Zumwalt Hypersonic Missile Perspective

As you know, the Zumwalt’s main weapon, the Advanced Gun System (AGS) was terminated some time ago in a major embarrassment for the Navy.  Now, seeking to recover some degree of usefulness for the class, the Navy has opted to convert the Zumwalt, itself, to a hypersonic missile shooter.  The conversion work has begun and the forward AGS gun has reportedly been removed.  Naval News website has a nice, short summary of the changes involved in the hypersonic missile conversion.[1]
 
The main change, of course, is the addition of four Multiple All-Up Round Canisters (MACs) housing three Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles each, for a total of twelve hypersonic missiles.  Presumably, additional missiles could be added in the space currently occupied by the after AGS gun, however, no such plans have been announced.  Even if that were to occur, that would, presumably, only raise the total hypersonic missile count to 24 assuming there was sufficient room.
 
The question is, are 12 (or even 24) hypersonic missiles a worthwhile use for a cruiser size ship that cost around $14B+ (with costs continuing to rise!)?  The answer would seem to be an emphatic, no.
 
Of course, if the Zumwalt conversion is actually a testbed prototype limited to just the Zumwalt and just the forward missile cluster, then the effort might be worthwhile.  ComNavOps has long been in favor of prototyping and, let’s face it, there is no better use for the hugely expensive Zumwalts.
 
As an actual combat vessel, the Zumwalt with hypersonic missiles offers very little value.  Even if the missiles were unstoppable and 100% accurate and effective (Russian experience in Ukraine suggests hypersonic missiles can be stopped and are not all that effective), 12 (or 24) missiles simply don’t constitute a serious threat.
 
In the Navy’s mind, is the Zumwalt an actual combat vessel or just a testbed?  Time will tell.
 
 
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Related side note:  In a scenario eerily reminiscent of the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford failures to develop non-existent equipment, the hypersonic missiles do not yet exist in an operational form and are being developed concurrently with the Zumwalt’s conversion.  Concurrency, as we know all too well, has not been a successful practice.

 
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[1]Naval News website, “US Navy Removes First 155mm AGS From USS Zumwalt At Ingalls Shipbuilding”, Carter Johnston, 14-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/us-navy-removes-first-155mm-ags-from-uss-zumwalt-at-ingalls-shipbuilding/

Burke, Zumwalt, and Deck Space

Let me ask you a question  …  Where do you put weapons on a ship?  It’s not a trick question.  The answer is simple and obvious:  you put them on some open area of the deck.  Guns, VLS, RAM/SeaRAM, triple torpedo tube launchers, Mk141 (Harpoon) rack launchers, Naval Strike Missile rack launchers  …  whatever.  They’re all mounted on decks.
 
The concept also applies to most sensors, decoy launchers, electronic warfare emitters, communications antennae, etc.  In some cases the deck space takes the form of a sponson or platform jutting off the side of the superstructure but we realize that the sponson/platform is simply a small section of horizontal deck welded to the side of the superstructure.
 
Here’s another blindingly obvious question (though a seeming mystery to the Navy!):  we want WARships to have as many weapons (and sensors and …) as possible, right?  Therefore, since weapons require deck space to mount and we want as many weapons as possible, it logically follows that we want as much open, available deck space as possible, right? 
 
A good WARship design should maximize deck space in order to maximize its installed firepower and to allow for future weapon additions such as inevitably happens during war when weapons that should have been installed from the start are frantically retrofitted.  Those magnificent Burkes with their single CIWS are going to quickly become loaded with additional CIWS/SeaRAM when war comes.  After all, you don’t want to protect a $2B ship with a single CIWS with a limited field of fire that only covers half the ship, right?  Where are those extra CIWS/SeaRAM going to be mounted?  Any open deck space, of course!
 
Further, the best deck space is the lower, main deck because it minimizes top-heaviness and stability issues.
 
So, a good WARship design should maximize deck space and, in particular, lower/main deck space.
 
We’ve covered this in a previous post where we noted that ship superstructures have grown enormously since WWII and the ‘cost’ has been usable deck space for weapon mounts (see, “ShipSuperstructures”).
 
 
So, having established that a good WARship design emphasizes and maximizes open deck space, let’s take a look at two specific examples:  the Burke and the Zumwalt classes.  How much deck space do they have?
 
 
Burke
 
Displacement = 9,700 tons
Nominal dimensions = 509 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 509 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Burke = 30,540 sq.ft. of deck space
 
The flight deck which is around 92 ft x 60 ft = 5,520 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 25,020 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
Zumwalt
 
Displacement = 15,907 tons
Nominal dimensions = 610 ft x 80 ft
 
The main deck section extends 325 ft from the stern to the forward edge of superstructure where the deck begins to sharply angle in towards the bow.  Allowing for the tumblehome of the hull which narrows the available deck space, we have around 70 ft of width on the deck.  Thus the main deck section is approximately 325 ft x 70 ft = 22,750 sq.ft.
 
The forward, angled section is a triangular shape about 255 ft to the bow and 70 ft wide at the base of the triangular shape.  Using the formula for the area of a triangle (1/2 x base x length) = 8,025 sq.ft.
 
Note that the extreme narrowing of the Zumwalt’s bow makes a significant portion of that area useless for weapon installations.  I would estimate that 10% is too narrow to be useful, making the effective forward deck area closer to 7,945 sq.ft.
 
Thus the nominal, usable total deck area = 22,750 sq.ft. + 7,945 sq.ft. = 30,695 sq.ft.
 
The flight deck which is around 141 ft x 70 ft = 9,870 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 20,825 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
 
 
Note that these calculations are for the apparent footprint of the deck area.  In reality, some portion of the apparent deck footprint consists of the slanted sides of the superstructures so all the deck area calculations are overstated by, perhaps, 5%-10%.  However, not wanting to be bothered with that exact of a determination, we’ll ignore the slanted sides reduction on the deck area and assume that it’s a wash across both ships.
 
 
We see, then, that the Zumwalt’s displacement is 64% (1.6 times larger) greater than the Burke while the deck space is 17% less.
 
 
We built a cruiser size Zumwalt 64% larger than a Burke with 17% less space for mounting weapons.
 
 
When war comes and we start looking to install additional weapons, we’re going to find that the Zumwalt was a poor design that could not readily accept additional weapons … such as close in weapons of which the ship currently has none.
 
 
Just for fun, let’s take a look at a WWII ship with a displacement similar to the Burke:  the Northampton class cruiser at 9,200 tons versus the Burke at 9,700 tons.  The Northampton is actually 500 tons lighter but that’s close enough. 
 
Northampton
 
Displacement = 9,200 tons
Nominal dimensions = 600 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 600 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Northampton = 36,000 sq.ft. of deck space
 
We see, then, that the Northampton, while slightly lighter, has 10,980 sq.ft. more deck space for weapons! 
 
 
 
 
We’ve lost our way in WARship design.
 
 
 
Caveat:  All of this ignores weight margins and stability.  Available deck space is useless if the ship can’t support the added weight and remain stable.  Of course, when war comes, we’ll strip out tons of crew comforts thus freeing up weight and stability for weapons.

Zumwalt First Live Fire

Naval News website reports that the USS Zumwalt conducted its first ever live fire exercise (ESSM and Standard) on 14-Apr-2022.  Okay, that’s nice but what’s noteworthy about a routine live fire exercise?

 

Well, it’s the fact that the Navy commissioned the Zumwalt on 15-Oct-2016 which means that it’s taken around five and a half years to get from commissioning to the first live fire exercise.

 

How many crew and captains have come and gone from the ship, never having fired a weapon?

 

Is a single live fire exercise every 5-1/2 years sufficient to establish and maintain combat proficiency?

 

Is 5-1/2 years really our standard for getting a combat system up and running after commissioning?  Shouldn’t a ship be combat ready the day it’s commissioned?

 

Zumwalt First Live Fire

Note the cameras set up around the deck to record the momentous event.

 

This is embarrassing and humiliating for the Navy.

 

 

 

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[1]Naval News website, “USS Zumwalt Conducts Live-Fire Missile Exercise”, Staff, 1-May-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/uss-zumwalt-conducts-live-fire-missile-exercise/

Zumwalt Hypersonic Update

The Navy has been working toward the installation of hypersonic weapons on the Zumwalt class by 2025.  The hypersonic missiles would be housed in, and launched from, modified Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes similar to those installed in the Ohio class SSGN submarines. 

 

Initial reports varied but the plan seems to be to install two MAC tubes on one of the Zumwalts, offset to the sides, port and starboard.  The existing, idled Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) does not need to be removed according to CNO Gilday.[1]

 

Zumwalt has been operating as part of the Navy’s unmanned ship test squadron, Surface Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRON) which was established in May-2019.

  

 

MAC Tube

 

The modified MAC launch tubes will hold three hypersonic weapons.

 

The MAC tubes on the four SSGNs put seven Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) in the same space of a Trident-II D5 nuclear ballistic missile. The Navy will put three of the larger C-HGBs in the same space, USNI News understands.[1]

  

 

Common Hypersonic Glide Body

 

The hypersonic weapon is the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) which is being co-developed developed by the Army and Navy.  The missiles will be housed in a system similar to the Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes that are installed on the Ohio class guided-missile submarines (SSGN).  The SSGN MAC tubes contain seven Tomahawk cruise missiles per tube.  Reports suggest that the Navy will convert the MAC tubes to house three hypersonic weapons.

 

The Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) is a weapon system that uses a booster rocket motor to accelerate to well-above hypersonic speeds, and then jettisons the expended rocket booster.

 

 

CONOPS

 

Here’s an interesting comment from CNO Gilday:

 

“Zumwalt gave us an opportunity to get [hypersonics] out faster and to be honest with you I need a solid mission for Zumwalt,” Gilday said.[1] [emphasis added]

 

I guess you should have developed a CONOPS before building the ship, admiral.  I guess you also should have R&D’ed the AGS before you committed to making it the main weapon of the ship.  The Zumwalt’s problems and current lack of mission are a purely self-inflicted wound … inflicted by stupidity.

 

Now, the question for the admiral is, have you learned your lesson about CONOPS or are you just stupidly plunging ahead with this hypersonics-on-Zumwalt idea without a CONOPS that tells you how you’ll use the Zumwalt-hypersonics, assuming it technically works?  I’m guessing you haven’t thought this through, at all.

 

For example,

 

-Zumwalt currently only has the capacity for 80 missiles.  Hypersonics take up more room so there will be even fewer (half as many??) regular missiles?  Is that a tactically useful amount?

 

-If you have to remove the existing Mk57 peripheral VLS and missiles to make room for hypersonics, how will the ship defend itself?  Will the ship require a permanent Burke escort (two ships to accomplish a one-ship mission)?

 

-In what scenario(s) will a ship with hypersonics be useful?  How will hypersonics fit in with the rest of the fleet’s missions?

 

-Does a ship with hypersonic missiles have a use in a carrier task force?

 

CONOPS, admiral, CONOPS!

 

CONOPS

 

CONOPS

 

 

 

 

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[1]USNI News website, “Navy Can Install Hypersonic Missiles Aboard Zumwalt Destroyers Without Removing Gun Mounts”, Sam LaGrone, 14-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/14/navy-will-install-hypersonic-missiles-aboard-zumwalt-destroyers-without-removing-gun-mounts

Zumwalt Status Update

The Zumwalt has finally finished its combat system installation and activation and testing is currently taking place at Pearl Harbor.  At last, nine years after physical construction began, Zumwalt is nearly physically complete and functional.  To celebrate, let’s briefly recap the ship’s history and check its current status.  Here’s a timeline of the ship’s major events.

Event	Year	Comment
Laid Down	2011	Beginning of physical construction
Launched	2013
Delivery	2016	Delivered incomplete; Phase II of construction pending
Fake Commissioning	2016
Transit to Homeport San Diego	2016	Lost power due to water leak in lube oil; had to be towed
San Diego Fitting Out	2016	Phase II construction and initial combat system install
PR Cruise	2019	Public relations cruise and transfer to Pearl Harbor for combat systems installation
Combat Systems Installation and Activation	2019	Combat systems installation and testing at Pearl Harbor
Real Commissioning	2020	Commission granted by ComNavOps

So, nine years to complete the ship.  Hmmm …  How are we going to replace lost ships in a war?  We should be seriously examining our ship designs and asking why it takes nine years to build a ship.  But, I digress …

Let’s quickly review the ship’s status.

Weapons.  The major problem with the Zumwalt is that it has very little in the way of weapons which means it has only limited use in combat.  The ship’s main weapon, Advanced Gun System (AGS) - the weapon the entire ship was designed around – is non-functional due to cancellation of the only ammunition the gun could fire, the LRLAP round.  That leaves the ship with a total weapons fit of the following:

• 80x Mk57 VLS cells
• 2x 30mm machine guns

Note the complete absence of any point defense weapons like CIWS or RAM/SeaRAM.  This is not a ship that stands a good chance of survival in combat. 

Worse, we’ve discussed that the Zumwalt’s VLS cells have only limited capability because it doesn’t have the full Aegis combat system software.  Currently, Zumwalt does not have Tomahawk or Standard missile launch capability although the Navy requested funds from Congress to integrate the Tomahawk capability.(2)  What does that leave?  I guess the ship is a giant ESSM barge.

On the ‘plus’ side, the Zumwalt just conducted its first live fire of its 30 mm machine guns, only four years after being commissioned! (3)

You’ll also note that the Zumwalt has no offensive weapon capability since the guns are non-functional and Tomahawk missiles are not supported.  So, that leaves Zumwalt as a purely defensive ship whose self-defense system is also non-functional (see the next section).

Ship Self-Defense System.  Due to the lack of illuminators and the decision to delete half of the Dual Band Radar, the Zumwalt has no functional missile guidance system.  The Navy is currently trying to modify missiles with the Joint Universal Weapons Link to accept radar guidance from the SPY-3 but that, in turn, appears to be negatively impacting radar performance (see, “Zumwalt Self-Defense Problems”).  The upshot is that Zumwalt’s self-defense system is non-functional.

Crew Size.  Zumwalt, like the LCS, was designed for minimal manning with a crew of around 140 on a cruiser size ship with a displacement of 16,000 tons.  By comparison, the Burke has a crew of 320 and a displacement of 9200 tons.  As the LCS has demonstrated, minimal manning has been an abject failure in every respect.  When the lack of point defense is combined with the lack of crew for damage control the situation is even worse.

Ballistic Missile Defense.  Information on the Zumwalt’s BMD capability, or lack thereof, is sketchy and confusing.  The Navy has, at various times, stated that the Zumwalt is capable of firing the Standard missile family and is not capable of operating Standard missiles.  What this appears to mean is that although the VLS cells can launch physically launch a Standard missile, they cannot be guided because the ship lacks the Aegis combat system which provides the missile guidance.  Regardless of the physical ability of the ship to eject a Standard missile from the VLS cells, it appears that the ship has no BMD capability due to a lack of BMD software in its combat system.

Experimental Squadron.  For the moment, the Navy plans to use the Zumwalt as a test bed for an unmanned squadron of ships that will include the first four LCS, DARPA’s Sea Hunter, and the Zumwalts.(1)  Wow!  What a collection of misfits!

Stealth.  Supposedly the ship’s most important attribute, stealth, was going to allow the ship to sit close inshore and rain death on our enemies while remaining undetected.  Setting aside the fantasy level of thinking contained therein, even the stealth has been degraded.  While the first two ships were constructed with a resin-wood composite deckhouse that supposedly had special stealth characteristics, the third and final ship was built with a standard steel deckhouse.  What’s more, the final fitting of the ship reveals that non-stealthy platforms, masts, sensors, and antennae have sprouted on the ship like mushrooms and have, presumably, negatively impacted whatever stealth the ship may have had.

Note all the non-stealthy projections, masts, platforms, antennae, etc.

Summary

Well, there you have it.  That’s what a $25B+ program gets you – a ship with no offensive weapons, no functional self-defense, no point defense, degraded stealth, and a crew too small to fight the ship and execute damage control.

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Stands Up Surface Development Squadron for DDG-1000, Unmanned Experimentation”, Megan Eckstein, 22-May-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/05/22/navy-stands-up-surface-development-squadron-for-ddg-1000-unmanned-experimentation

National Interest website, “Drones Are Giving The Troubled Zumwalt Destroyer A Place In The Navy's Strategy”, David Axe, 2-May-2020,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/drones-are-giving-troubled-zumwalt-destroyer-place-navys-strategy-149866

(3)MilitaryLeak blog, 21-May-2020,

https://militaryleak.com/2020/05/21/us-navys-uss-zumwalt-completes-first-live-fire-test/

Zumwalt Delivered

The US Navy has announced that the USS Zumwalt has finally completed the last phase of its construction, the installation and activation of its combat systems, and been delivered to the Navy.(1)

Zumwalt was laid down in 2011.  It’s been delivered, complete, in 2020.  That’s 9 years to build a ship. 

Nine years to build a ship.

Nine years.

What are we going to do when war comes and we start losing ships and need to replace them?  Are we going to wait nine years for the first replacement?  We really need to rethink our entire conceptual approach to ship design and shipbuilding.

Zumwalt Plank Owner Awaiting Delivery

__________________________________

(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet, 24-Apr-2020,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130601

Zumwalt Self-Defense System Problems

We all know the story of the Zumwalt debacle in which the Navy built a ship with a main weapon that, despite using an Army/NATO/world standard 155 mm caliber gun, was completely incompatible with any other artillery system and, when the unique munition for the Zumwalt gun failed in performance and demonstrated runaway costs, left the Zumwalt with no functional main weapon.  Well, it now appears that the Zumwalt’s firepower problems extend to its self-defense capability, as well.

According to the 2019 DOT&E Annual Report (1), the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the ship’s self-defense system – severe enough to render the system nearly useless. 

The Navy has discovered severe problems during the DDG 1000 SDTS [ed. Self Defense Test Ship] events that will adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the combat system if not corrected.  Consequently, the Navy has put the test program on hold and is currently working to identify the root cause of these problems. (1)

The report does not identify the specific problem(s), presumably for security reasons.  However, the magnitude of the problems can be gleaned from the status of the self-defense testing program,

The Navy conducted 4 of the 10 DDG 1000 tests planned for the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) (3 of 6 planned developmental tests, and 1 of 4 planned integrated developmental and operational tests). The Navy canceled one integrated test event and one developmental test event because of unacceptably low performance predictions. (1)

The fact that testing could not proceed even by the Navy’s demonstrably lax standards is incredibly damning.  We also know that Navy performance predictions are always excessively exaggerated so if their own predictions were too low to justify continued testing, they must have been truly horrible.  We’ve seen the Navy routinely push poor performing systems along in order to avoid jeopardizing funding so, again, the fact that the Navy would cancel tests suggests staggeringly bad performance and very serious problems.

As I said, the report does not specify the problems so we are left to speculate.  Just for fun, let’s try to reason out the problem, shall we?

As the report describes, the system consists of several components (1):

• Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – The command and control architecture unique to Zumwalt.
• Multi-Function Radar (SPY-3) – The new X-band radar going on DDG 1000-class guided-missile destroyers and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – The tracker and sensor data fusion and distribution system.
• Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – The passive electronic sensor used to detect and identify hostile radars.
• Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – The short-range missile interceptor used to defeat air threats at close-in ranges, and the system used for radar-missile communication and support.  Within the U.S. Navy, only the DDG 1000-class ships and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) use ESSM with JUWL.
• Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – The unique Zumwalt variant of SM-2 used to defeat air threats at longer ranges.
• MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The DDG 1000-only vertical missile launcher variant.

So, presumably the problem lies with one or more of the components on that list.  Let’s consider the likelihood of each component being the problem (or part of it).

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) – This is just the ship’s internal network and it’s been installed on various ships/classes for some time and has functioned without notable problems.  This seems very unlikely to be the problem.

Multi-Function Radar (MFR/SPY-3) – The radar is untested.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) – This has been around for many years and has been installed on many platforms.  It is very unlikely to be the problem.

Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 (SLQ-32B(V)6) – This has been a separate developmental effort and has been reported to have some typical developmental problems but nothing all that severe.  The system has been in development for some time and its issues are well known and would not likely trigger surprise cancellation of the Zumwalt self-defense program.  In addition, it is independent of the active defenses.  This is almost certainly not the problem.

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 with Joint Universal Weapon Link (JUWL) – ESSM has been around for some time, has been extensively test, by Navy standards, and has reportedly performed well.  It is highly unlikely that the missile, itself, is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

Standard Missile 2 (SM-2 Block IIIAZ) with JUWL – SM-2 variants have been around for some time and have been extensively tested, at least by Navy standards.  It is unlikely that the SM-2 is the problem.  However, the guidance data link appears to be brand new and untested.

MK 57 Vertical Launch System (VLS) - The VLS has not been extensively tested but, other than failure to launch, would be unlikely to cause severe problems and a systematic failure to launch issue would, undoubtedly, have been noted and reported before now since it would be too big and obvious a problem not to be publicly noted and reported.  Further, a launch failure does not fall into the category of predictable performance problems which the report refers to.  Therefore, this is not the problem.

So, what did that little analysis leave us with?  The only candidates for problems are the SPY-3 radar and the JUWL guidance link.  Either could be a likely source of predictable failure. 

As you may recall, the Zumwalt was originally supposed to have the Dual Band Radar (DBR) which consists of the SPY-4 (S band) volume search radar and the SPY-3 (X band) horizon search radar.  The SPY-4 was deleted from the Zumwalt design as a cost saving measure.  As a result, the SPY-3 was to be reprogrammed to selectively perform volume search or (and?) its intended horizon search function.  The functionality was to be operator selectable.

It seems quite plausible that the intended modifications to perform volume search have proven to be problematic.  The volume search was not intended, not designed into the SPY-3, and has had an extremely abbreviated development and testing schedule.  It is reasonable to believe that now that Zumwalt is undergoing actual combat system tests, the previously untested radar is demonstrating poor performance.

The other problem candidate, the Joint Universal Weapon Link, is also a plausible trouble source.  Again, it is unique and untested.  However, weapon guidance links are relatively straightforward communication technologies and relatively easy to correct, one would think.  So, this is certainly a possible problem point but seems much less likely than the SPY-3.

The other potentially problematic aspect to the JUWL is the mechanism of transmission.  Assuming the SPY-3 is being used to transmit the JUWL guidance commands, it is possible that the demands of the simultaneous dual guidance/tracking functions are not working together correctly.  If so, this again leads us back to a flawed SPY-3.

Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Zumwalt is experiencing severe problems with the SPY-3 radar.

Ominously, the SPY-3 is also installed on the Ford which has not yet tested its combat systems.  More problems to come for the Ford?

Zumwalt SPY-3/4

If all of the above speculation is correct, there is even worse news.  The Navy has been testing the SPY-3 on the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS) but is planning to remove the SPY-3.  From the DOT&E report,

The Navy plans to remove the SPY-3 radar and TSCE computer equipment on the SDTS at the end of 2QFY20. (1)

Whatever problems the SPY-3 has, the Navy’s best hope of solving them lies with exercising the SDTS with the SPY-3 installed.  Removing it may greatly hinder or totally prevent diagnosis and correction of the problem(s).  Removing the SPY-3 does not seem prudent or wise but when has the Navy ever been accused of wisdom?

The poor Zumwalt program can’t seem to catch a break, can it?  Aside from the complete failure of its main weapon system, it’s had problems with power generation/distribution (which was supposed to be a strength of the design), ship handling concerns in certain seas, and now its self-defense system is useless.  Think about it, though – is it really bad breaks or is it just a very bad design concept showing its inherent and utterly predictable problems and failures?

We’ll be keeping an eye on this one.

_________________________________

(1)Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, “FY2019 Annual Report”, 20-Dec-2019, p.159-60

The Great White Elephant

President Theodore Roosevelt sent a Navy fleet on an around-the-world tour during 1908 as a public relations tour and a sort of coming-out announcement and celebration for the nation and the Navy on to the world stage.  The fleet, and the event, was dubbed the Great White Fleet.

Now, something similar is happening on a smaller scale.  The USS Zumwalt is on its first operational voyage which appears to be a public relations tour and an attempt to introduce the Zumwalt to the world.

Here’s the Zumwalt’s mini-tour, thus far.

8-Mar-2019        Departed San Diego

11-Mar-2019      Esquimalt, British Columbia, Canada
23-Mar-2019      Ketchikan, Alaska
4-Apr-2019        Pearl Harbor

Zumwalt is, presumably, conducting live fire exercises at the naval range in Hawaii.

As a reminder, the total Zumwalt program cost is $8.4B per ship and continuing to climb as the remaining two ships work to complete construction and fitting out of combat systems.  The ship’s reason for being, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), has been rendered non-functional due to the Navy cancelling the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), the only munition the gun is capable of firing.  Absent the AGS, the only other significant weapon system on the ship is the 80x Mk57 VLS which can launch ESSM, Tomahawk, Standards, and the like.

The problem is that the 16,000 t, $8.4B ship, without the AGS, brings very little to the fleet in terms of combat capability.  Despite these problems, the Navy seems determined to operate the ship as if it were a useful asset.  The reality, though, is that the ship has no Concept of Operations (CONOPS), offers little combat capability, and contributes little to the fleet.  That being the case, one has to wonder why the Navy wants to operate the ship.  Why not park the ships and leave them idle pending the onset of a major war?  The Navy is constantly whining about the cost of operating ships and yet they’re pouring budget money into these marginally useful vessels that appear to be an evolutionary dead end.  Park the ships and save operating budget as well as wear and tear on the ships.

From Wiki, a white elephant is a possession which its owner cannot dispose of and whose cost, particularly that of maintenance, is out of proportion to its usefulness. In modern usage, it is an object, building project, scheme, business venture, facility, etc., considered expensive but without use or value.

Zumwalt’s publicity tour isn’t the Great White Fleet, it’s the Great White Elephant.

Zumwalt and LCS - Main Batteries

What do the Zumwalt and LCS programs have in common?  Well, lots of things – all bad!  However, for the purpose of this post, the thing they have in common is that despite having commissioned ships in the class, neither has their main batteries installed and functioning yet.

Zumwalt

• 1 built and commissioned Oct 2016
• 1 built (tentative commissioning date Jan 2019)
• 1 building

As you know, the Zumwalt was literally designed around the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that was intended to rain precision firepower at ranges of 70+ miles.  As you also know, the Navy has cancelled the only munition the AGS was capable of firing, the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), due to runaway costs and failure to meet range requirements.

A functional AGS does not exist.  The Zumwalt have no functional main battery despite being a commissioned warship.  We spent $24B to build a class with no main battery.  That’s some major league incompetence!

LCS

• 5 Freedom class commissioned
• 9 Freedom class built or building

• 7 Independence class commissioned
• 8 Independence class built or building

As you know, the LCS’ main battery is the modules – those swappable permanent modules that contain one of the LCS’ three main functions: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), or Mine Countermeasures (MCM).  Without one of the main battery modules, the LCS is just a patrol boat and not a very good one at that.

-          There is no functional MCM module.

-          There is no functional ASW module.

-          There is no useful ASuW module - it has been scaled back to the point of uselessness.

The first LCS, USS Freedom, was commissioned in 2008.  It is now ten years later with 29 LCS commissioned, built, or building and still no useful, functional, main battery.  A decade after commissioning and still no modules.  Wow, that’s some major league incompetence!

That is two major classes of surface warfare vessels and the two most recent classes to be built that have now been commissioned with no main battery.

That bears repeating.

The Navy’s two newest classes of surface vessel have been commissioned with no main battery.

How does this happen?  How does the Navy accept and commission a ship that has no main battery?  How has no one been fired?  How has no one been charged with fraud?  Has anyone’s promotion at least been delayed by a couple of months?

Okay, aside from simple complaining, what can we learn from this?

Well, the Zumwalt and LCS have another point in common regarding their main batteries – neither battery actually existed in a functional form when the Navy committed to building the ships.  The Navy assumed they could develop the batteries while the ships were building.  This is the concurrency that we’ve railed against and has been proven, repeatedly, to be a failure as a procurement method.  Concurrency has failed every time it’s been attempted and yet the Navy is still married to the concept.

It’s one thing to begin construction of a ship when the deck buffing machine is still under development but it’s insanity to begin construction of a ship when its main battery doesn’t exist.  Even the “fitted for but not with” philosophy, as bad as it is, is better than building with concurrency in the main battery.

I don’t know what it takes for the Navy to learn lessons.  Apparently, it takes more than the utter failure of two major ship classes (and the F-35, EMALS, AAG, Advanced Weapons Elevators, etc.)!

Zumwalt Fiasco Looking Worse!

The Navy is attempting to explain away the Zumwalt fiasco but is only looking more culpable while doing so.

As you know by now, the Zumwalt’s Advanced Gun System (AGS) was designed in such a way that it could only use one, unique munition – the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP).  The idiocy of that decision has become manifestly clear now that the cost of the LRLAP has risen to nearly a million dollars per projectile and the munition development project has been cancelled.  The Zumwalt is now left without a munition for its main weapon, the AGS.

“Even at the high cost, we still weren’t really getting what we had asked for,” he said. “So what we’ve elected to do is to separate the gun effort from the ship effort because we really got to the point where now we’re holding up the ship.”

“Holding up the ship”????  The ship IS the AGS.  The entire ship was designed around the AGS.  The ship’s reason for existence is to carry the AGS.  The ship IS the AGS.

You’re not holding up the ship – without the AGS, there is no ship.  The ship has no purpose or use.

You never, never, never, never design and build a ship around non-existent technology.  It’s failed every time it’s been tried and the Zumwalt was no exception.

Whoever approved the design concept for the Zumwalt program needs to be court-martialed for dereliction of duty and utter stupidity.  If stupefying stupidity is not a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it should be!

Did you also catch the part about not getting what was asked for?

“…the system was also failing to achieve the range it wanted …”

So, not only was the cost on an exploding, runaway trajectory (unlike the munition itself!) but the performance was inadequate.  The system couldn't achieve the claimed range.  What have I said, repeatedly?  - No system ever achieves its claimed performance.  Despite the 100% certainty of the truth of this statement, people will still wholeheartedly believe the claims for the next great weapon or system.

Take any performance/cost claim and double the cost and halve the performance and you’ll be somewhere in the ballpark of reality.

There’s no explaining this one away, Navy.  You screwed the pooch in a big way.

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(1)Defense News website, “US Navy takes ownership of its second stealth destroyer”, David B. Larter, 24-Apr-2018,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/04/24/us-navy-just-took-ownership-of-its-second-stealth-destroyer/

The Third Zumwalt

There’s been an interesting discussion going in a recent post about the fate of the third Zumwalt, currently under construction.  The Navy has stated that they are no longer pursuing a replacement munition for the cancelled Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP).  Thus, the Zumwalt’s have no functional main armament.  Their guns, the very reason for their existence, are just paperweights.  The magnitude of the stupidity that led to this situation is staggering but typical of the Navy.  We’ll leave that aspect alone, however, for the time being.  Instead, the situation raises an interesting problem and opportunity. 

The problem is the obvious one:  it makes no sense to complete the third Zumwalt with a non-functional gun.  To do so would create a $4B+, 15,000 t ship that carries only 80 VLS cells and a limited radar system.  That's the equivalent of a super-sized frigate or a partially neutered Burke.  That would add almost nothing to the fleet's combat power.

The opportunity is the chance to complete the third ship as a prototype – the question being what kind of prototype?  Here are a few possibilities:

• Complete the ship as a heavy (by today’s standards) naval gunfire support vessel by installing 8” guns.  The guns can be either the old, already tested, Mk71 or some new design.  Yes, it would probably take a year or so to design a new gun but, who cares – the ship isn’t needed.  This would give the Navy a chance to re-acquaint themselves with heavy guns and begin the process of regenerating actual, effective naval fire support.

• Install a navalized version of the Army’s MLRS/ATACMS in place of the guns.  Again, this would give the Navy a chance to explore another form of naval fire support and one with potentially much more range than the original Advanced Gun System would have had – potentially a major improvement!

• Complete the ship as a UAV “carrier” by repurposing the hangar and flight deck to exclusive UAV operations.  This would give the Navy a chance to explore operational integration of UAVs into task groups.

• Complete the ship as an advanced intelligence and surveillance vessel.  Unlike the Pueblo or Liberty, this ship would be able to defend itself and could be sent into high threat areas such as the South/East China Seas, off the Russian coast, or near NKorea.

• Complete the ship as an advanced electronic warfare (EW) ship.  Load it up with every electronic warfare piece of equipment and see what a dedicated EW ship can do.  This would allow the Navy to explore offensive and defensive EW and see if a single ship can provide effective area EW protection.  The ship has plenty of electrical power for the equipment.

We’ve discussed the need for diversity in the fleet and the need for prototypes to promote that diversity.  Well, this a golden, if unwanted, opportunity to prototype something new and potentially useful.  Knowing the Navy, however, they’ll complete the ship with a non-functional gun and waste the opportunity.

AGS-Zumwalt Colossal Failure

The Navy has now confirmed that the Zumwalt’s Advanced Gun System (AGS), the entire reason the Zumwalt class was built, will not be getting any new ammunition round.  After the gun’s Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) was cancelled due to the cost per round reaching $1M (see, "A Ship With No Ammunition"), the Navy indicated that they would adapt the Army’s 155 mm Excalibur artillery shell for use in the AGS (see, "Excalibur - LRLAP Replacement").  This would have provided a range of around 20 miles or so – woefully short compared to the LRLAP’s reported range of 70+ miles.  Now, even this option has been dropped by the Navy.  Instead, the Navy will monitor industry over the coming years and wait to see if some new, suitable round happens to appear.  Unfortunately, given the AGS gun barrel’s unique twist arrangement, that’s a pretty unlikely occurrence. (1)

“A year after the Navy decided to abandon the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) for the Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer, there is no plan in place for a replacement round for the Advanced Gun System (AGS) the ships are built around, service officials said on Wednesday.” (1)

What will the Navy do with the Zumwalts?

The Navy’s new plan is to focus the Zumwalts on deep strike land attack (Tomahawks) and anti-surface (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile – LRASM, maybe?) warfare by using the ship’s 80 Mk54 peripheral VLS cells.  I guess that makes the Zumwalt’s each an $8B+, lightly loaded arsenal ship?

Also, recall that the Zumwalt’s unique tumblehome hull form has some inherent sea keeping problems due to its shape (see, "Zumwalt Tumblehome Tests").  That was considered acceptable since the ship’s mission was intended to be shallow water littoral warfare rather than open ocean sailing.  Now, with the mission switched to largely open ocean work, the ship will have significant sailing issues to deal with.  The Navy had previously issued limitations on sailing in certain quartering seas.  This may be a mission that the ship has difficulty executing.

So, the Navy has built a $24B+ class of three ships whose entire reason for existence was the AGS and now the AGS is a non-functional, ocean-going, paperweight and the fall-back mission is one that the ship’s flawed sea keeping may render difficult or impossible to execute in common sea conditions.  Just plain, WOW !

Someone has got to be fired!  - or, as the Navy refers to it, promoted.

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(1)USNI News website, “No New Round Planned For Zumwalt Destroyer Gun System; Navy Monitoring Industry”, Sam LaGrone, 11-Jan-2018, retrieved 11-Jan-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/01/11/no-new-round-planned-zumwalt-destroyer-gun-system-navy-monitoring-industry

Zumwalt Power Casualty

I thought the Zumwalt class was supposed to be the ultimate in electrical and propulsion technology and combat resilience insofar as power was concerned.  The ship is supposed to be able to cross-connect any power source to any powered equipment, including propulsion, and to be able to do so via an infinite number of redundant, cross-connected cabling.  In short, this ship was supposed to be immune to power outages and highly resistance to combat damage to its electrical, power, and propulsion systems.  That makes the following announcement quite disturbing. (1)

“The second stealthy destroyer being built for the U.S. Navy cut short its first sea trials because an equipment failure prevented testing of propulsion and electrical systems under full power, officials said Friday.”

“The Monsoor’s problem was electrical in nature, with the loss of an induction coil causing the failure of another system.”

So, the Monsoor experienced a major power problem on its first trial?  What does that say about the class’ ability to absorb battle damage?  This was the ship that was supposed to have unlimited and “unbreakable” electrical/power systems.  Any electrical casualty was supposed to be able to be bypassed, rerouted, and resupplied from other electrical sources.  Apparently, that’s not quite working out.

I have no particular problem with issues arising during trials – that’s what they’re for! - but, this was supposed to be this class’ strength.  This was the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the resilience and flexibility of the ship and it failed.

I also note that almost every new ship over the last several years has experienced serious power failures during trials and initial operations.  Almost all of the LCS’s have had major power problems.  The Ford was delivered with a major power casualty unresolved.  Now the Zumwalts (Zumwalt, itself, suffered propulsion failures due to seawater in the lubricating oil).  What’s going on?

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(1)Navy Times website, “Equipment failure cuts short stealthy destroyer sea trials”, Associated Press, 10-Dec-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/12/10/equipment-failure-cuts-short-stealthy-destroyer-sea-trials/