The Best Defense is a Good Offense

We’ve had repeated discussions about the defense of Guam (or any forward base) and everyone except the military seems to recognize that requires a layered defense which includes ships, planes, missiles, mines, etc.
 
However, there’s another layer to defense that never gets mentioned and that is offense. 
 
The best defense is a good offense.
 
This means that if you can destroy the source of attacks before they even launch, there’s nothing to defend and your defense is perfect.  Rather than shoot down missiles, find and destroyer the launchers (shoot archers not arrows).  Rather than try to intercept aircraft, destroy the aircraft’s bases.  Rather than search for submarines, destroy them pierside and destroy their shore support facilities.  And so on.
 
Offense is the first, best, defensive layer.
 
We just noted that the military is making little or no serious effort to build up Guam’s defenses and, indeed, may be reducing those defenses in response to environmental concerns (see, “BaseDefense is a Joke”).  As bad as that is, there has not even been the slightest thought given to incorporating an offensive layer into Guam’s defense.  The Air Force is not planning to conduct strikes against Chinese ballistic missile launch sites, airbases, or naval ports.  The Navy has no plans to launch cruise missiles at Chinese airbases and naval ports.  The Navy has no plan to attack Chinese submarines in their home ports or destroy their support facilities.
 
Some might attempt to make the argument, purely on faith, that the military does have plans but they just haven’t made them public.  That might seem like a reasonable proposition, on the face of it, but in our society there’s no such thing as a secret.  Further, if we did have such plans, we’d be practicing them and there have been no such exercises conducted … ever.  Recall the WWII War Plan Orange?  We had plans for fighting Japan and we conducted practice exercises in the form of Fleet Problems for years prior to the start of war.  There were no secrets even back then.  Besides, at least in a general sense, you’d like your potential enemy to know that you have plans to defeat them and that you’re diligently practicing so … no need to be overly concerned about secrecy.
 
The obvious conclusion is that we have no offensive plans to support Guam’s defensive efforts.  This must change.  We desperately need to get serious about the war with China and start planning, practicing, and engaging  …  offensively.

Base Defense is a Joke

On this blog – and everywhere else except in the military – we’ve long recognized the vital strategic position of Guam and the need to defend it during war with China.  It couldn’t be more obvious.  We’ve also noted the apparent lack of urgency on the part of the military to institute any serious base defense plans.  Well, here’s a sad joke of an announcement about a first of its kind defense test for Guam.
 

The US military announced today the first-ever test intercept of a ballistic missile from its Guam-based missile defense system … [1]

Unbelievable.  We’ve been discussing the challenges and critical need for defense of Guam for years and only now have we conducted the first ever test of the ballistic missile defense?  What a joke.  Someone is not very serious about base defense.
 
But wait … it gets better.
 

The MDA described the event as a “pivotal step” towards a larger, more holistic Guam Defense System designed to take on multiple threats at once — a “persistent layered integrated air and missile defense capability.”[1]

Are you kidding me?  This implies we don’t currently have a layered defense capability for our most important base?  What has the military been doing for the last decade or two?
 
This seems to be saying that if China attacked, today, with more than one missile, we’d be helpless.  The reality is that we should be planning to defend against saturation attacks and, given the amount of time we’ve had, our base defense should be already prepared and thoroughly tested.
 

The Guam Defense System will ultimately integrate multiple independent fire control systems into something that can cope with complex and integrated attacks with salvos across the air and missile threat spectrum.[1]

“… will ultimately integrate …” ???!  What have they been waiting for?  This implies that a true, layered defense system is still years/decades away.
 
But wait … it gets still better.
 
Are we frantically (one presumes) building up our Guam defenses?  Of course we are, right?  We’d have to be utter morons not to be increasing our defenses.  Right? … Yeah, about that …
 

For several years, US military leaders from the Indo-Pacific region have emphasized the need to build up Guam as both a military staging point and an air-defense hub. However, the process hasn’t been easy, and in October, the MDA proposed scaling back the number of missile defense sites on the island from 22 to 16 due to environmental impact concerns.[1][emphasis added]

We’re decreasing our defenses?  Are you kidding me?  Since when is the defensive requirements of, arguably, our most important forward base determined by environmental concerns?  I’m all for reasonable environmental awareness in civilian communities and businesses but we cannot allow environmental concerns to dictate the defensive capability of our most important base.  If we need waivers or legislative action or whatever, we need to free the military from environmental concerns that negatively impact vital defense requirements.
 
You establish vital defense needs first and then make an honest effort to shoehorn whatever reasonable environmental concerns you can around the defenses.  We’re risking losing a war because of some isolated environmental concerns?  What kind of idiots are running the military?  Well, that was rhetorical because this blog has definitively established that blithering idiots are running the military.
 
We need to wake up and reassess our priorities and environmental concerns are not the number one priority.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Guam missile defenses conduct first-ever ballistic intercept in test”, Lee Ferran, 10-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/guam-missile-defenses-conduct-first-ever-ballistic-intercept/

Russian SAM Systems

Ukrainian aircraft appear to have attacked and sunk a Russian Ropucha class landing ship docked at the Crimean port of Feodosia.[1]  The strike weapon was speculated to be either a Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG cruise missile.[1]  The incident seems to be confirmed by Russia.
 
It should be noted that the ship was docked and was, apparently, functioning as a warehouse for Iranian supplied Shahed drones.[1]  Thus, the ship was not operating as a warship at sea.  Of course, a landing ship is not a warship, to begin with, and the Ropucha class has no viable and effective anti-air sensors or defenses.  The attack was tantamount to striking a fixed, land based building.  Thus, this is not telling us something about naval warfare despite what many observers will attempt to say.
 
The noteworthy part of this incident is the fact that the Ukrainian aircraft appear to have flown some 170-250 miles through Russian controlled air and ground space, depending on where they took off from and what route they flew.  This brings into question the effectiveness of Russian anti-air SAM systems especially since Ukraine is not flying modern, stealth aircraft.
 
Prior to the Russian invasion, most observers seemed to credit Russian SAM systems with near miraculous capabilities bordering on invincibility.  Reality seems to have revealed that, like all previous Russian SAM systems, the current systems are vastly overrated.  To be fair, it is unknown what SAM systems are in place … if any.
 
Regardless, there are only two possibilities:
 
1. Russia had no SAM systems operating between Feodosia and Ukraine which would reveal operational stupidity of an almost unimaginable level, or,
 
2. Russian SAM systems are vastly overrated, as we said.
 
The incident also raises, yet again, the issue of port defenses.  Russian has had several ships hit while docked.  It is, again, unimaginable that ports in a war zone would not be heavily and effectively defended.  The degree of ineptitude and unpreparedness of the Russian military is staggering.
 
For the US, the issue of port/base defense is the key takeaway from this.  We don’t even pretend to make any serious attempt at port/base defense (looking at you Guam).  We haven’t had to fight to defend a port/base since … I don’t know when … maybe Guadalcanal?  Remember, base defense includes not only SAM systems but hardening, dispersal, decoys (both electronic and visible), layered sensors, redundancy, and repair capabilities.
 
Guam has addressed only ballistic missile defense and then, only to a small degree.  To the best of anyone’s knowledge, there is no layered cruise missile or anti-submarine defense or any of the other items we just listed.  Hardening?  What’s that?
 
The US military is drawing lots of incorrect, invalid conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict and ignoring the few potentially valid ones.  We need to start thinking and acting as if we’re at war with China … because we are.  We’re being graced with a non-kinetic phase of the war that we should be using for serious preparations but we’re wasting it.  When the shooting starts, we’ll quickly realize what we should have been doing all this time.
 
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Massive Fireball Marks the End of A Russian Ship After Ukrainian Missile Attack”, streiff, 26-Dec-2023,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/12/26/massive-fireball-marks-the-end-of-a-russian-ship-after-ukrainian-missile-attack-n2167974

No Fuel, No Fly

One of the topics that keeps cropping up is airfield attacks and one of the most common rejoinders to discussions about attacking an airfield is that a runway can be repaired in hours so, therefore, it’s not possible to put an air base out of commission for any length of time and attacks are pointless.  Well, this is a complete fallacy so let’s address it and dispose of it.

 

How can an attacker halt the operation of an air base?  Well, the way to answer that is to list all the things an air base needs in order to operate.  In no particular order, some of the major needs include:

 

• Runways
• Aircraft
• Munitions for the aircraft
• Maintenance facilities
• Spare parts
• Fuel
• Mission planning facilities
• Control tower

 

And, of course, there’s always the simple attrition of the personnel.  Kill enough people and the base ceases to operate.  For the sake of this discussion, we’ll set the personnel issue aside and focus on the equipment side of things.

 

 

Now, let’s consider the impact of the loss of each of those.

 

• Runways – easily repaired;  just an annoyance
• Aircraft – easily replaced within limits
• Munitions for the aircraft – no weapons, no useful flight;  relatively easily protected by dispersal and bunkering but a severe problem if a significant portion is lost
• Maintenance facilities – no fix, no fly;  nearly impossible to protect though hardened maintenance hangars are possible;  modern aircraft require constant and copious amounts of maintenance;  this is a vulnerability
• Spare parts – easily replaced but can be problematic for extended periods
• Fuel – no fuel, no fly;  fuel storage is almost impossible to protect and dispersal is not really a viable option; resupply is a major difficulty that requires specialized ships;  major vulnerability
• Mission planning facilities – no planning, no productive missions;  tough to eliminate;  easy to hide/disperse
• Aircraft control (tower) – easily replaced;  easily moved;  difficult to eliminate

 

 So, what did that tell us?

 

It tells us that the wise attacker is going to ignore certain air base targets, such as runways, as unproductive and ineffective and focus, instead, on other targets that are easy to destroy, difficult to repair/replace, and produce large negative consequences for the base. 

 

Foremost among these attractive targets is the fuel storage and dispensing facilities.  Almost by definition, the fuel storage has to be in extremely large tanks.  It’s simply not practical to try to operate an air base using small, dispersed storage containers such as bladders or 55 gal drums.  The number required and the degree of difficulty moving and manipulating them is prohibitive.  This might have been feasible, to some extent, during WWII when we had small prop planes that didn’t require all that much fuel but that’s not the case with today’s jets. 

 

Below are a few fuel capacities for single aircraft, just to provide an idea of the amount of fuel needed to operate an air base.  Take the numbers below and multiply them by many dozens of aircraft, every day.  Bladders and drums are just not a viable option.  A centralized, very large fuel storage facility is required along with a robust dispensing system consisting of extensive piping and pumps.

 

• F4F Wildcat fuel capacity is 117 gal to around 140 gal, depending on variant
• F-35 internal fuel capacity is 18,250 lb (2765 gal)
• B-2 internal fuel capacity is 167,000 lb (25,500 gal)

 

While fuel storage can be broken down and dispersed into somewhat smaller storage tanks, they would still be quite large and fixed in place.

 

Underground tanks with some hardened covering could provide some degree of protection but, again, given the fixed – and known! – location of the storage, an enemy would have no problem targeting them with penetrating weapons.  Underground tanks are an engineering and regulatory nightmare which shouldn’t matter to a military but it does.  I’m not aware of any active, underground fuel storage tanks at air bases but I don’t follow that kind of thing so maybe there are.

 

Once damaged or destroyed, the fuel storage and dispersing system is not an easy thing to repair or replace.  It would take months, at best, to construct new fuel facilities.

 

As a historical reminder, while the Japanese put Pearl Harbor and the US fleet out of business for a [very] brief period (Enterprise refueled and replenished in Pearl Harbor 36 hrs after the attack), the real damage and long lasting effect would have occurred if they had destroyed the fuel storage facilities.  Instead, they misguidedly fixated on destroying the Navy’s obsolete battleships.  The true vulnerability of Pearl Harbor was the fuel storage.

 

Fuel Storage at Pearl Harbor - 1943

Clearly, fuel storage and dispersal is a major weakness of any air base and offers the potential to put an air base out of action for an extended period.  Add in damage or destruction of munitions storage, maintenance facilities, and spare parts storage and a base would have a very difficult time restoring itself to operational status … all without touching the runways.

 

This is how an intelligent enemy would attack an air base.  This puts an end to the ‘runways can be quickly repaired’ rejoinder.

Base Hardening

We’ve discussed the vulnerabilities of our forward bases (see, "Base Defense") and, among other actions, noted that we should be pursuing hardening of our bases.

National Interest website makes the point that hardening includes far more than merely protecting the aircraft on the ground.

“However, protecting the aircraft is just a first step. Combat aircraft sortie generation can be thought of as an industrial process with the airfield as a “sortie factory.” The factory needs working aircraft, but the aircraft must be able to taxi to a runway that is long enough for them to operate from safely and when they return they must be able to be repaired, refueled and rearmed, and their crews must be able to receive orders and plan missions. This means other parts of the factory must be protected if the base is to function under attack. This means hardening maintenance, fuel storage and distribution and operations facilities.” (1)

This is an interesting, and correct, take on the issue that recognizes what an airbase actually is and, therefore, the scope of what must be protected.  This leads to the concept of a “sortie chain”, similar to a kill chain, in which a series of steps are required to generate a sortie.  Breaking the chain at any point will terminate the sortie.  For example, there is no need to destroy the aircraft if you can destroy the fueling facilities or the maintenance facilities or any other step in the chain - hence, the need to harden the entire chain and its associated facilities.

Dr. Carlo Kopp notes that China is actively pursuing airbase hardening and presents data on the extent of that effort.

“The only nation in the region actively investing in airbase hardening over the past decade is China, which has incrementally expanded its inventory of underground hangars (UGH), while investing in HAS [Hardened Aircraft Shelter] at multiple airfields.

China’s tally as of 12 months ago (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2011-01.html) was 7 x UGH sized for Badger bombers, capable of accommodating 138 – 145 aircraft (or many more fighters), 14 x UGH sized for Beagle bombers, capable of accommodating up to 668 Flankers, 17 x UGH sized for MiGs, capable of accommodating up to 723 J-10 fighters, for a total of 38 sites, with several further sites unused or abandoned. In addition, all other PLA fighter airfields are equipped with revetted dispersals, and a good number have been upgraded with HAS.” (2)

Dr. Kopp also makes the point that China’s huge advantage in hardened sites creates a strategic imbalance in their favor.  The side that is better prepared to absorb attacks and continue to fight has a significant advantage – no great surprise but a concept seemingly lost on Western military professionals.

Air Force Magazine website notes some of China’s HAS efforts.

“Distributed over 15 air bases throughout Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions in the east and southeast of China, the number of hardened shelters has grown from 92 to 312 in the past 12 years …” (3)

Hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) are not a magic solution to attack and do not grant immunity to damage.  Precision guided, penetrating bombs will destroy HAS structures as the US demonstrated during Desert Storm and, just recently, in the Tomahawk attack on the Syrian airbase associated with chemical weapons.  What HAS (and any form of hardening) does is to eliminate the cheap kills and drive up the cost of achieving the desired degree of destruction.  “Dumb” bombs are plentiful - precision guided, deep penetrating bombs are not.  

Kopp illustrates the point using the Desert Storm war.

“When Coalition air forces flew into Iraq in early 1991, they confronted the most extensively hardened airbase system ever built. Saddam’s hardened airbases proved ineffective, and Coalition tactical fighters destroyed 375 of 594 during the six week air campaign. With complete control of the air won within the first day, Coalition fighters were able to repeatedly attack HAS installations until they were cracked open. The pivotal weapon used was the American 2,000 lb BLU-109/B I-2000 Have Void concrete piercing bomb, fitted with either the GBU-10, GBU-24 or GBU-27 laser guidance kit. Typically two weapons were used per target, the intent being for the second round to punch into the hole made by the first round. While many HAS were punctured in an initial attack, many others required repeat attacks until fatal damage was inflicted. This absorbed a significant proportion of available Coalition sorties, as the limited number of F-111, Tornado, and Buccaneer aircraft equipped to laser illuminate targets set hard limits on daily sortie rates.” (2)

Hardening did not defeat the overall attack but it greatly increased the time and effort required for the Coalition to achieve its goal.  The key lesson is that many hardened targets required multiple re-attacks.  In Desert Storm, with total control of the air, we were able to re-attack as often as needed.  Against a peer adversary and lacking control of the sky, the ability to knock out hardened bases becomes a much more difficult and questionable task and re-attacks will likely be prohibitively expensive, in terms of attacking aircraft attrition or simply not possible given sortie availability and defense changes.

A related point is that the type of laser guided, precision, penetrating bombs used by the US require that the launching aircraft (and lasing aircraft, if they are not the same) overfly or very closely approach the target.  Again, against a peer with a credible SAM system, this may be costly or impossible.

Kopp also discusses underground hangars.

“The alternative to HAS, underground hangars, if built with proper entrance designs, deflection grids and blockers, can resist repeat attacks with tactical fighter compatible concrete piercing bombs. Such targets require genuine ‘earthquake bombs’, such as the new 30,000 lb GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)…” (2)

Air Force Magazine notes possible vulnerabilities of underground hangars.

“… the perceived vulnerability of UGHs to precision weapons. Most of the shelters have only a few entrances, which if struck could pin aircraft inside for an extended period. …

Precision strikes against the taxiways leading to the entrances could also hinder operations. Although aircraft inside may survive, it could prove difficult to extract them from their underground lair and launch. In addition, it might be possible for the first precision guided munition to penetrate the doors with a follow-on weapon to detonate inside the UGH.”

Just as there is a crowd of people who believe that since armor can’t stop every weapon that exists, there is no point having any armor, so too there is a crowd, likely the same crowd, who believes that since no amount of hardening can stop every bomb or missile, there is no point hardening bases.  Clearly, this is misguided, idiotic thinking.  Hardening (or armor, as the case may be) drastically drives up the cost and effort for the attacker.  In a peer war, where you may only get one chance at an attack, hardening ensures that at least some of your assets survive and forces the attacker to expend many more assets than would otherwise be required.  China recognizes this and is preparing their bases accordingly.

On the U.S. side,

“Currently, the US military has 207 HAS dispersed among four bases in the Western Pacific, with a significant majority in South Korea.” (3)

On the other hand, some key U.S. bases have little in the way of hardening.

“Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, located just 460 miles from the Taiwan Strait, houses F-15s and occasionally F-22s—and large numbers of other USAF aircraft—but possesses only 15 shelters.

Andersen Air Force Base on Guam hosts a range of strategic assets, such as B-2 stealth bombers and RQ-4 surveillance aircraft, but has no hardened shelters.” [emphasis added] (3)

The US needs to devote serious efforts towards hardening its few forward bases.  This is a key point since the US has so few forward bases in the Pacific – Guam being the notable example.  We need to do all we can to ensure that Guam can withstand attack and continue to function.  

Can we afford more hardening efforts?  From Air Force Magazine,

“… it should be noted that roughly 20 new hardened shelters can be purchased for the cost of a single fourth generation fighter.” (3)

On the opposite side of the coin, we need to devote more effort to figuring out how to more efficiently and safely destroy hardened facilities.

___________________________________

(1)National Interest website, “Base Hardening: Can America and Its Allies "Play Fort" against China?”, Harry J. Kazianis, October 27, 2014,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/base-hardening-can-america-its-allies-play-fort-against-11551

(2)“Airbase Hardening in the Western Pacific”, Dr. Carlo Kopp

http://www.ausairpower.net/PDF-A/DT-Hardening-Mar-2012.pdf

(3)Air Force Magazine website, “The Dragon Pours Concrete”, David Lewton, Dec 2014,

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/December%202014/The-Dragon-Pours-Concrete.aspx

Base Defense

We’ve recently discussed forward bases and noted the two contradictory desires regarding base location:

1. The desire to be as close as possible to the next or ultimate objective in order to maximize sortie rate and to minimize response time and ship and aircraft transit times to and from the objective operational area.

2. The desire to be as far away as possible from the enemy’s defenses, typically cruise and ballistic missiles but also including bombers, submarines, and surface ships.

The existence of ballistic missiles with a few to several thousand mile ranges and submarines with cruise missiles effectively puts any base within range of enemy attack.  This compares somewhat unfavorably with our own attack ranges from a forward base.  Thus, if we place a base at a useful strike range, then we’re automatically placing it well within enemy attack range.  This leads to the inexorable conclusion that if we want to operate a forward base we’ll have to conduct a robust and continuous base defense – something we haven’t done since Guadalcanal.

Forward bases, even if we fight for them, can only survive if we harden them.  Hardening, for purposes of this discussion, is the process of making a base difficult to damage and permanently destroy.  Hardening measures can take many forms.  Let’s take a closer look at some of the means to harden and defend forward bases.

Anti-ballistic Missile Defense – A land base is a fixed target which is ideal for ballistic missiles.  We need an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD).  Of course, the best BMD is to destroy the enemy’s ballistic missile launchers before they can launch.  Failing that, ship based BMD out along the path of the missile adds additional opportunities for intercepts.  Rather than tie up multi-functional, expensive Burkes doing BMD, a dedicated, cheaper, single function BMD vessel is preferred.  Finally, land based BMD at the base constitutes ‘point defense’. 

Anti-Cruise Missile Defense – Cruise missiles can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.  We need cruise missile defense similar to the BMD described above.  Ships, submarines, and aircraft need to patrol in layers extending out to the theoretical maximum enemy missile ranges which is several hundred miles.

Anti-Submarine – Submarines present multiple threats to a forward base including mine laying to prevent base resupply, cruise missile attacks, and anti-surface attacks against our own ships.  To counter the submarine threat we need a layered defense (layers, again - are you sensing a theme, yet?) consisting of our own submarines, surface ships, and aircraft.  As always, the best ASW defense is to attack the enemy’s submarines in their own ports and destroy their bases.  The Chinese underground submarine pens in Hainan will prove challenging to incapacitate and we should take a lesson from them.  Failing that we need long range interdiction of enemy submarines by our own subs.  Ideally, this would occur just outside the enemy’s bases as their subs head out on missions.  Closer to our base, dedicated hunter-killer ASW groups (a helo mothership and four ASW corvettes, for example) could prove useful.  We also need relatively high speed, high endurance, fixed wing ASW aircraft for long range search and prosecution.  An S-3 Viking-ish aircraft would be good in this role.  We also need a SOSUS type listening array to assist in the search phase.

Physical Hardening – We need to physically harden hangars, fuel storage, repair facilities, munitions storage, etc.  We could take a lesson from the Chinese who routinely do this with their bases.  The point is not to make facilities immune to damage – that’s not possible – but to make them less susceptible to easy destruction and make the enemy work harder to destroy them.

Underground – We should give serious thought to constructing underground facilities to the extent possible.  Again, this won’t make them immune but it will make the enemy expend more munitions, larger munitions, and more expensive munitions to accomplish their destruction.

Repair – An overlooked aspect of base defense is a robust repair capability and capacity.  The base that can recover from damage quickly is one that can stay in the fight longer and that the enemy will have to expend more effort against.  We should assume that everything will get damaged and destroyed and be prepared to rebuild and replace them.  We need large stocks of dispersed parts and repair equipment.

Fuel Dispersal and Protection – Fuel is the most important feature of a base.  Without it, no ship sails and no aircraft flies.  We need to disperse the fuel storage and protect the fuel storage by placing it underground in reinforced spaces.

ECM – Historical data proves that electronic countermeasures (ECM) are the most effective anti-missile defense there is.  To be fair, there is very little active missile defense data and almost none from any US system so this conclusion could change.  Regardless, ECM is highly effective, easily upgraded or adapted to changing conditions and easily replace if damaged or destroyed.  We need robust ECM defenses with hugely redundant and widely dispersed sensors and transmitters so that ECM can continue even in the face of anti-radiation missile attacks.

Fighter Defense – Long range, high endurance, layered (there’s that layering, again) fighter aircraft defense is vital to allow engagement of enemy strike assets far enough out to prevent weapon launches.  We need to recognize that attrition, both from combat and from maintenance stresses due to combat, will severely reduce aircraft availability rates so we need several times more aircraft than we think are needed.

Simplification – Any forward base is going to be constantly under attack, chronically short of spare parts and replacement assets, woefully lacking in maintenance, undermanned due to combat casualties, and reduced to a much cruder level of operation than we are currently used to.  With that reality in mind, weapon systems such as the F-35 are simply too complex to maintain, operate, and repair.  Similarly, sensors such as Aegis are too complex to maintain and repair in combat.  We need to simplify all of our combat systems to the extent reasonably possible.  It’s a balancing act to simplify without giving up too much capability. 

Instead of F-22/35 aircraft that can’t be kept operational in combat, we need advanced F-16-ish aircraft that are simpler, cheaper to replace, and easier to repair and maintain.  We need electro-optical sensors and basic, mechanical, rotating radars that are easy to maintain, replace, and repair.  This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have Aegis radars, for example, but when the initial Aegis radar fails we need reliable systems to fall back on.  Similarly, we can start a war with F-22/35s but when they inevitably are all grounded we need lots of far more robust aircraft to fall back on.

In fact, we need a purpose designed, basic (F-16-ish) interceptor specifically for forward base defense.

Afloat Radar – Ship-mounted radar is far more survivable than fixed, land-based radar.  We need multiple, dedicated radar vessels whose only function is radar sensing.  These can be simple commercial ships with a radar system installed.  They don’t have to be – and should not be – multi-billion dollar warships.  They just need to be mobile, afloat radar barges.

Resupply – The final aspect of base hardening is resupply.  Logistics!  A base that can quickly and reliably replace its fuel, munitions, weapons, and sensors is a base that can continue fighting.  Arguably (actually, definitely!), this is the most important aspect of base hardening.

For forward bases in the Pacific theatre, resupply translates to convoys.  China knows this and convoys will be high priority targets.  Losses will be alarmingly high.  Unwisely, the US has put no effort into developing the numbers of cargo and escort ships needed, the type of dedicated escort vessels needed, or the tactics for operating and defending convoys.  Our initial attempts at resupply convoys will likely be disastrous.

As a historical note, the Japanese were unable to successfully and reliably resupply their forward base at Guadalcanal and had to eventually withdraw.  The US was also hard pressed to resupply but were just successful enough to eventually win out though at an enormous cost.  We would do well to study this example in great detail as we formulate our plans to operate Guam or any other forward base.

Conclusion - Base hardening goes well beyond physical hardening.  All of the above measures serve to harden the base against damage and make the base easier to repair and more resilient to the inevitable damage it will sustain.

The reality of forward bases is that, by definition, we’ll be attempting to operate in the enemy’s “home” territory and at the very long end of our own supply chain.  Currently, the US has almost no realistic base defense capability and certainly no comprehensive base defense system (layers!) and plan.  The US seems to believe that we can operate forward bases with some sort of magical immunity to enemy attack.  This belief is utter nonsense.  We need to begin planning for a robust defense, acquiring specialized equipment, developing defensive strategies, and practicing for wholesale damage recovery.

If we address the items listed and discussed above we can mount a credible defense of a forward base.  If we continue to keep our heads buried in the sand and deny the reality of forward base challenges we’ll find ourselves unable to sustain any forward bases.