Marine Missiles

Marine Commandant Berger keeps talking about hidden bases with small units that will rain missiles of death and destruction down on the hapless Chinese who won’t have a clue where the Marines are.  Well, let’s attempt to be fair and take a look at the missiles that the good Commandant envisions using.  Are they small enough to remain hidden?  Can they be easily moved as the Marines nimbly relocate from island to island on Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships?

 

Note:  The inspiration and, indeed, much of the organization and content of this post is taken from a Naval News website article by Peter Ong.[1]

 

 

Naval Strike Missile

 

The smallest of the potential missiles for the Marines is the Naval Strike Missile (NSM). 

 

The Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) mounts two Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) on a remote-operated, driven, and NSM launched unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 4×4 vehicle.  … The 900-pound (410 kilogram) NSM (or 910 pounds with booster) can be internally loaded aboard a CH-53 and onto the flatbed of a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 6×6 truck via a forklift.  … it is possible to push an NSM container on a trolley cart but loading it onto the JLTV will require a … forklift.[1]

NMESIS Naval Strike Missile on JLTV

That’s a hefty brute of a vehicle.  Note that it carries two missiles.  To be operationally relevant and combat effective, a unit is going to need … what ? … twenty or so missiles, at a minimum?  That would be a minimum of ten such vehicles.  That’s no longer a small, secretive, hidden footprint.  Of course one could always use fewer launch vehicles and just use reloads but that would require forklifts and some type of missile storage facility which, again, is not a small, secretive, hidden footprint.

 

These vehicles (JLTV or forklifts) give off very large infrared signatures, especially in the tropical sun.  Again, not conducive to remaining hidden.

From Wikipedia, here's a description of the components of a Norwegian coastal defense battery which is, essentially, what the Marines are trying to set up:

An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle. 

Again, that's not a small footprint ! 

 

 

Tomahawk

 

Another missile option is the cutting edge, brand new, ultra advanced, futuristic  Maritime Strike Tomahawk ... which you knew this as the 1980’s – 1990’s era Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM).  In any event, the Tomahawk will be deployed on 40 ft long, 34 ton, M872 trailers.

 

The semitrailer is designed to be towed over smooth, hard-surfaced roads with loads up to 34 tons (68,000 lbs payload) at speeds as high as 55 mph (88 km/h). It can also be towed over unimproved roads, trails and open rolling terrain with the same load limit, but at a sustained speed of no more than 10 mph (16 km/h).[2]

 

The M872 semitrailer is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6x4 Truck, Tractor.[2]

 

Tomahawk Launching From Trailer Mounted VLS Cell

Note the immense size of the trailer, VLS cell, and then factor in the trailer tow vehicle.  The photo depicts a feasibility demonstration but the final launch vehicle will not be any smaller.  Again, assuming we want more than a single missile shot, we’ll need dozens of these trailers, tow vehicles, and, potentially, large cranes to handle the VLS cells.  Imagine a large city freeway with a string of twenty giant tractor-trailers and you’ll get an idea of how hidden this operation will be.

 

Also, note the 10 mph speed limit for movement over unimproved roads and terrain.  This will not be a quick, agile, shoot and scoot operation !

 

The MST uses a two-way communications link for mid-course guidance and targeting updates.  This could prove problematic during combat as it violates EMCON and allows the enemy to locate the communications source. 

 

 

 

HIMARS

 

Another missile option is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) which is a podded rocket system with six rockets per HiMARS pod and are launched from a modified USMC Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) 6×6 truck.[1]  HiMARS rockets may require new seekers to target moving ships.

 

HIMARS Pod on FMTV 6x6 Truck

Note the size of the 6x6 truck.  Again, several such trucks/pods would be needed.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The options discussed above all involve dozens of sizeable vehicles – no easy thing to hide on an island inside your enemy’s zone of control.  Also, bear in mind that other necessities must be provided including large amounts of fuel, fuel handling equipment, vehicle maintenance and repair capabilities, spare parts, etc. in addition to the operator’s food, health, and shelter needs.  All of this is in addition to the gear and supplies that the regular Marines will require.  While the Commandant may have some fanciful notion of Marines living off the land (that has actually been discussed in various published articles), that is simply not feasible for any sustained period of time.  There is also the matter of health.  The tropics are renowned for myriad diseases and Marines weakened by malnourishment will be quickly rendered sick and ineffective.

 

We’re also ignoring the challenges associated with transporting and loading/unloading large vehicles to/from islands in secret.  Does the Commandant really believe he can transport and unload dozens of large vehicles without being noticed?

 

The other aspect that is not covered is targeting.  The Marines will need some type of UAV or radar or something to provide targeting beyond the 12 mile horizon.  That thousand mile Tomahawk sounds great on paper but how are you going to get thousand mile targeting?  Whatever vehicle or sensor the Marines use will further reduce their ‘hiddenness’.  Sensor assets will require two-way communications which, again, point back to the Marine’s location.

 

When all the vehicles, UAVs, sensors, support equipment, storage facilities, etc. are considered, it is difficult to see how anyone can believe that missile-shooting units will remain undetected even assuming that they can penetrate the enemy’s zone in a small, non-stealthy, painfully slow LAW and establish themselves on an island in the first place.

 

Finally, the Commandant has stated that in the unlikely event that the Marines are discovered, they will simply hop aboard a LAW  and relocate, thus regaining their secrecy.  Of course, loading and unloading all the equipment we’ve discussed is not an insignificant feat in itself.  Trying to load all the vehicles and equipment onto a LAW will be a pretty noticeable event, one would imagine.

 

By the way, when this unlikely relocation becomes necessary, where will the multiple transport LAWs come from?  Will they be floating offshore, waiting?  If so, wouldn’t they be quickly spotted?  If they’re not waiting and, instead, they’re back on, say, Guam.  It will take weeks to get them to the Marine’s island.  That’s not exactly going to allow for quick, agile relocations, is it?

 

Nothing about this concept appears feasible.  The Commandant either needs to come out and address some of these issues, at least in general terms, or he will continue to face resistance.  He appears to have successfully stifled internal dissent but has run into staunch resistance from former Marine generals and other top-ranking former officials.  Commandant, if you want support you’ve got to provide some information and address the gaping holes in the logic of the concept.

 

 

 

 

 

Side note:  Does anyone recall the Cuban missile crisis?  The Soviets attempted to secretly transport missiles using small, slow, unarmed transport ships (sounds like a LAW !) and place the missiles on the island of Cuba without being noticed and yet they were instantly spotted with 1950’s – 1960’s technology.  How’d that work out?

 

 

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[1]Naval News website, “A Look At The Sizes Of U.S. Land-Based Strike Missiles”, Peter Ong, 29-Jun-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/a-look-at-the-sizes-of-u-s-land-based-strike-missiles/

 

[2]https://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m872_trailer.php

Navy Strike Doctrine

We’ve had a lot of discussions about the role of the carrier.  ComNavOps has stated that strike (land attack) is no longer a carrier mission.  There remains, however, a substantial number of observers who still cling to the outdated concept of carrier strike operations.

 

Why is carrier strike – meaning, manned aircraft – no longer a mission?  Modern, peer defenses, consisting of both defending aircraft and land based surface to air (SAM) missiles along with extensive and sophisticated sensors have rendered aircraft strikes far too risky.

 

The preferred alternative is, of course, cruise missiles as suggested by the following missile characteristics.

 

Cost – Tomahawk cruise missiles cost around $2M compared to aircraft which cost $80M-$100M each.  In addition, aircraft operate on a daily basis and flight hour costs are on the order of $15K-$30K per flight hour, day after day.  That makes for an incredibly expensive weapon delivery system.  In contrast, a cruise missile has no operating or maintenance costs to speak of.  Finally, the cost of training and ‘maintaining’ a pilot is enormous whereas, again, the cruise missile has no pilot cost.

 

Expendability – Cruise missiles are, by design and by cost, expendable.  Aircraft, by design and cost, are not.  Modern peer defenses guarantee that strike aircraft will suffer significant attrition and the cost to replace the airframe and produce a new pilot is staggering.  Worse, the time required to produce new airframes and pilots is prohibitive during a war.

 

Stealth – The US Navy currently has no stealth strike aircraft.  That aside, cruise missiles have significantly greater stealth than even a stealth aircraft due to their much smaller size, smaller cross sectional area, smaller profile (regardless of angle), smaller engine exhaust (IR signature), and ability to fly a sea skimming terminal approach.  And, of course, new cruise missiles have stealth shaping.

 

Numbers – The current US Navy Tomahawk cruise missile inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 3000-5000.  The Navy currently has 9 air wings with around 44 F-18 Hornets in each for a total of 396 potential strike aircraft.  Of course, in actual operations only a fraction of those would be available as aircraft are needed for carrier defense, various CAPs, tankers, and escorts.

 

Missiles can be massed in very large numbers against a target.  Strike aircraft are severely limited in number although each aircraft can carry 2-4 missiles or several bombs.  Weight limits, weight distributions, external fuel tanks, range considerations, self-defense requirements, etc. limit the number of missiles that can realistically be carried.

 

Weather – While carrier aircraft can operate in bad weather, to a degree, there are significant limits.  Missiles, in contrast are virtually unaffected by weather.

 

Range – Cruise missiles have a range of around 1000 miles.  Aircraft have an effective combat range of 200-300 miles although various types of standoff missiles would add to that range.  For example, the air launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has a range of somewhere around 300 miles which, when added to the aircraft’s range, puts the total strike range at around 500-600 miles.  The extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) has a range of 500 miles or so which, combined with the aircraft’s range, gives a total strike range of 700-800 miles.  Other weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) have much lesser ranges.  JSOW has a high altitude release range of 70 miles.

 

 

The benefit, such as it is, of air launched, standoff attack missiles is negated by very long range SAM defenses and enemy aircraft which can, and will, contest the launch points.  The effort required to conduct an airborne, standoff strike (aircraft, fighter escorts, tankers, EW escorts, BARCAP, etc. also negates the benefits.  In short, it requires a far more massive effort to conduct an airborne, standoff strike than to conduct a simple ship-launched, cruise missile strike and the benefits are few especially when weighed against the inevitable aircraft losses.

 

So, is ComNavOps alone in his assessment?  After all, a lot of people are still unwilling to give up their comforting paradigm of carrier strike.  Well, it would seem that the Navy has also concluded that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset as evidenced by the strike history of the last few decades.  The table below is adapted from Wikipedia.(1)

 

 

 

Operation	Date	No. of Missiles
Gulf War	1991	288
Iraq disarmament	Jan 1993	46
Iraq disarmament	Jun 1993	23
Operation Deliberate Force	Sep 1995	13
Iraq disarmament	Sep 1996	44
Operation Infinite Reach	Aug 1998	79
Operation Desert Fox	Dec 1998	325
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia	1999	218
Operation Enduring Freedom	2001	50
Invasion of Iraq	2003	802
Dobley airstrike	Mar 2008	2
Al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen	Dec 2009	2
Libya	Mar 2011	124
Military intervention against ISIL	Sep 2014	47
Attack on suspected radar sites in Yemen	Oct 2016	5
Shayrat airbase strike	Apr 2017	59
Damascus/Homs chem weapons strike	Apr 2018	66

 

 

 

 

There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign.

 

You might also recall that not too long ago, the Navy had stated that the F-35 would be last manned naval aircraft – further recognition that manned aircraft strikes were no longer viable – and, more recently, the Navy attempted, but failed, to develop unmanned strike UAVs (that eventually ‘devolved’ into the unmanned tanker).  Clearly, the Navy has moved on from carrier strikes.

 

The implication of the Navy’s recognition that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset is that the carrier air wing should be shifting its composition from strike to air superiority.  We need to drop any aircraft that is a ‘strikefighter’ and switch to pure air superiority.  The immediate import of this line of reasoning is that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, which the Navy is working on now, needs to be a pure air superiority fighter and not a strikefighter.  Disturbingly, the Navy is already referring to the NGAD as the F/A-XX strikefighter so that train is already headed off the tracks.

 

Carrier aircraft strike has gone the way of the battleship in terms of being the primary strike method.  We need to complete the transition to carrier air superiority by modifying our doctrine and operational practices and adjust our air wing composition accordingly.  Carriers and their air wings remain just as vitally important as ever but their mission has changed.  Just as the battleship proponents clung to their outmoded paradigm, so too will the carrier strike proponents cling to theirs but the change is inevitable.

 

 

 

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(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomahawk_(missile)#United_States_Navy

Status Update: Marine Corps Ship Sinkers and Sub Killers,

We’ve discussed and dissected the Marine Commandant’s ill-conceived concept of small units of hidden,  missile-shooting, sub-sinking wonder-warriors winning a war with China single-handed and we’ve, rightly, scoffed at it.  Setting aside the mockery, let’s take a look at the status of the effort to establish that capability and see what kind of progress the Commandant is making.

 

To ever so briefly review, the concept calls for Marines to launch anti-ship missiles, with a range of several hundred miles, from island bases using modified ‘jeeps’ and light trucks.  Two missile systems have been commonly proposed:

 

Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM) – The use of a land based Tomahawk cruise missile has been made possible by the termination of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.  Unfortunately, the Tomahawk is slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuvering, and likely has a very poor survival rate against a peer defender.  It’s essentially a subsonic target drone and can only succeed if fired in overwhelming numbers which the small unit concept cannot generate, so …  On the plus side, the missile has a range of several hundred miles and is designed to use mid-course guidance.  Where that initial targeting and subsequent mid-course guidance will come from in the Marine’s concept is unknown and, thus far, unexplained.  Given the two hour travel time at maximum range, some type of mid-course guidance will definitely be required.

 

The U.S. Navy’s subsonic Block Va (i.e. Block 5a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) is capable of being reprogrammed and rerouted in flight to attack moving ships out to around 900 nautical miles (or 1,035 miles/1,666 km…the exact range has not been fully disclosed) with a 1,000-pound warhead. Maritime Strike Tomahawk is by far the longest-range ASCM option although it would take about two hours to fly 900nm miles at a speed of around 550mph. The MST is slated to become operational in 2023 with the probable preferred U.S.M.C. ground launcher being a quartet of MK41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells mounted on a towed semitrailer. (4)

 

A towed semitrailer is not exactly a small, nimble, easily transportable, easily hidden piece of equipment which renders the basic concept of small, hidden units somewhat suspect.  Such a vehicle requires roads or flat, open terrain which, again, renders the ‘hidden’ aspect questionable.

 

Also, a quartet of cells provides a ‘magazine’ capacity of 4 missiles.  That’s not enough to bother any peer defender warship.  Reloads are both problematic and useless for a single engagement since the reload delay time would preclude effective massing of missiles.

 

Of course, the small unit could always be provided with several, or a dozen or more, semi-trailers to increase the ‘magazine’ size but that would negate the small, hidden, rapidly relocatable attributes of the Marine’s platoon size units.

Test Firing of Tomahawk from Trailer

Naval Strike Missile - The Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) combines a Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires) drone vehicle, which is a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).(2)  Seriously, there must be an entire department that works exclusively on catchy acronyms, right?  The NSM, as you recall, is the Norwegian Kongsberg anti-ship missile intended for the LCS.  It is subsonic, moderately stealthy, and has a range of 200-300+ miles.

 

NMESIS uses the Marines’ High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) on the chassis of a remotely operated version of the Army’s Oshkosh-built Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, loaded with a Kongsberg/Raytheon Naval Strike Missile.(2)

 

USMC will likely integrate the NSM on unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) “ROGUE Fires” vehicles. (4)

 

Regarding the launcher,

 

The Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary-Fires (ROGUE-F) is the launcher vehicle for the NMESIS/GBASM [ed. GBASM stands for Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile] system.  … The GBASM project will procure a USMC system while leveraging other Service-developed missiles to provide a ground based anti-access/area denial, anti-ship capability.(3)

 

If we were shooting acronyms and abbreviations, we’d win the war in a few hours!

 

ROGUE Fires 

 

So, those are the two missile systems.  What’s missing from that?  Targeting, of course!

 

Targeting

 

The glaring weakness in the Marine’s concept is, of course, targeting.  The Marines have not discussed this aspect, at all.  They’ve simply hand-waved away the issue and, just as every discussion of the overall concept begins with the Marines already firmly established on an island, hidden from view, fully equipped, and with the enemy absolutely clueless, so too, does every discussion of the missiles begin with the assumption that they already have targets sighted and locked. 

 

 

 

Status

 

So, now that we understand what missile systems are being developed and what the glaring weakness of the concept is, what is the status of the equipment and funding for the various components?  Listed below is a summary of the equipment and funding status of the various components of the concept.  Items in red indicate gaps or shortcomings related to the anti-ship concept.  Funding information largely comes from the FY2021 Marine and Navy procurement documents (3) on the SecNav budget website.  Note that missile funding was stated in the documents as being classified at a higher level than could be shown in the public documents so information is fragmentary, at best.

 

 

Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (Maritime Strike Tomahawk)

 

Status – The missiles are currently non-existent and under development, however, TASMs previously existed so this shouldn’t be a drawn out development and the upgrades appear to be ready to implement.  The Marines originally requested 48 missiles in FY2021.  The Marines consider this a longer term option.

 

Funding – The Marines requested $125M for FY2021.  Reports suggest that amount was cut but it is unclear by how much.

 

Naval Strike Missile

 

Status – The NSM exists and is currently being procured by the Navy for the LCS although production rates and, therefore, acquisition rates are very low, at the moment.  There is no indication in the FY2021 budget document that any NSM will be procured for the Marines.  So, the missiles are available but either not being procured or not in any significant quantity.

 

Funding – There is no line item listed in the budget document for the NSM

 

JLTV ROGUE Fires Launcher

 

Status – While JLTVs are currently operational and plentiful, modified versions to carry a HIMARS launcher are developmental.

 

Funding – The FY2021 budget shows a quantity of 7 HIMARS for $30M.  The JLTV vehicle is being procured at a quantity of 752 for $382M but that is for all of the Marine Corps, not just the anti-ship concept.  It is unclear whether any of the HIMARS or JLTV are modified for the anti-ship role and the budget language suggests that they are not which, in turn, suggests that there is no funding for any actual launch-modified vehicles.

 

 

Tomahawk-MST Launcher

 

Status – Likely a modified semi-trailer.  Currently non-existent. 

 

Funding - Unfunded

 

Sensor

 

Status – No sensor currently exists that has been linked to this concept.

 

Funding - Unfunded

 

 

 

 

Regarding FY2021 funding, here’s a general statement that is lacking in specifics but conveys a certain reluctance by Congress to fully fund the Marine’s request.

 

The Marines had requested $125 million for Tomahawks and $64 million for GBASM as well as $75 million for long-range fires. The final bill essentially cuts the GBASM budget in half and trims almost $20 million for LRPF research and development — roughly a 25 percent cut. (1)

 

Note that the Marines have, at various times and by various people, mentioned Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missiles, Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF), Ground Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM), Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires), all, apparently, describing the same or different aspects of the overall concept.  It’s difficult to know exactly what refers to what.

 

Acronyms aside, the takeaway is that Congress is funding less than the Marines requested and by a significant amount.

 

Noting the status of equipment existence, or lack thereof, and funding, the anti-ship concept appears to be currently severely underequipped and underfunded.  Admittedly, much of the anti-ship concept remains conceptual and under development so this is not, alone, worrisome, at this time.  Of greater concern is the fact that Congress has cut funding for the concept to some significant degree and the Commandant’s time in office is becoming limited.  A Commandant serves for 4 years with an option for a single additional term, however, there has not been a two-term Commandant since Gen. Lejeune in the 1920’s.  Commandant Berger has a bit over two years left in office.  Therefore, it is reasonable to question whether significant progress can be made on the concept before the Commandant’s term expires and someone else, with possibly a different or more Congress-friendly agenda, takes over.  The inescapable conclusion is that this entire anti-ship concept may die before it can be implemented.  When other items such as the Light Amphibious Warfare ship which is critical to the implementation of the concept and is barely even in the early developmental stage, are factored in, the future of the anti-ship concept becomes even more suspect.

 

Regarding implementation timing,

 

The Marine Corps had planned to move quickly on GBASM and wanted to field an operational battery by FY23.(1)

 

This would appear to be optimistic based on reduced funding and possible changes in concept and priorities.  It would also be somewhat disappointing that simply mounting an existing HIMARS on an existing JLTV and launching an existing NSM would require two years of development.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “Lawmakers slash funding for Marine Corps’ long-range fires development”, Jen Judson, 23-Dec-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/12/23/lawmakers-slash-funding-for-marine-corps-long-range-fires-development/

 

(2)Defense News website, “To combat the China threat, US Marine Corps declares ship-killing missile systems its top priority”, David B. Larter, 5-Mar-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/05/to-combat-the-china-threat-us-marine-corps-declares-ship-killing-missile-systems-its-top-priority/

 

(3)FY2021 Budget Justification Book, “Procurement, Marine Corp”, Feb 2020,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/PMC_Book.pdf

 

(4)Naval News website, “Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles and the U.S. Marine Corps: Options Available”, Peter Ong, 27-Sep-2020,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/09/land-based-anti-ship-missiles-and-the-u-s-marine-corps-options-available/

Does Every Sub Need Tomahawks?

Here is a companion piece to the recent post, “Does Every Ship Need A Helicopter?” which examined US Navy design assumptions.  This time, we’ll take a look at submarine design.

One of the seeming absolute characteristics of a US Navy submarine design is the capability to shoot Tomahawk cruise missiles.  Here are the recent submarine classes and their possible Tomahawk loads.

Los Angeles  12

Ohio SSGN    154

Seawolf      50

Virginia     12-40

Without a doubt, having the capability to covertly shoot Tomahawks from submarines is a useful capability.  But, does every sub need to be able to shoot Tomahawks?

The question is not whether Tomahawk cruise missiles are useful but whether their usefulness is sufficient to justify the expenditure of ship’s volume, the concomitant increase in cost and the resulting decrease in number of submarines built?  The volume and money dedicated to a submarine cruise missile capability could go to other ship’s functions and to building more subs.  In other words, there is an opportunity cost associated with submarine launched cruise missiles.

Let’s look a bit closer.

Tomahawk missiles add size and cost to submarines.  The size increase is 20% or so, depending on the specific sub class and version.  The cost increase is harder to determine but one solid data point is the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) scheduled to be installed on the newest Virginias.  The cost increase is estimated to be around $500M which is a 20% increase over the base cost of around $2.5B.

By leaving out the VPM, we could build one extra Virginia class sub for every five subs built.  Are the added Tomahawks worth losing one extra sub for every five built?  To answer that, we need to recall the submarine’s mission(s).

The problem with “missions” is that people tend to assemble a laundry list and then, in discussions, assign by implication equal value to every mission.  For instance, here’s a partial list of submarine missions in no particular order.

• Anti-submarine warfare
• Anti-surface warfare
• Long range strike warfare
• Intelligence gathering
• Special operations forces support
• Presence
• Cross training with foreign navies
• Mine laying
• Carrier group escort
• Area denial
• Blockade

As we examine the list of missions, we see that long range strike warfare is on the list.  Ergo, we must have Tomahawks on every submarine!  See what I’ve done, there?  I’ve equated every mission.  They are all equally important.  Therefore, they must all be incorporated into the design of any sub.  This is what we do today but it is wrong.

What we should be doing is prioritizing the list of missions.  We should be asking ourselves, what is the most important mission?  We might also ask ourselves what the most likely mission is – it’s often not the same as the most important!  If we do that then we can begin to intelligently design a submarine and make informed tradeoffs between cost and capability.

In war, a submarine’s most important mission is anti-submarine warfare according to US Navy doctrine since the Cold War – I’m talking about attack subs, SSN’s, not ballistic missile submarines.  The main job of our submarines is to eliminate the enemy’s submarines.  A close second mission, but still second, is anti-surface warfare.  Every mission after that is extraneous, in a sense.  If, by eliminating all the other missions – Tomahawk capability, in this case – we could build an extra submarine for every five we now build, would this be worth the loss of 12-40 Tomahawks (we’re talking about Virginia class subs, now)?  I suggest it would be and would be well worth it. 

Consider, of the 50 or so attack subs we’d like to have, we could have 10 extra subs if we dropped the Tomahawk capability!  60 subs vs. 50.  That’s a trade I’ll take!

But wait!  What about the loss of Tomahawk strike capability?  Well, that’s a significant loss, no doubt.  However, we have plenty of alternate Tomahawk strike capability in the form of Burkes and we could have much more if we took the retiring Ohio class subs and converted them into additional SSGNs with 154 Tomahawks each.  The subs are already built so it would just require the incremental cost to modify them to launch cruise missiles.  Wiki reports the conversion cost at around $700M per sub in mid-2000’s dollars.  Relative to ship building costs, that’s quite reasonable.

Submarine Launched Tomahawk - Is It Needed?

You’re asking yourself, how does an SSGN square with my previous mission list and stated priorities of ASW and ASuW?  Well, an SSGN has a different mission priority – pure cruise missile strike warfare – so the SSGN falls in line with the concept of recognizing what the priority mission is.

We see, then, that we could have more subs for the same cost and maintain or increase our fleet wide Tomahawk strike capability if we choose to spend a little bit more. 

Note, the cost of one LCS would just about cover the cost of converting one SSBN to SSGN.  Would you rather have one LCS or one Ohio SSGN with 154 Tomahawk missiles?

So, does every submarine need to have Tomahawk launch capability?  My answer is no.  The Navy needs to look at submarine CONOPS and rethink submarine design and numbers.  We need to abandon the every-ship-must-be-capable-of-every-mission thinking that now dominates our design philosophy.

Tomahawk Inventory

We've been discussing cruise missile use in the A2/AD penetration scenario, specifically, and combat in general.  Just a quick reminder that our total Tomahawk inventory is estimated at around 3000 missiles.  That's not a lot in the context of a major peer war.

It's easy to postulate cheap commercial ships loaded with cruise missiles (an arsenal ship, essentially), actual high density Arsenal Ships, or other very large capacity cruise missile launch ships (or even aircraft!) but with a total inventory of only 3000, there quickly comes a point where you wind up with far more launch cells than missiles.

Further, the risk of concentration is real.  Suppose we design a platform that can carry 300 cruise missiles (to pick an arbitrary number).  If it gets destroyed, we've instantaneously lost one tenth of our total inventory.  There's a lot to be said for distribution of inventory (the Hughes small combatant philosophy, to an extent).

Finally, we are quick to assume that we can ramp up production but that isn't really the case.  Cruise missiles are not like simple bombs in WWII.  They require sophisticated electronics among other components.  That can't be instantly and infinitely ramped up.  Even if they could, the cost of $2M per is a consideration.

So, hypothesize away but bear some of the realities of modern weapons in mind!