MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15^th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 

Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 

Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 

But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 

… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”

There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 

ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?

Another disturbing note was this,
 

The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 

At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 

The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/

ACV Update

The Marine’s new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program is a mystery.  The Marines have repeatedly stated publicly that they’re out of the frontal amphibious assault business which instantly raises the question, why do they need ACVs?  From their statements, the Marines should be shedding ACVs, not buying them and yet, from a recent Breaking Defense website article,

 

The Pentagon announced it was purchasing an additional 30 Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs) for $153 million … [1]

 

No Justification = Accelerated Acquisition?

The Marines are out of the assault business and yet they’re buying additional ACVs at an accelerated rate?

 

To date, the service has purchased roughly 260 ACVs in previous years and are expected to purchase 74 in fiscal 2023, including the 30 announced this week.[1]

 

The Marine Corps’ goal for the program is to buy 632 Amphibious Combat Vehicles to replace the legacy fleet of Amphibious Assault Vehicles.[1][3]

 

This makes absolutely no sense.  Even the Marine’s ACV acquisition program acknowledged the reduced need for ACVs as evidenced by a sharp reduction in acquisition quantity plans.

 

Last year [2020], the Marine Corps reported a plan to manufacture 1,122 production vehicles, but according to program officials, the amount was reduced as part of the Marine Corps’ Force Design restructure that was formalized in August 2020.[2]

 

So, the Marines appear to recognize that the justification for the ACV has decreased and yet they continue to acquire the vehicles in substantial quantities.  Given their unhesitating leap to eliminate their entire tank inventory, one would think that, logically, they would eliminate their ACV inventory, as well.

 

Despite the lack of justification, the Marines are not only pushing ahead with acquisitions but are also pushing ahead with development of additional ACV variants.

 

The four planned variants will include a personnel variant, a command and control variant, a recovery variant and a 30-mm gun variant.[1]

 

As noted in the 2021 GAO annual report,

 

… the ACV contractor plans to deliver three production-representative ACV-C [command and control variant] prototypes to support testing in fiscal year 2021 and start production of the first 10 ACV-Cs in fiscal year 2022.[2]

 

If all they want the ACV for is to use it as a low end armored personnel carrier (APC), there are much better, proven APCs available on the market.

 

Alternatively, the $2B being spent on the ACV program [2] could be much better spent on anti-air defense vehicles and systems, anti-UAV systems, electronic warfare systems, self-propelled artillery vehicles, etc.

 

The ACV program seems to be inherently contradictory.  The Marines say they are out of the assault business and, indeed, have eliminated all their tanks and much of their artillery, which would be vital in supporting assaults, while also shifting their focus to small, missile-shooting, platoon size units that are supposed to act as deterrents more so than combat forces.  Despite this, they continue to acquire ACVs whose main purpose is amphibious assault – the very mission the Marines have publicly abandoned.  Huh????

 

The Marines are confused and seem to have no consistent purpose or core reason for existence and the illogic of the ACV acquisition program typifies their confusion.

 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense, “Marine Corps buys 30 more ACVs following rough year of waterborne ops training”, Justin Katz, 17-Nov-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/marine-corps-buys-30-more-acvs-following-rough-year-of-waterborne-ops-training/?_ga=2.173716768.2017970294.1668633283-1009727458.1647467636

 

[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021

 

[3]Reference [2] cites a total acquisition of 678 ACV

The LVT Family

WWII saw the birth of the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) amphibious assault vehicle, known variously as the "amtrak", "amtrac", "alligator", or "buffalo", among other nicknames.  The vehicle was the answer to the Marine’s need for a protected transport capable of traversing surf and coral.  The development of an armored version with a 75 mm howitzer provided anti-infantry and anti-fortification firepower available in the initial assault wave.  Later, a flamethrower capability was added. 

 

The personnel carrying LVT was the forerunner to today’s standard Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV).  Indeed, the AAV was initially designated the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel-7 (LVTP-7).

 

We see, then, that during WWII, the LVT variants included transport, flamethrower, and armored “tank” versions.  These developments were critical to the Pacific war island assaults and were impressive enough in their own right.  However, after the Korean War, the LVT underwent yet another round of development resulting in an entire family of functional variants.

 

The base vehicle for the subsequent LVT family was the 35 ton LVTP-5.  The variants, designed by Borg-Warner Corp., included (1),

 

LVTP-5 – personnel carrier rated for up to 35 troops (though not in practice) 

 

LVTP-5

LVTH-6 – armored amphibian with fully stabilized armored turret housing a 105 mm howitzer with storage for 151 rounds plus an additional 150 rounds in the cargo hold, a 0.30 cal co-axial machine gun, and a 0.50 cal anti-aircraft machine gun

LVTH-6

LVTC-5 – command vehicle with extensive communications suite for battalion or regimental command;  could send and receive on 7 channels and monitor 4;  space for seating and map boards

 

LVTAA-1 – anti-aircraft vehicle fitted with the M42 Duster turret housing twin 40 mm Bofors;  Note: It appears that the LVTAA-1 never entered production after prototype testing.

 

LVTR-1 – recovery vehicle with two winches, each capable of pulling 45,000 pounds, a welding rig, crane and other maintenance equipment (2)

LVTR-1

LVTE-1 – combat engineer and breaching vehicle with an angled blade plow for mine clearing that could clear a 12 ft wide lane to a depth of 16 inches; also included a top mounted, rocket-propelled demolition line charge launcher for mine and obstacle clearance

LVTE-1

The really noteworthy aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that we still need the same functions today!  The absolutely astounding aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that most of the required functions are still unmet, today!  

AAV

 It is also interesting to note how little the base vehicle has changed.  If we could simply, magically, transport these vehicles to our time, we’d find them quite welcome and useful.  That illustrates how little improvement has occurred in amphibious assault – arguably, we have regressed since we now lack any kind of amphibious heavy firepower which we commonly had in WWII !

 

The AAV/ACV (ACV – Amphibious Combat Vehicle) that is currently being produced has barely changed, functionally, from its historical predecessors and lacks the various variants that are required for a fully functional amphibious capability.  The Marines have discussed adding ACV command and 30 mm gun variants but nothing has happened as yet and budget constraints suggest that few, if any, variants will be produced.

 

This raises the larger question, are the Marines actually serious about amphibious assault?  The statements, doctrine, acquisitions, and budget allocation present a very mixed bag of answers.

 

Statements by various Marine leadership claim that amphibious assault remains a core capability, that a line of AAVs assaulting the beach will never be seen again, that traditional assaults are a thing of the past, and that the AAV/ACV is vital for the Marine mission.  An astounding bit of mixed messaging, for sure!

 

Doctrinally, the Marines/Navy call for a standoff distance of 25-50+ miles for an opposed assault.  This suggests that the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault since they have no landing craft capable of conducting effective 25-50+ mile transits.

 

Marine acquisitions and budgets are heavily focused on the aviation – and now missile – side of things.  The lack of importance attached to assault is evidenced by the decades spent meandering around the AAV replacement issue (recall the failed EFV?).  Even now, with new ACVs being procured, the utter lack of amphibious firepower and anti-air capability is startling and sends the message that amphibious assault is not a priority and may not even be feasible (if so, why are the Marines even procuring ACVs?).

 

One final bit of evidence about the degree of likelihood and seriousness with which the Marines view amphibious assault is that the Marines have never conducted an exercise using their own doctrine of assaulting from 25-50+ miles – because they know it can’t be done with the capabilities they currently have.  Further, there is no serious investigation of 25-50+ mile connectors being conducted.  Recall any photo you’ve ever seen of Marine amphibious exercises.  The AAVs are pictured coming ashore in neat rows with a giant amphibious ship parked just offshore so that the AAVs had a very short ride to the beach (barely getting wet in the process!).  Great photo op but worthless training.

 

Amphibious Assault Exercise - note the proximity of the host ship

If the Marines are serious about amphibious assault – and that’s a huge ‘if’ – they desperately need a complete family of vehicles identical in function to the post-WWII LVT family.  If the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault, as the preponderance of evidence suggests, then they need to stop wasting money on ACVs which will never be used.

 

 

 

 

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(1)”Marines Under Armor”, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, 2000

 

(2)http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/1993/MAR_APR/ArmorMarchApril1993web.pdf , p. 13

Marine’s AAV – High and Dry

The Marine’s Amphibious Assault Vehicle, AAV, is now just the Vehicle, V.  The amphibious part is gone as the Marines have announced that the AAVs will no longer be used for water operations.

 

… given the current state of the amphibious vehicle program, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has decided the AAV will no longer serve as part of regularly scheduled deployments or train in the water during military exercises; AAVs will only return to operating in the water if needed for crisis response.  …  The AAV will continue to operate on land; 76 percent of its tasks are land-based. [1]

 

AAV - Now Just 'V'

Well, they always have the new ACV, right?  Well, no, at least not at the moment.

 

The ACVs are under their own restrictions from waterborne operations. [1]

 

The Marine Corps in early September announced the pause to ACV water operations due to the problem with the towing mechanism. [1]

 

ACVs were temporarily suspended from open ocean waterborne operations as we worked to solve an issue that was identified with the towing mechanism. We expect that issue to be resolved soon and for ACVs to return to the water early in the New Year. [1]

 

So, currently the Marines have no means to get ashore in an assault since the LCAC is doctrinally excluded from initial assaults and has been relegated to follow on support.  Of course, the Marines have stated that they’re out of the amphibious assault business so I guess this isn’t really a problem.

 

This does, however, lead to a potentially serious question.

 

Is the AAV the best vehicle for land tasks?  Presumably, the newer ACV also has the same 76% land tasks so the same question applies.  The AAV/ACV is not an armored personnel carrier (APC) like the Israeli Namer nor an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) like the Bradley so what tasks is it being asked to perform? 

 

Land combat vehicles are intended to go in harm’s way and are armed and armored appropriately.  The AAV/ACV is not.  As best I can tell – not being a land combat expert – the AAV/ACV was intended as a poor man’s APC, though without the armor – thus making it a very lightly armored personnel carrier.  As such, it is unsuited for modern battlefield combat.  It could, perhaps, function as a rear area personnel carrier but does that role justify the expenditure on the new ACV?  I would think not.

 

The amphibious nature of the AAV/ACV led to a compromised vehicle that is optimized for neither water nor land tasks.  This was possibly acceptable if the Marines were going to conduct amphibious assaults (no, it really wasn’t but we’ll set that issue aside for now).  Now, since the Marines are abandoning landings from the sea they should seriously re-evaluate whether the AAV/ACV is suited for strictly land tasks. 

 

The AAV/ACV seems to have no role in the new Marine Corps so why are they continuing to purchase ACVs?

 

 

On the bright side, the Marines have no viable mission so I guess none of this matters but, wow, this is some top notch embarrassing fumbling and incompetence on display for the world to see.  China has to be wetting themselves laughing about this.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Marines Keeping AAVs Out of the Water Permanently”, Sam LaGrone, 15-Dec-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/12/15/breaking-marines-keeping-aavs-out-of-the-water-permanently

Flat Tire - Mission Kill?

The DOT&E report on the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) trials of the Marine’s Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) illustrates a concern related to the trend towards wheeled vehicles instead of tracked and that is the age old automobile plague of flat tires.  Many followers of armored vehicles have speculated about the performance and, therefore, advisability of substituting wheels for tracks with the obvious concerns of traction, durability, vulnerability, etc. being raised.  Now, we have the IOT&E results to offer some actual data.

 

ACV land mobility in the desert environment was often degraded by tire failures, which led to 2-hour mission delays while crews replaced or swapped tires. The ACV platoon did not have a hydraulic jack or other means to lift the ACV without an LVSR Wrecker. Some tire failures could be attributed to incorrect tire pressure settings in the Central Tire Inflation System (CTIS) on the ACV. As crews actively monitored CTIS settings, tire failures were less frequent. (1)

 

So, to no great surprise, we see that wheeled vehicles are subject to flat tires.  The DOT&E report notes two main issues:

 

1. Modified driving may be required.  DOT&E notes that ACV drivers will have to learn to modify their driving to avoid obstacles that may penetrate tires and cause flats.  According to Gunnery Sgt. Christopher Sorrell:

 

“Since IOT&E, we’ve had the ability to change tires out more expediently, and since we’ve also learned how to ultimately not pop or puncture more tires, based off of terrain, and actually making smarter decisions as drivers of what we should and cannot maneuver over,” he added. “And comparable to an AAV, it’s the same. We can maneuver over anything that an AAV can maneuver – no changes in that – but it is like, hey, am I really going to roll over a bed of nails. In an AAV, I could, but maybe I’m not going to do that in an ACV.” (2)

 

So, the solution to flat tires is to learn what the vehicle can and cannot drive over?  Hmm …

 

On the face of it, that seems like a reasonable suggestion/solution and a simple matter of training.  However, a bit more thought reveals a lot wrong with that.  While avoidance of suspect obstacles may be easily achieved in a staged test under ideal conditions, what happens when the driver/vehicle is confronted with darkness, fog, rain, confusion, and the stress of combat where avoidance of certain types of terrain or obstacles is not the highest priority?  How will the driver detect and avoid suspect obstacles then?  For that matter what happens if the only immediately desirable direction happens to lead through suspect terrain or obstacles?  Does the driver abort the mission due to a ‘bed of nails’?  Is that really all it will take for an enemy to stop an ACV movement or assault … just scatter some nails?

 

Other than a mine, tracks don’t care what they travel over.  By using wheels, we’ll be giving up some mobility and operational capability.  We’ll have combat vehicles with obvious and common limitations.  Is this really combat-desirable?

Wheeled ACV

 

2. Tire replacement is problematic.  From the USNI News website,

 

The [DOT&E] report suggested the Marines think about “adding a spare tire kit at the section level” and find a better way to change the vehicle’s tires.

 

Sorrell described the tire issues as a learning experience for the Marines, who used trial and error to figure out what worked best in the field. For example, during testing, the Marines would dig a hole in the ground to change a tire because at the time they did not have tools like a jack.

 

“But now we have the capability, since IOT&E, to basically bring an air compressor to the field with us, be able to lift a strut up in the air underneath the tire, and change a tire out in less than 30 minutes,” Sorrell said. (2)

 

Doesn’t having a fast, easy method for changing tires on a wheeled combat vehicle seem like something someone in the program should have thought of long ago?  But, I digress …

 

Is driving over a stick or obstacle the only way to get a flat tire?  What about shrapnel and small arms fire?  Is that all it will take to stop an ACV … just shoot out a tire?  I’m not terribly knowledgeable about wheeled vehicle combat operations but is a single flat tire really enough to mission kill a vehicle and require immediate changing as seemed to be the case in the IOT&E trials?  If so, that would seem to be a poor design for a combat vehicle potentially subject to large amounts of shrapnel and small arms fire.

 

On a closely related note, the ACV size and weight present some recovery challenges.

 

The weight, height, and size of the ACV made recovery of a disabled ACV challenging and time consuming, at times requiring additional LVSR support. When vehicles sustained severe damage to suspension components or became mired, one or more LVSRs were required to recover the ACV. LVSRs are on the Table of Organization for the Assault Amphibian Battalion, and Marine Corps Maintenance Battalions. Additional LVSRs may be required to support future ACV platoon or company-level operations. (1)

 

 

Summary

 

I find myself deeply troubled by the US military’s push toward wheeled vehicles.  I don’t follow the issue closely enough so I don’t know whether it’s been carefully studied or not but my vague impression from reading bits of discussion over the years is that this is another example of an assumption based on no tests and no experience.  Common sense would suggest that tracks are far superior in terms of ruggedness and performance.  There may be financial arguments for wheeled vehicles but, as we’ve often stated, combat assets should never be designed to business cases.  Combat vehicles should be designed for maximum combat performance and all other factors assume a secondary importance.

 

I’ll continue to follow this with great interest.  As I say, I’m not a combat vehicle expert.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

(1)Director, Operational Test & Evalution, “FY2020 Annual Report”, Jan 2021, p. 121-123

 

(2)USNI News website, “Marines Defend ACV Development as Program Matures”, Mallory Shelbourne, 19-Feb-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/02/18/marines-defend-acv-development-as-program-matures

ACV Comparison and Evaluation

The Marines are developing a wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1.1) to replace its legacy amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) (for some background, see, "Future Connectors - The Marine Corps View").  On 19-Jun-2018 the Marines selected BAE over SAIC to build the ACV and awarded a contract.  The plan, at that time, was for 204 vehicles at a cost of $1.2B. (4)

Here are some comparative specs on the forerunner, the WWII LVT-4, the legacy AAV, and the new BAE ACV.

	LVT-4	AAV	BAE ACV
Length, ft	26 (6)	28 (5)	28 (3)
Width, ft	11 (6)	11 (5)	10 (3)
Height, ft	8 (6)	11 (5)	9 (3)
Weight, lbs	36,500 (6)	58,000 (5)	63,000 (3)
Payload, lbs	6950 (7)	?	6,000 (3)
Sea State	?	5 (5)	3 (1)
Horsepower, HP	250 (6)	400 (5)	690 (1)
HP/ton	13.7	13.8	21.9
Land Range, miles	250 (6)	300 (5)	325 (1)
Land Speed, mph	14 (6)	45 (5)	65 (1)
Water Speed, kts	7 (6)	8 (5)	6 (3)
Troop Capacity	30 (6)	21 (5)	13 (1)

Comparing the three vehicles, it is interesting to note that in its main role as an amphibious transport vehicle, the water speeds are identical and the troop carrying capacity has steadily decreased from WWII until now.  This is not necessarily a bad thing especially given that the AAV and ACV are intended as light armored personnel carriers (APC) and it would be nice if they carried some even multiple of squads.  The BAE ACV does appear sized for about one squad whereas the AAV was an odd squad and a half, or so.  The WWII LVT was a pure water transport vehicle and troop capacity was maximized.

LVT(4) Amtrac

Land performance, in terms of speed and range, has improved which, again, tracks with the use of the AAV and ACV as light APCs.

This is mostly just an informational post.  The main realization from looking at the historical vehicle performance compared to today is how little the vehicles have improved since WWII in regards to their primary role of ship to shore connector.  When one considers the incredible increases in performance of aircraft, missiles, stealth, guidance, sensors, etc. one can’t help but be disappointed by the relatively minor improvements from LVT to ACV.  

AAV

Although a Marine issue, I guess this is lumped in with the Navy’s indifference towards naval gun support and ship armor.  Landing craft just aren’t ‘sexy’ enough to get Navy/Marine attention although I would have thought the Marines would have pushed hard for vastly improved landing craft (not withstanding the long, drawn out, failed EFV program).  Of course, I would have thought they would have pushed hard for heavy naval gun support and they didn’t.

The main problem is that the ACV suffers from the same problem as the AAV which is that it is limited to a few miles of travel to the shore.  In other words, it no more supports the Navy/Marine amphibious assault standoff doctrine than the AAV did so why did the Marines opt to procure it?  It represents zero improvement in the ability to conduct a landing from 25-50+ miles offshore.  So what was the point? 

ACV

Conceptually, the AAV/ACV seems like a failed compromise between a heavy armored personnel carrier (HAPC – like the Israeli Namer or Achzarit) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV – like the US Bradley).  The AAV/ACV has neither the armor protection of an HAPC nor the firepower of an IFV.  It is the worst of both worlds!

An amphibious HAPC would have allowed the vehicle/troops to roll straight through any initial resistance and get off the exposed beach.  The ACV, by comparison, has no significant armor and no firepower.

There is now another issue confronting the ACV and that is Commandant Berger’s all but explicitly stated abandonment of opposed landings.  That being the case, what purpose do ACVs serve?  If all future landings will be unopposed then an ACV is not needed – any old ship to shore connector will suffice, including pure helo transport.  In fact, in an unopposed landing and with no heavy equipment like tanks or artillery, helo transport of the resultant light infantry is perfectly adequate.  Of course, rowboats, canoes, barges, and rafts would work equally as well.  To be fair, the Commandant has hinted that the ACV numbers might be decreased.

The ACV appears to be a piece of equipment that has no real purpose in the Commandant’s vision of a new Marine Corps.  Of course, that vision is badly flawed, so …

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(1)https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/amphibious-combat-vehicle

(3)https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2016/01/04/inside-the-amphibious-vehicles-that-won-the-marines-225m-contracts/

(4)https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/06/19/bae-wins-marine-corps-contract-to-build-new-amphibious-combat-vehicle/

(5)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assault_Amphibious_Vehicle

(6)http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/US/LVT-4_Water_Buffalo.php

(7)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_Vehicle_Tracked#Variants