Ship Defense

The Navy’s trend in ship design has been towards lighter and lighter built ships with less and less defensive capabilities.  Well, let’s step in and put a stop to that!  Since the Navy clearly doesn’t know how to design a ship with defensive capabilities, let’s do it for them.
 
We’re all familiar with the concept of a carrier group’s layered defense.  Aircraft provide wide ranging defense against search aircraft and provide the initial defensive layer against an attack.  Standard missiles offer the possibility of very long range intercepts.  Escort ships range dozens of miles out to provide extended ASW and AAW protection.  Medium range defense is provided by closer escorts and medium range defensive missiles.  Various missiles, electronic warfare systems, and CIWS provide close in defense.
 
Similarly, an individual ship’s defense should consist of more – much more! – than just Standard/ESSM missiles and one or two RAM/SeaRAM, as the Navy seems to believe.  A ship’s defense should be a multi-faceted, layered construct.  Let’s consider the individual components.
 
 
Outer Layer
 

• UAVs – small, stealthy, wide ranging UAVs providing passive aerial sensor coverage
• Standard Missiles – long range anti-air defense
• Passive Sonar – long range detection
• EO/IR – long range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system
• ESM – very long range signals analysis (Outboard/COBLU and S-3 Shadow type sensing) providing detection and triangulation
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Middle Layer
 

• EO/IR - medium range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system combined with fire control
• ESSM – medium range anti-air defense
• EW/ECM – detection, jamming, spoofing, etc.
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Inner Layer
 

• EW/ECM – point defense jamming, spoofing, etc.
• RAM/SeaRAM – close in anti-air defense
• CIWS – close in anti-air defense
• Decoys – integrated into Aegis
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
 
A few supplementary comments are warranted:
 
Sensors – 360 degree EO/IR with targeting capability (IRST) in addition to supplement and largely replace radar.  Such a system would involve far more than the current one EO sensor on ships today.  This would be several, perhaps dozens, of sensors each scanning a portion of the sky and acting as a single, integrated system.  During war, this may actually be the main sensor system so that the ship doesn’t have to radiate.
 
UAVs – This has been posted on previously.  Every ship should sail with several dozen small, stealthy, passive UAVs for establishing situational awareness.  These are cheap and expendable.  They must be stealthy.  It’s pointless to try to establish situational awareness if doing so gives away your own position.  We must be able to see without being seen.
 
Long range missiles – I hesitate to even include long range missiles as I believe their use will be quite limited, bordering on never.  No enemy is going to present high altitude targets other than ballistic missiles which are a special case.  So many people forget that long range missiles can only engage high altitude targets because of the radar horizon limitation.  Beyond the radar horizon, radar can only see targets at altitude. 
 
Close In – Attackers will get through.  It’s guaranteed.  Even in scripted exercises, they always do.  Every ship should have several to dozens of close in weapon systems instead of the nearly useless single (or no!) close in weapon on today’s ships.
 
Inner Layer - The inner layer has the most components and yet the Navy devotes the least amount of effort and resources to it.  The Zumwalt has no close in weapons.  The DDG(X) concept graphic has only two RAM launchers for close in defense.  The Burkes have only one CIWS.
 
EW/ECM is the most common and, historically, the most effective anti-air component and yet the Navy devotes very little attention or resources to it.  Even the current SEWIP upgrades are a limited effort, poorly executed.
 
Focus - So, what does the Navy focus its attention and resources on?  That’s right, the most expensive and least likely to be used component:  long range missiles.

Mine Countermeasures Emphasis

Recently, a reader (username “Chinese Gordon”) made the astute observation that mine countermeasures (MCM) was not a path to flag rank.  He’s correct, as far as I can tell.  Of the 250 or so  flag officers we have, how many are former MCM operators?  I don’t know but my guess is somewhere between none and almost none.  This may explain, in part, why the Navy has, for all practical purposes, abandoned MCM.  If we had a couple dozen flag officers with MCM career backgrounds, I’d like to think the Navy would be paying more than lip service to MCM.
 
How do we get more MCM officers into flag ranks?
 
Well, this is where we run into a brick wall.  Even if the Navy magically decided to add MCM officers to the flag ranks … … there aren’t any to add.  There simply are no MCM focused officers left in the Navy.  The Avengers are essentially gone, parked pierside, rotting as they wait to be officially retired.  The LCS has yet to field a viable MCM module so there are no LCS officers that have worked LCS-MCM.
 
You’d have to go down to the Lieutenant level to find anyone who deals with MCM to any degree and those few are doing one-at-a-time, unmanned mine hunting technology development, not real world MCM.
 
Who in the Navy has ever cleared a thousand-mine field, or even just a hundred, in the real world?  No one.  Who has engaged in an amphibious assault exercise that included actual clearance of mines from a 50 mile approach to the beach?  No one.  Who has cleared mines from a chokepoint while under enemy fire, real or simulated?  No one.  And so it goes.  No officer in the Navy has even a rudimentary level of MCM expertise as it would pertain to a peer war or even a disagreement with a group of radical Girl Scouts.
 
We can’t develop flag level focus on MCM because no one in the Navy has any MCM experience.
 
We’re screwed.  We’ll be forced to learn MCM on the fly in a real war and that is a very costly way to learn anything.
 
By the way, the same applies to offensive mine warfare.

ESSM Inventory Perspective

Just a quick follow up on the previous post about the Blk 2 ESSM inventory.  As a bit of perspective, if the entire Blk 2 ESSM inventory were applied across the 70+ Burke class, that would give each ship approximately 7 missiles.  How’s that for an inventory?!
 
Of course, there are other ESSM variants but not all that much more.  If we go to war, I hope it’s a very, very short war!

ESSM Blk 2 Delivery

In case you missed it, here’s a brief update on ESSM Blk 2 missile deliveries.  According to DOT&E[1], ESSM production missiles began delivery to the Navy in July 2022.  Raytheon has just delivered the 500^th missile to the Navy.[2]  That’s 500 missiles in a bit over three years.  That also tells us what the entire current, maximum Blk 2 inventory for the Navy is.  Those who envision ships teeming with quad-packed ESSM missiles should note that a single Burke, with 96 VLS cells, would consume almost the entire inventory of ESSM Blk 2 missiles!
 

ESSM Blk 2

 
_____________________________

 
[1]https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/navy/2022essm.pdf?ver=OqRFEN_Af764y6bEgF_k3A%3d%3d
 
[2]Naval News website, “RTX’s Raytheon delivers 500th ESSM Block 2 to U.S. Navy”, staff, 2-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/10/rtxs-raytheon-delivers-500th-essm-block-2-to-u-s-navy/

AI Hacked – How Would We Know?

Since the age of sail, sailors have mastered the skill of navigation on the open seas using the stars and a sextant.  What happened when we introduced the miracle of GPS?  We completely lost our navigating skills.  Aside from a few individual throwbacks who enjoy using a sextant as a hobby, no one in the Navy can navigate without GPS.  Unbelievably, in some of the recent spate of collisions and groundings, it was discovered that bridge navigation teams had even lost the skill of fixing a position by taking bearings on known landmarks.
 
Since time immemorial, explorers have traversed the land using the stars, a map, and dead reckoning.  Our overland navigational skills increased even further with the advent of the compass.  Today, the Army has lost the ability to navigate overland without GPS.
 
Pilots used to be able to navigate cross country and hit a time on target to the second with nothing more than a map, bearings, and a stopwatch.  Today, that’s a lost skill.
 
GPS, the miracle of technology, caused us to lose our navigational skills and has made us weaker and less competent.  We have become dependent on GPS.  When our GPS systems fail or are degraded or eliminated by the enemy, we have nothing to fall back on.  Exactly like a drug addict, we have become addicted to GPS and unable to function without it.
 
What’s the next miracle of technology that we’re working so hard to acquire?  Yes, artificial intelligence (AI).  Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
Ask a college student to write a report without using AI.  He’ll produce gibberish.  He’s lost his ability (or never developed it) to conduct research, assemble a cogent thesis, and present an intelligible, written document.  Heck, forget AI;  ask a student to write a paper without the Grammarly app and see what results.  Even simpler, ask any young adult who’s gone to public school to calculate change for a purchase in his head, without a calculator, and watch the deer in the headlights, frozen response.  We’ve become dependent on calculators and can’t even do simple arithmetic in our heads anymore.
 
Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
The military, by the way, is attempting to make AI the foundation of our entire command and control systems.  We believe, mistakenly, that AI will give us the advantage we need to beat China.  AI, we believe, will analyze all our data, make sense of the fog of war, tell us exactly what the enemy is going to do even before he knows, and will tell us how to counter and defeat the enemy.  AI.  Magic.  One and the same.
 
Those of us who grew up during the introduction of computers are all too familiar with the well known computer programming adage, Garbage In, Garbage Out (GIGO).  Bad data in, bad results out.  AI is not immune to this phenomenon.
 
Be honest.  Does anyone seriously question what they find on the Internet?  Sure, we’ll make jokes about the Internet but does anyone actually question what they read?  Of course not.
 
Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
Where are we going with this?  Hang in there.  We’re almost at the point of the post.  One more tidbit to assimilate.
 
Does a week go by without hearing about high level computer systems and programs, both in the military and civilian worlds, being hacked?  Nope.  And those are just the incidents that are made public.  The military and government computers and programs are hacked on a daily basis but for security reasons the incidents are kept quiet.  Despite our best efforts, various state and criminal actors routinely hack our most secure systems.  For all practical purposes, they’re unstoppable.
 
So, now put those two bits together:  absolute dependency on new technology and unstoppable hacking, and ask yourself what the result will be? 
 
The answer is easy to predict.  China will routinely hack and compromise our AI-based systems and we’ll by absolutely paralyzed because of our dependency.
 
But wait, it gets worse.  What if China hacks our AI-based systems subtly and we don’t even know it?  What if they simply manipulate the AI to give us results that give them the advantage?  We’d blindly accept the results (that’s what dependency is), never questioning them and never knowing we were being mislead and manipulated.  In fact, it would never even occur to us to ask whether the AI output was valid.
 
But wait, it gets still worse.  Even if someone was inclined to question AI results, we have no one competent enough to know what a valid result should be.  You have to have subject matter knowledge and expertise to even have an idea that something might not be right and our so-called professional warriors have no expertise (you built a ship without galvanic corrosion protection!).  So, even someone who was inclined to question a result wouldn’t have the slightest idea whether the result was or was not valid.
 
A calculator is a great tool for someone who has been trained in classical math and can recognize a garbage out result.  It is a terrible tool for someone who has no useful math skills and is unable to recognize a garbage out result.  So too, an AI command and control program could be a useful tool to a thoroughly trained and experienced professional warrior who can recognize a garbage out result.  It is a terrible tool for someone who has no useful warfighting skills and is unable to recognize a garbage out result … such as entire current flag officer corps.
 
We all recognize that networked computers are a vulnerability because if one is hacked, they’re all hacked.  We aren’t doing much to address that vulnerability but we do recognize it.  Similarly, we must recognize that AI is a vulnerability, especially when it’s being used as the basis of our highest level command and control programs.
 
Right now, just like drug dealers, we’re being given a free taste of AI to get us hooked.  We need to halt the process before we become totally addicted and helplessly dependent.  We need to regain our unaided warfighting expertise.  We do that by eliminating all non-war education (diversity, equity, gender sensitivity, climate, etc.) at the service academies, eliminating diversity crap from the leadership and ranks, ruthlessly eliminating paperwork from the daily lives of officers, eliminating deployments, bringing the fleet home for maintenance and training, start promoting a culture of acceptance of aggressiveness and ‘good’ mistakes, and start conducting daily realistic warfighting exercises and force our incompetent leadership to learn their profession.
 

This is Your Mine Countermeasures

The last Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, USS Devastator (MCM 6), has now been retired.[1]  Our surface MCM capability is now entirely in the hands of the Independence class LCS.  Yes, that LCS.  The ship and MCM module that has suffered years of delay, failure after failure, and no realistic operational testing.  That one.  That disaster.  No, this isn’t a Halloween horror story, although it should scare you to death.  This is our current naval MCM reality.
 
To briefly review, the LCS-MCM consists of a helo and an unmanned boat, each of which carry/tow various attachments as listed below.
 
MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopters 

• AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) shallow water laser mine detection
• AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) suicide drones

 
Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) tow boat 

• AN/AQS-20C forward/side scan mine detection sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) acoustic and influence sweep

 
Now, how is that all working?  Go read the annual GAO and DOT&E weapon assessments and you’ll get the history and status of the LCS MCM module.  It’s not pretty.  In addition, Naval News website offers a fantastic summary of the Independence-MCM.  Here’s some excerpts. 

Embarked helicopters also operate with the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.[1]

Safer?  Yes.
Effective?  No.
Efficient?  No.
Fast?  No. 

The sonars on the CUSVs are not a high enough resolution to identify specific threats. The lasers used on MH-60S helicopters require water that is not too turbid to operate in.[1]

So, the system only works in clear water and even then can’t reliably identify the threats?  Good … good. 

… when it comes to the unmanned systems used for mine countermeasures. Each mission takes roughly four hours of maintenance pre-mission followed by one-and-a-half hours of calibration of GPS and sonar to reach acceptable accuracy for MCM missions. The rough estimate is six hours of pre-mission preparation before mine countermeasures can begin. In real-world scenarios, that time may not exist.[1]

So, the equipment may not be effective but it’s slow.  Agonizingly slow.  That might be okay for clearing a fifty foot wide channel over the course of a month but that’s useless for combat operations. 

These concerns do not address the single points of failure in the LCS and MCM package, which make the package an extremely risk-prone platform for operations.
 
The platform lift on the LCS that moves equipment from the mission bay to the flight deck is a major operational point for equipping the MH-60S with ALMDS or AMNS. If the lift fails, the helicopter is combat ineffective. If the tow hook on a CUSV breaks, it is combat ineffective and must be towed back or recovered another way. If the Twin Boom Extensible Frame, used to lower CUSVs into the water, breaks, the entire MCM platform is inoperable and USVs cannot be launched for missions.[1]

As an example, 

One test of the MCM package on USS Tulsa (LCS 16), a ship that arrived in Bahrain in May for MCM operations, resulted in a runaway USV, according to one U.S. Navy official familiar with the testing. During that test, part of the tow bracket used to recover the mine countermeasures CUSV broke, leaving it unrecoverable.[1]

But wait, there’s more! 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[2]
 
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.[2]
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[2]
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.[2]

Conclusion
 
Really?  Isn’t the conclusion pretty obvious?
 
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain”, Carter Johnson, 26-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/combat-ineffective-littoral-combat-ships-are-replacing-mcm-ships-in-bahrain/
 
[2]Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnson, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

The Meeting, The Message

SecDef (SecWar?) Hegseth has delivered his speech to the assembled leadership of the US military and it was one of the best speeches I’ve heard/read in a very long time.  As reported and summarized by Redstate website[1], here are some excerpts on various topics:
 

Leadership
 

For too long we've promoted too many uniformed leaders for the wrong reasons. Based on their race, based on gender quotas, based on historic, so-called firsts. We've pretended that combat arms and non-combat arms are the same thing. … Promoting risk-adverse, go-along-to-get-along conformists instead. …  Foolish and reckless political leaders set the wrong compass heading and we lost our way. We became, The Woke Department …

Ideology
 

No more identity months, DEI offices, dudes in dresses. No more climate change worship. No more division, distraction or gender delusions. No more debris. As I have said before, and will say again, we are done with that sh*t.

Fitness
 

… either you are disciplined, fit, and trained, or you are out.  … each service will ensure that every requirement for every combat MOS, for every designated combat arms position, returns to the highest Male Standard only.
 
… it's completely unacceptable to see fat generals and admirals in the halls of the Pentagon and leading commands around the country and the world.
 
… if you do not meet the male level, physical standards for combat positions or cannot pass a PT test or don't want to shave and look professional, it's time for a new position. Or a new profession.

Appearance
 

… grooming standards. No more beards, long hair, superficial individual expression. We're going to cut our hair, shave our beards, and adhere to standards.

Toxic Leadership
 

Upholding and demanding high standards is not toxic. Enforcing high standards, [is] not toxic leadership. Leading war fighters toward the goals of high, gender neutral, and uncompromising standards in order to forge a cohesive, formidable, and lethal Deparatment of War is not toxic.  …  Real toxic leadership is endangering subordinates with low standards. Real toxic leadership is promoting people based on immutable characteristics, or quotas instead of based on merit. Real toxic leadership is promoting destructive ideologies.  …  The definition of toxic has been turned upside-down, and we're correcting that. That's why today, at my direction, we're undertaking a full review of the Department's definitions of so-called "toxic leadership," bullying, and hazing. To empower leaders to enforce standards without fear of retritibution or second-guessing.  …  words like "bullying" and "hazing" and "toxic" — they've been weaponized and bastardized inside our formations, undercutting commanders and NCOs.

Females
 

… when it comes to any job that requires physical power to perform in combat, those physical standards must be high and gender neutral. If women can make it, excellent. If not, it is what it is. If that means no women qualify for some combat jobs, so be it. That is not the intent, but it could be the result, so be it. It will also mean that weak men won't qualify, because we're not playing games.

Oversight and Legal Intimidation
 

We are overhauling an Inspector General process, the IG, that has been weaponized. Putting complainers, ideologues, and poor performers in the driver's seat. We're doing the same with the equal opportunity and military equal opportunity polices — the EO and MEO at our department. No more frivolous complaints. No more anonymous complaints, no more repeat complaintants, no more smearing reputations. No more endless waiting. No more legal limbo. No more sidetracking careers. No more walking on eggshells.

Firing
 

… if the words I'm speaking today are making your heart sink, then you should do the honorable thing and resign.  …  But, I suspect, I know, the overwhelming majority of you feel the opposite.

 
Discussion
 
There was only one thing in SecDef’s remarks that I disagree with and that is his rosy view of the viewpoints of those in attendance.  If he truly believes that the overwhelming majority of senior leadership really feels as he does then he is delusional.  We have seen for the last several years exactly how the majority of senior leadership feels and it is largely in line with the liberal agenda.  Those liberal leaning officers have been systematically selecting other liberal leaning officers for promotion resulting in a thoroughly infested officer corps.  They are not going to suddenly change their mindsets because of a single speech from an administration that is limited to a single term.  They may cover their tracks, now, but they’re going to resist at every opportunity.  Wholesale firing of the senior leadership is the only solution.
 
That aside, I agree with everything else.  However, this is only talk.  Hegseth has yet to demonstrate much in the way of concrete actions to back up the talk.  Indeed, his inactions have already repudiated much of what he says.  He has failed to engage in wholesale firings for all the infractions and failings he cites in his speech and which have been blatantly evident for years.  What is he waiting for?  He’s been in office for several months, now.  He’s had more than ample opportunity to actually implement the various points he discusses.  Talk but no walk.  At the end of this year will we still be waiting to see some evidence of action or will I be writing an apology post to SecDef?  I hope it’s the latter but color me skeptical.  We’ll see.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1] Redstate website, “Pete Hegseth Sets Directives and the New Direction for the Department of War”, Jennifer O’Connell, 30-Sep-2025,
https://redstate.com/jenniferoo/2025/09/30/war-secretary-pete-hegseth-sets-10-directives-and-a-new-direction-for-the-department-of-war-n2194564

SecDef Hegseth Failing?

ComNavOps has expressed both hope in SecDef Hegseth and an ominously growing sense of disappointment about the Secretary.  Hegseth talked the talk but has, thus far, failed to walk the walk.
 
He had the opportunity to come in and clean house throughout the services and, with a couple of welcome exceptions, has failed to do so.  The same service leadership is still, largely, in place.  All the incompetent and politically motivated flag officers are still there and still running things.
 
Who has he fired over the disastrous Afghan pull out?  No one.
 
Who has he fired over the Chinese spy balloons?  No one.
 
Who has he fired for the military’s multi-year failure to pass an audit?  No one.
 
Who has he fired for allowing the Navy’s fleet to look like a bunch of rusted out garbage scows?  No one.
 
Who has he fired over the lowering of physical fitness and qualification standards?  No one.
 
Who has he fired over the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard?  No one.
 
Who has he fired over the decades long debacle of the USS Boise (SSN)?  No one.
 
I can pose these questions all night and the answer is the same for all of them:  no one!  Hegseth is holding no one accountable.
 
But ComNavOps, you whine say, we can’t afford to fire every flag officer.  That would cause insurmountable problems!  Bad as they might be, we need flag officer leadership.  Really?  You’re saying that we’d have problems if we fired all the people who have, over the last several years, hollowed our military, driven readiness into the toilet, allowed maintenance to become an afterthought, and wasted obscene amounts of money on failed programs?
 
It’s a shame.  Based on his pre-nomination public statements, I had high hopes for Mr. Hegseth.  Unfortunately, his actions to date, or lack thereof, suggest he’s yet another failed SecDef who lacks the courage to take sweeping and decisive action.  All talk, no walk.
 

Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 

The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 

The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 

Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

It’s Not About One Versus One

Far too often (all the time?) commenters and analysts focus on one-on-one assessments of the weapon systems they are arguing for or against.  The US has more carriers than China.  A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile can’t be stopped.  This missile has a ten mile greater range than that missile.  This weapon can penetrate that tank’s armor.  And so on.  That’s fine but it completely ignores the big picture.  Where does the weapon system fit into the larger military scheme?  Can it be produced in quantity?  Can it be serviced in the field?  Is it reliable?  And so on.
 
How many times have you heard the argument that if this weapon can beat that ship/plane/tank then that ship/plane/tank is obsolete and useless?
 
One-on-one, the WWII German Tiger tank was nearly unbeatable but that’s not how the war was fought.  Tiger tanks and US Sherman tanks didn’t line up, one against one, in a series of jousts.  The Tiger tank was difficult to produce, lacked numbers, was hard to maintain, hard to repair, and suffered from critical fuel shortages due to Allied attacks on Germany’s raw materials, factories, refineries, etc.  The war against the Tiger tank was fought in many ‘domains’ not just one-on-one.
 
We, as observers and analysts, need to stop the one-on-one thinking that dominates our discussions and begin recognizing and considering the many other factors that make up the larger military picture.
 
Let’s take a look at a current example involving Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian fuel capacity which is impacting the general Russian military effort.
 

Ukraine has intensified its campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, hitting refineries in recent weeks and deepening fuel shortages across the country.[1]
 
About 40% of Ukraine's long-range strike missions this year have focused on refineries, while others have hit storage and pumping facilities. [1]
 
Independent estimates suggest up to 20% of Russia's refining capacity has been disabled, cutting more than 1 million barrels a day of output, mostly gasoline. Refineries that have been hit repeatedly have sustained lasting damage, especially to cracking units that are difficult to replace under Western sanctions. [1]
 
The impact has been felt nationwide. Motorists face fuel shortages, long lines, and record prices. Wholesale gasoline prices have jumped 54% since January, prompting authorities to suspend exports and impose rationing in some regions. [1]

We see, then, that the Russian military effort can be impacted not just by one-on-one weapon contests but by many other factors such as fuel supply – a lesson straight out of WWII (and every other conflict in history!).  No longer can we, as analysts, talk about one-on-one assessments without considering the larger picture and all the other factors that impact and determine a weapon system’s actual usefulness and effectiveness.
 
___________________________
 
On a bit of side note, albeit closely related, here’s a bit of information about Ukraine’s drone effort.
 

The FP-1 long-range "kamikaze" drone, introduced in May, now accounts for about 60% of strikes inside Russia. Produced at an estimated 100 units a day, it carries a 60- to 120-kilogram warhead with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers.
 
Despite a price of about $55,000, it is said to feature advanced guidance software that maintains accuracy under electronic jamming. [1]

This highlights so many lessons we’ve discussed in past posts.  For example, not every weapon has to be bleeding edge, light years ahead technology.  Had the US tried to produce this drone, it would have been 10x the size, 1000x the cost, and been partially ready in a decade or two.  In the non-US procurement world, simple and just plain effective will almost always be sufficient.  Low cost, easy to mass produce, reasonably useful characteristics … this is what effective weapons procurement should look like.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Russia Faces Gasoline Crisis as Ukrainian Drones Strike”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 5-Sep-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2025/09/05/id/1225208/

F-35 Block 4 – Total Crap

As you know, the F-35 does not yet have its full combat capabilities.  Those were part of the incremental Block software upgrades and should have happened years ago.  Now, the Block 4 upgrade effort has been delayed yet again.
 

The Pentagon now anticipates the F-35’s Block 4 modernization won’t be complete until 2031 at the earliest, a five-year delay from its original timeline, even as the department rescopes the effort to include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned … [1]

Note the phrases,
 
“at the earliest”
 
“include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned”
 
You know, beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt, that the even the much delayed 2031 date will slip further still and the already downgraded capabilities of the Block 4 will be further downgraded.  Honestly, at the rate we’re going, Block 4 isn’t going to deliver much in the way of new capabilities, at all.  Many features have already been deferred to a nebulous, non-existent, unfunded, future upgrade instead of the Block 4.
 
In addition, the Block 4 program is being reorganized, yet again.  GAO reports,
 

According to program officials, the new Block 4 major subprogram will have fewer capabilities, will experience schedule delays, and will have unknown costs until the program office finishes developing its cost estimate.[1]

The cost for this pile of digital crap is stunning, even by Department of Defense standards.
 

An updated cost estimate for the Block 4 effort, which was $16.5 billion as of 2021, is expected “later in 2025,” according to the GAO.[1]

Well over $16B and counting (with at least five more years of costs still to come!) and with next to nothing to show for it.  I really don’t know how to apply any value-added analysis to that.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  Okay, I guess that was my value-added analysis.
 
On the off chance that you aren’t angry about this, yet, the following should correct that.
 

The F-35 program’s use of incentive fees has largely been ineffective at holding the contractors accountable to delivering engines and aircraft on time,” the GAO stated. “For lot 15 aircraft, where the program originally tied incentives to on-time delivery, the program gave the contractor a second chance to earn fees by redirecting those incentives to other aspects of the program when it was clear that Lockheed Martin would not deliver any aircraft on time.[1]

So, we set up a contract with incentives and then paid the manufacturer incentives even after they failed to deliver aircraft on time.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  See?  More value-added analysis.
 
This is exactly the kind of thing I had hoped that SecDef Hegseth would address but he is disappointing me.  Heads should be littering the halls of the F-35 program.  What is Hegseth doing with his time?
 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 Block 4 upgrade delayed until at least 2031: GAO”, Valerie Insinna, 3-Sep-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/f-35-block-4-upgrade-delayed-until-at-least-2031-gao/

Can You Afford To Lose It?

Newsmax website has an article about a Chinese jet powered VTOL drone intended for surface ships.[1]  The article goes on to rave about the advantages this will confer upon the Chinese navy … according to Chinese sources/propaganda.  Setting the dubious nature of the claims aside, the article does raise an interesting and highly relevant issue that the US Navy/military is struggling with, generally unsuccessfully, and that is the question of whether the supposed warfare-changing technology of the moment actually has any value.
 
For example, let’s consider a hypothetical example of an advanced drone with all kinds of near-magical capabilities for surface ships.  Who wouldn’t want it, right?  I mean, it could potentially change the future of warfare … until you start asking a few simple questions.
 

• Can it be produced in quantity?  -answer: no, it’s so magically advanced that it’s hideously expensive
• Can it be produced in large quantities?  -answer: no, it’s too expensive and its complexity and advanced technology means it takes months or years to produce
• Can it be serviced in the field?  -answer: no, its advanced technology and complexity requires advanced depot level maintenance support
• Can it do anything combat-useful?  -answer: it can probably carry only one small munition which is almost insignificant in the big picture;  ISR might be a useful function
• Is it small enough to not impact existing ship’s functions?  -answer: no, complexity, range, capability etc. all come at a cost and one of those costs is size
• Can a ship carry enough to compensate for attrition or simple mechanical failure?  -answer: no, its size and cost preclude large quantities on a single ship
• Can it perform its function without giving away the host ship’s location?  -answer: no, it will require frequent/continuous two-way communication for sensor analysis and command/control

 
 
Conclusion
 
Sounds good on paper but fails the real world, value test.
 
The US (and good to see China is susceptible to this, as well) is so focused on the technology that we forget to ask the real world combat questions.  Sometimes (well, most of the time!) that amazing feat of technology simply has no real world value.  LCS … Zumwalt/LRLAP … EMALS … magic elevators … large non-stealthy UAVs … etc.

 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “China Makes Major Leap With 'Jet Drone'”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 15-Aug-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-navy-jet-drone/2025/08/15/id/1222629/

7th Fleet and Deterrence

Despite having thoroughly discredited the notion of deterrence (see, “Forward Presence Deterrent EffectDisproved”), there is a faction of naval observers who continue to insist that deterrence is real and works despite the overwhelming evidence of China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea’s expansionism, terrorism, and general disregard for international laws, treaties, and norms which more than disproves the validity of deterrence.  In fact, many of these people believe that the only thing wrong with the Navy’s approach to deterrence – if there is anything wrong – is that we aren’t devoting enough ships to it.  If only we’d use even more ships our deterrence would be even more effective, they say.
 
Well, it’s time to take an analytical approach to the Navy and deterrence as regards our main enemy, China.  Is deterrence working?  What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  Do we need more? 
 
Is deterrence working?  -  Well, this one is easy to answer.  China has, for all practical purposes, annexed the entire South and East China Seas despite them being mainly international waters.  They’ve built illegal artificial islands and militarized them.  They’re continually encroaching on the territorial waters and air space of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in the region.  They’ve made public claims about ownership of Japanese territories and most or all of the second island chain.  There are even reports stating that China has made claims on a third island chain which includes Hawaii and most of the Pacific.[2]
 
In addition to territorial expansion, China has also engaged in the seizure of US military assets and ignores the UNCLOS treaty to which it is a signatory (demonstrating that China’s word is worthless).
 
 
What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  -   The US Navy’s entire 7^th Fleet is devoted to deterring China.  As a reminder, 
 

It is headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan. It is part of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines.[1]

Seventh Fleet includes a permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, currently the USS George Washington, CVN-73.  Yokosuka, alone, typically includes a command ship, an aircraft carrier, Ticonderoga class cruisers, and a dozen or so Burke class destroyers.
 
In addition to the 7^th Fleet, numerous other carriers, ARG/MEUs, and aircraft regularly rotate into the 7^th Fleet’s control.
 
We are devoting an enormous number of ships, aircraft, and personnel to deterring China.
 
 
Do we need more?  - 
 
The facts are crystal clear.  If the 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines aren’t deterring China, no additional forces will suddenly, magically alter the situation.  Think about it, though, that’s a lot of ships, aircraft, and personnel.  Why isn’t China deterred?  Why aren’t they behaving very cautiously, in not cowering?  The answer is simple and painfully obvious:  China does not believe we’ll use our forces.  If your enemy does not believe you have the will to act, no amount of forces in the region will alter their thinking.  We could pack the entire US Navy into the South China Sea and it wouldn’t deter China for one second.  They believe, correctly, that we won’t use our force so any gathering of naval forces is a hollow, empty gesture.
 
The only force we’ve ever used in peacetime is against third rate countries and China does not see themselves as a third rate country.  In fact, history proves their view of things is correct.  China has seized US military aircraft and drones while they were in use, disrupted naval operations, successfully threatened and chased away US ships in international waters, established and militarized illegal islands while the US Navy stood back and watched, enforced illegal territorial water claims, violated the air space of Taiwan, etc.  All the while, the US Navy did nothing.  Ironically, the only substantive action the US Navy has taken, Freedom of Navigation exercises according to the conditions of UNCLOS Innocent Passage, has only reinforced the validity of China’s illegal territorial water claims!
 
No will to act means no deterrence and no amount of additional forces will change that.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “United States Seventh Fleet”, retrieved 18-Aug-2025,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Seventh_Fleet
 
[2]The National Interest website, “China’s Next Territorial Claim: Hawaii and Almost the Entire Pacific Ocean?”, Harry J. Kazianis, 10-Sep-2016,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-next-territorial-claim-hawaii-almost-the-entire-17658

Kirov Class Cruiser Begins Trials

It is reported that the Kirov class cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov (formerly Kalinin in the Soviet navy), has put to sea for trials after decades of modernization (can it really be called modernization if it takes decades?).  The ship last sailed in 1997 and has been undergoing repairs and modernization since 1999 with many stops and starts.
 
Details are sketchy but Naval News reports the following upgraded systems.
 

The vessel reportedly has over 176 vertical launch cells, capable of firing a wide array of anti-ship and air defense missiles. The cruiser reportedly has 10 universal shipborne firing systems (USFS), each capable of housing 8 missiles. This results in 80 launch cells reserved for launching Russia’s most modern missiles such as the subsonic Kalibr cruise missile, the supersonic Oniks anti-ship missile, and the hypersonic Tsirkon cruise missiles. In order to make room for these launch cells, the 20 angled Granit anti-ship missiles were removed.
 
An additional 96 launch cells are reserved for surface-to-air missiles to be used for air defense. It is unclear what missiles are installed on the cruiser with some reports stating that the cruiser operates the S-300Fort-M air defense systems with other sources stating that the S-400 air defense system is installed. Additional air defense systems for close to medium range engagement include six Pantsir-M air defense systems as well as a number of AK-630 close-in weapon systems.  The vessel is reportedly also equipped with the Paket-NK and Otvet anti-submarine and torpedo weapon systems.
 
The 130mm AK-130 dual purpose naval gun has been replaced by a modern 130mm AK-192M naval gun.[1]

Nakhimov heading out for trials

That makes for a large, powerful, expensive to operate ship which leads to the obvious question:  what’s its purpose?
 
The Russian navy is, for all practical purposes, a coastal defense force not an open ocean, globe spanning force.  For one thing, Russia has very limited overseas territories or commitments that would require the presence of a naval force, hence the emphasis on coastal or near coastal forces.  Thus, overseas naval operations would not seem to be a legitimate purpose.
 
Cost is another major factor.  Manning and operating a major warship like this is a very expensive proposition and Russia simply lacks the financial resources to comfortably do so which, again, leads one to question what the purpose of the ship is.
 
The key question, of course, is what combat purpose would this ship serve?  The original Kirovs were intended as anti-carrier strike assets with their twenty SS-N-19 (P-700) Granit supersonic missiles with 1600 lb warheads.  Today, a single Kirov would be no threat to a carrier group and, indeed, if the report is to be believed, the SS-N-19 missiles have been removed.
 
Of course, the ship can launch land attack missiles but against who?  Considering Russia’s likely enemies list, land attack missiles could be launched much more easily and cheaper from land sites or aircraft.
 
The Russian navy, today, consists primarily of frigates, corvettes, and various patrol vessels with a few surviving Soviet era destroyers.  In other words, it is a coastal defense force. 
 
The Russian navy has also demonstrated in the Ukraine war that they lack the equipment, doctrine, and training to survivably and effectively operate in contested waters so it’s hard to imagine they would risk their symbol of national pride in a naval battle that didn’t involve an existential threat.  That makes the Nakhimov a very limited use asset.
 
One obvious purpose, and perhaps the only real purpose, is international prestige and public relations.  Russia/Putin seems very big on trying to generate international prestige (a losing battle but Putin keeps trying) and there’s no denying that a large cruiser does generate a certain amount of attention if not any actual respect.  Of course, knowledgeable naval observers are not impressed by a ship with no naval purpose (hey, we have plenty of those!) but for Russia/Putin this would seem to be a valid purpose, perhaps the only real purpose.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News, “RFS Admiral Nakhimov commences sea and factory trials”, Frederik Van Lokeren, 21-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/rfs-admiral-nakhimov-commences-sea-and-factory-trials/

AUKUS Program

There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine project may be cancelled.  The speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs.  At the moment, the project is not cancelled and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
 
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the program.
 
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight nuclear powered submarines (SSN).  Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied with time so this is probably not locked in yet.  The first delivery would not be until at least 2040.  The US has committed to providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
 
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever.  Here are a few issues:
 
Strategic Situation - A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation.  The US already has enough submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs that enter the open ocean.  Of course, this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years pierside waiting for maintenance.
 
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot.  If Australia could, magically, operate a fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall.  Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+, the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful. 
 
Support - I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.  As of November of last year, only one of the six Collins class subs was operational.[1]  Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
 
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.  Establishing a nuclear technology base will be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training course.  Nuclear technology, technicians, scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air.  It would take decades to establish.
 
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create significant costs.
 

Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs

Nuclear Storage – Disposal and storage of spent nuclear materials and reactors is an issue.  Whether Australia would attempt to take that on or whether the US would do it is unknown.  Either way, someone will have to foot the costs.  Similarly, nuclear fuel storage is an issue as would be the handling and storage of contaminated nuclear equipment that needed to be changed out as part of maintenance.
 
Basing – One of the claimed major benefits for the US is basing in Australia with access to full nuclear submarine support capabilities.  Referring back to the support issue, it seems very unlikely that there will be any significant nuclear submarine support capability in any useful time frame.  Complicating matters is that basing for nuclear vessels has far more stringent security issues than for conventional ships.  Again, this is a significant added cost for Australia that I have not heard anyone discussing, yet.
 
 
 
Alternative
 
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. These submarines could be used to monitor and control shallow water chokepoints along the first island chain, a task better suited to smaller SSKs than the larger US SSNs.  That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]The National Interest website, “Australia Has Only 1 Collins-Class Submarine ‘In Service’”, Peter Suciu, 4-Nov-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563

Upgraded Littoral Perrys

Once upon a time, the US Navy faced a choice about how to deal with the fake ‘littoral’ issue (see, “LittoralWarfare – Is There Such a Thing?”):  either upgrade/modify the Perry class frigates or build an entire new class of ships, the LCS.  One required new hulls.  The other required only upgrades of existing hulls.  Of course, the Navy being the Navy, unhesitatingly opted to build new LCS hulls, thereby ensuring their continued shipbuilding budget slice.  In order to eliminate the possibility of anyone suggesting that Perrys could be upgraded for a fraction of the cost of new construction, the Navy neutered the Perrys by removing weapons (2003 timeframe) and stating publicly that it was not possible to upgrade the Perrys to use the new SM-2 missiles that were then coming.  In addition, the Navy wound up giving away Perrys in order to irretrievably remove them from possible service.
 

The USN had decommissioned 25 "FFG-7 Short" ships via "bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 years of service".[1]

Of course, as is so often the case, the Navy was quickly proven wrong as the Australian navy proceeded to upgrade their Perrys (the Adelaide class) to use the SM-2 and, in fact, added an 8-cell VLS in the bow of the ship.
 
Not only did Australia upgrade their Perrys and continue to operate them but so did quite a few other countries.  Let’s take a look at some of the upgrades performed by other countries after the US Navy stated that upgrades were not affordable or technically feasible.
 
 
Australia
 
The Australian Perrys (Adelaide class) received an extensive upgrade in the mid-2000’s.  The program cost around A$1.46B to upgrade four Perrys (A$365M ea).  Following is a partial list of the upgrades.[2]
 

• Added 8-cell tactical length VLS in the bow for ESSM missiles
• Upgraded to use SM-2MR Standard missiles
• Switched to Eurotorp MU90 Impact torpedoes
• Upgraded fire control from Mk92 Mod 2 to Mod 12
• Replaced sonar with new Thompson (Thales) Spherion Medium Frequency Sonar
• Upgraded Phalanx CIWS to Block IB
• Added Link 16
• Upgraded computers
• Upgraded SPS-49 and SPS-55 radars
• Added Radamec 2500 EOTS long-range passive TV & infrared surveillance
• Added laser rangefinder.
• Added multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT) for improved target detection, tracking, and engagement, particularly against low altitude targets in cluttered ocean or near-shore environments
• Replaced SLQ-32 EW system with Elbit (EA-2118) and RAFAEL (C-Pearl)
• Added ALBATROS towed sonar
• Added two RAFAEL Mini-Typhoon 12.7mm remote weapon systems
• Added additional decoy launchers

 

Adelaide Class Frigate with 8-Cell VLS and SM-2

 
Taiwan
 

• Added 8x Hsiung Feng II/III SSM in two box launcher racks
• Added 2x Bofors 40 mm/L70 guns
• Added 2x Type 75 20 mm/75 guns

 
 
Spain
 

• Replaced Phalanx CIWS with Meroka 20 mm CIWS
• Replaced SLQ-32 with Nettunel Mk-3000 EW suite
• Added RAN-12L/RAN-30 air search radar for low horizon scanning

 
 
Pakistan
 

• overhaul of all four diesels
• replacement of sea valves and air conditioning
• new bridge and navigational suite
• composite dome over the overhauled AN/SQS-56 sonar array

 
 
Following are some other countries that have operated Perrys although I could not readily find lists of upgrades:
 
Poland
Turkey
Bahrain
Egypt
Philippines
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Navy lied when they stated that the Perrys could not be upgraded.  They simply wanted to ensure that no viable option remained that could derail the – even then – controversial LCS program.
 
Looking at the list of upgrades proves that we could have added racks of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, VLS cells, added more guns, and upgraded almost every weapon, sensor, and piece of equipment on the ship.  In short, we could have had a very powerful littoral combat ship worthy of the name that would have put the LCS to shame and all for a fraction of the cost of the LCS.  This is all the more disappointing when we note that many of the Perrys were retired after only 14 years or so of service.  We had serviceable ships, viable upgrades, acceptable costs, and we chose to scrap the entire Perry class and build the LCS … just a monumentally stupid decision.  And, of course, we are now early retiring the LCS which simply emphasizes and compounds the near-criminal stupidity of the Navy.
 

 
_____________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “Adelaid-class frigate”, retrieved 12-Apr-2025
 
[2]Defense Industry Daily website, “Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last”,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/