Desert Storm provided an interesting perspective on the use of special forces in a conventional war. General Schwarzkopf was dead set against the use of special forces and had no plans to use them until forced by the President to do so.
Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the four-star commander of US Central Command and the war's military leader, viewed unconventional-warfare units with skepticism.
Initially, Schwarzkopf was adamantly against special-operations units having any significant role in the conflict — though he did accept some Delta Force operators as personal bodyguards.
… after some persuasion from the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schwarzkopf relaxed his no-commandos policy. (1)
The problem with special forces in conventional wars is that, by definition, they can’t provide any significant firepower effects due both to their small unit size and their lack of heavy weaponry. The best case scenario is a minor, occasional, nuisance effect and that’s not a war-winning impact. Balanced against that minor impact is the significant cost required to man, train, and logistically support an entire military branch. In addition, special forces seem to constantly require emergency extraction which takes away from the activities of other forces.
I recognize that this is not going to be a popular post for many people but, objectively, it is what it is.
Now, let’s consider some of the historical successes by special forces in conventional wars:
WWII Coastwatchers – This consisted of individuals who were inserted into enemy territory to report on enemy ship movements.
Vietnam Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP, “Lurp”) – These small units inserted into enemy territory to provide deep reconnaissance.
French and Indian War (1754-1763) Rogers Rangers – This force was initially formed to provide scouting and reconnaissance but grew and morphed into light infantry.
Decima Flottiglia MAS – This Italian group of ‘frogmen’ conducted many ‘human torpedo’ attacks with a couple of partial successes such as temporarily disabling the British HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant. Overall, the effect was negligible and many/most forces were killed or captured.
The preceding examples demonstrate that there are a couple of characteristics of successful historical special forces:
Small Size – The forces have been small, ranging from individuals to small units. Contrast that to today’s special force organizations which have ballooned in size and have become bloated, self-propagating entities.
Reconnaissance – The focus of successful historical special forces has been reconnaissance as opposed to firepower effects. The question is whether the enhanced reconnaissance is worth the maintenance of entire organizations? Could the information thus obtained have been obtained using other, possibly better, methods?
Unfortunately, the historical characteristics of successful special forces seem to be at odds – indeed, almost direct opposites – with today’s special forces which are large and ever-growing and have moved far beyond (left behind?) traditional reconnaissance roles and into light infantry roles.
How does all this tie into the Navy?
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) comprises approximately 10,000 personnel, including active duty and reserve component Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel; support personnel, referred to as Enablers; and civilians. NSWC headquarters is located at Coronado, CA, and is composed of eight active duty SEAL Teams, two reserve component SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, three Special Boat Teams, and two Special Reconnaissance Teams. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well-postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units. (2)
That’s 10,000 people, untold quantities of equipment, and vast sums of money all to support a force that will have little use in a conventional peer war. That’s a lot of resources that could be better used by the regular Navy. None of this is to suggest that Navy special forces be totally eliminated – just that they be vastly scaled back. Navy SEALs, for example, should stop deploying as a ground infantry force and get back to operations in the water. For an in-depth discussion of SEAL forces and the kind of missions they should be performing see, “SEALs”.
Conclusion
The US’ special forces have grown out of the last few decades of continual small wars and anti-terrorism activities. Given that impetus and the inexorable tendency of any organization to attempt to grow itself (the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy), the special forces have expanded beyond all reason and need.
As stated about Navy SEALs , this is not to suggest that all special forces be eliminated but they should be vastly scaled back. Conventional forces are more than sufficient for most of the missions we’re currently using special forces for. We also need to reorient our military away from minor conflicts and back to peer war.
Future peer wars are going to be massive, fast, and deadly with armor and artillery being emphasized (as the US will quickly discover, to its regret). This is not an environment where special forces will be particularly useful unless they re-embrace their roots of small size and reconnaissance.
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(1)Insider website, “How US special-operations forces helped the US military win its first post-Cold War victory”, Stavros Atlamazoglou, 23-Feb-2021,
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-us-special-operations-forces-helped-win-the-gulf-war-2021-2
(2)https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf
