The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 

National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 

He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini²-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 

The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf

Our Navy For The China War

ComNavOps has discussed various aspects of what our naval force structure should be but it’s generally been in isolation rather than presented as a grand overview.  This has sometimes made it difficult for people who haven’t been following the blog closely to understand how the individual components relate and where they fit in the overall force structure.  I think it’s time to begin presenting the overall picture.  One way to do this is to examine the naval force structure we’ll need to fight China and win.  Of course, we lack an explicit military strategy which is what we really need to do a detailed analysis and presentation but we can still generate a pretty good picture just by looking at the typical types of naval operations that will be needed.
 
With that in mind, here are some of the naval operations that will be required in the China War and the specific force needed to meet those requirements.
 
Tomahawk Strikes – We will need massive, very long range, cruise missile strikes against Chinese bases, industrial facilities, etc.  The easiest and most survivable way to accomplish this is via submarine.  We need a moderate sized SSGN force.  The handful of Virginia Payload Module equipped Virginia class subs with their 40 cruise missiles is simply insufficient and inefficient compared to the 154 missiles carried by a single Ohio class SSGN.  It takes 4 Virginias to equal the missile load of a single Ohio SSGN.  Let’s recall that the Tomahawk strike on the Syrian airbase in response to the chemical weapon attack used 70+ missiles and was only a partial strike on a small, undefended base.  Any serious strike against any substantial, defended target is going to require hundreds of missiles.  Trying to mass and coordinate a dozen Virginias is much more difficult than using two or three Ohio SSGNs.  We simply must build more SSGNs.
 
We also need a new cruise missile.  The Tomahawk is old, slow, non-stealthy, and has limited capabilities.  The attrition rate among Tomahawks in a peer defended attack will be substantial which will require much greater numbers of missiles to achieve the desired result – numbers we don’t have in inventory.
 
Our surface ships will have to participate in Tomahawk strikes and the Burke is our only cruise missile shooter.  In order to get our Burkes into launch position, they will have to be escorted.  In a role reversal, the escorts will be carriers.  The carriers will provide the aircraft portion of a strong, layered defense in addition to the Burke’s own AAW capabilities.
 
Air Force Protection – The Air Force is going to be busy launching constant, very long range B-2/21 bomber strikes and will need protected air corridors to the extent possible.  Carriers will have to provide temporary, mobile, air superiority to create protected transit lanes.  This will require long range air superiority fighters with very large weapon loads.
 
Anti-Surface Superiority – The Navy will need to establish surface superiority – total domination, actually – to enable free movement of submarines, unhindered by enemy ASW forces, free movement of carrier forces, transport of supplies, at-sea fleet logistic support, etc.  Since carriers can’t be everywhere and will have higher priority tasks, this will require independent (independent of carrier support) surface groups tasked with eliminating Chinese surface forces and capable of operating, at least initially, with minimal or no air support.  These surface groups will need extensive organic small UAV capability for local situational awareness, a long range (200 miles or so), stealthy anti-ship cruise missile, and heavy naval guns for those close range, unanticipated naval encounters that are all too common in naval warfare.
 
ASW – Arguably, the most important aspect of our naval operations will be our submarine activities.  To do this successfully, we need to provide the maximum amount of ASW support.  We need to attack enemy subs and ASW assets at the source (factories, supplies, bases) and at sea, as they operate.  All of the source attacks will, of course, be on the Chinese mainland and all the operating attacks will be inside the first island chain.  We need to be able to penetrate the A2/AD zone, find those assets, and destroy them.  This leads back to a long range strike capability (Tomahawk or, ideally, a Tomahawk replacement) and the ability to operate near or inside the first island chain using surface groups.
 
Logistics Convoys – Resupply convoys from the US west coast will have to transit to Pearl Harbor and beyond and will require ASW/AAW escort.  A typical escort group should include small ASW corvettes and a single Burke AAW destroyer.
 
Air Superiority – The one absolute we count on, operationally, is that the Chinese will make a Taiwan invasion the initial action of any war.  Assuming we intend to contest that, a Guadalcanal-like battle will ensue with the Chinese invasion fleet on the west side of Taiwan and US naval forces on the east.  Carriers will provide the local air support over Taiwan and will attempt to establish air superiority over the island and the Chinese fleet – no easy task.  Again, this demands a pure air superiority fighter for our air wings.
 
Mine Warfare – The Chinese reportedly have hundreds of thousands of mines and we have no useful mine countermeasures capability.  Offensively, on our part, the Chinese are contained by the first island chain and should be bottled up by mining the relatively narrow passages out of the chain.  However, we have little to no useful mining capability as measured by the ability to lay thousands of mines in a very brief period of time.  A sub or airplane laying a couple dozen mines at a time is not combat-useful.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This is beginning to tell us what our fleet structure should look like and what kinds of weapons we need.  THIS … this is how you build a fleet – from an analysis of needs not a desire to pursue isolated technology for its own sake.
 
We can see what we need and now we need to look at our current force structure, see what’s useful, see what’s useless, see what’s missing, and recognize what we need to begin acquiring on an urgent basis.
 
So much of what we have, and are actively acquiring, has little or no use in a war with China.
 
Of note, what naval capabilities are conspicuous by their absence from the discussion?  That’s right … amphibious assaults and unmanned assets.  There is simply no strategic need for assaults and no tactical need for unmanned assets, at least at their current level of capability.
 
To summarize,
 
Not Needed: 

• amphibious ships
• F-35
• F-18
• Zumwalt
• Ford
• LCS
• unmanned assets

 
Needed: 

• new cruise missile
• Simpler, cheaper aircraft carriers
• new air superiority fighter
• SSGNs
• 8” gun ships / 16” battleships
• new electronic warfare aircraft, both air-to-air and air-to-ground optimized
• true destroyer
• Burke replacement
• mine countermeasure ships and equipment

 
There you have it … the naval force we should be procuring for the war with China.  It’s noteworthy that pretty much everything we currently have is not needed and everything we need is non-existent and, worse, we have no plans to develop/acquire any of the missing items.
 
So what is the Navy working to acquire?  Unmanned sail boats, a generic do-everything aircraft that will do nothing well, more Burkes, tiny cargo/landing vessels for the Marines, AI-powered everything, and more Fords.
 
I’ll put it as plainly as possible:  What we have, we don’t need and what we need, we don’t have.

Constellation Construction Progress

We’ll probably never know the real reason why the Navy decided to terminate the Constellation program but one of the factors certainly had to be the glacially slow pace of construction progress.
 
Constellation was laid down 12-Apr-2024 although, as with most modern ships, construction of subassemblies had already begun.  Now, Nov-2025, 19+ months later, the ship is reportedly 12% complete.[1]  That’s 12% in 19+ months.  That’s an average of 0.6% construction progress per month.  At that rate, it would require 167 months (13.9 years!) to complete the construction and even then, that would only be the basic hull.  Fitting out would require many more months.
 
Fourteen years to partially build a frigate?
 
If you were SecNav, would you have continued this program?

 

Constellation Under Construction?

 

 
________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Nov-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants

Navy Cancels Constellation Frigate Class

You’re probably thinking this is a ComNavOps April Fool’s piece that somehow got misplaced on the calendar, right?  Well, it’s not. 
 

The Navy is walking away from the Constellation-class frigate program to focus on new classes of warships the service can build faster, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced Tuesday on social media.
 
Under the terms negotiated with shipbuilder Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the Wisconsin shipyard will continue to build Constellation (FFG-62) and Congress (FFG-63) but will cancel the next four planned warships.[1]

This is not exactly surprising.  ComNavOps has heavily criticized the Constellation program since day one and the evidence of failure has steadily accumulated since then.  The program should never have gotten this far.  That said, I do give the Navy some degree of credit for recognizing and terminating a failed program before it got totally out of hand.  How much better off would we be if the LCS had been cancelled after just two ships?
 
I have not seen an official explanation for the cancellation although reasons abound.  I doubt we’ll ever know the real reason.  So, lacking any definitive information, we’ll instead discuss the implications of the cancellation.
 
ASW, never a Navy point of emphasis, fades further into the background … out of sight, out of mind.  We now have no surface vessel that even pretends to do ASW except the Burkes and no sane commander will risk a multi-billion dollar vessel playing tag with a submarine.
 
Replacement options unfortunately include additional LCS (perhaps the modified Saudi versions?) and, most distressingly, some cockeyed, garbaged up “family” of unmanned craft.  The latter strikes me as exactly the kind of thing the Navy would do although either option, bad as they are, is more than plausible. 
 
There is also the question of whether the Constellation even needs to be replaced?  ComNavOps has opined that a frigate is about last on the list of the Navy’s needs.  If they did opt for a new design frigate, it should be just that: a new design and something along the Visby lines.
 
Orphans have now being created, just as has happened with Zumwalt and the F-35.  We’ll now have a mini-class of two ships that require their own dedicated supply, maintenance, training, and support pipelines and that never works out well.  It is almost certain that in a relatively short time frame, the Navy will declare the two ships too expensive to maintain and operate and will retire them early.  We seem to be early retiring a lot of ships, don’t we? 
 
CONOPS were never developed for the Constellation but even if they had, this now completely invalidates any concept of operations.  How do two ships fit into the fleet?  Where do two ships, dissimilar to the rest of the fleet and too small in number to have an impact, fit into the warfighting scheme?  The ships will not only be physical orphans, they’ll be operational orphans, much like the Zumwalts.  No commander will know what to do with them.
 
Trust between Congress, who holds the purse strings, and the Navy has never been lower and this is just going to make it even worse.  Congress has been extremely upset with the Navy for failures, lies, and deceit for several years now and, after being told by the Navy how vitally important the Constellation class was and after being assured that the “parent design” would eliminate all risk, Congress is going to be extremely skeptical and reluctant to fund whatever idiotic idea the Navy comes up with next.
 
Land facilities, as you recall, were built or being built to provide ashore testing and support for the class.  Obviously, they no longer serve a purpose.  Can they be repurposed into support for the next class or will they be abandoned … more of Congess’ (meaning us, the taxpayer) money lost to the Navy’s incompetence?
 
Accountability has never been a strong suit of the modern Navy.  Will SecDef Hegseth fire the people responsible for this debacle?  I doubt it.  He’s been a major disappointment.  This is yet another opportunity for him to truly change the culture of incompetence but I’ll be surprised if he does anything.
 
Battle Force structure is terribly out of whack, as we’ve discussed many times.  In WWII, we had a range of ships from the ultimate battleships and carriers all the way down to destroyer escorts.  We could tailor forces for the capability and risk we faced.  Today, we have only one class of surface ship, the Burke, and carriers.  There is no range from which we can select and tailor forces.  Any task we have, no matter how big or small, will be performed by a Burke/carrier.  This is how we wind up with Burkes chasing pirate skiffs.  The Constellations, poor a choice as they were, would have provided a degree of range.  Now … Burkes.
 

Goodbye

 
Conclusion
 
This has been a debacle, without a doubt.  The only saving grace is that it’s being stopped at two ships.  This was the program that would not, indeed could not, fail thanks to the Navy’s insistence on requiring a parent design (which they instantly abandoned and modified to a mere 15% commonality).  If the Navy couldn’t make a parent design approach work, what approach can they successfully execute?  The last successful surface ship the Navy built was the 1980’s Burke.  That’s forty years of subsequent failure.  If you were Congress, would you give the Navy any more money for anything?
 
The ripples of this failure will spread far and wide and last a long time.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Nov-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants

Japanese Minesweepers

A few comments in recent posts have suggested that the US Navy buy minesweeper ships from foreign navies/yards.  Japan has one of the more extensive fleets of MCM vessels so let’s take a look at Japan’s minesweepers as a good example of a possible MCM vessel for the US Navy.
 
Japan has MCM vessels of various types, size, and function.  We’ll look at the Awaji class mine countermeasures ship.  The Awaji is classified as a mine sweeper as opposed to the larger mine warfare mother ships that Japan also operates.
 

Awaji Class Minesweeper

As a brief summary, the Awaji class has a displacement of 690 tons, a length of 219 ft, a width of 36 ft, and is powered by 2x 2,200 hp diesel engines.  Top speed is 14 kt.  Crew size is around 50.  The hull is a composite fiber-reinforced plastic for weight and magnetic signature reduction.  Service life is 30 years.[1]
 
The ship has LIDAR mine detection systems that use reflected light to detect underwater mines.  Note, however, that this is similar to the ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) the U.S. Navy attempted to develop for the LCS MCM module and which has encountered significant problems and limitations in capability.
 
A variable depth sonar (VDS) system is also used to detect mines.  It also has a Remus 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), known as OZZ-4 to detect deeper mines.
 
For mine destruction, the ship has the Mitsui expendable mine disposal system (EMDS) which is fiber optic cable controlled and uses a camera for detection and identification before blowing up itself and the mine. Surface mines can also be engaged with a remote control 20 mm weapon station.
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that this is not a minesweeper in any sense of the word but, rather, a one-at-a-time mine hunting/clearance vessel.  Of course, this means that the clearance rate is incredibly slow and is utterly unsuited for dynamic combat operations. 
 
Unfortunately, the one-at-a-time mine clearance approach has been adopted by all Western navies with only an occasional and minor nod to actual sweeping operations.  Again, this approach is useless in combat is reflective of the West’s fixation on unmanned and crippling dependence on technology as the solution to the brutal, hard aspects of warfare.
 
We see, once again, that foreign MCM assets offer no value to the US Navy although they might be of use to Coast Guard ships charged with harbor defense.  This is not to say that glacially slow mine hunting is not without its uses for countries that are only concerned with limited territorial waters but for a global US Navy that must be able to fight anywhere and ensure vast areas are free of mines, mine hunting is a non-starter.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Japan commissions fourth Awaji-class minesweeper”, Kosuke Takahashi, 12-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/japan-commissions-fourth-awaji-class-minesweeper/

Do It Again!

Reader AndyM had recently offered an absolutely masterful summation of Marine Corps acquisition programs. 

Nothing says dead on ideas like just making a new repeat, LCAC, H-53 and LCU.[1]

He is dead on.  Indeed, this thought can be expanded to the entire Navy!  Consider some recent Navy acquisition programs:
 

• LCU-1700 – nearly an exact duplicate of the previous LCU class
• H-53 – in production since the 1960’s
• SSC (Ship to Shore Connector) – nearly an exact duplicate of the original LCAC
• Burke – rapidly approaching its centennial year of production
• Constellation (mini-Burke) – just a scaled down Burke
• Virginia – an upgraded Los Angeles class submarine
• F-18 Super Hornet – a little bigger regular Hornet
• Ford – a bigger repeat of the Nimitz with some [thus far] failed technological gimmicks thrown in
• E-2D – repeat of the E-2C with the next higher letter;  22 more versions to go before a new aircraft design is needed
• ACV – repeat of the AAV

 
Granted, each has incorporated some technology improvements but none have been clean sheet, unconstrained, new designs with future combat in mind.  This blog has proposed many platforms that are designed with future combat requirements in mind and none bear any resemblance to the Navy’s tired repeats.  Future combat will require entirely new ways of approaching stealth, armor, firepower, surveillance, sensors, ship design, and doctrine/tactics.  None of that has been incorporated into recent acquisition programs.
 
Not only have these platforms remained almost unchanged, unbelievably, some have been downgraded in order to keep them the same!  For example, the new Burkes have had their critical radars downsized in order to fit into the same platform.  The future war requirements have changed but the Navy has proudly demonstrated that the Burke will not change, by God!  The Navy wants no part of a new ship when they can keep making the same old one!
 
Where are the stealthy carriers with long range fighter air wings?  Where are the Visby-like stealth ships?  Where are the UAV carriers?  Where are the pure passive platforms, ship and aircraft?  Where are the dedicated ASW corvettes?  And so on.
 
As AndyM observed, this pattern of repeats clearly demonstrates an organization bereft of ideas which, in turn, denotes an organization bereft of professional warriors capable of analyzing combat and correctly predicting future needs.  Even the Marines didn’t analyze future combat in making their idiotic and useless shift to being pointless missile shooters;  they analyzed future budget share and changed to preserve their slice of the pie.
 
We must break the cycle of repeats whose main justification is that they’re viewed as “safe” acquisition programs.
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2025/11/my-marine-corps.html?showComment=1762315642312#c3837210506297094006

My Marine Corps

 
ComNavOps has often criticized the Marine Corps for what it’s become.  A once proud and valuable fighting force has been reduced to silliness and irrelevance.  So, what would ComNavOps’ ideal Marine Corps look like?  What would its main mission be?  What forces would it need?  I’ve described some of this in passing in previous posts and comments but here is the collected and condensed summary.
 
As always, it starts with mission.  What is the Marine’s mission – its purpose? 
 
There are two answers to that:  legal (Title 10) and practical (what’s actually needed)
 
Mission – Legal Requirements
 
Title 10 [see Ref 1 for the text of Title 10, Section 8063] defines the purpose of the Marine Corps which consists of the following stated purposes:
 

• seizure or defense of advanced naval bases
• conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
• provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy
• provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases
• perform such other duties as the President may direct
• develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces
• responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war

 
Notice that it doesn’t actually say that the Marines must be the ones to conduct amphibious operations, only that they jointly develop the “tactics, technique, and equipment” for such operations.  Note, also, that there is no explicit mention of amphibious assaults, only “operations”, which can be any action initiated or enabled from the sea.  Again, that means that amphibious assaults, while certainly one example of an “amphibious operation”, are not the only possible action.  Thus, the claim that many make that the Marines must be capable of performing amphibious assaults is not true, strictly speaking.
 
 
Mission – Practical Requirements
 
Legal requirements aside, what missions are actually pertinent to US military operations, in general, and suited to the Marines, in particular?
 
Main Mission – Port seizure (a form of amphibious assault, thereby satisfying the legal requirement)

Secondary Missions – naval base defense, embassy protection, and the like
 
Regarding the more commonly envisioned amphibious assault, I’ve said, repeatedly, that I don’t see amphibious assaults as being strategically necessary in the foreseeable future so what does that leave?  As we’ve often noted, any ground action (adage:  the seat of purpose is on the land) requires a secure port for sustainment.  Over the beach supply cannot support a large ground action.  For example, Normandy was all about securing ports.  Thus, the Marine’s main mission should be port seizure.  I’d add airfield seizure to that except that the Army/Air Force once had that mission and, presumably, still do.  If not, that would also be part of the Marine’s mission.
 
Many would suggest that the Marine’s primary – or, at worst, secondary – mission is to be the nation’s first response force.  Once upon a time that was true, though not a legal requirement, but now the combination of Army/Air Force can respond faster and with more force than the Marines can.  Thus, first response is not a Marine Corps mission although they might assist in such a mission if circumstances warranted.
 
So, having defined the main mission as port seizure, what is needed to execute that mission?
 
 
Size
 
Two divisions (10,000 men, each) ought to be sufficient to execute a successful port seizure.  If you need more than that, you’ve probably bitten off too big a bite and should look elsewhere for a port to seize.
 
There is also the practical concern that 10,000+ men crammed into the relatively small area of a port is beginning to get too physically crowded to be practical and would offer an enemy too concentrated a target.
 
In addition, one brigade (3000 men) should be dedicated to specializing in the secondary missions.
 
Add in a 50% extra troop level for logistic support tasks and you get a total troop strength of around 34,500.
 
Division Unit Types
 

• 3x Assault Brigade
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) specifically dedicated to port clearing and initial repair
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) dedicated to road construction and repair to enable landed supplies and forces to quickly disperse outward
• 1x Harbor clearance and dredging unit (specialized vessels, 100 troops)
• 1x MCM – land (100 troops)
• 1x MCM – sea (100 troops)
• 1x Recon Drone Company

 
Equipment
 

• Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (think ZSU)
• Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile units
• Mobile C-RAM
• Mobile EW
• High speed landing craft with capacity for two squads
• Amphibious tank like LVT(A) for anti-personnel and anti-building and anti-fortification
• Small, very fast, very maneuverable assault helos carrying one squad each;  very fast insertion/unloading/departure (think Vietnam Huey) unlike current helos and V-22
• Specially designed, high speed attack transports
• Lots of self-propelled mortars for use in urban areas requiring indirect fire.due to high rise buildings
• Combat Engineering Vehicles for debris clearance

 
Note some of the things that are not listed as equipment, meaning that they are not useful or required under this concept:  AAV/ACV, fixed wing aircraft, ‘jeeps’, anything towed
 
 
Aviation
 
This is the big question.  Does a Marine Corps need its own air force?  For the port seizure mission, I see a need for a heavy helo component providing both attack and troop assault transport.  Helos are used for rapid insertion of troops at key locations in and around the port.  Attack helos provide the suppression and fire support needed to land the ground force from the air and sea.
 
I do not see a need for a fixed wing component.  Fixed wing aircraft are nearly useless for ground support in an urban area and are far too vulnerable to ground anti-air weapons.  Aerial supremacy is a fixed wing function but is a Navy responsibility so no Marine aircraft are needed for that.
 
A division should have a helo component of something on the order of 50 attack helos and 50 transport helos.  This would require the use of three big deck amphibious ships.
 
I’ve often stated that helos are not survivable over the battlefield.  Well, port seizure is an exception to that rule though only under this specific scenario.  The helos must be supported with ground forces applying relentless attack against the enemy’s anti-air assets.  Further, the helos do not fly overland to any great extent and thus avoid much of the enemy’s anti-air threat.  Finally, as described in the equipment list, the helos must be designed for very rapid insertion, which is the polar opposite of the MV-22 or any existing helo. 
 
The idea of helos spending time over a battlefield is, indeed, a non-survivable scenario as is trying to land in giant, open fields using snail-slow descents and takeoffs as MV-22s are required to do.  The helos in this scenario, as in Vietnam, would use a gut-wrenching drop, a five second unloading, and bounce back into the air heading directly away from the battlefield.  You might want to look at videos of Vietnam helo insertions to see just what we were once capable of.
 
One of the reasons helos had such high attrition rates in Vietnam was that we attempted to use them to insert troops directly into high threat areas.  In this concept, helos would be transporting troops around the periphery of the battle more so than directly into the threat.  We also attempted helo ops without much firepower support, depending on surprise to achieve survivability.  For this scenario, naval gunfire should be used to suppress enemy anti-air fire as the helos are inserting.  Of course, we have no naval gun support but that glaring weakness is another topic.
 
Another aspect of aviation is the role of the fleet carrier.  Many people believe that our carriers will supply ground support aircraft.  Setting aside the fact that we have no carrier based, ground support aircraft, that is not the role of the fleet carrier.  The carrier group’s job is to provide distant interdiction of enemy counterattacks.  That means preventing enemy naval response, overland troop reinforcement, cruise missile attacks, air attacks, etc.  Typically, this would be done at significant distances from the landing site and the carrier would not be in range to provide effective ground support.
 
 
Ships
 
Amphibious Aviation Ship – Looking at the equipment list, it is obvious that a new type of amphibious aviation ship, geared toward port seizure, would be needed.  The ship would carry 30+ helos (attack and transport) but not troops.  It would be purely an aviation ship – a landing support carrier.  As such, it would be, conceptually, half the volume and displacement of today’s big deck amphibious ships.  Troop insertion helos would be supplied and serviced by this ship but would pick up their loads from the attack transports, as needed, using the same combat-quick ‘bounce’ loading as for insertion unloadings.
 
Attack Transport – As we’ve previously discussed, WWII style attack transports would transport and land troops.  Landing craft would consist of around 30 reusable landing craft (think Higgins boat) as opposed to the sinlge use AAV/ACV.  While a well deck is an option, I would lean towards a WWII style attack transport. 
 
 
Basing
 
My Marine force would not function like today’s Marines.  There would be no deployments, no extended MEU-like cruises floating around, doing nothing, just waiting for something to happen.  Instead, the forces would embark from CONUS or, possibly, a central base such as in the Middle East or Pearl Harbor.  A port seizure is never going to be a spur of the moment operation so there is no need for deployments.  The force would be home based, training relentlessly – nothing else.
 
 
Mission Methodology
 
The key to the success of the port seizure mission is speed.  This means a rapid approach to minimize defensive reaction time.  For example, despite knowing pretty much where and when the Allies would invade Europe, the Germans were still slow to react and were unable to mount a rapid, coordinated counter attack.  Even if the enemy knows we’re coming, if we can hit fast enough and hard enough (shock), we can still be successful.
 
 
Command
 
This force would have little need for a top-heavy command structure.  Here is the envisioned command:
 
Commandant = General
Staff = Colonels, as needed
Division = General (1x per division, 2x total)
Brigade = Colonel
 
Thus, the entire force would have a total of 3 Generals and a handful of Colonels.  Hopefully, this would create a smaller, more focused force.
 
 
Missing
 
What are we currently missing in order to execute my vision of the Marine Corps?  Well, almost everything!  Setting aside the missing mission, organization, doctrine, operational planning, command and control structure, and mindset, we lack the following equipment (partial list):
 

• Large caliber naval fire support
• Amphibious aviation ship
• Attack transport
• Landing craft
• Anti-aircraft vehicles
• Self-propelled mortars
• EW
• C-RAM
• MCM
• Amphibious tank
• Transport helo
• Combat engineering vehicles
• Harbor construction vessels

 
In short, we lack everything.  Almost nothing we currently have is useful other than largely untrained bodies.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There you have it.  I’ve laid out a coherent rationale for the existence of the Marine Corps and a description of their mission and what is needed to execute that mission.  Contrast my vision to today’s Marine Corps vision – to the extent that they even have one.  Which one would you like to devote your taxes to supporting?
 
  
 
___________________________

 
[1] Following is the text of Title 10, §8063.
 
Title 10, §8063 United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
 
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
 
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
 
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Outage

 ComNavOps region is currently experiencing a massive Internet service outage.  I will resume normal operations when service resumes.  Apologies until then.

Ship Defense

The Navy’s trend in ship design has been towards lighter and lighter built ships with less and less defensive capabilities.  Well, let’s step in and put a stop to that!  Since the Navy clearly doesn’t know how to design a ship with defensive capabilities, let’s do it for them.
 
We’re all familiar with the concept of a carrier group’s layered defense.  Aircraft provide wide ranging defense against search aircraft and provide the initial defensive layer against an attack.  Standard missiles offer the possibility of very long range intercepts.  Escort ships range dozens of miles out to provide extended ASW and AAW protection.  Medium range defense is provided by closer escorts and medium range defensive missiles.  Various missiles, electronic warfare systems, and CIWS provide close in defense.
 
Similarly, an individual ship’s defense should consist of more – much more! – than just Standard/ESSM missiles and one or two RAM/SeaRAM, as the Navy seems to believe.  A ship’s defense should be a multi-faceted, layered construct.  Let’s consider the individual components.
 
 
Outer Layer
 

• UAVs – small, stealthy, wide ranging UAVs providing passive aerial sensor coverage
• Standard Missiles – long range anti-air defense
• Passive Sonar – long range detection
• EO/IR – long range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system
• ESM – very long range signals analysis (Outboard/COBLU and S-3 Shadow type sensing) providing detection and triangulation
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Middle Layer
 

• EO/IR - medium range visual and infrared detection integrated into a 360 deg hemispherical sensor system combined with fire control
• ESSM – medium range anti-air defense
• EW/ECM – detection, jamming, spoofing, etc.
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
Inner Layer
 

• EW/ECM – point defense jamming, spoofing, etc.
• RAM/SeaRAM – close in anti-air defense
• CIWS – close in anti-air defense
• Decoys – integrated into Aegis
• Stealth – do all the above without, in turn, being detected

 
 
A few supplementary comments are warranted:
 
Sensors – 360 degree EO/IR with targeting capability (IRST) in addition to supplement and largely replace radar.  Such a system would involve far more than the current one EO sensor on ships today.  This would be several, perhaps dozens, of sensors each scanning a portion of the sky and acting as a single, integrated system.  During war, this may actually be the main sensor system so that the ship doesn’t have to radiate.
 
UAVs – This has been posted on previously.  Every ship should sail with several dozen small, stealthy, passive UAVs for establishing situational awareness.  These are cheap and expendable.  They must be stealthy.  It’s pointless to try to establish situational awareness if doing so gives away your own position.  We must be able to see without being seen.
 
Long range missiles – I hesitate to even include long range missiles as I believe their use will be quite limited, bordering on never.  No enemy is going to present high altitude targets other than ballistic missiles which are a special case.  So many people forget that long range missiles can only engage high altitude targets because of the radar horizon limitation.  Beyond the radar horizon, radar can only see targets at altitude. 
 
Close In – Attackers will get through.  It’s guaranteed.  Even in scripted exercises, they always do.  Every ship should have several to dozens of close in weapon systems instead of the nearly useless single (or no!) close in weapon on today’s ships.
 
Inner Layer - The inner layer has the most components and yet the Navy devotes the least amount of effort and resources to it.  The Zumwalt has no close in weapons.  The DDG(X) concept graphic has only two RAM launchers for close in defense.  The Burkes have only one CIWS.
 
EW/ECM is the most common and, historically, the most effective anti-air component and yet the Navy devotes very little attention or resources to it.  Even the current SEWIP upgrades are a limited effort, poorly executed.
 
Focus - So, what does the Navy focus its attention and resources on?  That’s right, the most expensive and least likely to be used component:  long range missiles.

Mine Countermeasures Emphasis

Recently, a reader (username “Chinese Gordon”) made the astute observation that mine countermeasures (MCM) was not a path to flag rank.  He’s correct, as far as I can tell.  Of the 250 or so  flag officers we have, how many are former MCM operators?  I don’t know but my guess is somewhere between none and almost none.  This may explain, in part, why the Navy has, for all practical purposes, abandoned MCM.  If we had a couple dozen flag officers with MCM career backgrounds, I’d like to think the Navy would be paying more than lip service to MCM.
 
How do we get more MCM officers into flag ranks?
 
Well, this is where we run into a brick wall.  Even if the Navy magically decided to add MCM officers to the flag ranks … … there aren’t any to add.  There simply are no MCM focused officers left in the Navy.  The Avengers are essentially gone, parked pierside, rotting as they wait to be officially retired.  The LCS has yet to field a viable MCM module so there are no LCS officers that have worked LCS-MCM.
 
You’d have to go down to the Lieutenant level to find anyone who deals with MCM to any degree and those few are doing one-at-a-time, unmanned mine hunting technology development, not real world MCM.
 
Who in the Navy has ever cleared a thousand-mine field, or even just a hundred, in the real world?  No one.  Who has engaged in an amphibious assault exercise that included actual clearance of mines from a 50 mile approach to the beach?  No one.  Who has cleared mines from a chokepoint while under enemy fire, real or simulated?  No one.  And so it goes.  No officer in the Navy has even a rudimentary level of MCM expertise as it would pertain to a peer war or even a disagreement with a group of radical Girl Scouts.
 
We can’t develop flag level focus on MCM because no one in the Navy has any MCM experience.
 
We’re screwed.  We’ll be forced to learn MCM on the fly in a real war and that is a very costly way to learn anything.
 
By the way, the same applies to offensive mine warfare.

ESSM Inventory Perspective

Just a quick follow up on the previous post about the Blk 2 ESSM inventory.  As a bit of perspective, if the entire Blk 2 ESSM inventory were applied across the 70+ Burke class, that would give each ship approximately 7 missiles.  How’s that for an inventory?!
 
Of course, there are other ESSM variants but not all that much more.  If we go to war, I hope it’s a very, very short war!

ESSM Blk 2 Delivery

In case you missed it, here’s a brief update on ESSM Blk 2 missile deliveries.  According to DOT&E[1], ESSM production missiles began delivery to the Navy in July 2022.  Raytheon has just delivered the 500^th missile to the Navy.[2]  That’s 500 missiles in a bit over three years.  That also tells us what the entire current, maximum Blk 2 inventory for the Navy is.  Those who envision ships teeming with quad-packed ESSM missiles should note that a single Burke, with 96 VLS cells, would consume almost the entire inventory of ESSM Blk 2 missiles!
 

ESSM Blk 2

 
_____________________________

 
[1]https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/navy/2022essm.pdf?ver=OqRFEN_Af764y6bEgF_k3A%3d%3d
 
[2]Naval News website, “RTX’s Raytheon delivers 500th ESSM Block 2 to U.S. Navy”, staff, 2-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/10/rtxs-raytheon-delivers-500th-essm-block-2-to-u-s-navy/

AI Hacked – How Would We Know?

Since the age of sail, sailors have mastered the skill of navigation on the open seas using the stars and a sextant.  What happened when we introduced the miracle of GPS?  We completely lost our navigating skills.  Aside from a few individual throwbacks who enjoy using a sextant as a hobby, no one in the Navy can navigate without GPS.  Unbelievably, in some of the recent spate of collisions and groundings, it was discovered that bridge navigation teams had even lost the skill of fixing a position by taking bearings on known landmarks.
 
Since time immemorial, explorers have traversed the land using the stars, a map, and dead reckoning.  Our overland navigational skills increased even further with the advent of the compass.  Today, the Army has lost the ability to navigate overland without GPS.
 
Pilots used to be able to navigate cross country and hit a time on target to the second with nothing more than a map, bearings, and a stopwatch.  Today, that’s a lost skill.
 
GPS, the miracle of technology, caused us to lose our navigational skills and has made us weaker and less competent.  We have become dependent on GPS.  When our GPS systems fail or are degraded or eliminated by the enemy, we have nothing to fall back on.  Exactly like a drug addict, we have become addicted to GPS and unable to function without it.
 
What’s the next miracle of technology that we’re working so hard to acquire?  Yes, artificial intelligence (AI).  Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
Ask a college student to write a report without using AI.  He’ll produce gibberish.  He’s lost his ability (or never developed it) to conduct research, assemble a cogent thesis, and present an intelligible, written document.  Heck, forget AI;  ask a student to write a paper without the Grammarly app and see what results.  Even simpler, ask any young adult who’s gone to public school to calculate change for a purchase in his head, without a calculator, and watch the deer in the headlights, frozen response.  We’ve become dependent on calculators and can’t even do simple arithmetic in our heads anymore.
 
Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
The military, by the way, is attempting to make AI the foundation of our entire command and control systems.  We believe, mistakenly, that AI will give us the advantage we need to beat China.  AI, we believe, will analyze all our data, make sense of the fog of war, tell us exactly what the enemy is going to do even before he knows, and will tell us how to counter and defeat the enemy.  AI.  Magic.  One and the same.
 
Those of us who grew up during the introduction of computers are all too familiar with the well known computer programming adage, Garbage In, Garbage Out (GIGO).  Bad data in, bad results out.  AI is not immune to this phenomenon.
 
Be honest.  Does anyone seriously question what they find on the Internet?  Sure, we’ll make jokes about the Internet but does anyone actually question what they read?  Of course not.
 
Does anyone have the slightest doubt that we’ll become utterly dependent on AI?
 
Where are we going with this?  Hang in there.  We’re almost at the point of the post.  One more tidbit to assimilate.
 
Does a week go by without hearing about high level computer systems and programs, both in the military and civilian worlds, being hacked?  Nope.  And those are just the incidents that are made public.  The military and government computers and programs are hacked on a daily basis but for security reasons the incidents are kept quiet.  Despite our best efforts, various state and criminal actors routinely hack our most secure systems.  For all practical purposes, they’re unstoppable.
 
So, now put those two bits together:  absolute dependency on new technology and unstoppable hacking, and ask yourself what the result will be? 
 
The answer is easy to predict.  China will routinely hack and compromise our AI-based systems and we’ll by absolutely paralyzed because of our dependency.
 
But wait, it gets worse.  What if China hacks our AI-based systems subtly and we don’t even know it?  What if they simply manipulate the AI to give us results that give them the advantage?  We’d blindly accept the results (that’s what dependency is), never questioning them and never knowing we were being mislead and manipulated.  In fact, it would never even occur to us to ask whether the AI output was valid.
 
But wait, it gets still worse.  Even if someone was inclined to question AI results, we have no one competent enough to know what a valid result should be.  You have to have subject matter knowledge and expertise to even have an idea that something might not be right and our so-called professional warriors have no expertise (you built a ship without galvanic corrosion protection!).  So, even someone who was inclined to question a result wouldn’t have the slightest idea whether the result was or was not valid.
 
A calculator is a great tool for someone who has been trained in classical math and can recognize a garbage out result.  It is a terrible tool for someone who has no useful math skills and is unable to recognize a garbage out result.  So too, an AI command and control program could be a useful tool to a thoroughly trained and experienced professional warrior who can recognize a garbage out result.  It is a terrible tool for someone who has no useful warfighting skills and is unable to recognize a garbage out result … such as entire current flag officer corps.
 
We all recognize that networked computers are a vulnerability because if one is hacked, they’re all hacked.  We aren’t doing much to address that vulnerability but we do recognize it.  Similarly, we must recognize that AI is a vulnerability, especially when it’s being used as the basis of our highest level command and control programs.
 
Right now, just like drug dealers, we’re being given a free taste of AI to get us hooked.  We need to halt the process before we become totally addicted and helplessly dependent.  We need to regain our unaided warfighting expertise.  We do that by eliminating all non-war education (diversity, equity, gender sensitivity, climate, etc.) at the service academies, eliminating diversity crap from the leadership and ranks, ruthlessly eliminating paperwork from the daily lives of officers, eliminating deployments, bringing the fleet home for maintenance and training, start promoting a culture of acceptance of aggressiveness and ‘good’ mistakes, and start conducting daily realistic warfighting exercises and force our incompetent leadership to learn their profession.