Marine Commandant Berger keeps talking about hidden bases with small units that will rain missiles of death and destruction down on the hapless Chinese who won’t have a clue where the Marines are. Well, let’s attempt to be fair and take a look at the missiles that the good Commandant envisions using. Are they small enough to remain hidden? Can they be easily moved as the Marines nimbly relocate from island to island on Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships?
Note: The inspiration and, indeed, much of the organization and content of this post is taken from a Naval News website article by Peter Ong.[1]
Naval Strike Missile
The smallest of the potential missiles for the Marines is the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
The Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) mounts two Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) on a remote-operated, driven, and NSM launched unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 4×4 vehicle. … The 900-pound (410 kilogram) NSM (or 910 pounds with booster) can be internally loaded aboard a CH-53 and onto the flatbed of a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 6×6 truck via a forklift. … it is possible to push an NSM container on a trolley cart but loading it onto the JLTV will require a … forklift.[1]
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| NMESIS Naval Strike Missile on JLTV |
That’s a hefty brute of a vehicle. Note that it carries two missiles. To be operationally relevant and combat effective, a unit is going to need … what ? … twenty or so missiles, at a minimum? That would be a minimum of ten such vehicles. That’s no longer a small, secretive, hidden footprint. Of course one could always use fewer launch vehicles and just use reloads but that would require forklifts and some type of missile storage facility which, again, is not a small, secretive, hidden footprint.
These vehicles (JLTV or forklifts) give off very large infrared signatures, especially in the tropical sun. Again, not conducive to remaining hidden.
From Wikipedia, here's a description of the components of a Norwegian coastal defense battery which is, essentially, what the Marines are trying to set up:
An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle.
Again, that's not a small footprint !
Tomahawk
Another missile option is the cutting edge, brand new, ultra advanced, futuristic Maritime Strike Tomahawk ... which you knew this as the 1980’s – 1990’s era Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM). In any event, the Tomahawk will be deployed on 40 ft long, 34 ton, M872 trailers.
The semitrailer is designed to be towed over smooth, hard-surfaced roads with loads up to 34 tons (68,000 lbs payload) at speeds as high as 55 mph (88 km/h). It can also be towed over unimproved roads, trails and open rolling terrain with the same load limit, but at a sustained speed of no more than 10 mph (16 km/h).[2]
The M872 semitrailer is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6x4 Truck, Tractor.[2]
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| Tomahawk Launching From Trailer Mounted VLS Cell |
Note the immense size of the trailer, VLS cell, and then factor in the trailer tow vehicle. The photo depicts a feasibility demonstration but the final launch vehicle will not be any smaller. Again, assuming we want more than a single missile shot, we’ll need dozens of these trailers, tow vehicles, and, potentially, large cranes to handle the VLS cells. Imagine a large city freeway with a string of twenty giant tractor-trailers and you’ll get an idea of how hidden this operation will be.
Also, note the 10 mph speed limit for movement over unimproved roads and terrain. This will not be a quick, agile, shoot and scoot operation !
The MST uses a two-way communications link for mid-course guidance and targeting updates. This could prove problematic during combat as it violates EMCON and allows the enemy to locate the communications source.
HIMARS
Another missile option is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) which is a podded rocket system with six rockets per HiMARS pod and are launched from a modified USMC Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) 6×6 truck.[1] HiMARS rockets may require new seekers to target moving ships.
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| HIMARS Pod on FMTV 6x6 Truck |
Note the size of the 6x6 truck. Again, several such trucks/pods would be needed.
Conclusion
The options discussed above all involve dozens of sizeable vehicles – no easy thing to hide on an island inside your enemy’s zone of control. Also, bear in mind that other necessities must be provided including large amounts of fuel, fuel handling equipment, vehicle maintenance and repair capabilities, spare parts, etc. in addition to the operator’s food, health, and shelter needs. All of this is in addition to the gear and supplies that the regular Marines will require. While the Commandant may have some fanciful notion of Marines living off the land (that has actually been discussed in various published articles), that is simply not feasible for any sustained period of time. There is also the matter of health. The tropics are renowned for myriad diseases and Marines weakened by malnourishment will be quickly rendered sick and ineffective.
We’re also ignoring the challenges associated with transporting and loading/unloading large vehicles to/from islands in secret. Does the Commandant really believe he can transport and unload dozens of large vehicles without being noticed?
The other aspect that is not covered is targeting. The Marines will need some type of UAV or radar or something to provide targeting beyond the 12 mile horizon. That thousand mile Tomahawk sounds great on paper but how are you going to get thousand mile targeting? Whatever vehicle or sensor the Marines use will further reduce their ‘hiddenness’. Sensor assets will require two-way communications which, again, point back to the Marine’s location.
When all the vehicles, UAVs, sensors, support equipment, storage facilities, etc. are considered, it is difficult to see how anyone can believe that missile-shooting units will remain undetected even assuming that they can penetrate the enemy’s zone in a small, non-stealthy, painfully slow LAW and establish themselves on an island in the first place.
Finally, the Commandant has stated that in the unlikely event that the Marines are discovered, they will simply hop aboard a LAW and relocate, thus regaining their secrecy. Of course, loading and unloading all the equipment we’ve discussed is not an insignificant feat in itself. Trying to load all the vehicles and equipment onto a LAW will be a pretty noticeable event, one would imagine.
By the way, when this unlikely relocation becomes necessary, where will the multiple transport LAWs come from? Will they be floating offshore, waiting? If so, wouldn’t they be quickly spotted? If they’re not waiting and, instead, they’re back on, say, Guam. It will take weeks to get them to the Marine’s island. That’s not exactly going to allow for quick, agile relocations, is it?
Nothing about this concept appears feasible. The Commandant either needs to come out and address some of these issues, at least in general terms, or he will continue to face resistance. He appears to have successfully stifled internal dissent but has run into staunch resistance from former Marine generals and other top-ranking former officials. Commandant, if you want support you’ve got to provide some information and address the gaping holes in the logic of the concept.
Side note: Does anyone recall the Cuban missile crisis? The Soviets attempted to secretly transport missiles using small, slow, unarmed transport ships (sounds like a LAW !) and place the missiles on the island of Cuba without being noticed and yet they were instantly spotted with 1950’s – 1960’s technology. How’d that work out?
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[1]Naval News website, “A Look At The Sizes Of U.S. Land-Based Strike Missiles”, Peter Ong, 29-Jun-2022,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/a-look-at-the-sizes-of-u-s-land-based-strike-missiles/
[2]https://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m872_trailer.php
Even before the leadership answers the how the concept would work, they need to answer what is the objective of this concept.
ReplyDeleteIf the intent is to use the small missile bases to attack Chinese land targets, then why is this better than a flotilla of ships. The flotilla can choose the area of launch, which can be anywhere in the open ocean, not restricted to where the islands are. Also the flotilla simply sails in to the area of operation, shoots and runs away to safety.
If the intent is to use the small missile "bases" to hit stray enemy ships which happen to be sailing by, then how is it better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships in areas where enemy activity is present. Why would an enemy ship happen to sail around the island where the missiles are.
When we look at history, holding of islands was to control large swathes of ocean around it. But then the islands were not small discreet bases, but rather proper "bastions" with troops, air strips, logistic support etc. You want to control large area you have to invest and build big.
Everybody seems to be bitten by the Special Forces bug.
-BM
PS: I have long been a reader of your blog. First time commenting.
Welcome!
Delete"they need to answer what is the objective of this concept."
I think the Commandant has pretty well answered the 'what is the objective'. He has stated that he is taking the Marines back to their roots (one can debate what those roots are and how they relate to the present but that's a separate issue) with the objective being to support the Navy. His chosen method of support is to establish these island bases from which he will control the seas (including, according to him, ASW), thereby assisting the Navy.
Short answer: land based sea control using missiles.
Having established the objective, we're now left to debate the 'how' and that's where the concept completely falls apart.
"how is it better than a flotilla of ships sailing around"
Well, the Commandant's reply would be that a flotilla of ships will be quickly spotted by the enemy and attacked whereas his small, missile units will be undetected. Of course, that's delusional but that's his vision and explains why he thinks land based missile units are better than a flotilla of ships.
The logical discontinuity, here, is that he recognizes that ships will be easily spotted - including our Marines spotting enemy target ships - and yet he believes that his own ships, the LAWs, will operate undetected. You can't have it both ways. Either ships can be easily spotted, including his own LAWs, or they can't, in which case his entire concept of spotting enemy ships and attacking them falls apart.
"Everybody seems to be bitten by the Special Forces bug."
Now that's astute and incredibly relevant ! We've forgotten that wars are won by overmatching firepower which, by definition, requires large, massed forces. Instead, as you suggest, the US military is obsessed with small units that are somehow, almost magically, imbued with enormous effectiveness due to the miracles of data and networks.
This is really a great observation. I'm sorely tempted to do a post on this.
Keep commenting !
Given the actual missile ranges maybe this doctrine could work in a narrow seas like the Baltic, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf or Java but in the Pacific seems a bit lacking.
DeleteJM
"could work in a narrow seas"
DeleteTargeting, targeting, targeting ! Unless you have some kind of surveillance system, which the Marines have not said anything about, you're limited to the horizon which is around 12 miles.
"Everybody seems to be bitten by the Special Forces bug."
DeleteI say the problem is our government leaders fell for the delusion they could fight short, victorious wars to raise their popularity and popular support, i.e., they're repeating Argentinian President Leopoldo Galtieri's mistakes when he instigated the Falklands War.
No one is discussing measures necessary to fight an extended war, e.g., raised taxes, rationing, the draft... Without the resources such measures would provide, we won't win, which means we'll lose as voters see the fighting earns us nothing but pointless suffering.
China will have air and naval superiority in WestPac during the first four months of a conflict, probably longer. I think current Marine officers can't grasp the idea of operating when the enemy controls the air. They should run an exercise against the USAF where the Marines attempt to do their ship killing thing and LAW resupply while the "enemy" roams the skies.
ReplyDeleteThis comment is from G2mil. About a month ago the comment system was tweaked. Even though I'm logged into Google, I must remember to choose "Comment as G2mil Google" before I begin to type, otherwise my comment automatically appears as Anonymous. No big deal, just annoying.
Delete"I think current Marine officers can't grasp the idea of operating when the enemy controls the air."
DeleteInterestingly, the Commandant clearly grasps the idea that he will not have control of the air or the seas. He has explicitly stated that the missile-shooting units will be operating in the enemy's zone of control and that the Marines need to learn how to do that. I give him credit for recognizing that fact.
However, despite recognizing that fact, he seems to ignore it and its implications. Despite acknowledging that the Marines will have to operate in the enemy's sensor and firepower control zones, he believes his units will be able to remain undetected. He also, apparently, believes that the enemy's air power will be of no consequence as there has been absolutely no discussion of bringing any anti-air capability along with the Marine's missile-shooting trucks.
So, the Commandant recognizes the enemy's control of the air but gives it no credit for surveillance or firepower. That's some serious delusion at work !
"About a month ago the comment system was tweaked."
ReplyDeleteAs with most 'improvements', the improvements caused more problems than they solved.
Think its way past time for Berger to declassify or redacted results of some war games to give some semblance of justification and support to where he is taking USMC.....
ReplyDeleteThe Marines claim they're going to release some wargame summaries later this year. I suspect they'll be so sanitized as to be useless but we'll see.
DeleteIt's the fight before the fight.
ReplyDeleteMarines have to be there to buck up allies' morale & keep them in line. If the Japanese, Taiwanese, Pinoys don't see boots on the ground amongst them in danger's way (i.e. USN/AF fleet maybe effective as strike force during hot war, not so much as a consistent & permanent presence during cold deterrence), they may cave to Chinese peacetime geo-eco-political maneuvering. If China wins before the fight, there is not gonna be a fight.
You're missing key aspects of this concept:
Delete1. The units are intended to be HIDDEN and UNDETECTED. Thus, they can serve no 'presence' purpose without defeating their combat purpose.
2. The concept calls for platoon size units. A platoon size unit is too small to provide any deterrent or reassurance effect. If a potential ally 'caves' due to lack of a platoon size unit, they weren't going to be an ally anyway.
3. The Marine's small units HAVE NO TERRITORY THAT THEY CAN BASE ON. This is one of the fundamental flaws in the concept. The US doesn't own any of the islands in the first island chain that the Marines would want to use. Unless we can get basing rights (there goes secrecy !) or choose to conduct an illegal invasion, we have no islands to base on.
4. Deterrence has been disproven, repeatedly, in this blog.
Let's look at this as a spectrum (from purely Taiwan war calculation). On one end, we put all the eggs in the forward basket (i.e. armed the islands to the teeth north and south of Taiwan water, including Taiwan itself, maybe couple divisions worth of US boots). On the other end, remove all tripwire/human shield/token US boots and leave the war fighting to air/sea/space/non-boots arenas. In the middle, are combination of both in sliding scale.
DeleteForce-Design-2030 is actually towards your end of spectrum (i.e. minimal boots forward deployment, with heft going towards air/sea battle fleets). Now, if we take one step further and remove that minimal boots presence, what do you think will happen to Taiwan's psychology (1st, you gotta understand Taiwanese don't want war, 2nd. it wants US presence nearby.) What you proposeed is optimal for fighting, but not realistic considering the non-war scenario we're currently in. You may wish for a US-China showdown, but you'll never get there if Taiwan 'caves' in because they don't see us side-by-side (even if it's minimal presence) with them.
"armed the islands to the teeth north and south of Taiwan water"
DeleteWhat islands are you referring to? What islands does the US have basing rights to that would allow us to 'arm to the teeth'?
"What you proposed"
What proposal are you referring to? Nothing was proposed in this post.
"Let's look at this as a spectrum (from purely Taiwan war calculation)."
DeleteIf we are, why aren't you asking why the Taiwanese government isn't inviting the US to establish military bases on Taiwanese soil? If the US government seriously wants to deter a Chinese attempt to annex Taiwan, it's this or nothing.
China has been running training sorties thru both Miyako and Bashi straits, so that telegraphs their intentions in time of Taiwan war. Now, if you google "Miyakojima, missile" you'll find articles about JSDF stationing surface-to-ship missile batteries on Okinawa and Miyakojima (perhaps other islands if you google map the area). Maybe our missiles are not there per se (actually, we don't know) but all the supporting infrastructure are there already. With the Philippines there are more unknowns, but I believe we call the security shots there since Bashi strait seems to be a busy route for submarines by all sides, and the PH relies on us for SCS security issues.
DeleteAs for your proposal, you've have been for years hammering on strike force (get in fast, hit hard, then get out fast), not deterring deployments which you hate, and certainly not forward deployed tripwire presence. Also, as military mind, yours is probably not so interested in 'defending Taiwan' but destroying PLAN/AF rather. Both AirSea Battle and Off-shore Containment call for destruction of PLAN/AF. In the end, China-with-Taiwan or China-alone, without its fangs, serves our purpose the same.
Lastly, Aim9snake asked why there aren't US divisions on Taiwan. Because the US civilian leadership's aim is to deter a Taiwan war, but if war breaks out we don't want to lose that 2 divisions (or for the sake of that 2 divisions, USN have to come to their defense in a predictable manner, 100 miles off China's A2AD beehive).
I think there's a place for land based anti ship missile units, but to defend actual islands, with size, terrain, and vegetation to allow dispersal and hiding. And which have actual people on them to defend. This is the coastal defense artillery mission, which many countries have. Including China. I think the required units would be significantly different (most likely significantly larger) than Berger's planned units. And they'd probably be there in advance of the war, so wouldn't need to sneak in secretly.
ReplyDeleteWhether this is a mission for the Marines or the Army, I'm not sure.
One of the [many] problems I have with this concept is that, historically, it's been tried many times and has been successful almost never. That's not encouraging and a study of the reasons for that failure indicated why the idea can't work.
DeleteAnother aspect is that a coastal defense force is actually defending something whereas these missile-shooting units are not. That's not necessarily a problem but it illustrates the somewhat ill-defined nature of this mission and the lack of strategic or operational value of the mission.
The Marine's concept is for SMALL, platoon size units. That limits the unit's firepower to just a small handful of missiles and, by definition, a handful of missiles can't be effective against a combat ready naval force with a multi-layered anti-air defense. If the units can't be effective, why are they there?
Nothing about this concept makes sense.
"a study of the reasons for that failure indicated why the idea can't work"
DeleteCan you describe a few of the reasons? Inquiring minds want to know !!
"Can you describe a few of the reasons?"
DeleteFar and away, the main reason for failure is that the enemy gets to pick the time and location for attack and that invariably means that the enemy is able to achieve local numerical and firepower superiority. This is what happened to every US outpost/island at the start of WWII and why we lost every island we tried to defend and why every Japanese outpost/island during the later years of WWII was lost. The same is true for Normandy where the Allies achieved overwhelming numerical and firepower superiority.
Another reason is that the coastal defense force is usually isolated either physically (on an island) or temporally (can't reinforce in time to matter).
Another reason is resupply. In the case of island defense forces, the enemy invariably isolates the island and prevents resupply so that the defending force gets progressively weaker over time.
Priorities are another problem. Coastal defense forces are invariably deemed a second priority compared to the defender's front line forces. The coastal forces then get lesser quality troops and equipment. This happened at Normandy with the beach defense forces being largely comprised of second or third tier units.
And so on.
History has very few (bordering on none) modern examples of successful coastal defense actions.
Holding onto far flung Island outposts is a very very difficult proposition in my opinion.
DeleteLets, take a look at how outposts are defended on land. Since I am from India, I would try to illustrate this with how the Indian Army holds on remote mountain passes in the Himalayas.
You create an outpost to monitor or hold on to a pass or path in the mountains. The outposts need protection to prevent flanking, requires indirect fire support, etc. So you create a couple of more outposts on top of the hills around the first outpost. Now to support these outposts you create a few more outposts around them. So you end up with a multiple outposts, with 100's of soldiers in them. Now you need a bigger base just behind to provide logistics to these outposts and to rotate troops around. Without the mutual overlapping support the individual outpost is a sitting duck.
In a nutshell, holding onto a single pass adds on to multiple outposts and garrisons. At least on land you have the luxury of land to build the outposts or garrisons.
In case of Islands, one does not necessarily have the luxury of nearby land or islands which can provide support. Hence, defending small isolated islands seems to be a an extremely difficult proposition.
-BM
PS. Thanks for the warm welcome.
Considering how many (fairly large) vehicles we are talking about here, will they all fit into the LAW? After all, it's a small ship designed to handle a reinforced PLATOON sized force !
ReplyDeleteWell, we can use several ships but that, of course, makes it even more unlikely that the force will be able to penetrate enemy controlled waters and establish secret bases without being seen. A convoy of small, very slow, non-stealthy, defenseless LAWs will be quickly and easily detected and destroyed, one would assume.
DeleteNothing about this concept makes sense.
NMESIS on a JLTV allows it to be moved by H-53, maybe V-22? Otherwise its C-130 or a landing craft. In that event why not standardize around the Himars truck with variations for a manned NSM launcher or a NASAMs launcher. 1 vehicle, 3 launch types. For moving helos, why move a vehice when you can move the munition on the helo as the launcher. Figure out how to integrate NSM on AH-1Z or UH-1Y. Plus the Navy should be figuring out how to lessen the need for the Marines in this role. As it stands, how are the Mrines finding targets on their own? They will have a few reapers and are ditching the RQ-21s which haven't been quite what was needed to begin with.
Delete"helos"
DeleteYou seem to be conflating multiple situations/scenarios. The Marine missile-shooting concept has no helo use that has ever been mentioned. This is understandable since establishing a helo-capable base would negate the 'hidden' feature which is the main characteristic of the Commandant's vision.
"the Navy should be figuring out how to lessen the need for the Marines in this role."
I'm not sure the Navy cares what the Marines do. As far as I know, the Navy has never uttered a word of support for the Marine's concept beyond a slotting vague, future LAW acquisition program that they keep putting off. It appears that the Navy is content to let the Marines wander off on their own.
"They will have a few reapers"
No, the Marines will not have Reapers as part of their missile-shooting concept. You can't operate large UAVs from a tiny, hidden base, as the concept calls for. Large UAVs require runways, hangars, fueling facilities, maintenance facilities, control and communication facilities, remote pilots, etc. Surveillance/targeting is a major, gaping weakness in the concept.
While LAWs are great for amphibious assault, they are poor for semi-covert resupply. They will be easy to spot from shore, UAV or satellite. What is needed is a dozen small, cheap utility ships for various roles in the Pacific. Different ships painted different colors to blend in with normal ship traffic, such as the USNS Fast Tempo.
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USNS_Fast_Tempo
Even if spotted, an enemy may not want to try to hit a small cargo ship with scarce multi-million dollar anti-ship missiles.
Resupply, evacuation, rescue ect.
Right up until the Chinese declare a combat exclusion zone and start sinking anything that isn't theirs.
Delete"LAWs are great for amphibious assault,"
DeleteThey arent good for covert resupply, yet theyre design is for covert insertion and supply??? Not sure how theyd be good for assault either. Frankly the ideas behind them are terrible, and shouldnt be pursued or built imho!!
"...different colors to blend in with normal ship traffic..."
I think ships moving around islands that are lightly or unpopulated , and aren't part of normal shipping operations amd trade routes will stick out like the proverbial thumb, regardless of what color they are.
Here's a Naval War College paper on the logistical need of EABO operations: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1144374
ReplyDeleteGenerally, they stated it was not feasible with current capabilities.
If this is the future of the Corps, and the best effort theyre gonna have, then this might be the time to consider closing the doors. The budget would be better spent on somthing like more SSGNs- They can actually get in relatively close, they are actually survivable, they can actually hide, and they can actually contribute to a fight with meaningful firepower.
ReplyDeleteIt sounds blasphemous, and if the Corp would find a proper useful mission to follow, fine, keep em in business. (And there are a few) But unless someone jettisons the Commandant, and every fool espousing EABO, Im not seeing their existence as anything but a way to waste money, and eventually, young lives...
-Jjabatie
If Berger really wants to go "back to the USMC's roots", per the Constitution he should be asking for "a corps of marines, which shall consist of one major, four captains, sixteen first lieutenants, twelve second lieutenants, forty-eight sergeants, forty-eight corporals, thirty-two drums and fifes, and seven hundred and twenty privates, including the marines who have been enlisted, or are authorized to be raised for the naval armament". The rest of the current USMC staffing including himself could be given to the other services -- if they want them.
ReplyDeleteThe Marines seem to be stepping here into territory that has traditionally been an Army mission (coast artillery). Of course the concept as outlined is ridiculous (this equipment is very large and heavy, even the lighest verions, and could not possibly be moved to and concealed at a hidden base in the jungle. The idea of having coast artillery units which could be deployed forward at need is a valid one, but units like this don't operate alone. A matching delpoyment of air defence artillery (which needs to be co-located) and land based aircraft (which don't all necessarily need to be in the exact same place, but need to be in a place where they have the range to at least contest the airspace and provide recon), along with a major deployment of command, supply and signal assets, along with enough ground combat forces to provide local security, are all needed to make a land based missile unit an asset rather than a liability.
ReplyDeleteIt's not directly related to the core of the post but, is there any reason not to make podded versions of the NSM for use with HIMARS/MLRS?
ReplyDeleteI'm not saying as a replacement for their remote control launcher but as a supplement. If you can use regular MLRS launchers and just pods with different missiles why not go that route? It allows the launchers to be used as regular (effective) artillary until you need them in the more specialized role. Or for that matter try podding some antiair missiles.
NSM is podded for most uses. It is provided in a podded launch vehicle for Norwegian coastal defense batteries. From Wiki,
Delete"An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle."
Whether the native NSM pod is compatible with the US vehicles is unknown.
NSM also has a land attack capability although, at $2M (USD) per missile, that's pretty expensive artillery.
As noted in the post, pods cannot be tossed on and off a launch vehicle. They weigh a thousand pounds or so. That requires time, fork lifts, other vehicles, munitions storage, and manpower to swap out pods. The Marines are envisioning austere, minimal, hidden outposts that won't and can't have that kind of support without negating their 'hiddenness'.
Exactly, why not chose 1 vehicle and adapt for NASAMS, MLRS and NSM applications.
DeleteFor the Marine's vision of a very small, hidden unit that would require establishing some sort of munitions warehouse/bunker with heavy load operating equipment. That defeats the purpose of a small, lean, agile unit.
DeleteNot at all. I'm not saying one vehicle that can swap out. I'm saying 3 uniquue vehicles except they are on a base standard chassis etc.
DeleteThe Army and Marines already have a family of standard vehicles based on size/capacities,
DeleteYou finally touched on one of my biggest issues with this, namely whose islands are these Marines going to shoot from? IF any of this could actually be made to work and the Marines are able to launch a NSM at a PLAN ship, wouldn't that invite a retaliatory strike on the Nation that owns the island?
ReplyDeleteIts interesting how many commentators feel the Philippines will support the US in a confrontation with China. I suspect exactly the opposite will happen, given the lack of support for treaty obligations in 2012 when the Chinese took over Scarborough Shoal.
DeleteIts worse now because Marcos is a pretty definite supporter of China, so its becoming increasingly unlikely that the Philippines is going to allow weaponry on Philippine soil that will provoke the Chinese.
A Google search for Scarborough Shoal and 2012 will bring up the backstory. Personally I think it was a big mistake for the US not to have been more aggressively supportive at the time. I suspect the Philippines is off the list for stealthy Marine small bases.
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1143063
If the USA and China clash, I only expect Japan to ally with the USA. All others will wisely opt out as China is their largest trading partner. The Marines could insert recon teams with 4-10 members to act as coast watchers for months at a time in remote parts of the Philippines and Indonesia to provide valuable intel. This would be larger than standard four man teams because long-range comm is needed and they might use small radar or long range IR scopes. If caught, they'd try to flee or surrender and say their boat was sunk and they got stranded ashore.
ReplyDeleteBut you can't put 100+ men ashore with big trucks and pretend no local will notice, especially with the logistics that requires.
"can't put 100+ men ashore with big trucks and pretend no local will notice"
ReplyDeleteI still haven't heard whether the Marines are actually planning to put these teams on inhabited islands (with "locals") or on uninhabited ones. Does anyone know? Other than the Commandant, of course?
The problem is they'll stick out even more on an uninhabited island without civilian presence to mix in with. No roads, no other heat signatures, no water supplies, no electricity. Providing all these on their own will increase the size of the unit and therefore increase their signature where there should be none.
DeleteLowering IR signatures they can do; But regardless, if they are to be taken seriously, they will need either a radar, which will denote where they are down to a certain area on an island, let alone the island, and or an airborne asset that can do the initial search. Now, the only way this can be intelligently done is they are linked into the Navy's existing kill chain mechanisms which allow targeting by aircraft/ships to other aircraft/ships, or they will need some airborne radar dedicated to the Marines, either a podded aircraft or a UAV that can carry a serious airborne search radar. They don't have one in the inventory that can do that without need of a somewhat improved runway. Reapers don't just land ona small dirt strip, they need it to be somewhat improved and sizable. Other factor, these islands often get rain, some are quite dry, others quite humid, which is lovely on electronics. I think these mobile launchers will be non-mobile and the military will need to someow clandestinely get in bulldozers and build some type of underground area for the vehicles to spend most of their time in to avoid detection. Perhaps build a fancy looking empty shell of a home over it to hide the below ground vehicles, at least the bulldozer may make more sense if it's not a bunch of seabees using it. Half kidding here, but point is the vehicles will need protection from the elements too. I think only way to make the islands effective is either they have a big enough asset that can take off with very little runway or have access to the Navy's assets. Two things come to mind that may work- the air force wants to can all it's block 30 extremely large Rq-4's; Give them to the Marines, they can operate for long distances, for long time frames, and can transmit to a passive non-electric generating groups of various hidden marines. Other way for shorter ranges is put fuel bladders on islands, and keep the old Harriers around. They can use very minimal airstrips, they can carry various pods which could do the task, though they have very short legs, and hell, if there is an island runway, they might be able to carry some of the weapons themselves. I do think China if they use their brain will simply circle groups of suspected islands and just steer around them. The only missile that could harm them in Marines' possessions are the tomahawks and those are the least easy to hide; The rest have shorter legs unless they give them the LRASM's.
ReplyDeleteSnake Island has been a good lesson on this issue. Both the Ukrainians and the Russians have been unable to station a small, light force on the island without it becoming extremely vulnerable to being wiped out by enemy attack.
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