The first thing that jumped out at me was the Commandant’s
personal impetus for the radical changes he intends to make. We are all shaped by our experiences and it
is natural to wonder what experiences shaped this Commandant to the degree that
he believes a wholesale remake of the Corps is called for. Well, he lays out what motivated him.
That
prioritization was the result of my direct participation in five years of naval
and global war games while the Commanding General of I MEF, Commander of Marine
Corps Forces Pacific, and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and
Integration. Those war games helped shape my conclusion that modest and
incremental improvements to our existing force structure and legacy
capabilities would be insufficient to overcome evolving threat capabilities, nor
would they enable us to develop forces required to execute our approved naval
concepts. (1)
So, the primary driving force that shaped the Commandant’s
views is five years of war games. This
leads to a couple of thoughts.
It would have been nice to see a nod to history as a
driver/shaper of his views since he has no actual peer level combat experience
to draw on. Why not draw on the lessons
of those who did experience peer combat?
Now, I’ve got to be fair and acknowledge that the purpose of the FD 2030
was not to detail the Commandant’s life story and all the things that have
influenced him so he may well be a student of history, however, the military,
today, seems not to study history and seems to have no desire to partake of the
lessons of historical combat and, lacking a specific nod to history from the
Commandant, I lump him into the same category.
War games are wonderful tools, however, they suffer from one
huge weakness and that is that the value of the game is a direct reflection of
the value of the opposing force that is programmed into the game. In other words, garbage assumptions in …
garbage results out (GIGO).
Unfortunately, the military has a reputation for unrealistic games with
pre-ordained results. Were the
Commandant’s five years of gaming a series of well designed, accurate, open,
free play exercises or were they the usual scripted, pre-ordained games? Is the Commandant’s basis for overhauling the
Corps founded on good war games or the usual GIGO games?
Troublingly, assuming that the Commandant wasn’t playing
these war games by himself, why is he the only one to come to the conclusion
that the Marines need to be radically overhauled? Of all the game participants, he’s the only
one who has come to that conclusion, at least publicly. Did everyone else draw the wrong conclusions
and only he drew the right one? That’s
possible but not likely. You’ve got to wonder
if the Commandant is the outlier.
Now, just because he’s the only one to reach his conclusion
does not necessarily mean he’s wrong.
Having a solitary, contrary position in the face of institutional
opposition is kind of the definition of a visionary. However, it’s also kind of the definition of
a lunatic. So, which one is the
Commandant? I have my opinion and you
can form your own.
Finally, my colleague over at SNAFU website raises the
question of war games and asks how bad the results must have been to motivate
the Commandant to embark on such radical changes?
The
war games that led to USMC Force Design 2030 must have been awful...
War
games obviously showed us getting smashed...or in a fight so hard that it
stunned participants. (2)
SNAFU’s take on the war games is thought provoking, for
sure, but there may be another explanation.
Instead of the games demonstrating that the Marines were ‘smashed’, I
think it’s far more likely that the games demonstrated that the Marines, in
their current form, simply weren’t needed and played no significant role. That would, indeed, stun the Commandant
because that would be a direct threat to the Marine’s relevance and budget
slice. A budgetary threat would induce a
survival instinct reaction in any modern general and I suspect the Commandant’s
restructuring response is more about restructuring the Marines to be budget
relevant than to be combat relevant.
That the two may (or may not) go hand in hand is just fortuitous.
Moving on …
One concern I’ve had from day one of the Commandant’s tenure
is the degree of insularity that he has manifested. This reshaping of the Corps is his and his
alone. He has actively discouraged and
limited input from any other source than himself. This breeds an inevitable “emperor’s clothes”
mentality. We see this demonstrated in
the Commandant’s initial efforts:
Phase
I focused on problem framing, began in July 2019, and centered on a small
operational planning team (OPT) that worked directly with me to establish an
initial visualization of the future force … (1)
Noteworthy is that the Commandant did not range out to seek
input but, rather, concentrated inward with just a small group whose thoughts
and actions he could control – ‘a small operational planning team that worked
directly with me’.
Another troubling aspect of the FD 2030 related to the
suspect nature of the war gaming is the lack of actual exercises supporting the
conclusions already drawn.
Limited
experimentation has been conducted upon discrete elements of the future force
utilizing approved naval concepts, to include some carefully constrained tests
of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained from austere,
undeveloped landing sites.
A
single, limited-objective experiment addressing aspects of the organization,
training, and equipment of a Marine infantry battalion was conducted … (1)
So, suspect war games and limited and constrained real world
exercises are the foundation of this radical change? Does that seem wise?
To be fair, the FD 2030 acknowledges the need for further
exercises.
We
will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-based experimentation of the
future force in realistic maritime and littoral terrain. (1)
Unfortunately, the course has already been set. The Commandant has already begun the overhaul
of the Corps and future exercises will be too late to alter the
trajectory. The exercises should have
been conducted prior to committing to the overhaul, not after. Again, this demonstrates that the Commandant
has already made up his mind and done so with scant, reliable input from any
source other than his own experience.
Berger notes that F-35 numbers are, as yet, unknown.
I
am not convinced that we have a clear understanding yet of F-35 capacity
requirements for the future force. (1)
I assume this means that the Commandant is not yet sure how
many F-35s he wants. This seems slightly
at odds with his stated plan to reduce squadron numbers from 16 aircraft to 10
unless he’s possibly anticipating further cuts?
Berger goes on to state that ‘ground tactical combat vehicles’
will undergo further reductions not identified in the initial cuts.
Addressing land based anti-ship missiles which will become
the focus of the Marine Corps under the Commandant’s plan, he had this to say,
This
requirement is based on one of the more well-supported conclusions from
wargaming analysis conducted to date. (1)
That Berger believes this to be one of the more
well-supported conclusions from the war games suggests to me that the games
were pre-ordained to produce this result.
The illogic of the concept would seem to be evident from any realistic
war game so the strongly positive result suggests that the games were not
realistic.
For decades, the Marines have been focused on a replacement
for the venerable AAV and have finally settled on the ACV despite proclaiming
that the era of amphibious assaults is over.
If amphibious assaults are a thing of the past, why does the Corps need
ACVs? The logical discontinuity, here,
is breathtaking. Berger, at least, seems
to recognize this and states that Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) will be
reduced by some unspecified number.
One fact from Berger’s document comes through with absolute
clarity and that is his commitment of the Marine Corps to a concept of
distributed operations (DO). Addressing
the notion of a redesigned infantry battalion, he notes,
We
must conduct more live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed design
results in a truly DO-capable force. (1)
His focus is unerringly on distributed operations.
Now, here is a breathtaking summary of uncertainty.
I
am not confident that we have identified the additional structure required to
provide the tactical maneuver and logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO,
LOCE and EABO in contested littoral environments against our pacing threat.
While not an afterthought by any means, I do not believe our Phase I and II
efforts gave logistics sufficient attention. (1)
Berger acknowledges that the foundational sustainment of
penny packet forces, in enemy
territory, may well be inadequate.
This is exactly one of my primary objections to the concept. Despite his doubts, he has already fully
committed the Corps to the concept !!!!!!!
Essentially, he’s saying, I’m not sure this can work but we’re going to
do it anyway. This is not rational
thinking.
What happens when Berger’s own commissioned study produces
results he doesn’t like? He responds,
thusly,
The
Phase II IPT seems to have produced an incrementally improved version of
today’s 3-ship ARG/MEU. This vision falls short of our future needs. We cannot
accept or accede to recommendations for incremental change or better versions
of legacy capabilities … (1)
His own study produced a result he didn’t want so he’s
ignoring it. This man is accepting no
outside input that is not exactly in line with his own thinking. This is dangerous.
What does Berger need in the future to support his
objectives? For one, more war gaming. However, it will be carefully controlled,
pre-ordained gaming.
To
further refine and develop our understanding of force design changes, I am
directing the immediate implementation of an intensive program of iterative
concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and simulation, and experimentation. I
will be personally involved in and
responsible for setting priorities and ensuring that necessary resources are
made available for this effort. (1) [emphasis added]
It is clear that Berger is not going to allow any war game to
produce a result that does not support his vision.
Summary
What makes analyzing this Commandant a challenge is that
he’s not completely wrong. If he were a
total idiot then it would be easy to analyze his failings and write him off as
a crackpot. However, much of what he
observes in the world and much of what he says is spot on. His analysis of the challenges and
shortcomings of the current Marine Corps force structure is largely
correct. Where he fails is in his
solutions to those problems. In other
words, he sees the problem but fails in the answer.
Along with his recognition of China as the main threat,
here’s some more examples of his observations that are absolutely correct:
“… an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy
platforms …”
“…create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of
concentration …”
“…foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and
noncombatant evacuations do not define us – they are not our identity.”
“There is no avoiding attrition. In contingency operations
against peer adversaries, we will lose aircraft, ships, ground tactical
vehicles, and personnel. Force resilience – the ability of a force to absorb
loss and continue to operate decisively – is critical.”
If only his solution was as good as his analysis of the
problem!
We’ve discussed the enormous degree of fantasy involved in
believing that you can insert, supply, and operate sea control forces inside
enemy territory without the enemy observing and destroying you. I have yet to hear the Commandant explain how
this can successfully happen. In fact,
he explicitly acknowledges that the logistical support for such operations is
likely inadequate and yet he is fully committed to the concept. This is not rational.
Commandant Berger comes so close to being exactly what the
Marines need in a leader and yet he falls so far short of the right answer that
he will ruin the Marines as a relevant, capable fighting force.
(1)”Force Design 2030”, Department of the Navy, Mar-2020
(2)SNAFU website, “The war games that led to USMC Force
Design 2030 must have been awful...”, posted by Solomon, 28-Mar-2020,
https://www.snafu-solomon.com/2020/03/the-war-games-that-led-to-usmc-force.html
