Friday, December 26, 2025

NSC Patrol Boat

I applauded the Navy’s decision to terminate the Constellation program and still do.  I also, initially, viewed the decision to build a NSC-frigate as a poor choice but one that had some slight potential to produce a useful vessel if certain constraints and discipline could be applied such as a rigorous CONOPS and an obsessive fixation on a single mission, presumably ASW.. 
 
Sadly, the program is already doomed. The vessel will, apparently, have almost no weapons or useful sensors and no mission focus, whatsoever.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will have 1x 57mm gun and 1x RAM mount.[1]  That’s it for weapons.  Nothing else.  That’s not a frigate.  That’s barely even a patrol boat and is hideously oversized, overpriced, and overmanned for that level of firepower.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will NOT have a 5” gun, VLS, anti-ship missiles, strike missiles, ASW sonar, towed array, anti-submarine torpedoes, or CIWS.[2]  What it doesn’t have is far more impressive than what it does have.
 
Looking at the equipment list (or lack thereof) one can’t help but wonder, in stunned disbelief, what the purpose of the ship is?  What is the mission?  It barely qualifies as a patrol boat.  What is the Navy going to do with it?
 
It sounds like we’re just going to be building Coast Guard cutters and not even good ones.
 
I know the Navy is incapable of learning lessons but after decades of hitting themselves in the head with a hammer wouldn’t you think they’d at least stop just to make the pain go away?  I guess not.  They’ve just picked up a new hammer and immediately started whacking themselves in the head again. 
 
Enjoy the pain, Navy!  What a bunch of morons.  Good work, SecDef, SecNav, and CNO!

 
 
_______________________________
  
[1]The War Zone website, “Navy’s New Frigate Will Not Have A Vertical Launch System For Missiles”, Joseph Trevithick & Howard Altman, 22-Dec-2025,
https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles
 
[2]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

67 comments:

  1. Maybe they just need to get one in the water fast that's painted grey. Then the next one is really a navy ship with armament and sensors and they repaint the first one white..... One could hope.

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    1. Personally, I think the Navy has been burned so many times and so badly by the last several shipbuilding programs, and Congress is so mad about it, that the Navy is now so gun shy that they just want a hull, any hull, in the water quickly and with no major problems. The combat usefulness is no longer even a concern.

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    2. Think you right, BA. My guess is the want to restart the production line as fast as possible so pretty much means, no changes or very little changes to the regular Coast Guard version and switch to a new FLIGHT 1.0 or 2.0 with some weapons and some ASW gear, I mean, USN can only blame itself for where they are right now.....

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  2. "The initial NSC “frigate” will NOT have a 5” gun, VLS, anti-ship missiles, strike missiles, ASW sonar, towed array, anti-submarine torpedoes, or CIWS.[2]"

    Minor quibble. I completely agree with your general thrust that the ship is grotesquely under-armed for a frigate. However, I'm not so sure about the "no anti-ship or strike missiles" thing. There are a couple sentences in the reference that (somewhat ambiguously) talk about only minor modifications. On the other hand, the artist's conception in the reference (as well as in previous articles I've seen) does appear to include what look like missile launchers on the fantail where the boat launching ramp used to be.

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    1. "On the other hand, the artist's conception"

      The artist's conception is intended to be the best possible version of the vessel. Everything I've read states that a platform will be constructed over the stern to POSSIBLY accommodate some sort of container for missiles but not initially.

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  3. We have seen too many good examples of Frigate platforms pass us by - Type 23, the Asagiri/Takanami - Asashi series.. now Type 31 and Modified Mogami show us what we should be expecting.

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    1. No. We have seen examples of frigates but none that would be useful in USN service. Every other country's frigate is their attempt to create a Burke within the constraints of their budget. The USN has plenty of Burkes and a frigate that is a mini-Burke is of no value.

      So, yes, lots of frigates in the world but, no, none that offer an example of a useful frigate for the US because the US does not need a frigate as the world defines it currently.

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    2. Daegu-class frigate ROKN

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  4. Ok, so I was under the impression (seems misguided) that they would revert back to the 2012 timeframe and select either the PF 4501 or the PF 4921 variant from HIIs NSC.

    One is the PF 4501 – essentially a gray version of the while-hulled NSC with minimal modifications. The key external
    change is a modified stern launch and recovery ramp for a RHIB.

    The other, PF 4921, features a more extensive set of
    changes – primarily in its combat systems. Around 70 percent of the ship design is to Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), according
    to HII.

    Both designs share the hull form and propulsion system of the NSC. Principal dimensions are a length of 418 feet/127.4
    meters, a beam of 54 feet/16.5 meters, a draft of 22 feet/6.7 meters and a displacement of 4,600 metric tons. The NSC’s
    flexible CODOG propulsion system, with one LM 2500 gas turbine and two MTU 20V 1163 diesels, permits twin-screw
    operations with any one of the three engines if required. Top speeds are 18 knots on one diesel, 24 knots on two diesels and
    28+ knots with all three engines online. Cruising speeds are in the 9-11 knot range.

    The PF 4501 is an OPV that has a range of 12,000 nautical miles and an endurance of 60 days. Weapons and sensors are
    similar to the NSC, with a Bofors 57 mm main gun, six machine guns, and a Phalanx close in weapons system (CIWS).
    Sensors include a 3D radar and optronic systems. The ship can launch two SH-60 sized helicopters or one helicopter and an
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The PF 4501 has a bow thruster – a feature that the PF 4921 lacks. Ship’s complement is
    148 persons.

    On the other hand, the PF 4921 is a light frigate for executing anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. However, it
    sacrifices range – which is about a third less than the PF 4501 – for vastly enhanced combat capabilities. Armament is a 76
    mm main gun, a vertical launch unit for the evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), a Phalanx or SeaRAM CIWS, and six
    crew-served as well as remotely operated machine guns. Mounted aft are two quad packed Harpoon surface-to-surface
    missile launchers and a triple torpedo tube launcher. Sensors shown on the concept ship include a CEAFAR radar system, a
    hull mounted sonar and a towed array sonar system. Ship’s complement is 141.

    I would think the latter variant would be preferred based on a more robust armament/capabilities.

    Link: https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/patrol-frigate-concepts-from-huntington-ingalls-industries-gain-traction-internationally/

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    1. "I would think the latter variant would be preferred based on a more robust armament/capabilities."

      Please don't fall prey to the tendency to substitute technology for purpose. All the weapons you mention don't mean anything if they don't serve a useful purpose. The USN does not need mini-Burkes which is what your second option describes. The USN needs a focused ASW vessel and that's not it.

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    2. The RN’s Type 26 is an ASW destroyer sized frigate,
      Built to replace the Type 23, even for North Sea service 6,900t seems a bit large. The RN unlike the USN adapted an outside design successfully , but it is oversized compared to a bespoke design.

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    3. The Type 26 doesn't yet exist and is on track to be vastly oversized, overpriced, and inappropriately equipped as an ASW frigate.

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    4. My first instinct was something more along the lines of a Knox-class type of FF.

      Knox-class Frigate

      Origin: United States
      Type: Frigate
      Complement: 257, including 17 officers

      Dimensions
      Displacement: 4.130 t full load
      Length: 437.99 ft
      Beam: 46.588 ft
      Draft: 24.606 ft

      Propulsion
      Arrangement: Steam powered, single turbine with twin boiler
      Machinery: 1x Westinghouse steam turbine 2x Babcock & Wilcox 1.200 psi boiler
      Power output: 35.000 shp
      Propulsion: 1 shaft

      Mobility
      Speed: 27 knots
      Range: 4.500 nm at 20 knots

      Sensors
      Surface search: AN/SPS-10
      Air search: AN/SPS-40
      Navigation radar: AN/SPS-67
      Sonar: AN/SQS-26 bow mounted sonar
      Sonar: AN/SQS-35(V) towed variable depth sonar added to 25 of class. Replaced by AN/SQR-18A TACTASS towed array at later stage

      Systems
      EW systems: AN/WLR-1C, AN/ULQ-6C, AN/SLA-15, AN/SLQ-32 added at later stage
      Decoys: Mk 36 SRBOC

      Guns
      Dual purpose: 1x 127mm Mark 42
      CIWS: After 2nd refit: 20mm Mk 15 Phalanx instead of Sea Sparrow
      Self-defense: 2x 12.7mm M2HB

      SSM
      Anti-ship After 1st refit: RGM-84 Harpoon in Mk 16 launcher, 2 ready to launch, 2 more in magazine

      SAM
      SAM system: After 1st refit: 1x8 Mk 25 BPDMS with RIM-7 Sea Sparrow (fitted to 31 ships of class)
      BPDMS was replaced during 2nd refit by 20mm Phalanx

      ASW
      ASW rocket: 1x8 Mk 16 launcher for RUR-5 ASROC, after 1st refit 2 cells capable of launching RGM-84 Harpoon


      Torpedo tubes: 2x2 324mm Mk 32 torpedo tubes
      Torpedo types: Mk 44 and Mk 46

      Aircraft
      Facilities: Hanger and platform for 1 helicopter
      Supported types: QH-50 DASH helicopter drone at first, After 1st refit: SH-2 Sea Sprite LAMPS I

      Obviously, all systems would be replaced with modern examples.

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  5. ComNavOps, I may be mistaken, but didn’t the article that you linked from TWZ also state that the “Legend Frigate” will have 16 NSM’s…based off of their analysis of the provided renderings?

    “Renderings so far have shown what look to be launchers for up to 16 Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) installed in that position.”

    I’m also curious if the Mk70 containerized PDS can quad pack ESSM in a single cell, that same way a traditional Mk41 VLS can. Doing so would allow for a cheap means of adding some kind of local defenses, without the time and cost (money, weight, space) associated with adding even a self defense sized VLS.

    I’m even more curious about these frigates not having an ASW capability, as I didn’t see anything in either source post stating that they will lack a built in or towed sonar and weapons…but I may be mistaken.

    I still think this is early and well get more details in the near future about the load out and layout of these ships.

    With that being said, I’m much less concerned about the lack of a VLS, as I wound be if these ships are not outfitted for ASW…as that to me is the primary role these ships should fill (and a huge gap that the USN needs to fill).

    During a peer LSCO event, we’ll be much more concerned with convoy protection operations from below than we will from above…especially considering that supply convoys will meet AAW assets in theater…where those threats will be.

    On the other hand, they’ll be targets for subs the entire time that they transit…they’ll need protection from that threat at all times.

    As a final note, given how every article about these frigates has stated the intent to use them to command drones…I’d be very interested to know if there is significant work/progress going on with the MASC program that we haven’t heard about yet.

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    1. 16 NSMs is in the LCS category while being a much larger ship. The NSM has limited effectiveness against anything other than Chinese Maritime Militia or drug boats. It needs to carry something more substantial.

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    2. One could argue that 2NSM’s is arguably better than 1 harpoon.

      Additionally, I imagine you could arm the Mk70 with AGM-158C LRASMs…but those are much more likely to be reserved for ships whose primary job is CBG/ARG defense….like the Burkes.

      I guess I’m curious what your realistic/ideal frigate load out is, and how that corresponds to what we want these ships to do?

      I’m not saying a VLS wouldn’t be nice, but I think it’s much less of a priority than this ship having a decent ASW suite.

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    3. "didn’t the article that you linked from TWZ also state that the “Legend Frigate” will have 16 NSM’s"

      No, the article did not state that. It stated that the artist's drawing had what looked that. The article further states that the stern may have space for containerized modules. Missiles could be one of the containerized options. However, the definitive statement that lists what the NSC will have makes no mention of it. I reasonably interpret that to mean that the NSC may, at some future point in time, have the ability to carry containerized weapons (or other functions).

      "I’m also curious if the Mk70 containerized PDS can quad pack ESSM in a single cell,"

      It would seem like it could but I have found no actual reference confirming that.

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    4. " I imagine you could arm the Mk70 with AGM-158C LRASMs"

      There currently is no vertical launch LRASM. That developmental effort has apparently been idled although an initial push-through test was conducted.

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    5. "curious what your realistic/ideal frigate load out is"

      Load out is a function of what you want the ship to do and that is defined by the CONOPS. The NSC lacks a CONOPS so ...

      As I've repeatedly demonstrated that Navy has no use for mini-Burkes so there is no worthwhile load out.

      We desperately need a dedicated, specialized ASW vessel of some sort. THAT'S the load out that is needed but that requires a specialized ship designed from the first rivet to be ASW and no amount of modification will make the NSC that. The best the NSC could ever be is a mediocre ASW vessel which would still be more useful than a mini-Burke.

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    6. “The NSC lacks a CONOPS”

      Does it lack a CONOPS, or have they just not told us explicitly what it is yet?

      I agree that mini Burkes aren’t useful for much, and my suspicion is that the Navy’s intent with the Constellation class was, essentially, “1 flight III Burke + 1 Constellation = 1 Ticonderoga”.

      I also agree that the new frigate’s role should be ASW, but event if it’s not ideal, as you said, a decent ASW frigate is better than no ASW frigate.

      It seems to me that the single largest factor that will determine whether the Legend frigate is useful or successful will be if they spec it (as much as is reasonable) for ASW, and on that…we just don’t know yet.

      I’ll reiterate my position tat the first flight of Legend frigates NOT having VLS is actually a good sign.

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    7. "Does it lack a CONOPS, or have they just not told us explicitly what it is yet?"

      It lacks a CONOPS. Given that the NSC-frigate was announced like the day after the Constellation cancellation, I'm pretty sure they didn't develop a full CONOPS overnight.

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  6. My understanding is that these will be command ships for Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) and that the USVs will provide the firepower and defense to make these into useful warships. I believe the concept is fundamentally flawed and as currently designed the USN frigate based on the legend cutter will be as worthless for fighting as the LSC ships are.

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    1. It does seem that almost every article states that the USN intends for these ships to control MASC drones, among others.

      I’m curious why you think the concept is fundamentally flawed, or at least, which parts of it are flawed?

      From my perspective, a lot depends on info that is certainly not open source, but that USN leadership should have…

      - How suited is the Legend hull for ASW?
      - How fast do they intend to get MASC USV’s in the water, and how suited for ASW will they be?
      - What mission packages will be immediately available for both the Legend frigate and MASC USV’s on launch?
      - What role do they want the Legend frigate to do…they clearly DON’T want an Arleigh Burke lite… so is this ASW centric or is there something else they envision?

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    2. "understanding is that these will be command ships for Unmanned Surface Vessels"

      EVERYTHING the US military is designing now seems to be labelled as being capable of controlling unmanned assets. Of course, there currently NO useful unmanned combat assets so being able to control nothing is not exactly a useful feature.

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    3. "almost every article states that the USN intends for these ships to control MASC drones, among others.

      I’m curious why you think the concept is fundamentally flawed"

      There are no existing, useful unmanned assets so that, alone, makes the idea of using the NSC as a controller a complete waste.

      "What mission packages will be immediately available for both the Legend frigate and MASC USV"

      None. This was one of the major failings of the LCS. The modules were pure fantasy and, to this day, have yet to materialize. There are no modules for the NSC or any unmanned vessel and there are no CONOPS for the employment of any modules even if they did exist.

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    4. “There are no existing, useful unmanned assets so that, alone, makes the idea of using the NSC as a controller a complete waste”

      True, but given the Navy’s recent decision to curtail the previous USV efforts and transition to MASC, it would seem reasonable to assume that by the time a Legend frigate hits the water, there will be medium sized (MASC baseline) surface strokes for it to command. I understand your point of view, especially given that the only role that’s been explicitly stated for the new frigate is drone control, but it would seem reasonable to assume that drones will only become more numerous in the USN.

      “This was one of the major failings of the LCS. The modules were pure fantasy and, to this day, have yet to materialize. There are no modules for the NSC or any unmanned vessel and there are no CONOPS for the employment of any modules even if they did exist”

      Again, fair point. There aren’t any mission modules for the Legend frigate…but there isn’t a Legend frigate yet either.

      It is reasonable to assume that these will be developed alongside the effort to build the initial flight, especially given the design/use philosophy of simple 20 or 40 CEU boxes mounted externally.

      The Mk70 does exist now and is obviously the primary mission module intended for use here, though I’d hope that ISR modules are in the works as well.

      I think your concern is well placed. The Navy doesn’t have a great 30 year track record, but as I’ve said before, it does seem like someone is at least trying here.

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    5. "reasonable to assume that by the time a Legend frigate hits the water, there will be medium sized"

      A couple decades ago, it was reasonable to assume that modules would be available for the LCS by the time it hit the water. How'd that work out?

      At the start of the Zumwalt program, it was reasonable to assume the dedicated, specialized gun would work and that munitions (LRLAP) would be available. How'd that work out?

      Do I need to keep listing examples illustrating the folly of assuming non-existent technologies will be ready when needed?

      "It is reasonable to assume that these will be developed alongside the effort to build the initial flight"

      Again, the LCS modules were to be developed alongside the ship construction and ...

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    6. "I think your concern is well placed."

      Given the Navy's history, I don't have a "concern"; I have a 100% certainty that the non-existent, proposed "stuff" will not be ready when needed.

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    7. "The Mk70 does exist now and is obviously the primary mission module intended for use here"

      Have you given any thought to the CONOPS for a Mk70 container/launcher for the NSC? I guarantee the Navy hasn't. Here's a couple issues:

      1. How many containers do you think can actually fit on the small stern area of the NSC given both the length/width and weight (empty 40-Conex weighs around 4 tons and a launcher presumably double that or more)? I have concerns about the weight distribution, center of gravity effects, fore/aft waterline, impact on seakeeping, etc. I'm guessing one container is the practical limit although possibly two.

      2. Given the slow speed of the NSC, it won't be operating with carrier or surface groups. So, where will it get targeting data for the Mk70? With no VLS of its own, it won't have any advanced radar so it will have only horizon range (10 miles or so) surface targeting. Are Standard missiles useful with horizon range surface targeting? A couple racks of NSM or Harpoon would seem smaller, lighter, and more useful and an additional RAM launcher more useful in the AAW role.

      So, before you jump on the Mk70 bandwagon, think through the actual use of the weapon.

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    8. I think it’s a safe assumption that each Legend frigate will carry 1 CPDS. However, I think it’s fair to say that, at least conceptually, the mission modules that will be designed for this frigate are much less complicated than those of the LCS. Many are very concerned about this entire mission module concept again, without consideration of the myriad of elements that failed with the LCS…it wasn’t just a lack of complex, proprietary, mission modules.

      Re the CONOPS…I think it’s fair to say that these decisions didn’t occur in a vacuum (and I seriously doubt that they came from Navy brass either). I’m willing to give this SecNav the hereditary of the doubt because it seems, at least to me, that he’s been the driving force behind these changes.

      Re speed…from my research it seems that a Legend frigate will be a couple knots slower than a Ford at full blast, but it will also be a couple knots fast let than a Constellation at full blast. I don’t know how often carriers run at full speed, but my suspicion is that these ships can cruise together just fine. Moreso, these frigates should be able to roll with freighters and supply ships, freeing up Burkes for carrier escort during LSCO.

      As far as actually employing the Mk70, could these ships not receive data from other USN ships with NATO data links? Obviously lacking a SPY radar constrains the ships’ ability to gather its own data…but that system would also add significant cost, complexity, and time to production.

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    9. "CPDS"

      ??? Don't know what that is.

      "could these ships not receive data from other USN ships"

      Under the right circumstances and IF THEY'RE EQUIPPED WITH THE NECESSARY DATA LINKS (unspecified, as yet), yes. Of course, that assumes a benign electromagnetic environment free from jamming, cyber attacks, hacking, spoofing, and EW effects.

      That also assumes the data link software works properly. You might want to read about the recent Navy friendly fire shootdowns of two F-18 Hornets. A major part of the problem was failures of the group's data link software.

      "don’t know how often carriers run at full speed"

      The question is not how often, it's how important. When you need the speed to run into a launch point or RTB with haste or for whatever other reason, you really don't want to leave your escort lagging far behind. This is analogous to asking why a policeman needs a gun? How often does he use it? The question isn't how often, it's how important when it is needed.

      "mission modules that will be designed for this frigate are much less complicated than those of the LCS."

      There is no system so simple that it can't fail spectacularly. Consider the straightforward Zumwalt gun system. All it had to do was launch a rocket. And it failed spectacularly. Do not make me cite an endless of seemingly simple systems that have failed and do not make the mistake of assuming success is guaranteed for whatever the Navy tries to develop for the NSC.

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  7. While the Navy pushes for an OPV that is not a frigate the chinese present an arsenal ship... https://www.twz.com/sea/chinese-cargo-ship-packed-full-of-modular-missile-launchers-emerges
    Along the same lines as the escort (frigates) the Navy has talked about arsenal ships for a long time (decades) without producing anything useful. The Navy is rapidly losing it's edge, once it's gone it will be impossible to remain a viable force.

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    1. "the chinese present an arsenal ship"

      A cargo ship with some container missiles is utterly useless. Thank goodness the US Navy has not gone that route.

      Delete
    2. This seems to me to be less like a mainline combatant, and more of a reflection of Chiba's total force policy, where everything can be repurposed to serve the war effort. Take the ro-ro ferries and their excercises with using these for invasion - and it's not like this is a new Idea, Red Storm Rising had the soviets land an armor battalion in Iceland using a ro-ro.

      China hass the world's biggest shipbuilding. This looks like a way of quickly converting a merchant into a q-ship, of geberating additional missile shooters quickly. The missile's effect on target is platform-agnostic, afterall.

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    3. "q-ship"

      I've debunked this notion many times. I'm tired of it. This time, I'll let you debunk it. What about this concept suggests even the slightest possibility of combat usefulness to you?

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    4. My use of q-ship was a little incorrect and perhaps implied more that I intended.

      All I am saying is that this just can be a relatively quick way of generating additional expendable missile shooters to augment a purpose built force of warships. It's really not too different from having 18 wheelers pulling containerised ASCMs vs buying dedicated SSM TEL trucks.

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    5. "relatively quick way of generating additional expendable missile shooters to augment a purpose built force of warships."

      A converted cargo ship would be incapable of operating with warships unless it could go 30+ kts. Further, it would be an absolute detriment being a very large, extremely non-stealthy object - it would give away the group's location.

      As I said, so many people are enamored of this "camouflaged" merchant ship idea but no one bothers to work out a viable CONOPS ... because there isn't one!

      Before you write another word supporting this idea, first come up with a viable CONOPS.

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    6. My brother, recall your blogpost here: https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/03/civilians.html

      We have established that all facets of the chinese nation will be used to support their war effort. Is it strange to imagine that they would explore how to leverage their large merchant fleet and tremendous civilian shipbuilding capability in a total war scenario?

      Anyhow, I'm not anon, but I see several potential CONOPS for a ship of this type:

      1) Wartime Emergency Escort

      This is the most obvious: rapid conversion of a merchant ship into a vessel capable to a degree of convoy escort, or acting as a warship. The containerised radar system and missiles shown allow this ship to carry SAMs and AShMs - at 60 tubes, that's a potent punch to be sure.

      The weakness of this ship in that role is it cannot carry ASW helos or conduct ASW, which means it would need to work in concert with ASW helos flown off a seperate converted helo carrier, which PLAGF Aviation has already been using as a helo carrier for amphibious assaults: https://x.com/jesusfroman/status/1847552507494408428?s=20

      It's unlikely that any one ship could protect a convoy on its own, the way the Perries were expected to, but the beauty of this system is that the hulls are already in the water, and are already being manned by PLAN reservists serving in their merchant marine: within a week, their shipyards could churn out multiple converted merchantman, in the absolute fraction of the time it would need to make purpose-built convoy escorts.


      It's also possible that this ship's role is to act as an air defense picket ship in a relatively stationary patrol zone ahead of key shoreline targets. This is where the 20 knots speed would be less of an issue, because it's augmenting the air defenses of shoreline infrastructure targets (the Chinese do not have much in the way of air defenses for protecting their infrastructure, which requires them to shift their AD from the PLA Ground Forces to protect their infra, leaving their military less defended).

      A third possibility is that the Chinese expect to lose all their warships in their fight with us, and this ship is meant for the repurcussions of that fight: merchant ships converted to warships to serve as a stopgap until new construction comes online. It is a degraded and compromised warship, to be sure, but it's better than nothing!



      2) Cruise Missile shooter

      Merchant hulls, as you've pointed out, suffer from having large radar cross sections and slow speeds of 20 knots. However, these flaws are less damaging when firing land attack cruise missiles from a thousand miles away. You don't actually need a full on warship to fire cruise missiles.

      Four 1000 mile-class cruise missiles can fit into a standard 40-foot container; with 8 containers on deck, that's 32 missiles, which is the ballpark for the presumed Tomahawk loads carried on Burkes. An offset of 1000 miles is a search area of 3.1 million square miles, the size of Brazil. That's a lot of ground for an enemy to search and cover.

      So, conceptually, in the land attack role these ships can carry a large enough payload, and can mitigate their vulnerability with distance.

      In the land attack role, these ships just need to make it to the firing point one thousand miles away, fire their cruise missiles, and then return to base. Even if they're sunk on the way home, the Chinese still come ahead: they completed the mission, they're lower value than the actual warships - every missile used on these wartime emergency ships is one missile less we have to fire at the real threats, the Chinese warships.

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    7. "Is it strange to imagine that they would explore "

      The US military comes up with all kinds of pointless, idiotic, useless technologies and adaptations. Is it strange to imagine that the Chinese would also explore some worthless technologies that they can trumpet to the world for public relations and propaganda purposes, if for no other reason. The mere fact that they've done it doesn't make it useful any more than many of the US developments.

      "Wartime Emergency Escort "

      If your idea of an escort is a very large, slow, non-stealthy vessel with no ASW or aviation, no close in weapons, limited sensors, etc. then, yes, it's an escort.

      "air defense picket ship"

      Again, if your idea of an effective picket ship is one with the aforementioned characteristics then, sure. A picket that is nearly defenseless and screams, "here I am", is worse than useless.

      "Chinese expect to lose all their warships in their fight with us,"

      Then they've lost the war and a few half-assed merchant ships won't make any difference.

      "when firing land attack cruise missiles from a thousand miles away"

      If that's the role, it could be much better done using land launchers at a fraction of the cost. Most of China's likely targets are withing a thousand miles of some bit of land the control. Targets further away than a thousand miles can't be reached by a large, slow, non-stealthy converted merchant ship which would be spotted and sunk long before it could reach a launch point.

      Even as a poor man's arsenal ship, no task force commander is going to want a giant, slow, non-stealthy ship in his group because it will slow him down and give away the group's location.

      There is no viable CONOPS for a converted merchant ship.

      Delete
    8. Question: several posts ago, you argued for deriving an ASW helo carrier from commercial hulls. However, you're making the point here that these converted merchant ships cannot be used in a PLAN SAG because they're too slow and too large.

      Would not this same predicament befall your proposed ASW helo carrier? If so, how would you propose acting to mitigate these predicaments?

      I am merely seeking to understand.

      Delete
    9. "ASW helo carrier from commercial hulls. However, you're making the point here that these converted merchant ships cannot be used in a PLAN SAG because they're too slow and too large.

      Would not this same predicament befall your proposed ASW helo carrier?"

      CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS! A converted merchant vessel (converted for whatever use) cannot be an effective part of a surface group. It can, under the right circumstances, be an effective part of a specialty group such as an ASW hunter/killer group, as I've previously proposed, or as an element of a convoy escort group with other, stronger ships.

      "I am merely seeking to understand."

      It's all in the CONOPS - a lesson the US Navy consistently ignores. A converted merchant ASW helo carrier is a far cry in both form and function from a giant, missile barge like the Chinese example. It's all in how to intend to use it.

      Delete
    10. Okay, but then i don't see how this sort of ship couldn't be used as a wartime emergency escort in a group with other ships. You're right that it can't do ASW, but torpedoes aren't the only threat that submarines have - submarine-laaunched seaskimming missiles are also a legitimate threat, as are enemy MPAs.

      Like you've said before, we need to stop expecting single ships to be war winners. I think there's some merit in a ship like this to play a supporting role to the 054A ASW frigates.

      Delete
    11. CONOPS would be as a supplemental magazine for a DDG escorting an ARG, for instance. F-35s from the LHD/LHA could also provide target data for the magazine ship to fire, leaving the DDG hiding with good EMCOM.

      Delete
    12. Hi, everyone. I am a Korean reader of this blog. Just some context to consider - ROKA possesses multiple land-based cruise missile and TBM launchers; however the decision was made to pursue the Joint Strike Ship, which is a cruiser carrying multiple types of missile - TBM, cruise missile, AShM. The rationale for why we chose to pursue the JSS is because we are concerned that in time of war, if we are attempting to coordinate multiple independant missile batteries, to say nothing of dispersed individual launchers, we forsee that friction of combat will degrade our ability to command and control our fires. We expect that our comms and C3 nodes will be degraded from the North's attacks. The firing order goes from high command to the Army's net, which is then filtered by Command, Division, Brigade, Company, to Battery.

      In contrast, with JSS, the firing order is simpler: High Command, Navy's Net, Fleet, JSS.

      I believe that there are some parties in PLAN who have reached the same conclusion as ROKN. It is cheaper and faster to send in a squadron of merchantman to a dockyard for conversion to armed cruise missile carriers, than it is to construct a dedicated JSS.

      Of course, the most likely reason for this ship is that this is just a proof of concept undergoing testing and trials, from which to refine further its concepts and systems. This could simply be just a test of how well these containerised systems handle the naval environment. If these systems are adequetely durable in the naval environment, then they'll surely withstand the environmental rigors of use in a land-based application.

      Delete
    13. "F-35s from the LHD/LHA could also provide target data for the magazine ship to fire, leaving the DDG hiding with good EMCOM."

      If we can get targeting from an aircraft, why not just have the DDG launch? The act of launching doesn't give away a position. The last thing a surface group with LHAs and DDGs needs is a slow, loud, non-stealthy merchant ship tagging along.

      Delete
  8. I don't think that PLAN agents infiltrating the US Navy could do a better job of screwing up than the current Navy leadership.

    Lutefisk

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    1. A key problem is that most Americans cannot accept expensive single (or limited) mission ships. They can only accept a mini Burke. Constellation Class was ruined because of this.

      If you really want a mini Burke, then, build a Burke, not a mini version.

      Delete
    2. "most Americans cannot accept expensive single (or limited) mission ships."

      There is absolutely no evidence to support this conjecture. In fact, peripheral evidence would suggest otherwise. The American populace has grown up on the WWII Navy, to the extent they've paid attention to anything Navy-ish, and recognize single function ships (destroyers, DE's, cruisers, BB's, carriers) as normal.

      Delete
  9. The TWZ article also mentions 30mm guns. I would assume the 2 CROWS mounts up on the hangar get upgraded, hopefully to mk 38 mod IV. I also hope we see an aviation magazine to fit whatever MH-60R and S can carry with hangar for up to 2.

    As for modules on the back we have:
    -NSM which I would rather see on a helo.
    -2 MLRS pods in a 20' container. This could end up being 16 PRSM Blk 2 anti-ship variants. That would be much more exciting.
    - NGELS/ADL which we know got funding but have not seen. This would be a path to 32 ESSM and probably leave some room for NSMs, maybe.
    - Mk 70 launchers which would be my last pick of my speculative items.

    The burden of proof is on the state. I don't assume they know enough to get this right. As Cavas pointed out on Cavasships this week, there was no uniformed navy in the Mara Largo golden fleet announcement and only 2 of the 4 civilian leadership looked pleased to be making the announcement.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "my speculative items."

      I'm so glad you acknowledged that the items are purely speculative. NONE exist in functional form today. I have no problem with speculating as long as it's clear that's what it is.

      Delete
  10. If one does a Google AI search on the Mk 54 lightweight torpedo, it reads problematic. Not sure when the navy will have one fully functional . Yet the navy projected this to be the replacement for the mK 46

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    1. I thought it is was the Mk54 being considered for vertical launch.

      Delete
    2. My apologies. I misread your comment and thought I read Mk48 instead of Mk46. The Mk54 is, indeed, the projected replacement for the Mk46 and could be used in the VL-ASROC weapon. Yes, the Mk54 has had a troubled development. For details, read some of the older DOT&E reports before they became too heavily censored to be worth reading.

      Delete
  11. If a ship is not big enough (basically stable enough), it cannot install big guns. Firing this kind gun will cause ship vibrate violently. Similarly, this is why light tank cannot install/operate 5 inch cannon.

    My speculation is that NSC will fail like Constellations as too many people think it should add this/that so it will go as the Constellation, even after start construction, design has not finished yet.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Time for a true high-low mix. Keep it simple. Here is my dream small surface combatant, I'd call it a littoral multi-role corvette (LMC) perhaps with a bias toward ASW, similar in dimensions to a Turkish Ada-class: 2,400 tons, ~325' length, ~48' beam, with 32 RIM-162 ESSM Block II quad-packed in 8 VLS cells for AAW, 8 deck-mounted NSM for ASuW, two Mk 32 triple 324 mm tubes firing Mk 54 Lightweight Torpedoes and 8 RUM-139C VL-ASROC in 8 VLS cells for ASW, towed array, smallish hangar with helicopter, OTO Melara 76 mm main gun, CODAG: one GE LM2500 gas turbine and two MTU 20V 4000 M93L diesels, 2 shafts. Build lots of them, to a price, aim for $500M each. Replace all LCS with them ultimately. Let this ship do as many of the tasks that might be expected of an LCS or old Perry-class FFG; if the job is too big, send a Burke.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. Like the Navy, you're focused on equipment and technology. Far more importantly, what's the CONOPS? What will your dream vessel do? Don't say "free up more important ships". That's just vague nonsense. What would this ship do and why? Who, how, and when could it perform a useful combat function?

      CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!

      Delete
  13. If we can’t build anything better than the NSC, we better come up with CONOPS for them. I know it’s backwards but apparently that’s where we are. If we need hulls in the water, why wouldn’t the Sa’ar 5 or similar be something we could crank out in numbers. They were built in Mississippi.

    E

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    1. Built in Mississippi over 30 years ago.

      Hulls in the water:
      Tell Saronic to have the people at their new yard build their old ships like OUSV Ranger and Mariner. Man them with crews of 18 and arm them. Use the larger 206' hull.

      Get Bollinger Lockport building a slightly larger Damen design like the FCS 5009 outfitted very similar to the Gulf Craft ships.

      Have Westport yachts get cracking on the enhanced Swedish SAAB, composite MCM vessel.

      Get Safeboats building Mk VI PBs again ASAP (Stopped when we cut off foreign aid).

      Unfortunately these are the real things we can actually do in a relevant window. We will do none.

      We should also buld small aptrol boat sized USV and put real strike weapons on them. Likely building manned command variants. They must be networked to get target data. In essence water borne stand in force.

      Delete
    2. "If we need hulls in the water"

      We don't need hulls in the water; we need USEFUL, EFFECTIVE hulls in the water. The NSC, as envisioned, would be useful to the Coast Guard but not the Navy.

      Delete
    3. "Hulls in the water:"

      You forgot combat canoes. They'd be just as useful. You're forgetting about CONOPS. What would all these small vessels do that would strike fear into the Chinese? Small boats are potentially useful as a coastal defense force but not for a global navy. Give me a CONOPS before you give me hulls.

      Delete
  14. Reposted as accidentally replied instead of posting and couldn’t delete

    An excellent post (for me at least) on YouTube by Sal at the Whats Going On With Shipping channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSExpG6e6bg describing early US Logistics 1941-42 in the Pacific. The post effectively skips combat and focuses on logistics, but also includes support for the movement of combat groups and most critically fuel supplies, reflects on decisions made on combat group movement based on the availability and location of supplies, restocking combat losses, ond the reasoning behind forward positioning of forces to maintain the usability of shipping routes.

    One of the big takeaways for me was how relevant the lessons learned in 1941-42 and generally describing the different logistic shipping support requirements there would be for a frigate class which can feed into a CONOPS. I believe these lessons and requirements are largely still relevant in a future major conflict in the Pacific (eg. merchant convoy or fast-oiler escorts etc) during which ASW would be one crucial functionality (plus some air defence) . However I agree with above comments that specialised ASW ships need to be "designed from the first rivet" if you are serious about ASW - anything less will be a compromise.

    To my mind there is also an obvious need for more ASW capable vessels to act in carrier groups as outer pickets (low cost, quick build, low observability, passive sensors, air defence), however I am mindful of your earlier comment CNO that ships are "incapable of operating with warships unless it could go 30+ kts.”

    Modifying the cutter design to be either an effective ASW ship, or a productive member of a carrier group seems would require extensive hull, propulsion, and structural changes that are likely to add years and billions to build costs.

    I believe the selection of the Coast Guard cutter as the basis of a new frigate class is a major fail.

    WB

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    1. Taken as a given that these things are going to be compromised from the start and potentially too little too late, would it be feasible to add enough sensors and weaponry to employ them escorting troop and supply ships across the pacific?

      For that matter, what about the LCS? My understanding it's already vastly overweight (and the propulsion system is crap)

      I guess in the end, the lack of will to embark on any sort of crash course to try filling this requirement is a bigger deal than finding hulls to bolt stuff onto.

      If we did have the will, would these sort of modifications be better than nothing, or not worth the effort?

      Delete
    2. "employ them escorting troop and supply ships across the pacific?"

      Of course, the major problem with the concept is that we don't actually have any cargo ships to escort!

      Setting that issue aside, could the NSC be configured in such a way as to provide some degree of value as a convoy escort? Certainly! It would be fairly simple. The main threat is submarines so an ASW fit would be appropriate. The secondary threat is missiles and that requires a Burke type escort which means the NSC just needs a simple 8-cell VLS for 32 (quad packed) ESSM plus RAM mount and CIWS and a basic TRS-3/4D level of radar.

      The shortcomings of such a design are speed (sprint/drift and repositioning abound the convoy) and acoustic quieting. Short of a total redesign to the point of creating a new ship, those can't be mitigated too much.

      Delete
  15. I have read through the various comments here with great interest. I am a little puzzled as to why anyone would think adding what amounts to an over-sized Oceanic Patrol Vessel to the USN is a good idea, but at the same time it seems to be unclear what exactly is wanted. What is currently being proposed should perhaps be called the 'Target' class, but perhaps I am just being a cynical foreigner.

    The Royal Navy at one time would classify frigates in categories such as ASW, General Purpose, Anti-Air Warfare, Air Direction, etc and then sub-divide these as 1st Rate (capable of accompanying a major Task Force and playing a major role in high intensity operations), and 2nd Rate (intended to escort convoys or operate alone in less demanding environments such as anti-piracy patrols).

    This construct raises the question of where the NSC frigate might fit - and indeed what roles it can realistically be expected to fulfil. The point of a 2nd Rate vessel is that it can do one role well (look at the RN's Type 14 Blackwood class ASW frigates) and perhaps be just about capable in one or two other less demanding roles. It seems to me that the USN is procuring a frigate that in tonnage terms should be 1st Rate, but in capability is likely to be 2nd rate or even worse. If that is what's wanted, then fine, but given the rapid growth of foreign navies that appears be an indulgence that cannot be afforded by the US or its allies.

    The problem is that the USN seems too think that there is no mid-way between a high tech Aegis ship equipped with all the latest systems, on a tonnage that will not really justify cost of such systems and a seriously under-armed and under-equipped vessel that has very little practical use in a serious conflict. I am sure there is: the Singapore Navy's Formidable class frigates appear to me as an example of what can be achieved on a smaller tonnage the the NSC frigate.

    Given that various readers have made suggestions, perhaps ComNavOps would like to outline in detail what exactly he thinks the next US frigate should be like. I'd certainly be intrigued to know.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "ComNavOps would like to outline in detail what exactly he thinks the next US frigate should be like."

      I've answered this many times but I'll be happy to do so again. The US Navy doesn't need frigates, regardless of their size or capabilities. Frigates, by the modern definition, are just mini-Burkes and we don't need mini-Burkes since we have plenty of full Burkes.

      What we need is a smaller, dedicated ASW ship, a true destroyer (conceptually a Fletcher), an MCM vessel, a UAV carrier, non-aviation attack transports, ASW helo carriers, big gun cruisers/battleships, and so on. Nowhere on that list is there a frigate.

      Delete
    2. Thanks, that is a very clear and logical response to my question. Let’s concentrate on the smaller, dedicated anti-submarine vessel you favor.

      I assume we are looking at a ship capable of sustained Pacific operations in all weathers, using towed array, one or two helicopters, Asroc (or similar) and sufficient self defense guns and missiles (ESSM?) to have a chance of surviving against a long range Chinese air and missile threat. I am not sure that anti-ship missiles are required, although a self defense fit of perhaps 4 NSM might be useful

      Quietness for ASW suggests some sort of electric drive, suspended/rafted power sources and perhaps propulsors or similar rather than propellers. Long endurance for oceanic operations and a full range of countermeasures against torpedoes and missiles will needed if these ships are to deploy within about 1000nm of Chinese bases. This suggests quite sizeable vessels, perhaps 4,500-6,500 tons displacement. I guess the nearest recent equivalent would be the original Soviet Udaloy class vessels.

      Alternatively you could look at some of the UK Cold War projects for small, cheap and expendable towed array frigates like the Type 24 and 25, neither of which were built. This concept might suit the open Pacific or Atlantic, but would be very exposed to air or missile attack closer to China. That sounds a bit like the NSC frigate. Hmm.

      Any views?

      Delete
    3. "I assume we are looking at a ship capable of "

      The Navy has myriad problems which I've thoroughly documented on this blog. However, we, as naval observers/analysts/commentators also have problems. I've many times mentioned the tendency for naval observers to get caught in the one-vs-one paradigm instead of examining how an asset fits within the overall scheme. Another, which you've perhaps succumbed to in your comment, is the tendency to want to find a SINGLE solution to any problem. ASW? Let's define the one ship that will conduct ASW! Well, that's as wrong as can be. We should have a family of ASW ships covering a range of capabilities from low to high. If you look at my Fleet Structure page from the headings above, you'll see that I've specified three levels/types of ASW ships. The different levels means that we don't have to try to solve every problem with just one solution. Want to ASW patrol a chokepoint that is fairly unlikely to see an enemy submarine? Don't waste a full fledged, large, expensive ASW ship, use my ASW corvette. Want to escort a carrier group through sub infested waters? You'll need the full, top end, destroyer (and ASW DE). This gives us true flexibility in allocating scarce resources.

      So, what ASW ship would I design? I "designed" three different ships at three different capability levels to truly cover a range of threats and situations.

      Does this change your thinking?

      Delete

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