Ukrainian aircraft appear to have attacked and sunk a Russian
Ropucha class landing ship docked at the Crimean port of Feodosia.[1] The strike weapon was speculated to be either
a Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG cruise missile.[1]
The incident seems to be confirmed by Russia.
It should be noted that the ship was docked and was,
apparently, functioning as a warehouse for Iranian supplied Shahed drones.[1] Thus, the ship was not operating as a warship
at sea. Of course, a landing ship is not
a warship, to begin with, and the Ropucha class has no viable and effective anti-air
sensors or defenses. The attack was
tantamount to striking a fixed, land based building. Thus, this is not telling us something about
naval warfare despite what many observers will attempt to say.
The noteworthy part of this incident is the fact that the
Ukrainian aircraft appear to have flown some 170-250 miles through Russian
controlled air and ground space, depending on where they took off from and what
route they flew. This brings into
question the effectiveness of Russian anti-air SAM systems especially since
Ukraine is not flying modern, stealth aircraft.
Prior to the Russian invasion, most observers seemed to
credit Russian SAM systems with near miraculous capabilities bordering on
invincibility. Reality seems to have revealed
that, like all previous Russian SAM systems, the current systems are vastly
overrated. To be fair, it is unknown
what SAM systems are in place … if any.
Regardless, there are only two possibilities:
1. Russia had no SAM systems operating between Feodosia and
Ukraine which would reveal operational stupidity of an almost unimaginable level,
or,
2. Russian SAM systems are vastly overrated, as we said.
The incident also raises, yet again, the issue of port defenses. Russian has had several ships hit while
docked. It is, again, unimaginable that
ports in a war zone would not be heavily and effectively defended. The degree of ineptitude and unpreparedness
of the Russian military is staggering.
For the US, the issue of port/base defense is the key
takeaway from this. We don’t even
pretend to make any serious attempt at port/base defense (looking at you Guam). We haven’t had to fight to defend a port/base
since … I don’t know when … maybe Guadalcanal?
Remember, base defense includes not only SAM systems but hardening,
dispersal, decoys (both electronic and visible), layered sensors, redundancy,
and repair capabilities.
Guam has addressed only ballistic missile defense and then,
only to a small degree. To the best of
anyone’s knowledge, there is no layered cruise missile or anti-submarine defense
or any of the other items we just listed.
Hardening? What’s that?
The US military is drawing lots of incorrect, invalid
conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict and ignoring the few potentially
valid ones. We need to start thinking
and acting as if we’re at war with China … because we are. We’re being graced with a non-kinetic phase
of the war that we should be using for serious preparations but we’re wasting
it. When the shooting starts, we’ll
quickly realize what we should have been doing all this time.
___________________________________
https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/12/26/massive-fireball-marks-the-end-of-a-russian-ship-after-ukrainian-missile-attack-n2167974
"The noteworthy part of this incident is the fact that the Ukrainian aircraft appear to have flown some 170-250 miles through Russian controlled air and ground space"
ReplyDeleteI must be missing something. According to Wikipedia, the Storm Shadow missile (the SCALP EG is the French name for the same missile) is a low observable cruise missile with a range of slightly over 300 miles. According to Google maps, Feodosia is under 200 miles from Kherson, which is in Ukrainian controlled territory. So the Ukrainian aircraft should have been able to fire the missiles without penetrating Russian controlled territory. And even though the aircraft are not low observable, the missiles are.
What am I missing?
Unless the missiles were blind fired into the general area and just happened to hit the likely preferred target, I'm assuming the aircraft flew close enough to the target to get precise targeting data. But, maybe not.
DeleteRegardless, something, either aircraft or the missile(s) flew hundreds of miles through Russian controlled space and were undetected and not defended against. Either way, the post conclusion - that Russian SAM defensive systems are vastly overrated - holds.
We tend to look at theoretical, maximum weapon ranges and think that's exactly where they'll be launched from. The reality is that would rarely, if ever, be the case. EFFECTIVE weapon ranges are much shorter and if precise targeting is needed for a specific target, the range becomes even shorter.
Of course, Ukraine may have had spotters on site providing data comms back to the launch platform but now we're starting to push believability. Does Ukraine have the ability for people, on foot, to penetrate hundreds of miles into enemy territory and operate undetected for an extended period of time? Theoretically possible. Does Ukraine have undetectable comms over hundreds of miles for targeting data to be transmitted back to the launch site/platform? Theoretically possible. Does Ukraine have secure launch sites/bases within range? Theoretically possible. You can see what's happening - we're starting to have to string together multiple unlikely but theoretically possible conditions to achieve the desired outcome. If any single link in the chain fails the entire chain fails. This scenario seems unlikely.
I suspect the targeting information may have come from allies.
DeleteSomeone could have used an illuminator, or set up auxiliary GPS beacons, or someone has found a way around Russian GPS jamming, or advantage was taken of scheduled maintenance of defense systems, or really good gyro’s and optical homing were installed on the Sky Shadows…. A lot of possibilities.
Delete"A lot of possibilities."
DeleteLots of theoretical possibilities ... none very likely.
The simplest explanation is invariably the correct one.
Well to be fair the place used to owned by Ukraine they necessary need somebody putting a laser dot on a ship if somebody can just radio in X ship is in Y berth at this port they should be able to work out the coordinates.
DeleteAlso the Russian seem a bit lax on security. Consider this contemplation of if they had a S-400 at the facility in question.
https://medium.com/@DFRLab/new-missiles-for-old-4470e2c22f88
I mean times change. But my father and Uncle got quickly escorted away a NIke site in Detroit trying to take a picture of their girl frinds in the view and their film taken.
"somebody can just radio in X ship is in Y berth at this port they should be able to work out the coordinates."
DeleteCorrect. Knowing this, the Russians ought to have better defenses in place than they appear to have which brings us back to the point of the post: that the Russian SAM systems are vastly underperforming their claims, for whatever reason.
RE: Targeting.
DeleteI had assumed it was identified by a commercial overhead satellite. I believe the Ukrainians have been using those. Isn't that how they identify some of their targets for the HIMARS? Since it was parked at a pier, if you can identify which pier, that should be enough. You don't have to track a parked ship in real time.
It's true that at least the missile would have to penetrate several hundred miles. However, the missile is, according to Wikipedia, at least somewhat low observable. Probably not a B-21, but that combined with the fact that it's much smaller than an airplane makes it much harder to see. Especially if it flies close to the ground.
Obviously your main points, that Russian air defenses aren't nearly as good as people thought (probably true of ANY air defenses), and that our lack of defenses of our own bases is practically criminal, still hold true.
I don't think "targeting data" is hard to acquire for a ship that is stationary in port. It wouldn't require an aircraft at all, just one spy in the area, satellite photography, or open-source intelligence from social media, such as just one photo with the port in the background would.
Delete"I don't think "targeting data" is hard to acquire for a ship that is stationary in port."
DeleteThis is an example of hand-waving away challenges. While the location of a port are, of course, exactly known, the determining the location and timing of a worthwhile ship with a worthwhile cargo in enemy territory is quite a challenge. Simply stating that it's easy is ignoring all the attendant challenges.
"While the location of a port are, of course, exactly known, the determining the location and timing of a worthwhile ship with a worthwhile cargo in enemy territory is quite a challenge."
DeleteNo, I don't think it is in the modern age. They could be tipped off to the location of the ship by US spy satellite sharing, or by commercial imaging satellites. Or just one trained spy, or sympathetic citizen could look out their window and see it. Or Ukraine could pore though social media to find pics/vids with the port accidentally in the background.
As for "worthwhile cargo", the ship itself is worth blowing up. And there's a decent chance the US could monitor what's going in and out of it via satellite or other means such as eavesdropping communications.
Exactly. As this particular ship seems to have been used as a storage facility or in general sitting still in the same spot for too long. The time it takes for a missile to fly a few hundred km is shorter than for a ship to leave it's berth for another. Cruise missiles fly low so it would have a very low radar horizon. Russia would essentially have to have a Tor or pantsir directly in the flight path to intercept it while it was on its way. The point defense at the port should've obviously been better but for now we don't know why that is. As stated the ship was functionally no different a target than a building and you can get the coordinates accurate enough for that off Google maps if you had to. Directional antennas can help overcome GPS jamming and INS will not deviate much over the period of time the incoming missile is likely being jammed anyway. All they need to know is that the ship is there and it isn't likely to move in the next little while and there is a fair opportunity to launch an attack. This doesn't seem like a surprising outcome at all because some missiles always get through.
Delete" some missiles always get through."
DeleteThere is zero indication that some kind of swarm or saturation attack occurred thereby allowing a missile to get through in the face of [presumably] stout defense. Instead, all indications are that this was a single missile that traveled unhindered and found its target. This is why the post questions the effectiveness of Russian SAM systems. It would be understandable if Russia shot down dozens of missiles and one happened to get through but there was, apparently, only a single missile and there's no indication that any Russian defensive system even saw it.
"Russia would essentially have to have a Tor or pantsir directly in the flight path"
Or ... would have a layered defense of a major port with multiple, overlapping radar/SAM sites, constant airborne AEW aircraft, signals intercepts, EO/IR observation sites, etc. which any competent military would implement as a matter of routine to defend a major port.
During war, a competent military port defense would also include electronic monitoring of nearby communications and aggressive patrols to find and eliminate any enemy observers. You people are hand-waving away some significant challenges in getting targeting info!
"It is, again, unimaginable that ports in a war zone would not be heavily and effectively defended."
ReplyDelete"Hold my beer" - US military, circa 2026.
There does seem to be Pentagon movement to fortify Guam but still somewhat slowly. Partially operational by 2026 is not exactly moving heaven and earth. Also the lack of NASAMS and C-Rams seems a gap in the plan and a lack of mobile parts.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/guams-airspace-set-to-be-most-defended-on-earth-in-new-plans?fbclid=IwAR3Xiv-_EmPAUEqMo486pswu7gFglCLt2p8Gm5BsmFybSqsDSsRzEHWsj5s_aem_AWKSYUCTcskQOBqNZ4ZohRsq83bNSbfmPYq2R2lhk7J7D6KbNXkm7qqdpRYBRhvO8bc
edit/add: Although the article mention Tomahawk capability. I would also think that many shore based NSM launches should be added as well. They look pretty mobile and even if guam is not large the ability to move about would be good. Guam really needs enough missiles both air and anti ship to defend itself without tethering a bunch of USN assets to it
Delete
Delete"movement to fortify Guam"
That is about the slowest, least effective effort you could make and still claim to technically be making progress!
As you note: "want at least some parts of the system to be in operation by 2026"
"At least some parts"! Wow, that's really pushing the boundaries! Glaciers move faster than that.
On the one hand, the Navy has publicly stated that they expect war with China in the next few years and, on the other hand, they're pursuing these kinds of barely moving plans. Which is it, Navy? Do you expect war or not? You're certainly not preparing for war at any useful pace.
By the way, did you note that the naval base areas to the south didn't seem to have any radar sitings? They all seemed to be to the north. Of course, depending on topography, arcs, and effective ranges, the south could be covered by sites to the north.
I did notice the coverage map seemed well to have some gaps. But it was public filling so one could hope it was the minimal possible info needed and not true capacity?
DeleteI have to wonder if the pace is dictated more by how threadbare we have allowed military supply chains to become. Something the GWOT really really hurt. In this case I doubt the US military has the capacity to surge fortifying Guam with all the new batteries, of all types and with sufficient quantity of missiles before 2026 or later.
If nothing else the desperate race to supply Ukraine with sufficient AA resources or artillery should be leading to decision now on the ugly word industrial policy. The Pentagon needs face facts and convince Congress (and themselves first I suppose - I mean I would feel a lot better if we had no LCS ships but were paying Raytheon to be able to surge production of all types of Standard missiles and we a lot more in stock on hand and some merry-go-round of maintenance to keep workers busy (*)) one way or the other we have to subside supply chains if we want surge capacity and trained workers on hand and probably a lot more stock piles of everything from rare earths and metals to chips.
* ... and spending a lot more to have crews firing them off at all type of test drones, and drone planes and missile simulators all the time. I take a 30 ship smaller navy (no LCS) for one with crews that all spent more firing missiles in practice
It could also be the personnel operating the SAM systems. Untrained, inattentive, not taking any initiative, asleep or drunk operators can negate any weapons system. Look at the US Navy ship collisions a few years back, the Patriot system shooting down friendly aircraft, or the Iranian shoot down of the commercial airliner at Tehran. That said, I believe the lack of realistic testing means all SAM systems' capabilities are VASTLY over rated.
ReplyDelete"I believe the lack of realistic testing means all SAM systems' capabilities are VASTLY over rated."
ReplyDeleteThe Russian systems ARE being realistically tested, right now, in actual combat, and appear to be failing badly. Whether that's due to operator failings, as you suggest, or inherent equipment limitations is unknown but the final conclusion is that the systems are not the miracles we were led to believe.
I would also note that EVERY Russian SAM system ever deployed has failed miserably regardless of what country operated it. That should be telling us something.
This should also be screaming at us to test our own SAM systems under realistic conditions and yet we seem to have no interest in doing so.
Raytheon is probably getting some good test data from the NASAMS that they whipped up for the Ukranians.
Deleteaviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/how-raytheon-rapidly-surged-air-defenses-ukraine
One assumes on the Patriot as well and the franken units of what sea sparrows and what not jammed into SOviet kit or on trucks.
DeleteIts too bad all the military aid packages are hung up. I assume no Taiwan aid deal is why Taiwan won't give up their retired HAWK missiles. My understanding is theres were pretty upgraded it be interesting to see how they would perform for Ukraine.
There are a number of countries still using upgraded HAWKS. They cut down the number of required radars from 4-5 down to 2. I think at the end of the Cold War the system had been shown to have the potential to do ballistic missile intercepts. The US should've kept it but all the cuts dumped it.
DeleteIn terms of the Russian hardware.... The big S-300 LR system was upgraded to a new S-400 system in the 2000s. Doesn't seem to be the case. They sold S-400 with new missile but the electronic were modified S-300 for many years until they got it working. Supposedly. Story that when testing the S-500 if you fired more than 1 missile at a time the entire system crashed.
Maybe Guam / Saipan area of ops would be a good place to deploy the LCS's as floating AA platforms. Use the flight deck to attach the AD system too ( Iron dome/NASAMS/Patriot, whatever works). Use the hanger for reloads. Long range detection can come from land based sensors. Let them patrol out around the island chains as a forward air defence net. If they have mechanical issues or need to refuel/rearm their within a day or so of home port. Better have a ocean going tug there as well (just in case).
ReplyDeleteHere's hoping the LCS hulls are intact enough to float with the air defense weapons, sensors, AND crew's weight upon it, instead of rusting away into nothing; and at least one of the engines will run and power the sensors an air defense system needs to effectively defend a position, instead of breaking down; and the crews are actually trained to operate, and if necessary, repair the weapons, sensors, generators, etc.; and tugboats (plural) are available to tow the hulls into position, as I don't trust the LCS hulls to move themselves.
DeleteProbably the cruise were launched safely from within Ucraine. While they have low radar signature we are lacking some data regarding the efficiency of russian air defence: How many missile have been launched and how many have been intercepted? How many missiles did the russians use in case of successful intercepts? Did the ukrainians use MALD decoys? In the end we have to consider that there will always be something that gets inside the defence so there is always a risk of failure.
ReplyDeleteI'm, adding that Ukraine has already used MALD decoys toghether with Stor Shadow missiles. Even ramping up the defences of strategic ports you have to consider that defences can always be saturated. A possible air defence system in Guam could probably killed off or seriously damaged by loitering munitions launched by commercial shipping at night some miles off the coast. It'important that there are some defence, but in the end it will be a tradeoff.
Delete"launched by commercial shipping at night some miles off the coast."
DeleteThis keeps coming up an it's got to stop. It's absolute nonsense. During a war, no country is going to allow an unidentified commercial vessel to approach within any weapon range. If the vessel isn't positively ID'ed as friendly, it will be instantly sunk.
I agree that some kind of exclusion zone would imposed immediately. But mistakes happen and can't see why things the vampire counter drone system should be hanging about all over.
DeleteThis would be the case if war was declared openly. How often has this happened in the last century? A real war with China would probably start with a surprise attack along the whole Pacific Rim. Such surprise attacks could compromise defences by localy launched effectors which could maximise the damage and give the defenders nearly no response type. In case of of a declared or somehow announced war such an attack would be impossible due to exlusion zones and other similar measures.
DeleteI am hard pressed to see how China could mange a surprise attack all across the pacific region. Honestly sure they can build a lot ships - of questionable quality. But they no fought a war in forever. The officer corp is riddled with both political and monetary corruption. Let's not turn them into super men. I don't mean to dismiss them but their system of reporting hardly makes me believe their claims. I know how bad thier economic reporting is and how full of bull their growth numbers are I have no reson to cower at their military claims.
Delete"some kind of exclusion zone would imposed immediately."
DeleteA formal exclusion zone isn't required. No commercial vessel is going to sail anywhere near a war zone. We're already seeing countries/companies avoiding the waters near Yemen because a few simple drones and missiles.
"start with a surprise attack"
DeleteThe initiating country always gets one free attack. However, it's never a surprise. Any semi-competent defense would ensure that no unidentified ship gets anywhere near a target in the run up to war. Also, the one free shot is never critical.
Consider Pearl Harbor, the classic 'one free shot' example. We knew it was coming for months, almost to the day. No surprise. Why we opted to do nothing about it is still a mystery to this day but it was not a surprise. Further, the strike was nearly irrelevant. It caused no significant problem for the US war effort and, arguably, helped the US in that it eliminated the pre-war focus on battleships and forced us to move immediately to carrier-centric naval ops.
"war with China would probably start with a surprise attack along the whole Pacific Rim."
DeleteThat seems both logistically impossible and strategically pointless. In order to spread attacking forces along the whole Pacific Rim, they'd dilute their main effort (Taiwan, presumably) and would blatantly telegraph their intentions as hundreds of assets moved into position, thereby forfeiting the element of surprise.
It was a docked ship and the Ukrainians at least have the same access to satellites that I, a civilian, have access too.
ReplyDeleteJudging by Ukrainian attacks being conducted as far away as Siberia & Africa on Russian assets, it can be a safe assumption the Russians lack serious security in the areas they control and that the Russian fleet is under 24/7 surveillance.
This strike probably took less than an hour to plan and probably was executed in less then 8.
I think you're right.
Delete"It was a docked ship and the Ukrainians at least have the same access to satellites that I, a civilian, have access too."
DeleteAny semi-competent military faced with defending a major port in a contested war zone would not leave a ship docked for long periods of time any more than they would leave artillery parked in one spot on the battlefield. This incident is further proof of the incompetence with which the Russian military is conducting this war.
SAMs are ineffective against low flying cruise missiles because they fly very low and radar is line of sight. Only airborne radar can see them at a long distance unless radar is mounted on high towers or hilltops. Our national defense system has always ignored this threat because it's nearly impossible to counter, although there have been proposals to build radar towers every 100 miles along the US coastline.
ReplyDeleteOr you know it the air force's job with its flying detection assets.
DeleteIts very difficult to keep several radar aircraft airborne 24/7 especially when radar seeking missiles can down them from a couple hundred miles away.
DeleteWell the experience from Ukraine is saying something else, low flying missiles have been successfully intercepted by SAMs, SPAAGs and MANPADS. Sure to engage them those systems have to be in the right place at the right time, but on the technical level those system work against low flying missiles.
Delete"SAMs are ineffective against low flying cruise missiles"
DeleteI wouldn't say that. Yes, the supporting radars are horizon-limited but within the horizon, SAMs should be quite effective. This is exactly what ESSM and RAM are designed for. Whether they work as claimed is, of course, unknown, as yet.
"although there have been proposals to build radar towers every 100 miles along the US coastline."
DeleteTo what purpose? No country (China, presumably) could position launch platforms (ships, presumably) along the US coast without being detected and attacked during war or in the run up to war.
Launched from submarines or another nation like Cuba. We placed missile launch systems in Poland and Romania that Russia complains about. Bombers can launch them if refueled somewhere.
DeleteWith the curve of the earth, ground based radar on the earth can only cover 20 miles to detect cruise missiles flying just off the deck, and this assumes no mountains or big building are in the way.
"Launched from submarines or another nation like Cuba."
DeleteCurrently, China has no SSGNs that I'm aware of although they are developing/building the Type 093B class. It will be many years before operational SSGNs are in service. So, there is no submarine launched cruise missile threat for the moderate future.
Presumably, we would not allow missiles to be place on Cuba as we set the precedent in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
It would be a huge stretch to imagine China being able to conduct an intercontinental bombing mission.
It would also be a huge stretch to imagine that a missile launching platform of any type could travel halfway around the globe to attack the US without being spotted by aircraft, radar, satellite, or any other means.
"ground based radar on the earth can only cover 20 miles"
There are, of course, over-the-horizon radars, satellites, roaming aircraft (AWACS and various sensor types), ships with radar, patrol aircraft, etc.
We need to be careful to distinguish between purely theoretical capabilities and realistic capabilities. Yes, in theory, China could attack our shores in various ways. In reality, there is no chance of that short of ICBMs.
More fun news about the USS Ford. Remember during the crisis in the Red Sea it made a port call at Crete on Dec 2nd. I don't know how long they stayed but on Dec 15th the SecDef said it would have to remain near Israel for several more weeks.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2023-12-15/gerald-r-ford-carrier-deployment-extended-12371891.html
The USS Ike was covering the Persian Gulf, but now I read it's near the Red Sea with its aircraft shooting down drones. Can't the Ford's aircraft cover that? So I google and learned the Ford is back in port in Crete.
https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/national/military-news/norfolk-based-uss-gerald-r-ford-souda-bay-greece/291-3a2bce52-99c5-40d6-92d0-61e511cc5e75
Might there be problems with that ship?
There could be problems or they are in port to decompress, as the crew that has been underway since May and should have returened home in November. As I've understood Ford is tasked to the Med regarding Israel, while Ike has been tasked for the Red Sea and the Gulf. As far as I rember in past there was mostly a carrier in the Med when Isreal got hot.
DeleteI wouldnt be suprised, although I imagine theyre trying to give the crew some port time since the deployment os now extended, with likely no end date set yet. Im dying for an update on the failure rate of the EMALS/ASG, and the silly elevators too!! Of course we won't get one. When the attack on Israel started, it was an instant facepalm moment- realizing we had our least capable carrier on station in a hot zone...!!! So are the Admirals and their glowing reports to be believed??
DeletePort Defense is what the Marine Litoral regiments will actually be used for. Look at their organization and equipment, mostly focused on air and missile defense and airfied support.
ReplyDeleteThis is a plausible possibility, however, I've not seen any training or doctrinal efforts along those lines. Are you aware of any such efforts?
DeleteI think the Russian systems are overrated (especially poor performance against missiles) and much of their SAM network has been degraded around the Black Sea. They’ve lost Snake Island, the oil platforms, and some bigger S-400 systems in Crimea. So the Ukrainian aircraft can get penetration for select missions and the remaining Russian SAMs don’t have a good chance of intercepting the missiles.
ReplyDelete"SAM network has been degraded around the Black Sea"
DeleteIf so, this illustrates an appalling lack of operational and logistical expertise. If the third rate (to be generous) Ukrainian military effort has been enough to degrade the Russian SAM system, this suggests either that the Russians are totally inept (a distinct possibility) or that modern SAM systems have inherent, systemic flaws in their concept of utilization and cannot stand up to the rigors and challenges of the modern battlefield. I have no idea which is the case but this is a question that should be of intense interest to the US military as we plan to defend our bases against Chinese attacks.
I think the US has proven that we can dismantle static Soviet-style SAM networks with a combination of anti-radiation missiles and cluster munitions (both on aircraft and missile like ATACMS). Probably what is most embarrassing is that the Russians can't reciprocate this against big, immobile systems like Patriot.
DeleteThat has moved the equilibrium to smaller, mobile systems. And now our new missiles have additional seekers that hunt the SAMs in the area after they shut down and try to move. It gets back to "radiate and die."
I think this is general thinking in why the Army wants a lot of new systems that are less expensive and shoot the AIM-9X with information fed by a protocol that could be using sensors other than a giant radar. I think it is the radar that is ultimately the vulnerability.
In the 1973 war one of the things that cleared the skies for the Israeli air force was the army pushing ahead and moving the long range 175mm SP & 130mm(captured) guns in range of the fixed SAM sites. That blew a big enough hole, combined with new jammer pods from the US, for them to finally go to work.
Delete"guns in range of the fixed SAM sites"
DeleteThat would be an example of operating jointly, air and ground - something neither Ukraine nor Russia seem capable or inclined to do. Hence, one of my [many] reasons why I say that both sides are demonstrating alarming ineptitude and 'lessons' should be drawn very carefully.
https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2023-12-26/tinian-airfield-reclaimed-wwii-air-force-12473942.html
ReplyDeleteThe Air Force wants to add infrastructure to make Tinian a alternative air base .
" Funding for the island includes $26 million for airfield development, $20 million for fuel tanks, $32 million for parking aprons, $46 million for cargo pad and taxiway extension and $4.7 million for a maintenance and support facility. " Can we assume that base air defense will be added ?
Tinian is a U.S. territory 118 miles from Guam.
Another report said that the Russian ship had 4000 artillery shells on board. Piece of the hull traveled about a kilometer to land in the garden outside a grocery store.
ReplyDeleteI agree with your take on the matter.
ReplyDeleteThe Chinese military appear to have reached CEP of a few meters for their long rage missiles, so Guam could be in serious trouble if faced with a barrage attack.
Coming back to Ukraine, everytime this, or that russian asset deep in their territory is turned into scrap metal, a personal thought keep being reforced again and again, i.e. supposing NATO eventually clash with the Russian Federation, with all the data gained and the right preparation, it will possible to sink what remains of the Black Sea Fleet within a day.
Ukraine has (after 2 year of conflict!!), a small and outdated air force, propped up by Western made weapons... one could only imagine what effects would have a few squadrons of NATO warplanes, with associated SEAD, ELINT and EW capabilities.
Now, my take is probably an hyperbole, plus NATO will be probably overly cautious and focus first on Russian AA assets before going fishing vessels, still I think the capabilities are there... in fact, just the US Air Force alone will be enough for this mission.