Showing posts with label F-14 Tomcat. Show all posts
Showing posts with label F-14 Tomcat. Show all posts

Monday, January 30, 2023

Long Range Carrier Fighter - F-22 / F-15 Hybrid

ComNavOps has stated that the role of the carrier, today, is to provide escort for cruise missile shooting Burkes and to establish localized, long range, air superiority.  This requires a dedicated, optimized, long range air superiority fighter and, unfortunately, we have no such aircraft.  Many people have suggested a navalized F-22 and, while that would be a distinct improvement over what we have now, it would still only be a stopgap measure with shortcomings. 

 

An even better near term option would be a navalized hybrid of the F-22 and F-15 (the F2215?).  The F-22’s stealth and air-to-air (A2A) prowess combined with the F-15’s incredible combat radius of over a thousand miles[1] would make for a pretty good long range, air superiority fighter until we could develop a truly optimized fighter.

 

Here’s a few considerations.

 

 

Role.  This is where every US military acquisition program goes off the rails on day one.  The US military simply can’t resist making every asset a multi-role, do-everything, win-the-war-singlehanded, piece of unaffordable, unachievable crap that takes several decades to field.  This aircraft is an air superiority fighter and nothing more than that.  Not a single piece of equipment can be added that doesn’t directly support the main and only mission:  air superiority.  No strike-fighter.  No EW.  No surveillance.  No buddy tanking.  No mid-course guidance, hand off to a Boy Scout in Montana.  No mini-AEW.  Just air superiority.  That’s it.  That’s all.  Just that.  Air superiority.

 

Going a step further, this is just for the Navy.  No Air Force version with modifications.  No Marine jump jet version.  Just the Navy.

 

Size.  Almost by definition, a very long range, heavily armed fighter is going to be fairly large.  The F-22 and F-15 are both the same size as the F-14 which we operated routinely off carriers so that degree of size is not an issue. 

 

 

Length, ft

Width, ft

F-14 Tomcat

63

38 (swept)

64 (spread)

F-22 Raptor

62

44

F-15 Eagle

64

43

F-18 Super Hornet

60

44 (spread)

31 (folded)

 

 

Add folding wings to the F-22 and F-15 and their parked footprint width drops from around 44 ft to around 30 ft which is well within flight deck spotting requirements.

 

Thus, our notional F-2215 fighter would have a spot footprint of 64 ft x 30 ft, virtually identical to the F-18E/F which is 60 ft x 44 ft (31 ft folded).

 

Combat Radius.  The F-15 has outstanding combat radius for current fighter aircraft and that’s the point of merging it with the F-22.  I don’t know what gives the F-15 its great range (conformal fuel tanks / FAST pack?) but whatever it is we need to merge it into the F-22.  Note, however, that even that range is inadequate, longer term.  While a thousand mile range sounds impressive and useful, it’s not.  If all you want to do is to travel a thousand miles and then instantly turn around and return to base, that’s fine.  However, presumably, we want to get there and stay while we engage in A2A combat.  We want to have enough fuel left to ‘turn and burn’ for a while.  Thus, that thousand mile combat radius is actually only 500-800 miles or so if we want to retain enough fuel to hang around and fight.  Long term, we need a fighter with a true thousand mile combat radius which includes A2A combat time at a thousand miles.  That, however, is a development for the next fighter.

 

Weapons.  Obviously, we want as many weapons as possible especially against stealth aircraft where many missile shots will miss.  Below are some possible max weapon loadouts for reference to give some idea of what current max loadouts are.  It would be desirable to be able to carry around 12 A2A missiles of various types and the loadouts below show that to be within the realm of possibility although restricting ourselves to internal carry may reduce that to 8-10 weapons.

 

 

Possible Max Weapons Load

F-14 Tomcat

6x Phoenix + 2x Sidewinder

F-22 Raptor

6x AMRAAM + 2x Sidewinder (all internal)

F-15 Eagle

8x AMRAAM

F-18 Super Hornet

12x AMRAAM

 

 

Stealth.  The F-22 is the stealthiest operational fighter in the world so … good enough! 

 

Maneuverability.  The F-22 is the most maneuverable operational fighter in the world so … good enough! 

 

Speed.  The F-22 is capable of supercruise, however, it is not clear to me that extremely high speed is all that tactically useful.  If very high speed can be achieved without added cost, weight, or complexity then do it.  If not, leave it out and go with cheaper, lighter, simpler … you know, the characteristics that should be the creed of aircraft design.

 

Sensors.  US acquisition programs inevitably fall apart because we constantly try to concurrently develop non-existent technology as we enter production.  We need the best sensors currently operational and nothing more.  By all accounts the F-22 sensors are more than adequate so … good enough!

 

Development.  Conceptually, merging the F-22 and F-15 is easy and straightforward.  The airframe is already proven to work.  No development needed, there.  After that, it’s just a matter of packaging the internal components.  It is mandatory, however, to mature the design at the prototype level before committing to production and then to hold the design to zero changes during the production run.  That’s how you build an affordable aircraft (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

 

  

Summary

 

The Navy desperately needs a dedicated, long range, air superiority fighter and a conceptual merging of the F-22 and F-15 would provide an excellent near to medium term solution if it could be fielded within a 3-5 year period and we’ve already referenced exactly how to do that and this should be even easier as everything already exists – it’s just a packaging exercise.

 

The F-2215 fills the immediate need while we develop the truly optimized, longer term solution.



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Note:  Yes, I'm perfectly aware that an adapted F2215 would need beefed up landing gear, tail hook, corrosion resistance, low speed landing, etc.  Those are the nitty-gritty details for the engineers to deal with.  We're working at the concept level.

 

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[1]Wikipedia, “McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle”, retrieved 20-Jan-2023,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_F-15_Eagle#Specifications_(F-15C)

“Combat range: 1,061 nmi (1,221 mi, 1,965 km) for interdiction mission”


Sunday, December 31, 2017

Tomcat Eyes

Observers are looking with excitement and anticipation at the development and eventual inclusion of an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor into the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.  This will be a significant advance for the Hornet and broaden the aircraft’s capabilities.

The Boeing/Lockheed Block II IRST, under development in an $89M contract, will be housed in the nose section of an external centerline fuel tank.  Development is scheduled to be completed in 2020. (1)

"IRST is yet another addition to the Super Hornet Block II arsenal, and it will truly change the nature of the air-to-air fight," said Capt. Donald "BD" Gaddis, U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G program manager, PMA-265.” (2)

This revolutionary, first of a kind capability will …huh? … what?  …  Hold on a minute.  Someone is interrupting me.  What?  It what?  Back then? 

Uh, I’ve just been informed that this state of the art IR sensor may not be quite as revolutionary as I thought, having been lead to believe, by the Navy, that nothing like this has been achieved before.  Apparently, I’m told, the F-14 Tomcat had this sensor capability, and more, decades ago.  Okay, let’s take a look back and see what the ancient, outdated, hopelessly outclassed Tomcat had in the way of sensors.


The Tomcat’s non-radar sensors were mounted in distinctive chinpods under the nose. 




ALQ-100 E/F/G/H-Band Track-Breaker – The early F-14A had the ALQ-100 mounted under the nose.  While not a sensor, the electronic countermeasure device was a prominent chin-mount and I mention it for clarity.

ALR-23 IR Seeker - The early F-14A had an IR seeker in a chinpod mount.  The seeker could be slaved to the radar or used independently and was gimbal mounted and could be steered.  I’ve been unable to find much additional information about the sensor’s capabilities or how it was used tactically.

AXX-1 Television Camera System (TCS) – The Northrop TCS was an optical sensor consisting of a telescopic television imager and cockpit display and provided telescopic images of targets far beyond unaided visual range.  Identification ranges are stated to be 10 miles for small fighters and out to 85 miles for large bombers and cargo planes. (4)   The TCS had a 30 degree conical field of view and could be slewed at a rate of 30 degrees/second and was gyroscopically stabilized in pitch/yaw at up to 150 degrees/second.  Thus, the TCS was unaffected by the aircraft’s maneuvering within the field of view.  The TCS also had a tracking-lock capability to enable the target to be continuously followed.  Automatic scan-lock was another built in feature which allowed automatic target detection during continuous scanning.  The Tomcat’s AWG-9/71 radar could be slaved to the TCS or vice versa.  The TCS was first fitted to the late model F-14A.  Additional information is available in a summary report (5).


TCS System


AAS-42 IRST – A more advanced IR sensor, the AAS-42 appeared on the F-14D in 1990.  The sensor provided search and track capability as well as IR imagery.  From Deagel website,

“Operating in six discrete modes, the AN/AAS-42 provides the aircraft mission computer track file data on all targets while simultaneously providing infrared imagery to the cockpit display.” (3)

F-14D’s often utilized a potent side by side, dual combination of IRST and TCS which may have had detection ranges as much as 110+ miles, thereby greatly enhancing air-to-air targeting and useful missile launch ranges. (6)

 
AAS-42 IRST and TCS


While the Navy is loudly and proudly proclaiming the coming use of IRST on the F-18 Hornet, we see that the reality is that effective IR and optical sensors existed on the F-14 Tomcat long ago.  Why the Navy abandoned these sensors when the Hornet was developed is baffling.  Today, as we look at the F-35 and all its problems and costs, we view the Hornet fondly and think of it as a good, if not great, aircraft.  The reality is that the Hornet was a very compromised and, as regards combat effectiveness and range, a very ineffective aircraft.  The addition of IRST is a welcome development but, good grief, we had that and better in the F-14 many decades ago.  Even with the IRST, the Hornet will still lack the F-14’s highly effective TCS.

The eyes of the Tomcat were highly effective combat enhancers that the Navy is only now, and only partially, matching with the Hornet’s cobbled together IRST/fuel tank conglomeration. 

As the Soviet pilots of the era knew well, the eyes of the Tomcat were always on them.  We need to remember the capabilities we had decades ago and begin designing actual combat aircraft again that can at least match what we once had.  What passes for a combat aircraft today is a sad reflection of what once was.


Note:  I’m well aware that other aircraft in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s also had similar sensors – no need to list them in a comment.  Again, it just shows how far we’ve drifted away from actual combat aircraft design.



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(1)Defense Systems website, “Navy integrates new F-18 infrared sensor”, Katherine Owens, 20-Jun-2017,

(2)Boeing website,


(4)Air Power Australia website, “Electro Optical Systems”, Carlo Kopp, Mar 1984,

(5)Forecast International,



Monday, September 19, 2016

Super Tomcat Today

I mentioned in a previous post that with maintenance upgrades the Tomcat could have stayed around and we could have skipped the entire F-18 Hornet family.

Many people, myself included, have lauded the Hornet but only in comparison to the F-35 train wreck.  As a stand alone aircraft, the Hornet is woefully short ranged for today’s missions and is poorly suited for either air to air combat or strike.  The lack of suitability is a function of trying to be a multi-role aircraft and, therefore, being outstanding at neither.

A far better alternative would have been to perform the maintenance upgrade we previously discussed (see, "Maintenance Upgrades") combined with the Super Tomcat upgrades.  That would have given us a high performance fleet interceptor with vastly improved maintainability.  Let’s take a closer look at what we might have had if the Navy had opted to go the Tomcat upgrade route instead of the Hornet route.

To review, the sequence of proposed Tomcat upgrades (maintenance and performance) was, in order,

  1. F-14D Quickstrike
  2. Super Tomcat 21
  3. Attack Super Tomcat 21
  4. ASF-14 (Advanced Strike Fighter)

The first three modifications would have preserved the basic F-14 to the degree possible while the final version, the ASF-14, would have incorporated new materials and technologies and produced an essentially new aircraft similar to the way the Super Hornet is largely a new aircraft compared to the original Hornet.  The first three versions would have been remanufactured while the last version would have been new construction.

Here, in no particular order, is a list of the various technologies proposed for inclusion in the Tomcat upgrades.


  • GE-F110-129 engines for super-cruise at Mach 1.3 and increased acceleration
  • Upgraded APG-71 radar including an Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar mode and a 20% increase in target acquisition range. (3)
  • Modified and enlarged control surfaces to provide 33% greater low speed lift around the carrier and enlarged all-moving tailplanes. (3)
  • Enlarged leading edge root extensions (LERX) that would house more fuel and enhance the jet's low speed handling capabilities
  • Thrust vectoring nozzles tied directly to a new digital flight control system.  Even without thrust vectoring, the aerodynamic enhancements found on the ASF-14 would allow the jet to reach over 77 degrees of sustained AoA, but thrust vectoring was also to be part of the new design which would have made it the most maneuverable fighter of all time. (3)
  • Significantly greater range
  • The Quickstrike version would have had provision for up to 24 munitions points, fewer for heavier munitions. (3)
  • Modified radar with Forward Air Controller (FAC) mode
  • Integrated Defensive Avionics Package (IDAP)
  • FLIR targeting and Terrain Following Radar housed in front of the Phoenix missile mount's aerodynamic fairings under the fuselage
  • Infra Red Search & Track system (IRST) and Television Camera System (TCS) mounted in under-nose pods
  • Upgraded cockpit avionics including a new wide angle heads up display (HUD) that would be capable of projecting the navigational FLIR's imagery
  • Increase in internal fuel from 16,200 lbs for an F-14D to 18,500 lbs for the SuperTomcat 21. (2)
  • Further increase in internal fuel over the Super Tomcat 21 via thicker wings in the ASF-14.
  • Use of carbon fiber structural components to save weight and volume
  • 1960's era sub-systems that were heavy and complex would be replaced with modular components
  • All of the jet's hydraulic and electrical systems that gave legacy Tomcat maintainers such headaches over the years would have been replaced with greatly simplified systems
  • Many structural components would be made out of carbon fiber instead of aluminum or titanium. This would allow the new Tomcat to be only slightly heavier in gross weight (about 1000 pounds empty) than its predecessor, while gaining 2200 lbs of fuel in each glove area. (2)
  • Some stealthy characteristics would be applied to the ASF-14, this may have included radar baffles over it engines' fan faces and "edge-aligned" gear doors and access points. (1)
  • A mammoth active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar would have been fitted and provided with immense amounts of power for interlaced air-to-air and air-to-ground operations or even standoff electronic attack. You can see how incredible the ASF-14s AESA capability would have matured into by looking at the current APG-63V3 AESA radar upgrade program for the F-15. The APG-63V3 is actually more capable in some respects than the F-22A's APG-77 AESA radar because it is larger in diameter, allowing for more transit/receive modules to be utilized, and it is newer in its design. The Tomcat was built originally for the massive Hughes AWG-9 fire control radar, the largest radar ever deployed on a US fighter, so there is a LOT of real estate up front for the mother of all fighter jet AESA radar arrays to have been fitted. (1)

And, of course, any new technologies that have been developed and incorporated into the current F-18E/F would also have been capable of being added to the SuperTomcat.

In addition, if we had gone the SuperTomcat route, we would undoubtedly have upgraded the Phoenix or developed a new, better replacement – perhaps something like a longer ranged AMRAAM which we essentially now have, anyway.

So, what would be the specs of a Super Tomcat compared to the Super Hornet and F-35?  Obviously, the Super Tomcat’s specs are speculative and are my own assessments.


 Super Tomcat              Super Hornet                      F-35

Combat Radius                     750 (4) nm                   390 nm                       490 nm (5)
Speed                                    Mach 2+                      Mach 1.8                    Mach 1.6
Hardpoints                             10                                11                                2 (6)
Weapons Load                      17,750 lbs(7)               17,750 lbs                   3,000 lbs (6)


(4)Wiki credits the F-14D with a 500 nm combat radius.  Given the increases in fuel and wing area, combined with newer, more efficient engines, I’m estimating 750 nm combat radius.

(5)Wiki credits the F-35 with a 625 nm to 760 nm combat radius which is patently false since the credited range is 1200 nm.  The best possible combat radius is half the range since the aircraft has to fly out and return.  So, to list a combat radius that is greater than half the range is not possible.  When one factors in the combat maneuvering (higher thrust) during the combat mission, the maximum value of half the range becomes significantly less than half.  One of the two numbers is incorrect.  Given all the lies told about the F-35 by the manufacturer and the Navy so far, I flat out don’t believe the listed combat radius.  So, I’ve estimated a combat radius that is likely far more correct.

(6)This is the F-35’s combat capability.  The aircraft has 6x additional hardpoints but those will not be used in combat because of the resulting degradation of stealth.  Further, the aircraft’s combat radius is predicated on a clean configuration (internal weapons only).  Any configuration with external hardpoints would severely degrade the combat radius as well as stealth and maneuverability.

(7)The Super Tomcat would, undoubtedly, have increased its weapon payload from the 14,500 lb of the standard F-14 but how much is a guess.  I’ve seen no published number.  I’ve opted to cite the same capacity as the Super Hornet although I suspect the increase would be much greater.  This is a debatable number.


Now, let’s look at today’s aircraft roles.  The Navy needs a long range fleet interceptor and air superiority fighter.  Given the existence of the Tomahawk-TLAM, there may or may not be a need for a long range strike aircraft – but that’s another post.  Clearly, an upgraded Tomcat would have given us a vastly superior long range fleet interceptor and air superiority fighter as compared to the Super Hornet we have today. 

An upgraded Tomcat is even superior to the F-35 in all ways except stealth.  There’s just a limit to how much stealth you can “fit” on to an airframe that wasn’t designed and shaped for stealth from the beginning.  Of course, we don’t know how much stealth the ASF-14 would have had.  More importantly, we don’t know how much stealth is actually effective or needed.

The two-seat Tomcat would have also allowed a much greater degree of secondary tasking such as surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, control of other aircraft, etc.

What we see from all this is the possibility that the Tomcat could have been upgraded and the entire F-18 line skipped while providing a vastly superior aircraft.  Going further, the improved Tomcat would, today, surpass not only the F-18 but the F-35, as well, in all ways except stealth.

It is likely that the cost of the overall upgrade path would have been less than the F-18 path simply due to bypassing the basic airframe development.  Of course, the upgrades, themselves, would have cost the same as the upgrades for the Super Hornet.

Having a vastly superior aircraft, today, would allow the Navy to skip the troubled F-35 and wait for the next generation fighter instead of having to accept a hugely expensive F-35 that does not even meet the Navy’s need for a long range interceptor and air superiority fighter.

It’s not as if all this has become apparent only with the benefit of hindsight.  The advantages of the Tomcat upgrade path were well known at the time and the mediocrity of the F-18 Hornet was also well recognized.  The Navy had every opportunity to make an informed, better decision and opted not to.  They have no one to blame but themselves for the current situation.



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(1)Foxtrot Alpha website, “Top Gun Day Special: The Super Tomcat That Was Never Built”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-May-2014

(2)Home of M.A.T.S. website, 6-Aug-2016


(3)topedge.com website, “Advanced Tomcat Variants”, 6-Aug-2016



Sunday, March 9, 2014

Tomcat and F-35 Development

I noted the other day that the F-35C is slated to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2019 (history says that won’t happen!).  That lead me to take a quick look at the JSF developmental history.  The JSF developmental contract was issued in Nov 1996 with first flight occurring in Dec 2006.

In comparison, the F-14 Tomcat development effort began in 1968 with the issuance of a Request For Proposals.  A contract was awarded in Jan 1969 with first flight occurring in Dec 1970 and IOC in 1973.  The plane entered squadron service in 1974 with VF-1 and VF-2 aboard USS Enterprise.  The last Tomcat was finally retired in 2006.

Are you grasping the differences in developmental times?!

From program initiation, here are the elapsed times for the two programs.

First Flight:     F-14 = 2 yr,  F-35 = 10 yr
IOC:                F-14 = 4 yr,  F-35 = 23 yr

Are you kidding me??!  23 years to achieve F-35C IOC even assuming that the 2019 IOC date is met, which it won’t, versus 4 years for the Tomcat. 

In terms of technology, this plane will be pushing three decades old by the time it enters squadron service!  After three decades we were retiring the Tomcat.  After three decades, the F-35 will be just entering service.  Yikes!


F-14 Tomcat

I know someone is going to pound out a reply that the F-35 is far more complex and technically advanced.  Bilgewater!  The Tomcat was every bit as revolutionary and advanced for its day with variable geometry wings and the Phoenix missile system which allowed it to engage multiple targets simultaneously at long range.  Plus, the Tomcat development did not have the advantage of today’s powerful computer modeling and simulations or computer aided drafting and design.

I am continually blown away by the magnitude of the F-35 debacle.

Thursday, August 9, 2012

What's Old is New Again

The current issue of the USNI Proceedings (1) reports that China has reached a deal to license-produce Tu-22M Backfire bombers.  The arrangement will initially result in 36 bombers which is regimental strength from the old Soviet days and was believed to be the amount needed to defeat a US Navy carrier group.

As you recall, the Navy’s response to the Soviet bombers was the long range, high speed Tomcat with its load of AIM-54 Phoenix missiles guided by the plane’s AWG-9 radar.  Tomcats made up the outer layer of the carrier group’s layered defenses.  I bet the Navy wishes they had Tomcats now!


Tu-22 Backfire - Bigger Threat than Ballistic Missiles

The Navy’s current front line fighter is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet carrying AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles.  The Hornet has a combat radius of 390 nm compared to the Tomcat’s 500 nm.  The latest version of the AMRAAM has a 100 nm range which is comparable to the Phoenix but has a lighter warhead, 40-50 lbs versus the 135 lb warhead of the Phoenix.  Given the massive size of the Backfire, the much larger warhead of the Phoenix will be missed.


There are a couple of interesting points in all this.  First, the acquisition of bombers strongly suggests that the Chinese have realized (or known all along) that the magic, carrier-killing ballistic missile that has the Western media so frightened is only half the equation.  The other half is targeting.  Trying to produce launch quality targeting data on moving ships 500-1000 nm away is a challenge, to say the least.  We can’t do it and I highly doubt the Chinese can, either.  That renders the carrier-killing missiles ineffective.  Bombers, on the other hand, carry their own radar and generate their own firing solution.  The only question is can they survive long enough to get within radar range and launch? 

This is the Cold War scenario all over again and that brings us to the second point.  The Navy was misguided, to put it kindly, to abandon the long ranged, hard hitting Tomcat for the short ranged, light hitting Hornet.  This decision is further compounded by the decision to reduce the size of the carrier air wings based on the rationale that newer planes are superior to older ones.  If you’re going to fight an outer air battle to protect the carrier, you probably want as many airframes as possible to carry your missiles.  Instead of developing the marginally effective Hornet, we should have developed a new airframe with the characteristics of the Tom/Bombcat.  Oh well, at least we have the long range, weapons-dripping JSF coming soon and that will …  ah … well, it's not really long ranged, actually, and it can't carry much of a weapons load but still it can, ah …  Oh crap, we’re screwed!


(1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “Back(Fire) to the Future?”, Norman Friedman, Aug 2012, p. 90