The Marine’s new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program is a mystery. The Marines have repeatedly stated publicly that they’re out of the frontal amphibious assault business which instantly raises the question, why do they need ACVs? From their statements, the Marines should be shedding ACVs, not buying them and yet, from a recent Breaking Defense website article,
The Pentagon announced it was purchasing an additional 30 Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs) for $153 million … [1]
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| No Justification = Accelerated Acquisition? |
The Marines are out of the assault business and yet they’re buying additional ACVs at an accelerated rate?
To date, the service has purchased roughly 260 ACVs in previous years and are expected to purchase 74 in fiscal 2023, including the 30 announced this week.[1]
The Marine Corps’ goal for the program is to buy 632 Amphibious Combat Vehicles to replace the legacy fleet of Amphibious Assault Vehicles.[1][3]
This makes absolutely no sense. Even the Marine’s ACV acquisition program acknowledged the reduced need for ACVs as evidenced by a sharp reduction in acquisition quantity plans.
Last year [2020], the Marine Corps reported a plan to manufacture 1,122 production vehicles, but according to program officials, the amount was reduced as part of the Marine Corps’ Force Design restructure that was formalized in August 2020.[2]
So, the Marines appear to recognize that the justification for the ACV has decreased and yet they continue to acquire the vehicles in substantial quantities. Given their unhesitating leap to eliminate their entire tank inventory, one would think that, logically, they would eliminate their ACV inventory, as well.
Despite the lack of justification, the Marines are not only pushing ahead with acquisitions but are also pushing ahead with development of additional ACV variants.
The four planned variants will include a personnel variant, a command and control variant, a recovery variant and a 30-mm gun variant.[1]
As noted in the 2021 GAO annual report,
… the ACV contractor plans to deliver three production-representative ACV-C [command and control variant] prototypes to support testing in fiscal year 2021 and start production of the first 10 ACV-Cs in fiscal year 2022.[2]
If all they want the ACV for is to use it as a low end armored personnel carrier (APC), there are much better, proven APCs available on the market.
Alternatively, the $2B being spent on the ACV program [2] could be much better spent on anti-air defense vehicles and systems, anti-UAV systems, electronic warfare systems, self-propelled artillery vehicles, etc.
The ACV program seems to be inherently contradictory. The Marines say they are out of the assault business and, indeed, have eliminated all their tanks and much of their artillery, which would be vital in supporting assaults, while also shifting their focus to small, missile-shooting, platoon size units that are supposed to act as deterrents more so than combat forces. Despite this, they continue to acquire ACVs whose main purpose is amphibious assault – the very mission the Marines have publicly abandoned. Huh????
The Marines are confused and seem to have no consistent purpose or core reason for existence and the illogic of the ACV acquisition program typifies their confusion.
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Marine Corps buys 30 more ACVs following rough year of waterborne ops training”, Justin Katz, 17-Nov-2022,
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021
[3]Reference [2] cites a total acquisition of 678 ACV
I'd suspect the ACVs were purchased because the manufacturer bribed the USMC generals responsible for acquisitions, if I wasn't certain those generals were TOO INCOMPETENT to demand a bribe to go with this decision.
ReplyDeleteNo doubt some officers involved with ACV procurement will get cushy jobs with companies involved with ACV after retiring. This seems par for course in the US military these days.
Delete"So, the Marines appear to recognize that the justification for the ACV has decreased and yet they continue to acquire the vehicles in substantial quantities. Given their unhesitating leap to eliminate their entire tank inventory, one would think that, logically, they would eliminate their ACV inventory, as well."
ReplyDeleteWhat happened to the tanks that the Marines got rid of?
My guess? Mothballed and awaiting the Army to find a use for them, or a buyer that wants more MBTs- even used ones- RIGHT NOW, like Poland.
DeleteThe Army gobbled them up along with support equipment like recovery vehicles. Plus, some 70 enlisted Marines transfered to the Army.
DeleteHappy Thanksgiving to All.
Perhaps the Powers That Be at the pentagon are quietly prepping the USMC for a shift back to normal after the commandant is gone.
ReplyDeleteI hope you're right.
DeleteIm thinking and hoping this is the case. With the armor gone and likely hard to re-obtain, I think this might be some subtle resistance to the Commandants crazy visions, and a matter of trying to hang on to any capabilities they have/had while waiting him out...
DeleteIn early this month's Zhuhai Airshow (actually a weapon show). China displayed its new unmanned ACV for sale:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-quad-tracked-amphibious-unmanned-vehicle-is-fascinating
Its type 05 ACV, have sold to Venezuela and Thailand.
Pentagon should also think about developing unmanned ACV.
Delete"Pentagon should also think about developing unmanned ACV."
DeleteWhy? What capability(s) would it offer that are not available now?
"What capability(s) would it offer that are not available now?"
DeleteIt would offer the typical ground robot capability of gathering information about the surrounding environment, then discarding them and driving against random obstacles.
"gathering information"
DeleteA small, hand held UAV can do that job much better.
"driving against random obstacles"
Not sure what you mean by this. If you mean attacking, mortars can do a much better job.
You need a concept of operations that describes how such a vehicle would function, what tasks it would perform, how it would perform them, and why it would be superior to what we have now.
They can ahead of manned ACVs to attack enemies without worrying lose of lives.
Delete"Not sure what you mean by this."
DeleteI think he was being sarcastic about bots never really working as they should.
Unmanned ACV can work with attacking drones in air to open up safe paths for subsequent manned ACVs.
DeleteI don't know how Chinese marine plans to use them but guess they will go ahead of ZBD-2000 in landing.
"Unmanned ACV can work with attacking drones in air to open up safe paths"
DeleteAre you suggesting that an unmanned, lightly armored, ACV, armed with the standard single 0.50 cal machine gun can open safe paths through enemy defenses? Are you suggesting that's all it takes? If so, we've hugely overspent on armies, tanks, artillery, etc.
"ahead of manned ACVs"
DeleteYou understand that ACVs are not armored assault vehicles like tanks or IFVs, right? They're personnel transports.
I think that ACV, once success in R&D, can be developed into many types, some with large guns, some with missiles, some with engineering equipment, ....
DeleteTake China's type-05 as an example, it has been developed with many different models - some with 105mm gun, some with 30mm guns, some used as ambulance, .....etc.
To be honest under Berger the USMC seems irrelevant except as ship and embassy guards. Scrap the Marines and spend that money on more SSK, SSGNs, and SSNs, greater stocks of missiles, MCMs and frigates.
ReplyDeleteSeems blasphemous, but... if the fanciful missions and planned irrelevance continues, Im going to have to agree...
DeleteYou need something to replace the AAV as a waterborne battle taxi. The AAVs aren't getting any younger.
ReplyDelete"You need something to replace the AAV as a waterborne battle taxi."
DeleteWhy? The Marines have stated that they're out of the amphibious assault business so why do they need a landing craft?
As a landing craft, the AAV is suboptimal. As a battle taxi on lad, the AAV is about the same as the old M113: better than nothing.
DeleteThe ACV makes a certain degree of sense if the Marines continue to see themselves as America's second land army, at which point they will need protected transport on land, and the ACV - which is as well protected as other wheeled APCs in its weight class* - fulfills that job.
*Previous reading suggests that you view Boxer favorably, and while I too am an admirer of that vehicle, at 40 tons it's in a different weight class than the ACV, which is on par with other 25-ton wheeled APC offerings.
Since, by their own admission, the Marines are out of the amphibious assault business, that only leaves land personnel transport which is an APC function. That being the case, they should drop the ACV and acquire a proven, true APC, preferably an HAPC. I like the Israeli Namer a lot!
DeleteThe Namer's problem is that it's just too big and too wide and too heavy - it makes sense for Israel because Israel doesn't have any expeditionary intentions, and puts a heavy emphasis on crew protection due to political reasons. It makes less sense for the US to adopt the Namer because two Namers take up the weight of 5 wheeled APCs. Like it or not, the American way of war is to go and fight in other people's back yards.
DeleteWhat is your metric for a true, proven APC? the ACV entrants, the Iveco SuperAV and ST Engineering Terrex, were essentially off the shelf purchases that have already spent over a decade serving in their host nations, and their specifications and performance are on par with other 25-ton wheeled APCs on the global market.
The other option, of course, is to ignore overseas entrants and just get in on the Army's Stryker buys. Granted, Stryker's amphibious capability is more on the idea of fording rivers, but if we assume they'll be unloading from ships at close range onto undefended, permissive beaches, then that should be fine.
DeleteThe marines are out of the amphibious assault business, yes, but being able to drive off LHDs onto the beach means that they don't have to compete with the Army for space on Air Force transport flights. AAVs did that in Iraq during the occupation: drive off the LHDs onto the beach and then patrol on land.
"Namer's problem is that it's just too big and too wide and too heavy"
DeleteNamer is the same size (slightly lighter) as the Abrams tank and we seem to be able to move them around the world, as needed.
The issue is not the size of the vehicle, it's the purpose. What do the Marines want an APC to do - assuming they even want an APC?
Do they want a moderately safe transport vehicle to drop troops off well behind the combat area? If so, a small, light APC is needed.
Do they want to deliver troops straight into combat? If so, they need a very well protected, heavy APC.
Do they want to use the vehicle in assaults? If so, they need an IFV or tank.
And so on.
Until the Marines decide who they are and what mission(s) they'll take on, we can't define any vehicle and purchasing the ACV is pointless and, likely, a waste.
If they're no longer doing amphibious assaults, as the publicly state, then half the ACV's purpose (and features/cost) is rendered moot.
Debating which APC is best is pointless without knowing what the Marine's mission/need is. They don't seem to know what it is so we certainly don't, either.
"Namer is the same size (slightly lighter) as the Abrams tank and we seem to be able to move them around the world, as needed."
DeleteMoving Abrams around the world seems easy, but there's a lot of work and effort that goes into that. You can only fit 1 Abrams into a C-17, two in a C-5: the decades long dream of flying out an Armored Brigade remains a dream, alas. There's only so many transports the Air Force has, and while we can transport tanks by ship and rail, that still takes time.
The other thing to note is the combat value (for lack of a better term) that weight gets you. That 60 tons of Namer gets you an HAPC with a 7.62 GPMG and a 9-man squad. On the other hand, 60 tons of Abrams gets you a 120mm gun, at least 2 GPMGs, and a vehicle that can assault into enemy fire and breakthrough defenses to allow less protected APCs to move up and deposit their troops.
What we are taught is that in an assault, the decisive element for the breakthrough is the combination of firepower, armor, and tactical mobility. That's why tanks are doctrinally the breakthrough element: the tank coys go first, absorb fire with their armor, and blast the defenders with their firepower; then the lesser-protected APCs can follow on because the enemy fire has been reduced.
As much as the Israelis have been an influence, this is a matter of clear disagreement in our respective doctrines.
"Do they want a moderately safe transport vehicle to drop troops off well behind the combat area? If so, a small, light APC is needed."
I just want to discuss further the doctrinal thinking of the vehicles, and how we see the roles:
- the APC delivers its squad to an offset some 200 yards from the objective and retreats, at which point the squad assaults on foot to the objective. (That's how we've been doing it since Nam - Big Army gonna big army. It's "only" two football fields away. Under fire. Which is why arty and mortars are supposed to be suppressing them, or the tanks broke through first. But I digress.) The GPMG an APC carries just isn't impactful enough a weapon, so there's no point for it to hang around and eat RPGs from the bunkered/sandbagged defenders.
- The IFV delivers its squad straight into combat, on top of the objective and stays there to fight: this is because all IFVs carry autocannons and many carry ATGMs, which are significatly more impactful than the APC's GPMG. Every IFV is essentially a protected transport and a heavy weapons team, drastically augmenting the rifle squad's firepower. Sandbags can stop 7.62; they can't stop 25mm or airburst HE-frag 30mm (let alone 40mm Bofors, like some European IFVs have).
As we like to say in my unit: the bunker suppresses the APC, the IFV suppresses the bunker.
There are APCs and there are APCs. You wouldn't consider Tenryuu and Atlanta to be equal, even though they're both light cruisers, would you? The capabilities are just so different. The trope codifier APC, the M113 in use since Nam, is a lightly armored shitbox that'll die to heavy machine gun fire. But all modern 25 tonner wheeled APCs are now HMG-protected: a Terrex is functionally proof against .50cal and 40mm grenades in its _base_ config. Every wheeled APC offered by a reputable manufacturer has NERA, ERA or ceramic applique addons for more RPG protection - Strykers famously have the RPG cage. Put an autocannon on your wheeled APC, and it becomes a wheeled IFV, because it's now got that decisive firepower that it didn't have before. That protection scheme is enough for a SuperAV APC to deliver troops and run away, and keeps a Freccia IFV alive long enough to supress the bunker so the troops can storm it (if not kill the bunker outright).
-- Because people are not entirely dumb, and realise that a 7.62 doesn't always cut it, but also can't afford to put an autocannon and its turret on on every troop carrier, a combo .50 HMG/40mm AGL RWS is a fairly popular armament option on modern wheeled APCs (the RWS Stryker uses can also fit and fire Javelin, so that's a nice extra).
That said, observing the trends in military procurement over the last 40 years, there's been a pretty significant bias for tracked IFVs as a supporting arm to the tracked MBTs - Abrams + Bradley being the ur-Example; as an american friend told me, his tank battalion traded two Abrams coys for two Brad coys with a mech inf battalion, so they ended up with two 2/2 mixed battalions of Abrams & Brad. Where we see wheeled IFVs is where they're acting as supporting element for wheeled APCs - for example, Stryker brigades getting the Stryker Dragoon IFV to augment their Stryker APCs.
Delete"If they're no longer doing amphibious assaults, as the publicly state, then half the ACV's purpose (and features/cost) is rendered moot."
By this logic, the marines should not need protected transport for their infantry - and yet, even the Filipinos, the sick man of Asia, are trying to buy APCs for their army. The US Army does not do amphibious assault, and yet it is retaining its entire fleet of amphibious Stryker APCs. All European 25-tonner wheeled APCs are amphibious. Being able to swim across a river gives you operational flexibility. (Granted, Big Army's also given up on its Bradleys being any semblance of amphibious, what with the extra weight of the BUSK ERA panels. But I digress.)
Just becasue they are not doing amphibious assault does not mean that they do not need a troop carrier for when they play America's Second Land Army (which was their role for the last 30 years, and I'm of the firm belief it's what they'll revert back to once the current Commandant retires). They didn't use their AAVs for amphibious assault in iraq, they used them as troop carriers.
I suppose they could always just entirely divest themselves of vehicles and walk everywhere... but well, not even Singapore, a city-state, does that nonsense of just walking everywhere. But it wouldn't be the first time HQMC had a bad idea, I suppose.
To sum up my thinking: unless HQMC is completely retarded, the Marines will still need protected troop transport (unless they want to do stupid things like ride to combat in 5 tonner trucks which have NO protection at all, or be completely foot mobile the way 7th ID drank the light infantry kool aid), especially if they revert back to being America's Second Land Army, which I think is an inevitability. (Although at that point they should just buy Stryker instead of being special snowflakes). As VDV's misadventures in Ukraine show us, there's only so much a light inf force can do without protected transport and protected firepower alongside it.
Delete...unless, that is, HQMC wants to use helicopter lift to drop infantry battalions in place as blocking force. I don't think that serves any point - they don't have a need like that, not like Singapore. In wartime, Guards and Guards-adjacent inf battalions are supposed to be dropped in Malaysia to buy time for mobilising the reserves (because recalling 2 million men takes time), but that's not a need the Marines have.
Some of my American Army friends have talked about how Big Army's force future structure plans on using light inf divs for urban warfare to hold cities, pure leg inf still has a role... but again, that's not really what the Marines are for, or what they should be doing, isn't it?
To be honest, I've often thought that amphibious forces are something of a luxury capability, more useful for the great powers to punch down at their colonial holdings than to actually use in peer war. Parking a MEU (Chinese or American, the result is the same :V) off an African coast sends a message: do what I say, or I invade you.
This is not what I would call relevant to the current topic, but I did not know where else to put the link. Just something else to shake our heads or fingers at.
ReplyDeletehttps://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-navy-fined-software-privacy/
I don't approve of the use of unlicensed software, however, to add a bit of perspective, the impression one gets is that most of China's software is illegally obtained so ...
DeleteExactly. I don't know why, Com, but the Walker Spy Ring just popped into my head.
Delete