks stealthier!  Assuming that’s true, this gives the Type 055 an advantage in terms of detection range.  Aircraft will have to approach closer to “see” it and it can approach its targets much closer without being seen.  The Burke, being an early stealth design, and cluttered with all manner of topside gear, is at a distinct disadvantage.  I would go so far as to say that the Burke is no longer a front line warship design as regards stealth and its impact on the ship’s combat capabilities.

Type 055 Cruiser

Photo from China Defense Blog

Power.  Another likely difference is that the Chinese are actively and aggressively pursuing directed energy weapons (lasers) and it would be almost inconceivable that a high degree of excess electrical energy generation hasn’t been built into the design.  The Chinese have seen that electrical power limitations are one of the US Navy’s challenges with their current fleet and with the Burke Flt IIIs and it’s unlikely that they haven’t incorporated that lesson into the Type 055 design. 

Upgradability.  The Type 055 design has much greater potential for future upgrades and new sensors/weapons due to its much greater size and, presumably, power, than the Burke class does.  Despite the inherent limitations and very limited growth potential of the Burke, the Navy continues to build them even at the cost of sub-optimal equipment performance.

Almost unbelievably, the Navy continues to build Burkes and are now going to build sub-optimal Flt III Burkes rather than a clean sheet design.  China has opted to build a new design cruiser.  To be fair, the Chinese had no Burke type class worth upgrading so a new design was a given.  That aside, the Type 055 appears to be larger, carries more weapon cells, and has more growth potential.  Of course, it’s an open question about the radar performance and control software.  On paper, the Type 055 is setting the standard for modern cruisers while the US Navy continues to build sub-optimal, nearly obsolete Burkes.