Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

China Defeats US in Trade Deal

News has just come out that Trump has reached a trade deal with China and, at first glance, it appears to be a strategic defeat for the US.
 
Note:  We’re not going to discuss the political or financial aspects of the deal, only the military implications.
 
With regard to the military, the two key elements of the deal are:
 
1. US will continue to receive magnets and rare earths
2. US will continue to accept Chinese students
 
The magnets and rare earths aspect only furthers our vulnerability to this strategically vital resource.  China has never met a treaty or deal that it wasn’t willing to break (UNCLOS tribunal, for example) when it suited them so why would we think that China won’t threaten to cut off our supply the next time some disagreement or crisis arises?  We are continuing our dependency on our enemy.  That’s insane.  It would be far better to quit, cold turkey, and initiate a crash program to produce our own materials.
 
If this deal were just a stopgap while we frantically established our own strategic materials supply, I might be able to accept it but I see no evidence that we’re engaged in any massively accelerated program to do so.  Human nature, being what it is, we’ll just continue to depend on China without really addressing our vulnerability in any useful time frame.
 
We should be waiving every permit and review requirement in order to establish our supply as quickly as possible.  If necessary, we should be subsidizing construction and production;  after all, it’s a strategic necessity!
 
Every Chinese student we educate is both a technological spy and a future scientific asset to be used against us.  We are educating our enemy and giving them a look at cutting edge university research.  That’s insane.
 
From a military perspective, I can’t understand what Trump was thinking.  If I’m China, I’m extremely happy with the deal.

The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a reserve inventory of crude oil intended for use in the event of war or extreme emergencies.  Oil is stored in 62 salt caverns at four sites along the Gulf of Mexico and holds a total of 714 million barrels of crude oil.  In the event of war, the reserve could be used not only for direct military oil needs but also to supply defense industries.  To give an idea of the practical impact of the SPR, as of Jan 2022, the SPR represented around 1450 days of total U.S. petroleum net imports at the usage rates at that time.[1]
 
As an emergency supply, the importance of maintaining the supply at full capacity is self-evident.  Unfortunately, President Biden drew down the storage levels for political gain in violation of the intent of the reserve.  From Wikipedia,
 

On March 31, 2022, President Joe Biden announced that his administration would release 1 million barrels of oil per day from the reserve for the next 180 days …   The 2022 release became the largest ever SPR sale and lowered the SPR to its lowest levels in 40 years.  …  The Biden administration continued to release reserves in 2023, selling off 45% of the SPR by September 2023.[2]

Again from Wikipedia,
 

As of March 7, 2025, the inventory was 395.3 million barrels … [ed. 55% of capacity]).[2]

The SPR is a military safety net in the event of war and should not be manipulated for political purposes.  Even using it to mitigate occasional gasoline shortages, as other Presidents have done in the past, is wrong.
 
The Trump administration is refilling the reserve at the maximum rate the facilities can accept which is around 3 million barrels per month.  At that rate, it will take quite a while to completely refill the reserve – I calculate 120 months.  If correct, this is staggeringly slow and emphasizes why the reserve should never be tapped for anything other than a war or major disaster.
 
Redstate website has an interesting article on the status of the SPR.[3]  Energy Secretary Chris Wright said,
 

We are refilling the Reserve now and we will continue to refill the Reserve the whole time I'm in office.[3]

Discussing Biden’s actions, Wright noted,
 

You know, that was just such an irreponsible action to drain that reserve so quickly for electoral reasons, and in fact it was drained so fast, it did some damage to the facilities. So right now we can only fill two of the four major salt caverns that we have. So, we're doing repair work on the other two, we're slowly filling the other two … [3]

So, not only was the Biden action irresponsible, it apparently caused structural damage of some sort.  Even when the damage is repaired, given the apparent refill rate, we will be years refilling Biden’s drawdowns.
 
____________________________ 
 
 
Note:  For anyone who might be tempted to argue that the President can draw from the SPR for non-emergency reasons because it’s been done before, here is the relevant law governing drawdowns from the SPR.  Nothing in the law allows the President to draw from the SPR just because gas prices have increased a bit before an election.
 
 
42 U.S. Code § 6234 - Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(f)(1)The drawdown and distribution of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is authorized only under section 6241 of this title, and drawdown and distribution of petroleum products for purposes other than those described in section 6241 of this title shall be prohibited.
 
42 U.S. Code § 6241 - Drawdown and sale of petroleum products
 
(1)Drawdown and sale of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve may not be made unless the President has found drawdown and sale are required by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States under the international energy program.
 
(2)For purposes of this section, in addition to the circumstances set forth in section 6202(8) of this title, a severe energy supply interruption shall be deemed to exist if the President determines that—
 
(A)an emergency situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and duration;
 
(B)a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such emergency situation; and
 
(C)such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on the national economy.
 
 

_____________________________

 
[1]https://www.energy.gov/ceser/spr-quick-facts
 
[2]Wikipedia, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve (United_States)”,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Petroleum_Reserve_(United_States)
 
[3]Redstate website, “Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Strategic Petroleum Reserve: 'We're Filling It Right Now'”, Ward Clark, 28-Apr-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/04/28/energy-secretary-chris-wright-on-strategic-petroleum-reserve-were-filling-it-right-now-n2188445

Unmanned Nonsense

China is cranking out high end warships at an impressive rate … at least compared to our anemic shipbuilding effort.  That means they’re cranking out serious, high level firepower in various forms.  We, on the other hand, seem hell bent on ditching our high end firepower in favor of ever less lethal unmanned toys.  The latest idea I came across is Naval News website speculating about cancelling the Constellation program and replacing it with small, unmanned vessels.
 

With a price tag approaching $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion dollars each for the USS Constellation (FFG-62) frigate, Naval News asked RAND and CSIS if the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) and the DARPA No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) can replace the troubled FFG-62 frigate program.
 
… can MUSVs and NOMARS substitute for the FFG-62 frigates in terms of missions, roles, weapons coverage, and functionalities?[1]

As repeatedly documented on this blog, the Constellation is a poor excuse for a WARship but it is still worlds better than any unmanned asset.
 
The key point in the Naval News article is the following.
 

While the U.S. Navy, Congress, and the Department of Defense debate over whether to continue the FFG-62 program with government cost-cutting and downsizing …[1]
 
Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, and Senior Advisor to CSIS’s Defense and Security Department answered this question via email to Naval News in March 2025. Cancian wrote, “Yes, the [FFG-62] Constellation program is a mess, and the Navy is reviewing it, along with other troubled shipbuilding programs.[1]

To be honest, this is the first I’ve heard of the Constellation being directly considered for termination.  I know that all programs are being reassessed by the new administration but this is somewhat ominous given the Constellation program’s stunningly poor performance to date.
 
That aside, let’s examine the Naval News question – with its implied answer of yes – and see whether unmanned assets can replace the Constellation.
 
 
Mission
 
Most missions require manned interaction, interpretation, and decision making.  No unmanned asset can even begin to approach that level of automated action.  The recent example of an unmanned automobile backing over and dragging an injured person after an auto accident thoroughly demonstrates this point.  We are nowhere near Terminator level artificial intelligence.
 
Most missions, peace or war, require human presence and reasoning:  managed response to provocative moves – such as close approaches by another vessel, foreign exercises, port visits, boarding (VBSS), rescue and salvage, ASW, tactical improvisation, etc.
 
As the article points out,
 

[Unmanned assets] work better as remote sensors and shooters connected to the fleet.[1]

 
Weapons
 
Let’s start with the simplest comparison which is VLS cells since those are the main weapon of any warship.  The Constellation will have 32 Mark 41 VLS cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles, ESSM, and Standard SM-6 missiles.  In comparison, the MUSV, which is the patrol boat size ISR vessel as opposed to the LUSV which is the corvette size missile barge, has no weapons provision at all, at the moment, and is too small to fit VLS cells even if we wanted to.
 
In addition, the Constellation will carry 16 rack mounted, small anti-ship missiles, presumably the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).  The MUSV, given its small size, might be able to carry some kind of rack mounted anti-ship missile system such as the NSM.  That would likely be 4-8 missiles, depending on how many racks could fit on the boat.
 
Constellation also has a Mk110 57 mm gun.  The MUSV could not mount any comparable gun.
 
Finally, the Constellation has a RAM anti-air weapon which probably could be mounted on a MUSV.
 
NOMARS, as exemplified by the USX-1 Defiant unmanned vessel, is claimed to have the capacity for 4-6 VLS, however, this is just a wish, not a reality, at the moment.  Further, if defense weapons and sensors are added, such as SeaRAM or CIWS, the space available for larger, more offensive weapons such as VLS, markedly decreases.
 

USX-1 Defiant / NOMARS

Seizure
 
We’ve already seen that China and Iran will not hesitate to seize unmanned assets so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t seize an MUSV or NOMARS vessel.  The article also notes,
 

In peacetime, international law considers uncrewed vessels as derelict and subject to salvage.[1]

Repair
 
The following statement from the article says it all.
 

In wartime, it would be difficult to repair or retrieve such a vessel with a mechanical breakdown.[1]

Conclusion
 
It is, frankly, disappointing that anyone would even momentarily ask whether small, unmanned vessels can replace a frigate.  The lack of weapons and absence of human judgment as well as obvious maintenance issues unequivocally dictates the conclusion that unmanned vessels cannot replace a manned frigate, however flawed that frigate might be.  Unmanned vessels are, potentially, suited for ISR and acting as a very small weapons barge (mini-arsenal ship) if someone can come up with a secure communications system and a viable CONOPS.
 
What no one in the military seems to understand is that our emphasis on unmanned toys is the equivalent of asking whether an infantryman, armed with a knife, can replace an Abrams tank.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Can Unmanned MUSVs and NOMARS Replace the Troubled FFG-62 Frigate Program?”, Peter Ong, 20-May-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/can-unmanned-musvs-and-nomars-replace-the-troubled-ffg-62-frigate-program/

Changing the Calculus

You’ve probably heard, by now, about the Navy’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile.  It’s a Standard SM-6 surface to air missile adapted to be air launched from F-18 Hornets.  The key characteristic of this missile, in this role, is its 200-300 mile range.  There is no exact published spec on the range, yet, but the ship launched version has a range of 150 – 290 miles, depending on the flight profile.  Various reports suggest that the air launched range is 300+ miles. 
 
Other performance characteristics of note include a weight of around 1,900 pounds, a length of more than 15 feet, a speed of up to Mach 3.5, and an impressive 140-pound blast-fragmentation warhead. In comparison, the Sidewinder has a 20 lb warhead and the AMRAAM has a 44 lb warhead.
 
Of course, this performance comes at a staggering cost of $4.3M per missile.[1]
 

AIM-174B

This missile is intended to be the very long range air to air missile (VLRAAM) that’s been missing from the inventory and is an answer to the very long range Chinese and Russian air to air missiles.  The Chinese have the PL-15 which is reported to have a range of 120-190 miles and a speed of Mach 5, the PL-17 which is reported to have a range of 250-310 miles and a speed of Mach 6, and the PL-21 which has a reported range of 190+ miles.  The Russians have the AA-13 (R-37) Arrow which has a reported range of up to 250 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  A similar, though shorter ranged US missile is the AIM-260, currently under development.  It is reported to have a range of 120 miles and a speed of Mach 5.

 
This category of very long range, very fast missile is a severe problem for high value units such as tankers and E-2 Hawkeyes.  We’ve discussed the impact of this missile and noted that it could force our Hawkeyes, in particular, to operate so far back from the aerial battle as to lose awareness and control which is, of course, the doctrinal key to US aerial combat.  This would, for example, cede aerial supremacy to the Chinese over Taiwan in the event of an invasion.  Our carrier aircraft would be unable to operate effectively in the area with each aircraft forced to operate independently instead of with the benefit of an all-seeing controller.  It would also force each aircraft to radiate instead of remaining emissions silent and allowing the E-2 to detect and designate targets.  The negative impact of Chinese very long range air to air missiles (VLRAAM) cannot be overstated.
 
 
Targeting
 
This is, as always, the crucial and limiting factor.  A 300+ mile missile is useless if we can’t generate targeting at that range.  No fighter radar is going to see modern enemy fighters at anything approaching that range and certainly not enemy stealth fighters.  My best semi-informed guess is that a fighter won’t see an enemy stealth fighter until 20 miles or less.
 
In a match up between the Navy’s F-18, the only plane currently designated to carry the AIM-174B, and an enemy stealth fighter, the enemy is going to get first detection every time.
 
A large radar plane (AWACS or E-2 Hawkeye) might be able to see enemy fighters at somewhat longer ranges but, still, nothing approaching 300+ miles.  So, where do we get targeting for these missiles?  There are a few viable options.
 

• The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters).  HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected.  Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
• A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
• Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors.  It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.

 
The reverse case of the Chinese providing targeting for their VLRAAMs is interesting.  They would have their own stealth aircraft to provide targeting, land based over- the-horizon radars, and suicide aircraft.  The latter is concerning.  The Chinese do not have the same view of the value of the individual pilot that we do and the idea of sending throwaway fighter aircraft on semi-suicide runs straight at our HVUs, either to shoot them directly or to provide targeting for remote VLRAAM shooters, is viable and concerning.  From the Chinese perspective, if they can trade a handful of second tier fighters to kill a US HVU, that would be a win for them.  The Russians essentially had this as the cornerstone of their anti-carrier strategy during the Cold War.  They were doctrinally willing to sacrifice many Tu-95 Bear search aircraft to provide detection and targeting for their naval aviation bomber regiments.
 
 
Taiwan Scenario
 
The problem with any contemplation of a Taiwan-centered war with China is that it presents a massive advantage for China due to physical proximity.  The skies over Taiwan can safely be assumed to be packed with Chinese aircraft and only occasionally challenged by US sorties from Guam, if it remains operational or carrier aircraft.  The advantage becomes all the greater for Chinese aviation through their uncontested use of AEW and EW aircraft supporting the aerial fight from a safe distance.  Until now, we simply didn’t have a VLRAAM of our own to threaten Chinese AEW and EW aircraft.
 
Conversely, Chinese VLRAAM missiles would be used to push US AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft back, thereby relinquishing control of the air battle.
 
For many decades, US military operations have assumed aerial supremacy.  Chinese VLRAAMs have upended that assumption.  Now, however, the AIM-174B offers the ability to regain control of the aerial battle or, at least, force an even contest (which is not how you want to fight but it’s better than fighting from a disadvantaged position!).
 
 
Summary
 
The AIM-174B VLRAAM offers the possibility of establishing aerial supremacy (or, at least, equality) in the Taiwan scenario.  The key, as always, is targeting.  As usual, the US military has focused on the weapon and ignored the sensor/targeting issue.  We should be working just as hard at solving the targeting issue.
 
We also need to be working on tactics for the Taiwan scenario and I guarantee that we have not addressed this in any realistic fashion.  We need to figure out how best to deploy the AIM-174B and how best to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.  Will this allow our F-18s to fight with a reasonable chance of success or is the F-18 simply outclassed by Chinese aircraft?  Are there tactics that can make the F-18 effective?  This, by the way, is why I’ve repeatedly called for a new, very long range, stealthy, air supremacy carrier fighter and end this idiotic combination strike-fighter nonsense that produces an aircraft that is neither a good strike asset nor a good fighter.
 
We can win the Taiwan aerial battle but it means focusing on what’s important and letting go of our paradigms.  We need new approaches, new tactics, and new aircraft optimized for the Chinese war.  The AIM-174B is one piece of the puzzle but we can’t stop there, as we are almost certain to do.  We need to develop the accompanying tactics and fighter aircraft that will take advantage of the AIM-174B.  And no, we can’t simply stand off and lob these missiles into the skies over Taiwan.  The missiles are far too expensive, complex, and time-consuming to produce to ever have that kind of inventory.
 
We’ve taken the first step.  Now, we need to finish the job.
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/05/aim-174b-is-navys-new-air-launched-missile-a-hypersonic-killer/

Memorial Day

Enjoy your Memorial weekend and please remember those who gave their lives in the service of our country.

Leadership and the CNO

Everyone thinks they’re an interior decorator and you see the results almost every time you visit someone’s home.  They’re generally pretty poorly decorated.
 
Similarly, everyone thinks they’re a leader or know what makes a good leader … but they aren’t and don’t.
 
Breaking Defense has an article on the Navy’s vacancy at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position which attempts to point out the problems with a vacancy for CNO.[1]  Consider the following statement
 

“It’s not good,” Wills [Steven Wills, naval historian and associate at the Center for Maritime Strategy] said flatly, “to be operating without a CNO.”[1]

Think about that for a moment.  How has having a CNO worked out for the Navy these last several decades?  The Navy’s CNOs have guided the Navy straight into the toilet.  I’m not going to bother listing all the problems.  You read this blog so you know what they are.  If that’s what having a CNO gets us, maybe we’re better off without a CNO?
 
We have an acting CNO, Adm. James Kilby, Vice CNO.
 
Wouldn’t that be a great opportunity for Kilby to give us an on-the-job audition?  After all, he was/is the VCNO so he should be more than capable of stepping in and showing outstanding leadership, right?  Here’s what Breaking Defense and Mr. Wills think,
 

But even with Kilby in place, Wills and others said major strategic or programmatic decisions will likely be postponed with no empowered, confirmed CNO to back them up.[1]

Why would decisions need to be postponed?  If they’re good decisions, they should be implemented immediately and decisively.  Why hesitate?  If they’re not good decisions then you shouldn’t be in the position.
 
Take bold, decisive action until someone stops you.  Don’t cower in fear that someone might disagree.  Don’t wait for approval from above.  You’re the highest ranking Naval officer there is.  Act like it.
 
Here’s yet another person who doesn’t understand what leadership is.
 

Even the best acting leaders are reluctant to make tough calls on hard issues,” Erik Raven, former under secretary of the Navy, told Breaking Defense.[1]

If you’re reluctant to make tough calls then you shouldn’t be in that position.  Step aside and let someone else take over the acting CNO job.
 
Congress doesn’t understand leadership or how bad the Navy’s CNOs have been, either.
 

Sen. Tim Kaine, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee, told Breaking Defense he was “nervous” about the lack of a CNO.[1]

Nervous about the lack of a CNO????  Given their record, I’d be more nervous about having a CNO!  Heck, paralysis would be better than the incompetence we’ve seen from our CNOs.
 
Here’s a few sentences that should tell us everything we need to know about Navy leadership and officer ranks.
 

To cope with the strain of doing two jobs at once, the acting service chief must delegate tasks to subordinate officers, who then do the same as they become overburdened with new responsibilities. Those officers also become reluctant to act when asked to make decisions that are historically above their paygrade.[1]

Isn’t the entire idea of the Navy (or any military combat structure) that you’re always ready to step into the next highest job, at a moment’s notice?  Sure, you may lack experience and maybe you’ll make a mistake but hesitation shouldn’t be one of your problems.  If you’re a professional warrior, you’ve been studying naval warfare your entire career.  You should know what needs to be done.  If not, you’re a failure and in the wrong line of work.
 
There’s nothing magic about being CNO … as our string of abject failures confirm.  CNOs have no special knowledge or capabilities.  They’re just the guys who played politics better than the rest.
 
Consider this damning statement,
 

“When Adm. Franchetti was the vice chief, and acting as CNO, she was hesitant to roll out a plan for the Navy under her term of leadership,” Wills added.[1]

Shouldn’t that have told us what kind of CNO she’d be?  ComNavOps predicted her pathetic failure almost on day one because ComNavOps understands what leadership is and can recognize the glaring lack of leadership qualities in others.
 
Where’s the next Halsey?  Where’s Nimitz?  Where’s Willis ‘Ching’ Lee?  Instead, we get Franchetti and Kilby.
 
I’m not worried about the absence of a CNO;  I’m worried about having a CNO … another stinking, steaming pile of CNO since no one around the Navy seems to understand what real leadership is.
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “What a historic absence of its top officer means for the Navy”, y   Justin Katz and Valerie Insinna, 23-May-2025,
http://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/what-a-historic-absence-of-its-top-officer-means-for-the-navy/

Ship Order Quantities

Continuing on a little bit of an acquisition theme, we have become conditioned to think of military acquisition ordering, specifically ship ordering, as occurring in large quantities.  For example, here’s some planned or built orders for some classes:
 

 
 

But, this was not always the case.  In fact, this is an anomaly in the history of the Navy.  Historically, most shipbuilding programs resulted in small orders.  Consider the following sequential list of combat ship types in the WWII era and note the size of each class, as shown in the table below.

 

We see that even in the midst of an emergency wartime crash construction program that would see the Navy ultimately build a fleet of 6000 ships, the individual class sizes were still very small … stunningly small by today’s norm.
 
Even the smaller ships, of which the Navy needed many hundreds, were built in fairly small quantities as shown below.
 

 

Even these larger destroyer and destroyer escort class numbers are deceptive in that they were all built in the span of a few years.  Thus, although the numbers may have been larger, the construction period for the classes was very short which is almost the same as being a very small class as far as how it impacts ordering, construction, and pricing.  Contrast this with the LCS class, a corvette size ship, which has been under construction for some twenty years or the 3-ship Zumwalt class which began construction in 2009 and is still continuing, sixteen years later!
 
 
Future Proofing
 
One of the major impacts of class size has to do with the misguided notion of future proofing, the concept so beloved by so many naval observers.  The idea of future proofing is that if we build excess capacities (weight margin, electrical power, internal hull volume, hull length, extra cabling and ducting, etc.) into the new ship it will be much cheaper to upgrade it in the future as new technologies emerge.  While superficially appealing, the concept has failed almost completely in practice and has resulted in more expensive ships that never get ‘futured’, meaning, they never receive those nebulous, undefined future upgrades.
 
Future proofing results in compartments that have no function, cables and ducting that are dead ends, and length, width, and volume added to the ship for future needs that, history tells us with near 100% certainty, will never happen.  In short, we increase the cost of ships trying to future proof them despite knowing full well that we’ll never apply the future upgrades.  Instead, when the time comes for adding future upgrades, the Navy will claim, as they always do, the ships are too old and that it is no longer cost effective to upgrade the ship and that the ship is too worn out to be worth upgrading and that we must buy new hulls.  How many times have we seen this happen and yet naval observers keep calling for future proof designs?  Remind me, what’s the definition of insanity?  Oh yeah, that’s right …
 
In WWII, there was zero future proofing built into ships.  Future proofing, meaning the incorporation of new technology, was handled by building small classes so frequently that classes with new technologies (or the lessons of actual combat) were always just around the corner.
 
 
Order Size
 
One might think that industry would love large orders and, in theory, that would be correct if the Navy ever followed through on the large order (see, “Follow Through”).  In theory, large orders would lend stability to shipbuilders since they could plan years ahead for their workloads, better manage workforce levels, and intelligently plan facility improvements.  Of course, this is not what happens in practice.  In practice, shipbuilders are left unsure about future workloads since every program is always on the verge of being cancelled or reduced, orders surge and wane resulting in frantic attempts to hire workers followed shortly by layoffs, and facility improvements and, indeed, basic maintenance, keeps getting pushed into an undefined ‘someday’ that never arrives.  What’s the point of large orders that just get cancelled or reduced?
 
Contrary to what one might think, small orders actually promote stability in the shipbuilding industry because industry has a much higher confidence that the order will be fully carried to completion and that subsequent small orders are coming.
 
Large orders have had the effect of reducing new classes and new projects to near zero.  For example, we’re down to one new combat aircraft order every twenty or thirty years now.  This results in one winner in industry getting all the work for decades (Lockheed Martin and the F-35, for example) and the other manufacturers being forced to consolidate and/or die due to lack of work.
 
It is time to return to the historically more normal practice of building frequent, small classes of ships with short life spans (10-20 years).  We knew this, once upon a time, but stupidly abandoned timeless wisdom.  Let’s study our history, recall the lessons, and return to sanity.

Follow Through

We are constantly amazed – but, by this time, not surprised – by the inevitable increases in prices on military acquisition programs and the 100% guaranteed cost overruns.  We’ve discussed many of the factors that cause this but here’s one that we haven’t emphasized enough:  quantity reductions.
 
The more you build of something, the cheaper it gets due to economy of scale … at least, that’s the theory although it’s almost impossible to find evidence of that in any acquisition program.  But, what happens when the initial quantities get reduced as the program progresses?  Prices skyrocket for the remaining items and subsequent construction bids soar.
 
As a reminder, consider the historical programs listed below and the change from the initial quantities to the final purchased amounts, as shown.  Note that some of the quantities, especially the planned quantities, vary depending on source.  I’ve listed the most commonly cited quantities that I’ve found.  For programs with international sales, the figures shown are for US sales only.
 
 

• Seawolf-class - planned 29, built 3
• Zumwalt-class – planned 32, built 3
• Zumwalt AGS – planned 64, built 6
• F22 - planned 750, built 195
• LCS – planned 55, built 35
• LCS Modules – planned 64, built 35
• B-2 – planned 132, built 21
• M10 Booker – planned 504, built 80
• MQ-8C – planned 177, built 38
• EFV – planned 1025, built 0

 
 
There are also programs that have not yet concluded but appear to be on their way to reducing the planned quantities.
 

• LRASM – interest has died and the program is on the verge of termination
• F-35B – planned 353, now planned 280
• F-35C – planned 353, now planned 280
• ACV – planned 1122, now planned 632
• P-8 – planned 138, now planned 128
• F-35   planned 2866, now planned 2470
• MQ-4C Triton – planned 70, now planned 27

 
With this background, does anyone think programs such as the B-21, Columbia-class, and Constellation-class will survive with no quantity reductions?
 
 
Discussion
 
To return to the original premise, how do quantity reductions impact costs and future program bids?  Think about it.  If you’re running a defense industry company and you’re asked to bid on a project, you know, with near 100% certainty, that the quantity you’re bidding on will be reduced at some point.  So, what do you do?  Obviously, you calculate the actual cost to produce the specified number of products and then you add a significant extra amount to your bid to cover the inevitable reduction in quantity.  You have to do this to ensure your profit.  This isn’t price gouging … it’s just basic, common sense business.
 
The military’s instability in program quantities drives up costs as a simple matter of business.  If the military would hold to the planned quantities, the savings would be huge.

Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

Comment Quality

Comment quality has nosedived, recently.  I’m seeing far too many uninformed, unsupported, argumentative, pedantic comments.  As a reminder, and as stated in the Comment Policy page, the reader is responsible for knowing the basics of military history, strategy, and tactics.  Also, any statement of fact that is not commonly known should be supported.  Finally, the purpose of the blog is to discuss and learn.  Arguing for the sake of arguing is not allowed.
 
I suspect that many/most of the offending comments are the work of one or a few newer readers and, if so, I will weed them out in relatively short order.  I want productive comments or no comments.  I’m happy either way.
 
Once again, I urge commenters to append a username to the end of comments to avoid confusion about who said what.
 
Discuss, learn, and enjoy or find another blog.

Note: This is a closed post.  No comments.
 

Naval Marines

A reader recently suggested using detachments of Marines on Navy ships to conduct small land actions and, further, to supplement them with sailors who have been give some land combat training.  The reader noted that this was once a common practice.
 
The idea is intriguing and I’d like to run with it a bit. Is it a feasible idea, today?  Would it be effective?
 
Let’s do a brief review of some historical naval Marine actions to remind ourselves how they were used.
 
 
Sandwich – In May 1800, at Puerto Plata, Commodore Talbot, aboard the USS Constitution, sent a raiding party of 90 sailors and Marines under the command of then Lieutenant Isaac Hull to ‘cut out’ the Sandwich, a French privateer that had been plaguing the area and was being refit under the protection of the nearby Spanish fortress.  They quickly surprised and overwhelmed the Sandwich but needed time to prepare the ship for sailing.  Hull ordered the Marines to seize the nearby fort which they did with no casualties, ensuring the safety of the operation.  The Sandwich was successfully sailed out of the harbor.
 
Barbary Pirates – In Feb 1804, at Tripoli, Captain Stephen Decatur led a small unit of Marines in a clandestine night attack on the previously captured frigate Philadelphia, now being used as an enemy gun battery.  They successfully boarded the vessel and burned it, thus denying its use to the enemy.
 
Marquesas Islands – In Dec 1813, a detachment of Marines and sailors from the frigate USS Essex, Captain David Porter commanding, landed on Nukuhiva and secured the island to enable refit and R&R operations.  They established a small fort and mediated a cessation of a local tribal war.
 
Cape Antonio - On December 16, 1821, USS Porpoise, conducting anti-piracy operations under the command of Lieutenant James Ramage, located five pirate vessels and the merchant brig Bolina. Forty sailors were lowered into five boats and Ramage led an attack which burned the vessels and freed the Bolina.
 
Matanzas – In Nov 1822, near Matanzas, Cuba, USS Alligator, commanded by Lieutenant Allen as part of the Navy’s West Indian Anti-Piracy Campaign, launched small boats carrying 40 men to attack a group of three pirate schooners and five prizes.  The pirates were routed although Allen was killed in the action.
 
 
It is interesting to note that shipboard Marine detachments ended in 1998.  Beyond that, the Marines did, at one time, experiment with a Company Landing Team (CoLT) concept.  I don’t know what became of that.
 
 
Analysis
 
Now, let’s analyze the historical examples to understand why they worked and whether those same conditions for success would apply today.
 
In earlier times, the absence of timely long distance communications meant that ship’s captains had to act as an arm of the country’s diplomatic efforts, often creating policy on the spot.  This offered captains a great deal of latitude in the choice of options and force was often a preferred and effective choice.
 
Another major factor that allowed the success of these small naval Marine actions was the localized nature of affairs.  An enemy couldn’t respond quickly to bring reinforcements to bear.  Indeed, it would often be days or weeks before the enemy’s higher command or nearby forces even learned of the action.  Thus, if the naval Marines could overcome the local resistance, they and their host ship were assured of safety for days or weeks.  Today, with instantaneous communication, aircraft, missiles, long range artillery, etc., any local operation can potentially be countered with overwhelming force in a matter of minutes or hours.  A very lightly armed raiding force simply cannot withstand aircraft, armor, missiles, etc. and, further, the ship that they operate from is placed in immediate danger as well.
 
Today’s instantaneous communications means that the entire world will hear about an action almost on a real time basis which means that any action will have global political repercussions, good and bad.  This, among other factors, has made today’s leaders extremely reluctant to engage in the kind of ad hoc naval Marine actions we’re considering.  In earlier times, communication lags meant that it would takes months or years for an action to become known around the world and, by then, it was a past event and limited global consequence.
 
Along this same line, small actions generally mean small consequences.  A small naval Marine action would, almost by definition, have limited physical consequences – the political repercussions being a separate concern, of course.
 
Manpower was another reason why naval Marine actions were feasible.  Sailing warships carried large crews both for manning the labor-intensive cannons and to make up boarding and prize crews.  Thus, ships had an abundance of sailors and Marines available for off board actions.  Today, with minimal manning compounded be extensive at-sea billet gaps, there simply aren’t enough personnel to even consider such actions.
 
Yet another aspect of these actions is the defensive weapons that an enemy could bring to bear.  In earlier times, the attacking naval Marine force would face only weapons similar to their own with the exception of cannons which had limited, if any, mobility.  Thus, the attacking force could not be overmatched in weapons.  Today, with highly lethal, mobile, and often armored tanks and vehicles along with artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft, the attacking force, with only light weapons, is quite likely to face far superior defensive weapons.  Thus, even a small, local defense force may well possess superior firepower compared to a naval Marine force.
 
Finally, the most important factor in any potential naval Marine action is the willingness to take decisive, forceful action.  In earlier times, we were willing to use force as a part of war or as an arm of diplomacy.  Contrast that with today’s timid policy of avoidance and appeasement.  Even if we had naval Marine forces, we wouldn’t use them.
 
 
Potential Uses
 
Understanding why earlier actions were successful and the limits imposed on today’s potential actions, where/how could we use naval Marine forces, today, if we did have them?  Here’s a few examples.
 
Anti-Piracy – On any number of occasions, a naval Marine force could have used small UAVs to track today’s pirates back to their bases of operation and then conducted raids to eliminate them.
 
Anti-Small Boat – A raid against any of Iran’s swarm boat facilities would be a potential use for naval Marine forces.
 
Illegal Islands – As China attempted to build their illegal islands in the South China Sea, naval Marine forces could have conducted raids to destroy the island building efforts.
 
Cutting Out – Chinese vessels that violate allied nation’s territorial waters could be ‘cut out’ and seized.  China has repeatedly, and illegally, sent swarms of fishing vessels and “Coast Guard” vessels into Vietnamese, Philippine, and other waters.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Naval Marine forces for off board actions have been an historically useful and fairly common occurrence.  Today, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is timidity, this is no longer practiced.  There are, however, situations that could benefit from such actions if we had the mindset and wished to allocate the required resources.
 
Timidity aside, the main drawback would seem to be the potential for the attacking force to run into a level of weaponry that it cannot handle.
 
As an alternative, many of the contemplated actions might seem worthy of SEAL involvement although the need to transport SEALs to the action site would largely negate the benefit of having an organic action party always at hand.
 
It seems that there are situations that could benefit from a naval Marine force but the infrequency of such combined with the cost in additional manning and resources would seem to preclude the practice.  A much better alternative would be to make greater use of SEALs on carefully planned, small missions.  Of course, that assumes a level of fortitude we have not exhibited for many years.