We once had amazing capabilities that were considered
routine. Today, we’ve lost so many of
those capabilities. Far worse, we’ve
somehow come to believe that those capabilities are no longer possible. I constantly hear people argue that we can’t
do something when the reality is that we did it, and did it routinely, decades
ago.
For example, a common claim is that we can’t put armor on
ships because it would slow them down or sink them under the weight or severely
reduce their range. The reality is that
EVERY warship in WWII had armor, 30+ kt speed, and immense range compared to
today’s ships. We’ve forgotten what we
had and now believe it’s no longer possible to achieve those things.
Let’s take a look at some of the other capabilities we once
had and now believe are no longer achievable.
Long Range Interceptor – We no longer believe that we
can have a long range interceptor or air superiority fighter because it would
require too large an aircraft to operate from a carrier. The reality is that we had a carrier-based,
long range interceptor, the F-14.
Despite that we no longer believe that we can operate anything larger
than a Hornet.
Specialized Aircraft – We no longer believe that we
can afford to design, build, and operate separate, specialized strike and
fighter aircraft. The reality is that we
operated both the F-14 fighter and the all-weather, A-6 strike aircraft, simultaneously
Manning – We no longer believe that it’s possible and
affordable to man even a 300-ship fleet. The reality is that we fully budgeted and
manned a 600-ship fleet in the 1980’s.
Tanker - Interestingly, the A-3 had the most capacity
of any Navy tanker, delivering 29,000 lb of fuel at 460 miles (see, “Navy Aerial Refueling”). The Navy is currently struggling to develop a
tanker with half that capacity (stated goal of 15,000 lb at 500 miles).
Armor – We no longer provide any significant armor
for our ships. Many people believe that
ships would spontaneously sink under the weight of armor or, best case, be
slowed to a crawl and have not enough range to make it out of harbor. The reality is that every combat ship
in WWII was heavily armored and yet managed 30+ knots with greater range than
today’s ships.
Firepower – We no longer believe that it’s even
possible to manufacture large caliber naval guns. The reality is that we routinely manufactured
16”, 8”, and 5” guns.
Air Wings – The Navy no longer believes it is
possible to operate air wings of 90+ aircraft.
Recall their triumphant statements when they cobbled together an air
wing with one or two extra aircraft and bragged about pushing the boundaries of
air wing size? The reality is that we
used to operate air wings of 90+ aircraft from WWII through the early Nimitzes.
IRST – The Navy has been working [unsuccessfully,
thus far] on developing a IRST for the F-18 as a marvel of new technology. The reality is that we had it on various
aircraft of the F-14 era.
Fleet Without Helicopters – We now believe that it is
impossible to operate a ship and fleet without every ship having a
helicopter. We’ve forgotten that we
operated a 6,000 ship fleet in WWII without any helicopters. We managed to replenish at sea without
helos. We managed to transfer personnel
at sea without helos. We’ve forgotten
how to operate.
We’ve forgotten all the things that we used to routinely do
and now either believe they’re impossible or we look on them with
amazement. We need to remember what we
were once capable of and start bringing some of it back into the fleet.
Please add to that list:
ReplyDelete1) effective naval gunfire. The Zumwalt is gun less and DDGs are too valuable at other tasks such as air defense to be used for NGF close to shore.
2) effective amphibs. Our LSTs are retired and we are trying to re-invent the wheel with expensive and unfunded until FY 29 LSMs / LAWs.
"Please add to that list:"
DeleteNo. The list was things that we once had and have come to believe are no longer possible. Everyone believes heavy naval guns are possible. We've just forgotten why that's a good thing.
Similarly, we've moved away from LSTs but no one believes we can't build them anymore.
Our greatest weakness is personnel, but that will take a major political change to correct.
ReplyDeleteBeyond that - naval MINES. Reread the old War College China Maritime Studies report (6-2009 Chinese Mine Warfare). The conclusion reached then regarding Taiwan still applies. Look at our nearly fictitious offensive mine laying capability. Instead of being able to give a Comander in Chief a range of options with sophisticated, controllable mines the US Navy continues its boneheaded choice to 'opt to receive' . This is irresponsible and greatly diminishes our ability to control the ocean side of a potential battlespace.
"Our greatest weakness is personnel"
DeleteThat may well be but that's not the topic of the post. The post is about things we once had and now believe are not possible.
Similarly, while we've [foolishly] chosen to abandon mines, no one believes that they can't be produced or used.
I would add ASW, NGFS, and mine warfare. And I think helos are now a fact of life.
ReplyDeleteNo. The post is about things we once had and now believe are no longer possible. The items you list are important and we've [foolishly] abandoned them but no one believes they can't be done.
DeleteHello there ComNavOps, speaking about armor on warships, I read a small debate months ago on reddit where a user said no armor on warship is indeed a mistake and that, at least some basic old style hard protection should be there, but it was shut down by others saying that it makes no sense for the cost and the fact once you developed and built an armored warship, your enemies would have developed and built dedicated anti ship missiles to defeat the armor.
ReplyDeleteThe debate went on with a lot of technicalities, but with no "winners", still, does the "anti armor anti ship missile" critique makes sense, or not so much?
I was thinking that yes, developing a new anti armor ASM should be, on paper, easier than designing and building a new armored warship, but still, it ain't a walk in the park and theory a lot of times end up just being... theory.
I apologise if you have discussed the topic before and wish you a great day.
"makes no sense for the cost"
DeleteAnd yet, our fathers made sure that every warship was armored as heavily as possible, appropriate for their size, during WWII and they did so because the ramifications of building unarmored ships were so horrendous that it was unthinkable to even contemplate such a thing. Today's morons on reddit can debate all they want but they only demonstrate their ignorance and stupidity by doing so. WWII proved what was needed in ship design and the lessons and proof were paid for in blood.
It makes sense if only if you argue in favor of building a ship that would be "invincible" against all threats. But that's just because everything can be destroyed. It's about how much effort they have to put into destroying it. The current large Russian anti ship missiles can carry armor penetrating warheads capable of getting through the Iowa's armor belt BUT how much effort tdo they have to put in to get those missiles in position to be used? They have the Slava class and the Kirov class and I think a couple of their bombers can carry a few of them. Ok so now how much damage are those missiles actually doing to the ship once they get through the armor? As shown by WW1 and 2 large ships with armor take many armor penetrating hits to go down unless a magazine gets hit like with HMS Hood. Would the enemy be able to even carry enough missiles into battle to get the job done?
Delete"The reality is that every combat ship in WWII was heavily armored and yet managed 30+ knots with greater range than today’s ships."
ReplyDeleteThis one continues to baffle me from an engineering perspective. What changed? Are CODAG engines significantly less efficient than old steam plants (why use them)? Are electrical power requirements that much more (maybe part of it, but Aegis isn't throwing out max wattage 24/7)? Or has crew space increased that much (which I suspect)? Because otherwise less armor, fewer weapons, smaller crews and shorter ranges for bigger ships makes zero sense. None.
As an old steam engineer (75-85) I can tell you that steam plants were extremely efficient if well maintained, and had loads of extra power. Each engine room had two steam generators, one would run with the load (electrical), the other would idle with no load in case of failure on the load gen. We always had excess power capacity. The biggest user of electrical power was the AC plants (compressors), and electric motors in the engineering plant itself. The older ships used less power because half of the pumps were steam driven. Newer ships are all electric.
Delete"This one continues to baffle me from an engineering perspective. What changed?"
DeleteA lot of it is hull form. The Gearings were 390.5 feet long by 40.5 feet beam, a length to beam ratio of 9.64. The Sprucans were 529 feet long by 55 feet beam, a ratio of 9.61. The Burke's by comparison, are 509.5 feet long by 66 feet beam, a ratio of 7.72.
Now, I'm not a naval architect or marine engineer, so I can't quote the exact formula, but I have always understood that a higher length-to-beam ratio makes a faster ship. The difference between the Gearings and the Burkes is significant in the regard.
It seems that the wider beam on the Burkes may result from several factors:
1) Wider beam makes for a more stable weapons platform;
2) Operating two helos imposes significant minimum beam requirements, at least in the areas of flight deck and hangars;
3) Wider beam means more room for habitability improvements.
Other than the habitability one, there are arguments about capability tradeoffs either way--for example, would you rather have two helos or five more knots?
WWII-era ships carried more armor and made better speed because they had hull forms designed for speed. Now the hull forms are designed more for stability, and less speed is the offsetting loss. Putting more armor in a current fatter hull form would slow them down more. That can be cured with more power to some extent, but there are clearly tradeoffs between armor. speed, and the other factors above that the Navy now cranks into designs.
DeleteI would say keep the helos for ASW, get rid of some of the habitability space requirements (though I would keep gyms/workout facilities), keep stability as much as possible (possibly by reducing high weight as part of habitability space reduction), adjust hull forms to sleeker lines, add armor, see where that gets you, and make tradeoffs/adjustments from there.
Did a quick comparison of length-to-beam ratios for some other classes. The Clemsons were 314 feet long by 31 feet beam, for a ratio of 10.1. Most classes between Clensons and Gearings were about 9.6. The Perrys and Knoxes were about 9. The 1950ish-1960ish Royal Navy Tribals, Leanders, and Amazons were all about 8.5. The recent Europeans (Horizon, FREMM,Type 45, de Zeven Provincien) are all around 7.5.
DeleteSo clearly the length-to-beam ratio has been declining both in USN and overseas. I do think that reflects greater emphasis on helo ops, stability, and habitability at the expense of speed.
I agree with you that ships now have a wider beam for flight ops stability. My last ship was a Knox, any kind of mild rolling sea made flight ops down right harry, with a smaller helo (SH-2). A lot of times you could not conduct flight ops. The hull stabilizers didn't seem to make much difference ( when they worked).
DeleteI appreciate the great answers! This blog has a solid community.
DeleteThis feels like a tradeoff (stability and volume vs. speed) the BuShips would have gotten better. With a missile focused armament and fewer weapons per ship today, stability and volume seem less important than in the past, unless helicopters are a necessity. Do we really sacrifice this much for the sake of helicopter hangars on every ship?
The right evaluation math is probably something like 'capability per ton displacement.' If we could improve the weapons, armor and speed by increasing the length-to-beam ratio for a given displacement (at the cost of a helicopter hangar), we should do it! Not everything needs a chopper. At least add some skinny AAW and ASW escorts so we actually have a 'low' end to the high/low value fleet mix.
ComNavOps, as a follow-on to the open post a few days ago, perhaps it would be interesting to have a discussion about the various objectives in warship design and the tradeoffs between/among them. Some which come to mind:
DeleteSpeed
Maneuverability
Firepower
Armor
Sensors
Suitability for EMCON operations
Stability
Ease of repair and maintenance
Damage control
Endurance
Habitability
"Wider beam makes for a more stable weapons platform;"
Delete???? Stability (as a weapons platform) ceased to be a consideration shortly after the age of cannons. We developed gyroscopic stabilization and that took care of stability within reasonable bounds. VLS missiles don't require any stability since the missiles are GUIDED!
"helos ... beam"
The Perry class had a 45 ft beam and operated two helos so there's your maximum requirement. The Burke's 66 ft beam is NOT required to operate two helos.
"Wider beam means more room for habitability improvements."
Bilgewater.
"would you rather have two helos or five more knots?"
Horse droppings. The Perrys would do 30 knots and operated two helos on a 45 ft beam. There is no need to trade one off for the other. You simply have to know how to properly design a ship.
"Now the hull forms are designed more for stability,"
DeleteOne of the most stable hull forms ever designed was the Iowa class battleship with a length to beam ratio of 8.2. They had armor, stability and speed. You've focused, incorrectly, on one measure of hull design.
"Do we really sacrifice this much for the sake of helicopter hangars on every ship?"
DeleteYou might want to read, "Does Every Ship Need a Helicopter?"
" interesting to have a discussion about the various objectives in warship design "
DeleteI've addressed this is many posts and comments. In there archive keywords list there are 160 entries under "Warship Design"! Is there some particular aspect you'd like to address?
OK, let me be more specific. I saw an article (wish I could find it again) comparing priorities in warship design between WWII and now. WWII era priorities were described as firepower, speed, and armor. Today, they have shifted more to electronics, habitability, and endurance, a significant shift. I think you have commented frequently on those differences.
Delete"a discussion about the various objectives in warship design and the tradeoffs between/among them."
DeleteYou've missed what the overall tradeoff was. It wasn't between various design factors. The tradeoff was between combat and cruising. We deleted/de-emphasized combat characteristics and prioritized cruise comfort characteristics.
The designers weren't instructed to agonize over armor versus speed. They were instructed to stop producing combat platforms and start producing cruise ships.
Stability? Sure! Wouldn't want anyone to have a tummy ache.
Greater size? Sure! We need room for video game lounges.
More electronics? Sure! Gotta have continuous texting even while on watch.
All your analysis of length to width ratios, hull forms, or whatever else just mask the real change in design and that was the change in mission from combat to cruising. There's your tradeoff.
@CDR Chip
Delete"Speed
Maneuverability
Firepower
Armor
Sensors
Suitability for EMCON operations
Stability
Ease of repair and maintenance
Damage control
Endurance
Habitability"
A fine list I suppose. However do wake me up up when you will be filling those ships by draft and 90% of the jobs on said ships can be learned in say 6 months. Other wise I think you may want to reconsider Habitability. And putting damage control so does rather put you in the crowed that designed the pop top T-72.
"A fine list I suppose..."
DeleteI did not intend that list to be prioritized, just a listing. But now that you mention it, prioritization might be a useful exercise, and discussion of varying opinions regarding priorities could be worthwhile. Here’s a top of the head ranking for me.
1. Firepower - The mission is to put warheads on foreheads.
2. Electronics - Zumwalt actually put them first. I would include both active and passive sensors (for use during EMCON), plus countermeasures. Training crews to do without electronic crutches is also essential.
3. Armor – After being able to find and shoot enemies, three attributes to survive at sea in combat.
4. Damage control – This includes both design features to facilitate damage control and sufficient headcount to staff repair parties.
5. Repair and maintenance – Area where many observers have given USN a huge advantage versus Russians and Chinese. Requires adequate repair shop space, spare parts inventory, and trained and qualified personnel.
6. Habitability – At minimum, enough so those techs to do the repair and maintenance will re-enlist. I think you keep gym and workout areas to improve fitness of crews, and more habitable berthing, but a lot of other fluff can go.
7. Speed – Not as big a requirement as it used to be with anti-ship missiles replacing guns and with helos providing dash and area coverage as standoff platforms. Probably need to sustain 18-20 knots for main body and 30 knots for screening units.
8. Stability – Useful for some weapons platforms, helo ops, and general crew well-being and performance.
9. Endurance – A nice to have.
10. Maneuverability – Just like you’re not going to outrun a missile, you’re probably not going to outmaneuver and dodge one either.
One other thing to consider would be excess electrical generating power in order to accommodate future weapons systems. CODLAG or IEP propulsion may make sense in a lot of cases for this reason, as well as for quiet running for ASW platforms.
Would be interested in prioritization by others and reasons.
We also used to be able to build ships and planes as well as do repairs in a timely manner. We weren't as dependent on outside sources for so much of our materials. Even the few ships we have take so long to be completed with so few shipyards capable of producing the required hardware.
ReplyDeleteAll the ships I served on had a small machine shop as well as one or two machinist assigned to the ship. We did quite a few of our own repairs at sea. Anything big went to the tender when you were alongside. The only time you went in dry dock was for a major hull problem. (shafting/rudder). The one tender I was on used to do some major repair jobs to ships tied alongside and anchored out. While in Augusta Bay, one of the new California CGN(dont remember which one) had to tie up alongside for generator repair. Cut a hole in the side, craned out the generator to the machine shop on board for repair (GE flew in specialist to help). Re installed and replaced hull plating .Took right around a week to do. Navy can't do it anymore, got rid of all the surface tenders.
DeleteAbsolutely. We need a Naval Renaissance. Somthing that not only weeds out a majority of the Admiralty, but has large reach implications, from renewed emphasis on training and maintenance, to a reinvigoration/expansion (restoration??) of the industrial base. We need another Teddy R to come along and make the Navy his pet project. We wont ever return to those capabilities if we keep the leadership we have. We're on autopilot, and without a competent helmsman, chasing Unmanned dreams of grandeur...
ReplyDeleteSo sobering, and so true. The long range interceptor will probably be remedied, the fact we have a full fleet of S3's sitting in AMARG with a ton of life left that could be made into very fat tankers and as a bonus do ASW if they didn't want to fully configure them into a full tanker, it's just criminal. Wonder which four star gets a job over there for the drone decision (which would have been fine for when the S3's were finally too old)
ReplyDeleteThis was just a few days ago, new drone that supposed to help out with tanking....as usual now for DoD, lets spend $16 billion dollar program with no certainty that it works, let's start buying it before it's ready!!!!
Deletehttps://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/navy-delays-unmanned-mq-25a-stingray-timeline-after-ig-warnings/
"The reality is that every combat ship in WWII was heavily armored and yet managed 30+ knots with greater range than today’s ships."
ReplyDelete"The reality is that we routinely manufactured 16", 8", and 5" guns."
Another reality is the fact we SHUT DOWN the STEEL MILLS necessary to forge the steel needed to build the armor and the shells you want. We will need to REOPEN and REFURBISH existing steel mills, not to mention BUILD NEW ONES, to get the necessary steel. There will be a fierce competition for the funds needed to open and reopen those steel mills, and the PERSONNEL needed to operate them, against EVERYTHING ELSE WE NEED.
Yep. You're stating the obvious. Is there a point you'd like to make?
DeleteWhat you consider "obvious," is not what our government and military leaders consider "obvious." I hear NO ONE mentioning the need to build new steel mills, NO ONE mentioning the need to allocate funds so we can build new steel mills, NO ONE mentioning the need to raise taxes so we'll have funds to allocate...
DeleteIn short, we are about to go to war with.our pants down; yet NONE of our government and military leaders are demanding we do anything to fix this problem, before we end up tripping and falling on our faces!
Again, you're stating the obvious. I don't mean that in a negative way. You're simply not saying anything new or unknown. So, moving on, do you have a solution(s) to offer? You appear to have given the issue some thought so what can we do to address/correct the issues?
DeleteDo you think there's been a skill drain in our naval engineering? I worry that our economy pushes all the smart/nerdy kids into either finance or programming. I have an interest in ships (obviously, since I'm here) and yet it never even crossed my mind to start a career in naval engineering. I wouldn't even know how to start. It seems like a field where you have to either grow up in Chesapeake Bay, or have a dad in it, to really get into it professionally. Or be weirdly obsessed with it at age 18, enough to do a ton of long, difficult, expensive education in return for... questionable career prospects in an ultra-specialized discipline.
ReplyDelete"never even crossed my mind to start a career in naval engineering."
DeleteIF we have a need for more naval engineers - and I've seen no evidence that we do given our current woeful pace of development and design - then all we need to do is conduct a bit of 'recruiting' at the high school level and let kids know that the career opportunity is there.
"IRST"
ReplyDeleteRight now, current US fighter jets, only F-35 has built-in EOTS(IRST), rest need to carry a Legion Pod under it.
F-35, like J-20, has this device under it. There is a problem - F-35's service ceiling is quite low in comparison with J-20. Therefore, J-20 looks down but F-35's IRST's view is semi-blocked.
Another drawback of F-35's relative low service ceiling is not so stealthy while radars scan from above.
F-22 has no IRST, if it hangs a Legion Pod, lost stealthy.
Sadly, J-20 has EOTS(IRST) yet flight as high as F-22 which is much higher than F-35.
I would like to know what the admirals answer when somebody tells them about what has been lost, for example the size of the wing at 90 aircraft on the early Nimitz class ?
ReplyDeleteWe already know the answer. The admiralty was bragging about having increased the size of an air wing by two aircraft, just recently. They're ignorant idiots who have no idea what we once had.
DeleteThat's not what I was thinking of. When somebody points to them the facts you mentioned, how do they react ? I guess you can't do it yourself but maybe your local representative could, or one that is on the proper committee. I'm not a US citizen so I can't ask anybody.
DeleteWhat I'm hoping for is to have some kind of explanation or a good reason, especially on the Nimitz air group size.
The explanation for decreased air wing size is cost/budget, pure and simple. The Navy's 'mission' in their mind, is putting hulls in water since they see that as the way to ensure their slice of the budget. Reducing the air wing size frees up money to redirect towards new hull construction.
DeleteThis philosophy is why we have the debacle of minimal manning, deferred maintenance, reduced training, and so on. The pursuit of budget (meaning new hulls) is the root explanation for all of the Navy's decisions. It's why we abandoned mine warfare and mine countermeasures. It's why we abandoned heavy caliber naval gun support. It's why we are fixated on unmanned platforms. And so on.
So, let's use the philosophy for more hulls to an advantage.
DeleteHow about we then build dozens of smaller ships for ASW like discussed. Build four a year at four different yards. Efficiency of scale, supports four yards. Then build a couple of minesweepers a year at two different yards. Every twenty hulls of a particular type update the ship design from lessons learned and technological advances.
"So, let's use the philosophy for more hulls to an advantage."
DeleteThat's a better plan than anything we have going now!
Have we lost the ability to catapult aircraft?
ReplyDeleteThe USS Ford's first real deployment was quiet as she hung out near Italy. It was almost over but then this Gaza thing erupted. It moved eastward two months ago and we heard nothing. A helo from Yemen lands on a cargo ship in the Red Sea and takes over. Over a week ago a Navy destroyer in the Red Sea shot down drones and yesterday they shot some down as they hit three commercial vessels and also targeted the destroyers. I was thinking where is the air power from the Ford!
Then I learn she's in port at our naval base in Crete! Really, the first combat action for our Navy in two decades and the carrier in the midst of the action pulled back for a port call instead of flying CAP and strike missions? Is it because she can't launch aircraft?
When the attacks on Israel started, my first thought was- of all the CVNs to be in the Med, how bad is our luck for it to be the Ford?? Since its now classified, we have no idea what the launch to failure rate is of EMALS/AAG. Any bets that its still closer to the 20% of spec than the number routinely hit by the Nimitzes??
ReplyDeleteI doubt we will get anything else from USN than the usual "she did great" and no numbers will be provided.
Delete"we have no idea what the launch to failure rate is of EMALS/AAG"
DeleteAs documented by DOT&E, the failure rate has been disastrously poor and essentially unchanged for a few years. It's highly unlikely that it's suddenly improved.
"I doubt we will get anything else from USN than the usual "she did great" and no numbers will be provided."
DeleteYou must be writing the Navy's press releases because that's exactly what they're saying!
I've wondered why we've done no air strikes in Yemen. I suspect Turkey and Arab states denied permission for using their airbases or overflights. That's okay, Ford aircraft can fly through Israeli airspace to the Red Sea. This is why we have carriers, our own real estate. The Navy can ignore the media and dance in Congress, but I suspect there are some stunned Generals at CentCom and the Pentagon after hearing why the Ford is in port.
DeleteAlso note the Navy's wartime surge. None! Just the two regular deployed carriers, nothing more from the others.
@G2mil. Had somewhat same thought and was doing some research on what our 2 carriers are up too....now, it could be OPSEC but the images onboard seem very pedestrian. Most F18s seem to be flying with no weapons and just fuel tanks. Some of us were around for Cold War deployments photos and GW1 and GW2 photos and this ain't it! The decks look empty, low tempo and no weapons to be seen, basically just PR deployment IMO.
DeleteJust look at old carrier pics during the 80s and conpare with now, its not even close to the same feeling of power and determination.....
I am certainly no fan of the Ford but let's be objective and recognize that the current administration has repeatedly demonstrated a reluctance to engage with anyone militarily, under any circumstances. It is far more likely that we are simply avoiding military involvement as a matter of policy than the inability of the Ford to launch aircraft.
DeleteWe might also note that the Eisenhower and Bataan groups are not conducting any combat ops, either, so it isn't just the Ford.
As far as surging, since we aren't conducting carrier combat ops, there's no point surging additional carriers.
Just trying to be objective about all this.
"We now believe that it is impossible to operate a ship and fleet without every ship having a helicopter. We’ve forgotten that we operated a 6,000 ship fleet in WWII without any helicopters".
ReplyDeleteHuh? This comment doesn't make sense to me. Arguably we'd need a lot more escorts and escort carriers if we didn't have ASW helicopters. Not to mention logistics ships.
"Arguably we'd need a lot more escorts and escort carriers if we didn't have ASW helicopters. Not to mention logistics ships."
DeleteHuh? This comment doesn't make sense to me. Did you read the post? It doesn't say that we don't need helos specifically for ASW. It says that we don't need helos on EVERY ship in the fleet.
The post also points out that we managed perfectly well to supply a 6,000 ship fleet in WWII without a single helo and there's no reason we can't do it today. There is no relationship between helos and the number of logistic ships. Compared to a replenishment ship, helos have an absolutely insignificant amount replenishment capacity.
When a carrier is laid up for maintenance, does the air wing get redeployed to another carrier, or does it get idled too?
ReplyDeleteAir wings are not permanently assigned to a carrier. They move around as needed.
DeleteThank you.
Deletein The falklands War THe Royal Navy's lovely T21 frigates virtiually melted. No armour same as the type 42 Destroyers, Has no one noticed that yet after 40 years?
ReplyDeleteSigh. Would this "heavy armor" nonsence even go away?
ReplyDeleteHeavy armor is useless. Even not very modern weapon penetrating power is far beyond armor capabilities. See "Guided missiles and techniques" (NDRC, 1946) for example. They described 1945 test, when 1000-pdr shaped-charge bomb was tested against a full-scale model of battleship's horizontal armor protection (composed of several layers of armor and deck plates with deck-high air spaces between them. The bomb punched right through the whole test rig. If it was a real warship (the test imitated hit into the turret roof, the most armored part of horizontal protection), the metal jet would go right into magazines, and cause immediate detonation. And the majority of anti-ship missiles of Cold War era carried HE/shaped charge warheads (there were still enough old armored ships around...)
There are multiple ways to defeat heavy armor. Shaped charges, diving warheads (that dve and hit from below), just plain old supersonics (the "Moskit" missile, impacting at Mach 2.5+, have much more kinetic energy than 16-inch shell fired point-blank).
So heavy armor provide no protection anymore. Anti-fragment armor? Yes, its practical to limit damage. But no armor of reasonable thickness could stop a direct hit.
"Heavy armor is useless"
DeleteAll of naval history would disagree with you.
""Guided missiles and techniques" (NDRC, 1946)"
Page 47 of the document describes what I believe you're referring to. Contrary to what you claim, the test was not realistic or representative of actual armor under actual use conditions. The initial shaped charge 'jet' did, indeed, penetrate an unspecified number of plates (the 3/4" ones, presumably), and detonated some 100 lb bombs placed between some of the plates (no idea why they would do that). Also, no mention is made of the size of the hole, depth of penetration, extent of blast damage, etc. A bullet will pass through paper but it does very little actual damage to the paper in doing so.
You also seem to have the misconception that if armor can't provide 100% immunity to every weapon ever developed that it is of no value. Nothing could be further from the truth. See the "Armor for Dummies" post in the archives.
Yours is a very poor quality comment that betrays a lack of understanding of the purpose of armor. Please improve the quality of your comments should you wish to comment again.
I deleted several other comments of yours due to their unacceptably low quality.
"Sigh"
DeleteSign, indeed.
That report was written before the development of cheap anti-HEAT warhead protection. For the past several decades HEAT warheads have been the EASIEST to defeat for a given weight and expense of armor. It's even more suited to ships because HEAT protection is very high volume low density compared to steel plate
Delete"Full scale firing tests were made on April 1, 1945, at Dahlgren Naval Ordnance Station. The bomb was statically fired against the target, which consisted of one 11-in and one 4-in. armor plate, and three 3/4 in mild steel plates. Each plate was separated from the next by an 8 ft air space. Some unfused 100-lb bombs were stacked between the second and third plates of mild steel. The jet from the bomb penetrated all of the plates of the target and detonated some of the 100-lb bombs."
DeleteWith the full quote shown, I think your questions are answered. You said:
"The initial shaped charge 'jet' did, indeed, penetrate an unspecified number of plates (the 3/4" ones, presumably)"
and the report specifies that ALL of the plates were penetrated. You're curious about depth of penetration, which the report clarifies. "All plates" = 11 + 4 + (3/4x3) = 17.25" (spaced).
As to why they would place the bombs there, it's pretty clear when you draw out the stackup:
bomb
[11in armor]
8 ft air
[4in armor]
8 ft air
[0.75 mild steel]
8 ft air
[0.75 mild steel]
stack of bombs
[0.75 mild steel]
This is roughly analogous to a bomb fusing on an 11" armor deck with a 4" splinter deck beneath and the magazine a further 2 decks below. The bombs were included to answer a very specific question: "After passing through the entire armor scheme, will the jet retain enough energy to detonate munitions?" This is obviously a critical question for both weapon and armor designers.
You missed Patrol Boats. They seem needed otherwise one is hard pressed to know why 6 USCG cutters are based out of Bahrain. But the USN seems to have washed its hands of the Cyclone Class and no replacement in sight.
ReplyDeleteThe Sentinel seems a solid ship but its is not armed to be endangering its crews in the Persians gulf. Given the Sentinel program seems successful I can't see why the navy can't buy their own version. I would suggest obviously loose all the USCG rescue and small boat gear and go with two 30 mm + co MG Typhoon mounts. Bolt on the Vampire anti drone system and the Avenger Stinger system and the Griffins on Cyclone and you have a patrol boat able to play tag with Iranian small boats with confidence (or the Chinese coast guard). Maybe more kevlar inserts on the assumption you will be close enough to run into small arms fire. Even with the alterations coming in late to a still building run of 65 ships seems like good economics.