Decided to Stop or Forced to Stop?

The US pounded Iran and was on the verge of total destruction of Iran’s political and military power and then, inexplicably, stopped attacking in favor of pursuit of a peace agreement.
 
As we’ve often noted, you don’t negotiate with an enemy, you utterly destroy them and then impose whatever surrender terms you want. 
 
Since WWII, the US has failed to pursue ultimate victory in every conflict it’s been involved in and the results have always come back to bite us.
 
Keeping that in mind, let’s change gears.
 
ComNavOps has frequently offered estimates of weapon inventory levels by examining budget documents for the preceding years.  In very brief terms, our weapons have historically had inventories in the low to mid thousands with production rates in the low hundreds.  However, that balance has been upset by the recent heavy expenditures of weapons off Yemen, around Israel, and against Iran.  In other words, our inventories are being depleted far faster than production can replenish.
 
Now, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has done exactly what ComNavOps has done and has issued a report estimating weapon inventories prior to the Iran conflict, specific weapon expenditures during the conflict, and speculation about the amount of time required to rebuild the inventories.
 
As one example, here are the figures for Tomahawk missiles.  As reported by TWZ website, CSIS estimated a pre-war Tomahawk inventory of 3100 missiles and an expenditure of 1000+ missile, thus far.[1]
 
Think about that expenditure rate and note that was against a helpless, fourth rate enemy who was being pounded by other countries and other weapons.  Now, consider how that would change against China.  We’d be expending Tomahawks at a rate of a thousand per week!  But, I digress …
 
What about Tomahawk inventory replenishment ?  It’s not encouraging.
 

Tomahawk procurement “averaged 86 missiles in the past 10 fiscal years (FY 15–FY 26), with most orders coming from the Navy,”  CSIS noted. [1]
 
 … the recent annual production rate is less than 200 … [1]

It’s worse than that, though.  A significant chunk of production is slated for sales to foreign countries, as noted below.
 

Another factor to consider are foreign military sales, with nearly 800 due to Japan, Australia and the Netherlands.[1]

So, we have a very small production capacity which is further “eroded” by deliveries to other countries.  It’s going to take many years to recover our Tomahawk inventory levels.  How much worse will this be during a war with China?  But, again, I digress …
 
The same trends hold true, to varying degrees, for all other weapons in the US military.
 
With low inventories and dismal replenishment rates in mind and returning to the first sentence in this post, we can now legitimately ask whether the seemingly inexplicable pause on the verge of total victory was due to some [misguided] desire for a premature peace or due to having reached a state of weapons depletion that became unacceptable given the constant threat of war with China and the need to maintain a “sufficient “ stockpile of weapons.  In other words, did we choose to stop or were we forced to stop by low weapon inventories?  Did we hit the minimum “safe” inventory levels and had to stop?
 
There’s no way to know the answer but logic suggests that we stopped because we reached a point where we felt we couldn’t expend any more weapons without depleting our inventories to unacceptable levels.  If this is the case, then all the talk of the US being ready and willing to resume attacks is just public relations propaganda for the masses and Iran is in no real danger of further heavy, sustained attacks and that would certainly change the negotiation strategies on both sides.
 
What do you think?  Decided to stop or forced to stop?
 
 
Note:  This is not a post about the “rightness” of the Iran strikes, just the military aspects of those strikes.  Political comments will not be allowed.
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “Severity Of America’s Depleted Advanced Weapons Stockpiles Detailed In New Report”, Howard Altman, 28-May-2026,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/severity-of-americas-depleted-advanced-weapons-stockpiles-detailed-in-new-report

Ready! Ready? Not Ready …

It is the job of the military to have contingency plans for every conceivable scenario sitting on the shelf, ready to execute and to ensure that the force is properly trained, maintained, and equipped to execute those plans on a (figurative) moment’s notice.
 
When the Administration decided to strike Iran, it should have required nothing more than to pick a plan off the shelf and assemble the required assets.  We should have been ready and able.
 
Let’s digress for a moment.  How many aircraft carriers did we use during Desert Storm?  The answer is 6.  They were:
 

• USS Midway
• USS Roosevelt
• USS America
• USS Kennedy
• USS Saratoga
• USS Ranger

 
Compare that assemblage of power to the current Iran conflict.  How many carriers are active for this?  The answer is 2.  They are:
 

• USS Ford
• USS Lincoln

 
And Ford was at the end of a long deployment and overdue to return home.  We should also note that air wings during Desert Storm were larger than today’s air wings which makes the two carriers for Iran more like one and a half carriers!
 
An obvious question arises;  did operational requirements only need two carriers or were there only two carriers physically available?  Not knowing the detailed operational plan, we can’t say for sure but a common sense assessment sure seems to indicate that we needed more especially when we compare the needs of Desert Storm to this conflict.
 
Consider:
 
-We seem to lack sufficient air and naval coverage to keep the strait open.
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
 
 
Were we ready or were we caught unprepared? 
 
A peripheral piece of evidence is the attempted deployment of a MEU during the early Ukraine conflict.  Despite having around 30 amphibious ships, the Navy was unable to form a ARG and provide ships for the MEU.  This suggests that the Navy is nowhere near combat ready and, further, has zero surge capability.
 
One might also ask why the Japan based carrier was not moved to the Middle East?  It’s not as if anyone believes that carrier serves any legitimated purpose in Japan.
 
I can’t offer any definitive answers but the circumstantial evidence suggests that the Navy is woefully unprepared for combat.

This Is Not How You Fight A War

We have, in many posts, discussed how to conduct a war and have noted that the US, and the West, repeatedly fail to finish their wars which results in having to refight them down the road (see, “Ending War – True Victory”).  Consider the following quote from a Redstate article related to an attack by Iran against US ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) eliminated inbound threats and targeted Iranian military facilities responsible for attacking U.S. forces including missile and drone launch sites; command and control locations; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance nodes.[1]

You might be initially tempted to think this is a good, forceful response but give the statement some more thought.  It’s revealing and damning.  After being attacked, we struck various Iranian facilities as listed in the statement.  Since we apparently knew where these facilities and capabilities were, why hadn’t we already attacked them?  In war, you don’t allow the enemy the first shot.  You kill them before they can attack you.  What’s more, if you’re in a war worth fighting, your goal is total victory which means you don’t stop until the enemy forces have been 100% eliminated.  Again, why had we allowed known military facilities to remain in existence?
 
From a military perspective, we now appear to be fighting a half-measures war instead of going for total victory as we had seemed poised to do a few weeks ago.  I’m very disappointed that we’re in a war we don’t seem to want to pursue to the only worthwhile conclusion.  If we weren’t serious about it, we shouldn’t have gotten into it.
 
 
Note:  As always, we’re discussing only the military aspects, not the political.  Political comments will be deleted so don’t bother.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Iran Attacks Our Ships, and U.S. Makes the Regime Regret It”, Nick Arama, 7-May-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/05/07/us-hits-iranian-targets-n2202116

Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 

The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/

Iranian Drone Carrier

The Iranian drone carrier, Shahid Bagheri, has been attacked and set afire by US forces and is, apparently, now burned out and grounded.
 
Setting aside the fate of the vessel, the ship offers some interesting thoughts for the US Navy.
 

The Shahid Bagheri represents Iran’s most significant naval aviation platform. The 40,000-ton vessel was commissioned in February 2025 after being converted from the Perarin, a South Korean-built container ship. Iranian engineers modified the hull to accommodate a 180-meter flight deck equipped with a ski-jump ramp for drone launches.
 
According to CENTCOM, the vessel had been operating as a “mothership” in the Gulf, serving as a floating launch platform for both unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles.[1]

Regardless of the actual capabilities of the vessel, it stands as an object lesson about the ease with which a run of the mill merchant ship can be converted into a drone carrier; something the US Navy could surely use, at least as a prototype for operational experience and doctrine and tactics development.
 
Such a carrier does not need to be the typical gold-plated monstrosity that the USN always tries to produce.  It can be a simple converted merchant ship which is exactly what Iran did with the Shahid Bagheri.  If Iran can do that, surely we can?  Against the scale of USN budgets, such a conversion would be nearly free.
 
The Navy seems committed to unmanned everything so why not acquire and convert a merchant ship as a drone carrier to gain operational experience and develop doctrine and tactics?
 
Heck, had they been thinking ahead, the Navy could have seized the Shahid Bagheri for our own use!  Iran was kind enough to do the conversion so why not take advantage of it?  What a great mission for a bunch of SEALs!  Well, too late now, I guess.
 

Iranian Drone Carrier

This is just idle thinking on my part.  The Navy is probably better off just building more Burkes.  We’re up to … what? … Flt 27 now?  Anything different, or experimental, or innovative would be too much of a risk for the Navy.

 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “CENTCOM Releases Footage Showing Strike on Iran’s Drone Carrier”, Tayfun Ozberk, 6-Mar-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/centcom-releases-footage-showing-strike-on-irans-drone-carrier/

On Balance

There’s never been a 100% one-sided war and the strikes on Iran are no exception.  According to Newsmax website, as reported on 12-Mar,
 

… at least 11 American military bases or installations have been damaged …[1]

Now, compare that to the reported hundreds or thousands of targets hit per day in Iran.  That’s about as lopsided as you can get.
 
Too many people are trying to portray this as some kind nearly even war with Iran effectively fighting back.  Well, that’s about as far from reality as you can get.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Report: 17 US Sites Hit Across Mideast Since Iran War Began”, Charlie McCarthy, 12-Mar-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/u-s-military-iran-war/2026/03/12/id/1249244/

Secondary Effects From Iran Strikes

‘Multi-domain’, that beloved catchphrase of the US military, applies not only to combat but also to results as noted below.
 
 
Oil
 
Here’s an aspect of the strikes against Iran that you may not be aware of.  One of the secondary effects from the strikes on Iran and the toppling of the Venezuela Maduro regime has been the impact on China’s oil imports.
 

Almost all of Iran’s exported oil, and more than half of Venezuela’s, went last year to China, which remained one of the only purchasers of goods from the two heavily sanctioned nations. The two countries combined represented some 17 percent of China’s overall oil purchases …[1]

17% is not an insignificant amount of oil to lose!
 
In addition, the steady crackdown on the so-called shadow fleet of tankers is further reducing oil supplies to China and Russia.
 
 
Hezbollah
 
Apparently Lebanon is growing tired of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah, brought to a head by the strikes on Iran and Hezbollah.  From Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, as reported by Redstate website,[2]
 

… Lebanon called for direct talks with Israel on “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders,” while accusing the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah of betraying the country.
 
But it is his criticism of Hezbollah that is significant. Calling the Shiite Muslim group “an armed faction … that places no value on Lebanon’s interest nor on the life of its people,” Aoun said Hezbollah “wanted to achieve the fall of the State of Lebanon, under aggression and chaos.” He accused the group of working “for the sake of the calculations of the Iranian regime.” [...]
 
Aoun called for a new initiative, backed by the international community, which would establish a truce between Israel and Lebanon while helping the Lebanese armed forces disarm Hezbollah and confiscate its weaponry. The initiative would put in a place a “complete truce” with a halt to Israeli attacks as the two countries begin “direct negotiations under international sponsorship” to achieve a “final cessation of hostile acts” and “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders.[2]

Well directed force does produce positive results.

 
 
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[1]Politico website, “5 charts show China’s oil dilemma after US strikes”, Paroma Soni and Catherine Allen, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/02/iran-us-strikes-china-oil-supply-charts-00806415
 
[2]Redstate, “Lebanon Drops Some Bad News on Those Anti-American Hezbollah Terrorists”, Nick Arama, 10-Mar-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/03/10/lebanon-wants-talks-with-israel-n2200042

This Is Why You Don’t Depend On Allies

ComNavOps has repeatedly criticized our cross training efforts with allies as being pointless and because allies cannot be counted on when need arises.  Why train with someone you can’t count on?  Here’s the latest examples from the US strikes against Iran.
 
First up is Spain.  You’ll recall that it was Spain that abandoned the US by pulling an escort ship from the USS Lincoln carrier task force in 2019 during a threat from Iran (see, “This Is Why You Don’t Train WithAllies”).  This followed several months of training so that the Spanish ship would be qualified to join the task force for a deployment.
 

Spanish authorities have confirmed that they are not allowing U.S. forces to use bases in the country to support continuing strikes on Iran.[1]
 
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares said Spain would not allow its military bases, which are jointly operated by the U.S. and Spain but under Spanish sovereignty, to be used for attacks on Iran, which Spain has condemned.[1]
 
What started as possible move of around half a dozen [Air Force] tankers from Spain to Ramstein Airbase in Germany, now appears to be a full-on withdrawal of the entire tanker fleet from Moron Airbase (LEMO) and Naval Air Station Rota (LERT) … [1]

Hey, Spain, I assume the refund for the US’ portion of the joint operating costs is in the mail?
 
 
Even America’s stalwart ally, the UK, got in on the ‘abandon your allies’ act by denying the US operating rights from bases.
 

The United Kingdom has reportedly refused U.S. requests to utilize key military facilities—RAF Fairford in England and the joint U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—for any potential strikes against Iran.[2]
 
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has withheld permission for American forces to operate from these bases in support of preemptive or offensive actions against Iran.[2]

I wonder what other countries denied us assistance?
 
Don’t get me wrong.  I fully acknowledge that every country has their own agendas and the right to independently pursue those agendas but this emphatically emphasizes why you don’t waste time cross training with supposed allies and you damn sure don’t contribute money to their bases or assets.  If some country wants to cross train with us or wants us to base forces in their country then they can pay the entire cost.
 
To paraphrase … With Allies like these, who needs enemies?
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “War With Iran Now In Its Third Day”, Joseph Trevithick, Thomas Newdick, Howard Altman, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/war-with-iran-now-in-its-third-day
 
[2]Armed Forces Press website, “UK Denies American Use Of Diego Garcia And RAF Fairford For Iran Attacks”, L Todd Wood, 20-Feb-2026,
https://armedforces.press/foreign-policy/2026/02/20/uk-denies-american-use-of-diego-garcia-and-raf-fairford-for-iran-attacks/ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US Uses One-Way Attack Drones Against Iran

Among military websites, the headlines are all atwitter about the US’ use of the one-way, LUCAS, attack drone in the strikes against Iran. 
 
Here’s a Military Times website headline[1]:
 
US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes
 
This is a simply stunning development and marks a new chapter in strike warfare.  From the LUCAS performance specs, never before has any country had the ability to deliver a maximum 40 lb payload to a distance of 500 miles at a cruise speed of 85 mph (74 kts).  The closest the US has come to this in the past is the one-way Tomahawk attack drone (sometimes referred to as a cruise missile) with a 1000 lb warhead and a range of 1000 miles at a speed of Mach 0.74. (570 mph).
 
It’s embarrassing the way we’ve made a habit of proudly trumpeting “new” technologies that have actually existed for many decades.  That’s not to say that there isn’t a use for a small, very slow missile (which is what a one-way drone is) with very low end lethality but to brag that we’ve accomplished something remarkable is humiliating and deceptive (or ignorant).
 
Here’s an example of an embarrassing attempt at praise from Army Recognition website.
 

U.S. Central Command has moved Task Force Scorpion Strike into an operational posture, giving deployed forces a low-cost one-way attack drone capability designed to multiply strike capacity, absorb attrition, and overwhelm defenses through massed, distributed effects. Beyond adding another munition to the inventory, it effectively creates a new layer of “magazine depth” that can be launched quickly from dispersed sites, complicating enemy targeting and imposing unfavorable cost trades on air defenses. The shift matters less for a single drone’s performance than for what it signals: the U.S. military is now treating expendable systems as a scalable combat arm, not a niche experiment … [2]

“overwhelm defenses” ?  Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
 
“massed, distributed effects” ?  Isn’t that a contradiction?
 
“expendable systems” ?  Haven’t missiles always been expendable?
 
“scalable” ?  Haven’t we always scaled operations as needed?
 
Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release.  Now that’s an accomplishment!
 
Again, at $35,000 per unit, there may be a use for such a weapon but to believe it is something new is just ignorant and embarrassing.
 
 
Warning:  As usual, we are not going to discuss the politics of the US decision to strike Iran, only the military aspects. 

 

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[1]Military Times website, “US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes”, JD Simkins, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/
 
[2]Army Recognition website, “U.S. Central Command Deploys First Operational LUCAS Drone Unit for Potential Iran Strikes”, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/u-s-central-command-deploys-first-operational-lucas-drone-unit-for-potential-iran-strikes#google_vignette

The Scale of War

ComNavOps has often stated that we’ve forgotten what war is and just how much of everything is required to wage it.  One glaring example is the shrinkage of our carrier air wings from a WWII high of 90+ combat aircraft to a Cold War level of 90+ total aircraft (including non-direct-combat helos, tankers, etc.) to the current level of around 35-40 direct-combat aircraft. 
 
The just concluded US strike by seven B-2 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites gives us a brief reminder of what’s required for a single strike.  The strike ultimately delivered 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) across two targets as well as dozens of missiles at other targets.[1]  However, many more assets were involved in the delivery than just the B-2s.
 

… involved more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and firing approximately 75 precision guided weapons.[1]

All for a single strike against an essentially undefended target and with complete control of the sky.  The following gives us a reminder of the types of actions required to support a strike.
 

“As the Operation Midnight Hammer strike package entered Iranian airspace, the US employed several deception tactics, including decoys, as the fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface to air missile threats,” Caine [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] explained.[1]

Recall WWII carrier raids which, later in the war, involved hundreds of aircraft per strike.
 
We need to remember the scale of war and begin planning and training accordingly.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Operation Midnight Hammer: How the US conducted surprise strikes on Iran”, Ashley Roque, 22-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/

Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
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[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

Protecting the Sea Lanes?

The Navy is out there, every day, protecting the sea lanes.  That’s why we do deployments, right?  So, how’s that sea lane protection working out?  According to shipping giant, Maersk,
 

Attacks in the Red Sea by Iran-aligned Houthi militants have disrupted a route vital to east-west trade, with prolonged rerouting of shipments, pushing freight rates higher and causing congestion in Asian and European ports.
 
Maersk said recent data showed that the number of ships crossing through the canal has fallen 66% since carriers began diverting their vessels around Africa.
 
Maersk in July said disruption to its container shipping via the Red Sea had extended beyond trade routes between the Far East and Europe to its entire global network, and warned of a "cascading impact" causing congestion.[1]

 
So, what is the mightiest navy in the world doing about this threat to the sea lanes?  Well, we’ve shot down a few drones and missiles and bombed some suspected launch sites … to no effect.  Attacks on shipping continue and ships continue to get hit.
 
Similarly, Iran continues to harass shipping, attacking, seizing, and mining passing ships while our navy stands by and does nothing.
 
 
Conclusion
 
I know I’ve criticized our endless deployments but if we weren’t out there protecting the sea lanes, bad actors might attack shipping with drones and missiles so thank goodness we’re out there, continuously deployed.
 
Our presence is deterring nothing.  We’re clearly not effectively protecting the sea lanes.  Tell me again, why are we doing deployments?
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Maersk: Impact From Red Sea Attacks Intensifying”, 5-Sep-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/finance/streettalk/maersk-red-sea/2024/09/05/id/1179157/

US Strikes Iranian Proxies

Here’s a semi-open post for comments related to the US strikes on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq.
 
Note:  US Central Command reports that it struck 85 targets with 125+ precision munitions.  However, note the following from a Redstate website report: 

The number of targets appears to be "aimpoints" rather than bases. Sky News Arabia reports only three military bases were hit.[1]

Thus, if true, the strikes were nowhere near as massive as Central Command reporting would suggest.
 
I’ll update if/when I can provide any worthwhile analysis.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “First Video From US Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria Released As CENTCOM Confirms Attacks”, streiff, 2-Feb-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/02/watch-first-video-from-us-airstrikes-in-iraq-and-syria-released-n2169572

Iran Seizes Two More USVs

The US Navy has confirmed that Iran just seized two additional Saildrone small, unmanned surface vessels, held them for a period of time, and then dumped them back into the sea.[1]  As we noted just recently, it is open season on unmanned craft (see, “Open Season”) thanks to the US policy of non-interference with the acts of piracy.

 

One supposes the Iranians removed electronics and/or incapacitated the drones prior to dumping them back into the sea.

 

Open season continues!  No limits.  No license needed.  Bag your drones now, courtesy of the US Navy.  Happy hunting.

 

This is embarrassing and humiliating.

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Iranian navy nabs 2 American sailing drones, dumps them overboard: Iranian media”, Justin Katz, 2-Sep-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/iranian-navy-nabs-2-american-sailing-drones-dumps-them-overboard-iranian-media/

Open Season

As predicted, it is open season on unmanned vehicles.  The US has set the precedent that unmanned assets are not worth fighting over and that we’ll sit back and allow them to be seized if a strongly worded protest won’t stop the act of piracy/war.  That precedent guarantees open season on unmanned assets.  To whit,

 

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy attempted to capture a U.S. Navy unmanned surface vessel that was operating in the Arabian Gulf on Monday and Tuesday, U.S. 5th Fleet said in a statement.

 

U.S. 5th Fleet spotted IRGCN support ship Shahid Baziar towing the USV around … [1]

 

A warship is a piece of sovereign US territory and to seize one is to commit an act of war.  I would assume that an unmanned warship also constitutes a piece of sovereign US territory although that is a question I leave to legal experts on international law (here’s an excellent examination of sovereign status of ships).

Iran committed an act of war or, at the very least, an act of piracy.  I fail to understand why we don’t simply sink the Iranian ship.  Doing that every time would put a quick end to such attempts.  Our default position of abject appeasement is how you become a second rate nation.

 

Iranian Vessel Towing US Unmanned Craft (circled in red)

Apologists and pacifists may claim that it’s not worth going to war over a small unmanned boat (as if Iran is going to declare war on us over a failed act of piracy on their part) but what happens when the Navy starts deploying medium and large unmanned vessels that carry classified sensors and weapons?  Are we going to stand idly by while foreign countries seize them?  Precedent would suggest that’s exactly what we’ll do.  Heck, we did nothing when Iran seized two manned riverine boats and their crews so why would anyone think we’ll do anything about an unmanned vessel, no matter how large it is?

 

It is embarrassing to witness the level of timidity we’ve sunk to.

 

 

 

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[1]USNI News website, “VIDEO: Navy Blocks Iranian Attempt to Steal U.S. Surface Drone in Persian Gulf”, Heather Mongilio, 30-Aug-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/08/30/video-navy-blocks-iranian-attempt-to-steal-u-s-surface-drone-in-persian-gulf

USS Boxer - A Second Drone

It is now being widely reported that the USS Boxer, which reportedly downed an Iranian drone using jamming, also engaged a second drone, at the same time.

U.S. Central Command says that one Iranian drone crashed into the sea after the USS Boxer took what Central Command called "defensive action" against it last Thursday. It said the Boxer also "engaged" a second Iranian drone at the same time, but could not confirm it was destroyed. (1)

Set that aside, for a moment, and recall that the Navy wants to operate a distributed lethality concept which is based on a vast network of all-seeing, all-knowing data links assembled into a master picture and then distributed to all the ships in the region.  Thus, every ship, whether it uses its own sensors or not, will know, with unerring accuracy, the location and targeting information about every enemy asset in the region.  This will allow the distributed ships to co-ordinate and mass their fires on the unsuspecting and hapless enemy fleets.

The Navy is applying the same basic concept of vast networks and data links to AAW defense in the form of an advanced co-operative engagement capability (NIFC-CA).

Now, let’s return to the Boxer engagement.  According to the Navy, one drone was downed and the Navy doesn’t know what happened to the other.  Consider the implications of that statement … they don’t know what happened to the other drone.  The ship had all manner of radars, sensors, optical sensors, EW equipment, Mk1 Eyeballs, and who knows what else applied to a drone that was, by all accounts within a thousand yards so of the ship, and they don’t know what happened to it.

Recall the Burke destroyer that supposedly engaged several incoming anti-ship missiles off Yemen a while ago?  Despite Aegis and all manner of other sensors, the Navy couldn’t say whether any of their missiles hit any targets or what happened to the targets.  In fact, careful analysis of the reporting revealed that they couldn’t even say for sure that there were any actual incoming missiles.

Recall the giant hulking cargo ships that two Burke destroyers never saw and collided with.

Are you seeing the pattern?  Despite the manufacturer and the Navy’s claims of omniscient sensing, we can’t actually keep track of ships, UAVs, and incoming weapons right next to us!  So, how are we going to achieve this regional, distributed lethality, all-seeing, all-knowing master sensor picture or the perfectly networked NIFC-CA AAW defense?

We’re basing our naval offense and defense on a claimed capability that has been proven, time and again, to be woefully inadequate.  When you can’t keep track of a drone a thousand feet from you under non-combat, perfect conditions, how are you going to track every enemy asset in a regional distributed lethality network under electromagnetically challenged conditions?  The answer is obvious – you’re not!  And yet, we’re proceeding with the assumption that we can and will.  At what point do you stop believing unfounded claims and start believing actual field performance evidence?  I think that point is now.  The Navy needs to stop believing in Unicorns and Fairy Dust and start looking at reality.

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(1)Miami Herald website, “US now says it ‘engaged’ 2 Iranian drones, not 1”, Associated Press, 23-Jul-2019,

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article233033167.html

Boxer Downs Iranian Drone With Jamming

By now, you’ve heard about the downing of an Iranian drone by the USS Boxer while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.  The Drive/War Zone website is reporting that the downing was due to the action of a Marine anti-drone electronic warfare dune buggy chained to the deck of the Boxer rather than the defensive weapons of the ship. (1)

USS Boxer With LMADIS On Deck (1)

The Drive/WarZone published an article describing an anti-drone system known as the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS).  The system consists of a RADA RPS-42 short range, S-band, hemispheric, AESA radar mounted on an MRZR dune buggy.  On top of the radar unit is a gyro-stabilized CM202 multi-sensor optical ball that provides positive visual identification of targets. (2)  The systems apparently operate in pairs.  When a target is designated, the targeting data can be fed to various systems such as a Modi jammer which is a backpack signal jammer. (3)  Theoretically, the targeting data could be fed to a ship’s hard-kill defensive systems but it is unknown (and probably unlikely) that this was possible, in this case.  It appears that the Modi jammer was used to disrupt the ground control signal to the Iranian drone thereby causing it to crash.

LMADIS On Kearsarge (2)

The article also details several other extremely close encounters with Iranian aircraft and boats during the transit.  It seems clear that the decision to down the Iranian drone was a retaliatory action for recent Iranian downings of US drones and the choice of the drone as the target rather than, for example, an Iranian Bell 212 helo that passed “yards away from the deck”, was due to the unmanned nature of the Iranian drone.  Drones ‘plinking’ would seem to be the new sport in the Middle East.

There are a few aspects to this that merit some consideration.

Drone Survivability – While we have no idea how sophisticated the Iranian drone was, this is yet another example of the inherent fragility and lack of survivability of drones in combat.  Despite this mounting evidence, the US military continues to count on UAVs for all manner of tasks.  Worse, many of these tasks are the foundation of our combat capability.  When the UAVs are found to be non-survivable in combat, what will become of our combat capability without the foundations they were designed on?

Simplicity – The outstanding aspect of this incident is the fielding of a very simple system with a straightforward, limited (meaning focused) capability assembled from largely commercially available equipment.  This is outstanding.  It provides an immediately useful, basic capability rather than waiting indefinitely for an exquisite, leap ahead technology that will never deliver.  Whoever cobbled this system together deserves a salute.  K.I.S.S. !

Ship Defenses – For all the ultra high end, sophisticated sensors, electronic warfare, and defenses of the USS Boxer, the ship used a cobbled together dune buggy EW system chained to the deck for its anti-drone protection.  This is both commendable and highly disturbing that the ship’s organic defenses couldn’t handle the job.  This should also tell us something about designing systems for use against high end threats and ignoring the low end.  Where is the Navy’s cobbled together, low end, anti-drone system?  Has our development and acquisition system become so complex that we can’t respond with simple, basic, useful systems that can be quickly fielded?  Of course, we know the answer to that is, yes, our development/acquisition system is too complex to be responsive and useful.  We keep talking about innovation and speed of development/response but the evidence is that nothing is actually being done about it.

Engagement Bar – When armed UAVs first appeared on the scene, the civilian authority (the Presidential Administration) and the military latched on to them and began an almost free fire reign of Hellfires on terrorist targets across the world.  The bar on engagement had been lowered.  UAVs somehow seemed ‘okay’ and ‘permissible’ to use with little provocation or thought as opposed to committing manned air or ground forces to the same objective.  I’m not going to debate the wisdom of that policy.  The fact is that the criteria to use deadly force was lowered. 

Similarly, the spread of smaller drones seems to have further lowered the bar on engaging one’s enemies.  Drones seem to be acquiring a status of ‘free fire’ targets.  Countries seem to be considering anti-drone actions, even in international airspace, as freely permissible with little or no rationale.  This can only encourage further hostile acts and will, eventually, lead to intentional or unintentional actions against manned assets. 

We need to carefully consider the implications of this standard of behavior as we move forward.  Do we really want to allow unfriendly countries to believe that they have a ‘right’ to freely shoot down our drones?  Do we really want to limit ourselves to shooting down unfriendly drones as opposed to a much more extensive and severe reaction, if the provocation was worth it? 

For example, in this case, if we believed there was a bona-fide threat to the USS Boxer, should we have limited ourselves to downing the drone, which will do nothing to prevent a recurrence in the future, or should we have destroyed the drone, its launch site, its control site, and the personnel responsible for threatening our ship?  If the threat was real then we should have acted to permanently remove the threat capability, not just one drone, and send an emphatic message.  If the ‘threat’ was just a pretext to engage in some tit-for-tat drone plinking then we need to carefully consider what kind of behavior system we’re establishing.

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(1)The Drive/The War Zone website, “Marine Anti-Drone Buggies On USS Boxer Knocked Down ‘Threatening’ Iranian Drone”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Jul-2019,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29063/marine-anti-drone-buggies-on-uss-boxer-knocked-down-threatening-iranian-drone

(2)The Drive/The War Zone website, “USS Kearsarge Transits The Suez Canal With Anti-Drone Buggies Keeping Watch On Deck”, Tyler Rogoway, 20-Jan-2019,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26067/uss-kearsarge-transits-the-suez-canal-with-anti-drone-buggies-keeping-watch-on-deck

(3)https://www.sncorp.com/press-releases/snc-usmc-modi-ii/

Poop Or Get Off The Pot

For those of you keeping score, the Iranians have now shot at three US UAV drones this month, downing two of them.

6-Jun-2019 – Destroyed;  MQ-9 Reaper;  shot by SA-6

13-Jun-2019 – Miss;  MQ-9 Reaper;  shot at by SA-7

19-Jun-2019 – Destroyed;  Navy MQ-4C Triton (BAMS) (variously reported as RQ-4A Global Hawk)

This is in addition to at least six tanker minings attributed to Iran in the last few weeks.

You’ll also recall the 2011 capture by Iran of an RQ-170 Sentinel that may have had its control communications hacked.

Does allowing a country to conduct this many attacks seem like a good idea?

These incidents illustrate a couple points we’ve made.

• UAVs are not survivable over the modern battlefield.  These UAVs are flying in a very permissive air space (surface to air shots notwithstanding!) and are being attacked by a third rate (if that) military.  Imagine the life expectancy of such UAVs against China.


• These UAVs are just promoting incidents.  If we’re not going to respond aggressively and stomp on Iran HARD, then we should pull back and leave the area.  At the moment, all we’re doing is antagonizing Iran to no good purpose and wearing out our men and equipment, in addition to losing expensive drones.

This is the ‘shit or get off the pot’ moment.  We need to respond FORCEFULLY or leave.  

Iranian Tanker Attack

By now, you’ve read about the two tankers, one Norwegian and one Japanese, supposedly attacked by Iranian forces in the Gulf of Oman on 13-Jun-2019.  The US believes the Iranians were responsible.  Publicly released evidence is sketchy but includes,

• Photos and video, provided by US Central Command, of Iranian boats removing an unexploded limpet mine from a tanker. (1)
• Unverified report of an Iranian vessel firing a surface-to-air missile at a US MQ-9 Reaper UAV a few hours before the tanker attacks. (1)
• The belief that no other actor in the region would have the motivation, skill, and resources to conduct such an attack. (2)

On a related note, the crew of the Japanese ship reported being attacked by a flying object but there has been no other such reports or verification. (2)

Also on a related note, you might recall that a month ago four oil tankers were damaged in an attack off the coast of the United Arab Emirates using what were likely limpet mines. (2)

The US appears satisfied with whatever evidence it has and is blaming the Iranians for the attacks.

"It is the assessment of the U.S. government that Iran is responsible for today's attacks in the Gulf of Oman," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said. "These attacks are a threat to international peace and security, a blatant assault on the freedom of navigation, and an unacceptable escalation of tension by Iran." (1)

As I said, the publicly released evidence is sketchy although the video of the Iranian boat removing the limpet mine is fairly damning.  One would assume that the US has additional evidence that it prefers not to release so as to protect sources although that’s just speculation on my part. 

Photo From Surveillance Video Showing Iranian Boat Removing Limpet Mine From Tanker

Let’s set aside the question of absolute proof or not and, instead, examine the larger issue of maritime security and the US Navy’s role.

By their own claim, the US Navy’s mission is to ensure the freedom of the maritime global commons.  From the Navy website,

The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. (3)

So, the Navy exists not just to protect US-flagged shipping but to deter aggression, apparently from any source and directed anywhere and at anyone and to maintain the ‘freedom of the seas’ which, again, suggests that the Navy is defending the maritime commons for ALL nations.  Thus, an attack on any country’s ship constitutes aggression, which is the Navy’s self-proclaimed mission to prevent, and a threat to the general freedom of the seas which, again, is the Navy’s job to prevent.  This then eliminates the idea that since the attacked ships weren’t US-flagged, the Navy can’t get involved.

We have, then, ample justification for naval action with the only question being, against whom?  Since we just read that the US Secretary of State is unequivocally assigning the blame to Iran, it follows that the Navy is duty bound to take action against Iran.

Now, suppose we don’t take action.  This would lead one to wonder why we bother with our much ballyhooed forward presence.  What’s the point of presence if we won’t take action when we believe we have clear evidence of aggression and a threat to the freedom of the seas?  The Navy justifies its ships, deployments, operating costs, etc. on the basis of forward presence and yet that forward presence is rarely, bordering on never, used.

We have seen a pattern of inaction in response to provocations, aggression, and threats.  For example, the Iranians illegally seized our boats and crews when they were lost, the Chinese have made outrageous territorial claims and attributed non-existent attributes to EEZ zones, the Russians have conducted multiple unsafe aerial and naval acts around our forces, the Chinese have ordered us out of ‘their’ South China Sea (ignoring the fact that it is international waters!), the Chinese have seized our unmanned underwater vehicles, the Iranians have interfered with our carrier aviation operations, and the list goes on and on – a buffet of aggression and threats to the freedom of the seas.  The only recent exception to this pattern of inaction on our part was the launching of some Tomahawks at purported radar sites in Yemen in response to a claimed attack on a Burke destroyer – an attack that public evidence strongly suggests never occurred.

So, I repeat, why are we wasting time, effort, and resources maintaining a forward presence when we clearly have no intention of using them?  Now, perhaps I’ll be surprised and wake up tomorrow to read about a retaliatory attack on Iran but I suspect not.  If we’re not going to use the Navy then bring the ships and crews home and let’s save unimaginable amounts of money.

The video of the Iranians removing the mine from the ship was taken by a US drone.  What better opportunity and justification could there be for action?  Instead, we did nothing.  The fleet is useless.  It’s accomplishing nothing.  Bring it home.

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(1)Business Insider website, “An Iranian boat reportedly fired a missile at a US drone right before the tanker attack”, Ryan Pickrell, 15-Jun-2019,

https://www.businessinsider.com/iranian-boat-took-shot-at-us-drone-before-tanker-attack-2019-6

(2)BBC News website, “Gulf of Oman tanker attacks: US says video shows Iran removing mine”, 14-Jun-2019, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48633016

(3)https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/swmag/Pages/Our-Navy%27s-Mission-How-the-surface-forces-fit-in.aspx

Mk VI - Gunboat Diplomacy Story

The US Navy has always had a love-hate (mostly hate!) relationship with small patrol boats.  Witness the building and then rapid abandonment of the Cyclones, Pegasus class hydrofoils, and various riverine boats.  The current Mk VI patrol boats are underequipped, underutilized, and lack any coherent concept of operations which would take advantage of their potential.  With suitable modifications, various specialized versions could be built and integrated into multi-function squadrons.  The following story illustrates the concept.  Detailed descriptions of the Mk VI versions are presented after the story.

Mk VI Patrol Boat

The usual disclaimer (which no one takes note of):  This is NOT intended to be a fair and balanced simulation of combat.  It is intended to illustrate concepts and tactics in a more entertaining and understandable format than a simple listing.  Enjoy it as such.

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Mk VI Story – Gunboat Diplomacy

The eight Mk VI boats of the squadron crept silently through the night toward the Iranian naval base facilities with the MkVI-ISR surveillance boat in the lead, cautiously sniffing the electronic air for any sign that they had been discovered. 

The boats had been working their way up the coast, hugging the shoreline, with the ISR boat scanning the shore with IR sensors, monitoring communication signals, and plotting radar sources.  So far, there was no indication that the Iranians were aware of their presence.

Stealth was vital for this mission, as was plausible deniability.  The new Administration had decided that Iran had finally gone too far.  The seizure of US boats and crews a few years ago, followed by numerous taunting harassments of Navy ships by Iranian small boats, followed by a period of harassments of carriers by UAVs intruding into the carriers aircraft operating space had made a laughingstock of the US Navy and US political resolve on the world stage.  Now, the most recent series of mock attack runs by Iranian small boats on US warships had been a step too far for the new Administration and the President was determined to send an unequivocal message that the days of “strategic patience” were over.

So it was that the squadron of MkVI boats were approaching one of the naval bases that the Iranian boats operated from.  The squadron’s orders were to clandestinely wreak as much damage on the base and boat facilities as possible.

Tomahawk and Air Force bomber attacks had been considered but ruled out because they would leave far too much evidence of their presence.  The President wanted plausible deniability as part of a larger political game.  He had no problem with letting Iran know who had hit them and why but he wanted no blatant evidence.  The use of the MkVI boats would maintain the thinly veiled, plausible deniability that would prevent Iran from claiming proof of US involvement on the world stage and escalating the incident.  Of course, if they did choose to escalate without the benefit of clear and overwhelming evidence …  well, there were assets and plans in place for just that eventuality – and that would be communicated via back door connections, as well, once the attack was completed.

As the squadron, throttled down to bare steerageway, rounded the headland that partially sheltered the port, it became clear that the Iranian base was suffering from the fruits of its repeated successes.  In a word, they had become complacent and were taking no great security precautions.  They flatly did not believe that America had the political will to take any substantive action against them, especially inside their territorial waters and against a base on their mainland.

The squadron spread out with the five MKVI-Attack boats in a line abreast and a bit in front.  The two MKVI-AA (anti-air) boats hung back a bit, covering each flank and the ISR boat dropped further back to continue monitoring.

The base was clearly visible about two miles ahead – well within rocket range of the attack boats.  Though not guided, the Hydra 70 2.75” rockets were computer controlled by the boats fire control system to achieve the best aiming aspect by the launcher.  Each boat had several pre-assigned targets and now each rocket launcher twitched as the final aiming corrections for the first round of targets were made.  The boats each carried four rocket pods with each pod containing 19 rockets.  That gave a total of 76 rockets per boat and the five attack boats carried a total of 380 rockets.  Each boat would retain 10 rockets for defense on the way out.  The base would receive the remaining 330 rockets.

The boats idled, waiting silently for the pre-determined launch time.  At the exact same moment, all five boats began firing.  The initial salvos exploded out of their launchers and sped toward the targets at 2400 ft/sec.  Travel time was only about 5 seconds.  The base lit up as the rockets exploded on their targets and secondary explosions added their fireworks.  Some of the rocket warheads were point detonation and some were air burst, depending on their assigned targets.  What wasn’t destroyed outright in the wave of explosions was shredded by shrapnel.

Even before the first rockets hit their targets, the rocket launchers were adjusting their aim for the second round of targets.  And so it continued until all the assigned targets were serviced and the rockets were expended.

Piers, boats, fuel storage tanks, control facilities, munitions storage, and warehouses were all targeted and, now, were all burning furiously.  Notably, a pair of barracks for the Iranian boat crews had been allocated ten rockets each.  The destruction was devastating and, this late at night, most of the Iranian crews were in the barracks.  The Iranian death toll would be high and this was another aspect to the message being sent.  The US would hold individuals accountable and the prospect of enemy deaths would no longer inhibit military actions.

On one of the boats, a Hellfire launcher trained slightly to one side to target a large, lavishly decorated house that Iranian officers and leadership used as their quarters and as a luxury headquarters.  In fact, the base commander and his family occupied one wing of the house.  Four Hellfire missiles shot off the launcher and impacted the house.  There was nothing but rubble left when the dust settled.  This was yet another part of the message – that the fear of collateral damage would no longer unduly restrict US military actions.

As the boats completed their assigned attacks, silence settled back over the squadron and the boats throttled up a bit.  Led by the ISR boat, the squadron reversed course and began their return.  Surprisingly, they did not immediately throttle up to full power and begin a high speed run straight to the safety of international waters, twelve miles out to sea.  Instead, they began to slowly retrace their ingress route.  It was assumed that as Iran began to react the first place they would look was on a direct line to open waters. 

The boats hugged the shore, proceeding slowly along the coast.  They would continue this way for several miles before breaking veering off to international waters.  The exposure time was longer but the planners had concluded that the overall safety was increased.

After about 15 minutes, the ISR boat noted indications of helos and UAVs swarming towards the area and a few Iranian boats that had survived the destruction appeared to be putting to sea.  Sure enough, the majority were heading directly out to sea, right where the squadron would have been if they had made a direct run for safety.

After a few more minutes, the ISR boat spotted an infrared heat source several hundred yards ahead and about a hundred yards inland.  It appeared to be an Iranian truck of some sort with several people milling around.  They were likely Iranian soldiers ordered to look for intruders.

The squadron was prepared for this eventuality and this was why each boat had retained 10 rockets.  The ISR boat issued the first spoken command of the evening and assigned one of the attack boats to eliminate the threat.  A minute passed as the target was acquired and then five rockets ignited out of their pod.  One of the rockets hit the vehicle near the cab and a second exploded on the ground almost beneath the vehicle.  It was shredded and flipped over in a spectacular fireworks display.  The remaining three rockets impacted in the area, killing or severely wounding the presumed soldiers.  This was further proof that the US military would not be unduly constrained by fear of collateral damage.  The vehicle and people were almost certainly Iranian army and the squadron would take no chances. 

The squadron continued on their way.  Several more minutes passed and the ISR boat noted a small UAV about 3 miles out and heading in their general direction, possibly attracted by the attack on the vehicle.  Again, a brief message designated one of the anti-air boats to deal with the intruder, if it continued to close.

The AA boat’s Mk38 Mod 2, 25 mm remote control gun tracked the UAV.  The UAV was a small one and flying low, probably using an optical scanner of some sort, looking for the source of the base attack.  The squadron was tucked inshore and throttled way down, leaving no wake.  Unless the UAV had an infrared scanner, it wasn’t likely to see the boats from a couple of miles away. 

The UAV continued to close.  As it approached three quarters of a mile, the Mk38 fired.  The first short burst missed but before the UAV operator could react and veer off, a second burst connected and sent the UAV tumbling to the sea.

By this time, the squadron was far enough away from the base to turn out to sea and head for international waters.  Besides, they had begun to attract attention and a change of direction would be a good idea.  Turning perpendicular to the shoreline, the squadron increased speed to 12 kts.

Ten minutes later, the ISR boat detected a helicopter headed their way.  The flanking anti-air boat needed no directions for this encounter.  As the helo reached five miles, the boat’s Stinger mount launched.  The missile tracked the low, slow helo and impacted with a brilliant flash of light and a couple of seconds later, a sharp crack of thunder.  The helo wasn’t instantly killed but did immediately veer off, losing altitude steadily.  It likely wouldn’t make it back to its base.

It was obvious the Iranians were beginning to realize that the squadron was the source of the attack so there was no further need for stealth.  The boats throttled up to 37 kts to complete the run to international waters.  At that speed, the 12 mile territorial limit was just a 16 minute run away.

However, 12 minutes into the dash, the ISR boat detected communications signals from ahead and offset a bit to starboard.  One or more surviving Iranian boats must have put to sea and were now being vectored towards the squadron or, perhaps, had just stumbled into the right location.  Either way, it didn’t matter.

The AA boats dropped back a bit and the attack boats formed a line abreast, oriented towards the threat.  Two Iranian small boats appeared in the attack boat’s IR scans, about two miles out.  The ISR boat allocated one Iranian boat target to each of the two closest attack boats.  The boat’s Hellfire launchers trained and fired one missile each.  One of the target boats exploded in a blinding flash.  The other missile clipped a wave top just before impact and skidded above the boat – a clean miss.  This prompted the lucky, surviving boat to launch its rockets in an immediate and, probably, unaimed attack.  The rockets arced over the squadron and impacted the water well beyond the boats.

The attack boat that had fired the errant missile immediately launched another missile and this one found its mark, demolishing the Iranian boat.

With no further threats, the squadron resumed its dash to international waters where a Burke destroyer was waiting to escort the boats back to their mothership.

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The MKVI boats described in the story were one of three specialized, conceptual versions, as described below.  The boats operate in squadrons with types being mixed and matched according to the mission.

Mk VI Anti-Air

• 2x Stinger Pod Mounts, 4 missiles/pod, 2 pods per mount, 16 missiles total and ready, mounts fore and aft, FIM-92, effective firing range 5 miles


• Mk 38 Mod 2 Remote Weapon Station, effective range 9800 ft (1.8 miles), max firing range 22,000 ft (4 miles)


• 4x twin 0.50 cal M2 machine gun, 1 mile range

Mk VI Attack

• 2x AGM-114 Hellfire Pod Mounts, 4 missiles/pod, 2 pods per mount, 16 missiles total and ready, mounts fore and aft, effective range 4 miles


• 2.75” Rocket Pod Mounts, 4x on 2 mounts, 76 rockets total, Hydra 70 rockets, 8700 yd (5 miles) effective firing range, 11,000 yd (6.25 miles) maximum range

Mk VI Surveillance

• Signal collection and analysis electronics


• Passive signal triangulation electronics


• Radar threat receivers


• Laser detectors


• EO/IR imaging sensors providing hemispherical coverage


• IR tracking sensors