It seems like recent naval acquisition programs have been failures and that older programs were more successful. Is that true or just a vague, incorrect impression? Just for fun, let’s take a look at the success/failure of various naval weapon system programs over the last several decades and see if there’s a trend.
Below is a table of major programs, their approximate initial dates, and their success rating on a +/- scale. The table entries are in approximate chronological order from oldest at the top to newest at the bottom. The success rating is mine, based on the criteria (such as capability, cost, numbers, etc.) discussed throughout this blog.
|
Program |
Year |
+ |
Success |
- |
Comment |
||
|
Forrestal |
1955 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
The epitome of carrier evolution |
|
A-6 Intruder |
1963 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
Best strike aircraft ever |
|
F-14 |
1974 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
Best fleet interceptor ever |
|
S-3 Viking |
1974 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
Outstanding in multiple roles |
|
Spruance |
1975 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
Best ASW ship ever |
|
Nimitz |
1975 |
|
ü |
|
|
|
A step back due to escalating costs and size |
|
Perry |
1976 |
|
ü |
|
|
|
… master of none |
|
Los Angeles |
1976 |
ü |
|
|
|
|
Outstanding |
|
F-18 |
1983 |
|
|
|
ü |
|
Badly compromised design basis |
|
SH-60 Helo |
1984 |
|
|
ü |
|
|
Good but un-optimized for anything |
|
Avenger MCM |
1987 |
|
ü |
|
|
|
Effectiveness limited by lack of numbers |
|
Burke |
1991 |
|
|
ü |
|
|
A reasonable success that should have ended decades ago |
|
Cyclone |
1993 |
|
|
ü |
|
|
Solid design that could have been much more |
|
Virginia |
2004 |
|
ü |
|
|
|
Decent design that’s far too costly |
|
LCS |
2008 |
|
|
|
|
ü |
The definition of failure |
|
F-35C |
2019 |
|
|
|
|
ü |
Unsuited for any relevant requirement; $$$$ |
|
Zumwalt |
2020 |
|
|
|
ü |
|
Only saving grace is 80 VLS |
|
Ford |
2022 |
|
|
|
|
ü |
Unnecessary disaster |
The program success trend is painfully clear. The Navy has not produced a truly successful program since the 1970’s. That’s a scathing indictment of Navy leadership.
One of the entries that is sure to generate a reaction is the Burke rating. So many people believe the Burke class is an example of an outstanding ship design and a well run program. Unfortunately, this is not true. The initial version of Burkes lacked helo facilities which, for a destroyer tasked with ASW, is unforgivable. Later, Flt IIa versions were solid, bordering on good, but were woefully lacking in close in weapon defense which, for an AAW ship, is unforgivable. As the program went on, the Burkes became less and less effective (less effective stealth, insufficient weight/growth margins, limited power, etc.) and are now obsolete and poor value for the money. The overall program simply cannot be rated as any more than average. We think it’s good only because our base of comparison is other ship programs that are horrendous. This also points out the need to assess programs objectively rather than emotionally.
The trend is clear and desperately needs to be changed!
F/A-18 Mostly a failure????? Based on what criteria? You say "compromised design". Well that was what the Navy asked for. It had to replace the A-7 and F-4. It was not built as an F-14 replacement or an A-6 replacement? At worst you might give it a light green check mark. Yellow is just an outright lie to fit your narrative.
ReplyDeleteYou're more than welcome to have a different opinion but was the last sentence really necessary?
DeleteThe Hornet was designed to a business case (maintenance and operating cost basis) instead of a combat effectiveness case which makes it a compromised design. Military assets are COMBAT assets not business assets.
DeleteDifferent anonymous here -
DeleteWould you say that the A-C models were a compromised design? What about the E/Fs? Maybe what they should have been from the beginning?
The E/F are an improvement but they are still a short legged, unoptimized design that lacks basics such as IRST and optical camera. For comparison, consider what the Super Tomcat could have been had it been developed. Or, consider what a naval version of the F-22 could have been! The mediocrity of the F-18 design is emphasized by comparison.
DeletePer the USS Ford disaster, this just in:
ReplyDelete"Navy Could Extend the Oldest Nimitz-class Carriers, Decision in Next Budget"
https://news.usni.org/2022/04/20/navy-could-extend-the-oldest-nimitz-class-carriers-decision-in-next-budget
The article doesn't explain why this might be necessary.
The Navy may be looking at the non-functionality of the Fords, the equipment reliability problems (EMALS and AAG failure rates), and the greatly extended construction time to true operational status and realizing that we're going to be short on functioning carriers for a decade or so until the Ford problems get solved, if they can be solved. If so, they may conclude that they need to hang on to the Nimitzes a bit longer.
DeleteOf course, that leads into your series of articles about carrier numbers.
It might also be that the Navy, having stated that they believe war with China is going to happen in the next eight years, is looking to keep some extra carriers around. On the other hand, with war looming, according to the Navy, they haven't refrained from early retiring every other type of ship so this may not be a factor?
Have you considered how expensive it is to retire a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, let alone build a new one to replace it? Next consider the slow speed at which Ford class carriers are arriving at the fleet.
DeleteDoing yet another refuel and refit would be a cheaper option, with the added benefit of it being quicker to deliver as well. It makes a lot of sense to me.
That said we should be able to build a carrier quicker and cheaper, but the fact is we can't. The reality is we don't pay the low wages we used to pay back when we used to do things successfully. Low wages are the reason China can afford to build and crew a large Navy something we can't afford anymore even with the largest budget in US Navy history.
Mark
"Have you considered how expensive it is to retire a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, let alone build a new one to replace it? "
DeleteYou need to come up to speed on nuclear power costs before you comment further. A good starting point is this post: Nuclear Power Debate
"The reality is we don't pay the low wages"
You need to come up to speed on the economics of shipbuilding before you comment further. Wages are a minor factor. Wages have no impact on speed of construction and only a limited impact on total cost. You're ignoring regulatory impact, overhead, change orders, concurrency, build quantity, Navy contracting practices, and many other factors that have a bigger impact on cost than wages do.
I say this gently, you need to do your homework and educate yourself on these issues. You'll be amazed that most of what you believe is not actually true! This blog is a good starting point. Make use of the archives!
It was intended to replace the Scooter/Heinemann's Hot-Rod aka the A-4 Skyhawk and the A-7, fill in gaps left by the retirement of the F-4 and as a supplement to the Tomcat. The Hornet came to the forefront when DICK Cheney killed the Tomcat much to the displeasure of the Navy for no other reason than politics.
ReplyDeleteArticle: http://www.polimeni.com/polimeni-mr-cheney-tell-us-wounded-grumman/
The 688s were/are legendary, sadly, the Seawolf-class did not make this list.
The Seawolf is like the B-2, a program that could've and should've been a success, but when the "Peace Dividend" led to a cut production run, it massively increased individual unit cost as a direct consequence.
DeleteIMHO, the Navy should've just tried to build more Seawolves- maybe "fitted for but not with" some more advanced systems, to cut costs- instead of then developing a "cheap" supplement and eventual replacement in the Virginia class, bearing the massive cost of yet another "All New, All Different" program.
If I recall correctly, the Virginia-class SSNs are not hunter-killers as the Seawolf's were intended to be? Which do we need more of: straight-up H/K subs or Tomahawk shooters? Personally, I believe we need more of the former. Is it feasible/cost-effective to take the Columbia-SSBN design and come up with a 6-8-class SSGN variant to not only replace the four Ohio SSGNs but to lessen the loss of VLS on the Ticos? Just an off-the-wall idea.
DeleteThe USS Jimmy Carter is a stretched Seawolf. Need a cruise missile platform, build another stretched Seawolf, and put VLS cells in the stretched area- that'll serve as a "good enough" solution, instead of the "All New, All Different" one the Navy keeps insisting on.
Delete"Which do we need more of: straight-up H/K subs or Tomahawk shooters?"
DeleteAll SSNs are, by definition, hunter/killers. The US Navy has gone and done what they try to do with every platform and turn the SSNs into do-everything platforms. Had we not included VLS tubes in the SSNs we could have built more of them and left the missile shooting to dedicated SSGNs.
The major problem with SSNs as cruise missile shooters is that they don't carry enough missiles to be tactically effective. The VPM Virginias have more missiles but it comes at a significant cost both in dollars and submarine performance (bigger subs are more easily detected, all else being equal).
While we all know that the modularity concept doesnt work too well (insert LCS meme here) BUT... I see a place for it...kinda. I absolutely hate the idea of seeing the Ohio SSGNs retiring. In my mind they are some of our most important and potent platforms. So Id really like to see a Columbia SSGN. This is where the modularity comes in. Dont redesign everything. Literally just build a non-ICBM missile section. Fit the max number of TLAM in that you can with rhe least changes. And that way you could potentially slip an SSGN into the production schedule here n there rather than waiting til all the ICBM boats are done. I imagine we could squeeze the few more years needed out of the newer Ohios to allow that. Im afraid we are going to need SSGNs before/if we see any replacements...
Delete"F/A-18 Mostly a failure?????" Anonymous is correct. The government chose to tell the Navy to "select a P-40 to replace the existing Grumman Avenger and P-47" to "mitigate the blow" of the YF-17 (aka F/A-18) losing the Lightweight Fighter contest to the F-16 and keep our defense contractors strong. It was just "business" and not a military capabilities decision...
ReplyDeleteCan you make a list of China? TKS
ReplyDeleteI can't because I have no idea whether their individual programs are successes or not.
DeleteThere is an indirect indicator - if they equip this weapon in large number at high speed. You see they built some ships then stopped at small numbers.
Delete"There is an indirect indicator"
DeleteAn indicator of what?
It makes sense and fits the logic.
DeleteIt seems that their 05X ~ until 052C, are built in small quantities, each with the last one are more improvements, and each type is a long interval to find the actual use of feedback, and improve again.
Until the 052D began to build from a small amount to a large number of later, indicating success and satisfaction with the program.
Now, the fact about 055 that they are building 8 ships at a time shows their confidence in their own warships.
I think the main thrust of this piece is inarguable, though I do have a few nitpicks. There are a bunch of interesting tidbits that add nuance to the F-14's rating (both on the positive side and the negative side) that I can't do justice to with a quick five-minute comment. I can understand the lack of the CGNs (which don't really form one class), the Seawolf-class (too few), and a few other oddsd and ends, but on the other hand, the Tico, A-4 and A-7 seem like major omissions.
ReplyDeleteThat being said, I would like to note a recurring theme in some of these programs, a pattern which looks like this:
1. Kill a functional platform rather than upgrading it because its next-generation replacement is undergoing development
2. Cancel the replacement because it's too late and over-budget even for the Navy
3. Half-assedly upgrade a third platform to (badly) fill the gap between the two that we just killed
Examples:
F-14 (D and Quickstrike/ST21) -> NATF -> F/A-18E/F
A-6 (F) -> A-12 -> F/A-18E/F
Spruance -> DDG-1000 -> Burke Flt II/III
Arguably Tico -> CG21 (remember that!) -> Constellation (especially badly)
OHP -> LCS -> Constellation
The S-3 seems like it ought to be here, except the middle step is missing: I don't think there was ever a serious plan to replace it in any of its roles - by the time it was nearing retirement it had already been decided that the Super Hornet was going to replace every other fixed-wing jet in the air wing.
A final aside: am I blind or is the comment preview button gone since the recent update?
You understand that I had to eliminate some programs to keep the piece from becoming unwieldy, right? The program you mention weren't going to change the overall thrust of the post. I've often said, the hard part about writing a post isn't deciding what to include, it's deciding what to exclude. Unless I write a book on every topic, I've got to exclude stuff and, invariable, someone will take issue with whatever I exclude.
DeleteYour observation about the pattern of development is interesting and not one I've considered before. I'll have to give it some thought !
Yes, the preview button has vanished. Like most software improvements these days, it has produced more problems than benefits. This change seems like a change for the sake of change.
"This change seems like a change for the sake of change."
DeleteWe can say the same of too many weapons programs- having a 6.8x51mm cartridge replace both the 5.56x45mm and 7.62x51mm, so our riflemen and machine gunners have "overmatch" over those armed with 7.62x39mm weapons (i.e., the AKM and Type 56 assault rifles), being the most recent one.
Cheezit. Nice observations.
DeleteAndrew
I like the Spruance and I think it was a good top end ship. I still think the Japanese combo of the DE and Helo ASW carrier Leader was a better choice. You can build a lot more updated Abukuma types than a Spruance
ReplyDeleteAlso if you are going to go back to the Forrestal why ignore Pegasus?
ReplyDeleteEdit also the killed off Osprey class?
DeleteEdit more no Ohio listing?
Delete"Ohio"
DeleteI can't rate them because they've never done anything and I have no performance information about them.
The ones converted to cruise missile subs seem to have performed well in second life
DeleteI'd be interested in your rationale on SH-60. Arguably it was optimized for ASW.
ReplyDeleteThere was/is nothing horribly wrong with the SH-60 series but there's also nothing fantastically right about it, either. For example, the original SH-60B lacked a dipping sonar - a major gap for an ASW helo. The subsequent F model had a dipping sonar but gave up most of its sonobuoy capacity. The series never quite optimized the ASW sensor fit.
DeleteAnother example is the torpedo capacity limit of two torps. An ASW optimized helo ought to get more than two torp shots at a target.
And so on. Nothing horribly wrong but nothing fantastically right. A solid, competent, average platform.
"The Navy has not produced a truly successful program since the 1970’s."
ReplyDeleteTrue.
Now, which major social changes happened in the USA during the late 1960s?
@Anonymous
DeleteSome would say that as diversity has increased so has disaster.
"Now, which major social changes happened in the USA during the late 1960s?"
Delete"Some would say that as diversity has increased so has disaster."
This is not a sociology blog. If you'd care to link some aspect of sociology to specific navy matters, that's fine. Otherwise, let's stick to naval matters. Thanks!
"This is not a sociology blog. If you'd care to link some aspect of sociology to specific navy matters, that's fine."
DeleteWell, this is a social AND naval matter, so I'll try.
Pick any navy-related program from the 60s and before, and look at the people who were in charge of it: nearly if not 100% white, nearly if not 100% men and most importantly chosen for their actual talent.
Starting from around the desegregation years and increasing exponentially in the following decades, the concept of "hiring the guy most suited for the job" got replaced by "let's pick on the basis of race, religiosn, sex and whatever the current trend is".
At first it was mostly a subtle pressure ("Well, we don't want to look bad..."), and nowadays it's outright expected that most positions in society shall be distributed according to the aforementioned factors.
Now, people tend to look at this as a political issue, but its military (and economic, which is the same thing) implications are huge.
I'm pretty sure it would be possible to make a graph with "Diversity in the military" on one axis and "rate of program failures and other fiascos" on the other, offsetting a few years for the rot to set in and you'd have a neat correlation.
Why do those large military projects fail at a much higher rate than before?
Because a much higher rate of the people involved there are not competent enough (or at all), and have been chosen on the basis of race, sex, etc.
(The same works for most other groups as well.)
Simple, yet politically impossible to fix.
Now imagine to go into some Chinese military firm and look at the employees, from the management to the engineers and whatever.
I guarantee you they will be nearly all Chinese, mostly men and almost none hired for tokenism.
No affirmative action whatsoever.
In fact, try to suggest that to them and you will get called a baizuo and laughed at.
America could pretend this didn't matter when fighting savage tribesmen, but you can't compete with China under such an enormous handicap.
You have presented a theory with no data to support it. You are also treading into the realm of correlation without causation (I assume you know the difference and are familiar with the phenomenon). Many factors correlate with the trend of failed military programs but most do so without causation.
DeleteThis is not to say that none of the factors you describe had an impact. Some may well have. Some may not.
Unless you have some actual data to offer, we'll terminate this thread and return to naval matters.
Although they were not really intended to be, the Perrys actually turned out to be decent ASW platforms, once they got the towed arrays. They didn't have ASROC, but they did have a second helo, which was pretty much a push. And the tails made up for no having the 26 bow sonar. In the mid to late 1980s, there was a mad scramble as any commander preparing to do an ASW exercise/event wanted as many Perrys as he could get. Joined with Knoxes (which were intended as ASW platforms with ASROC and 26 sonar) and Sprucans (described correctly above as best ASW ships ever) the USN was in pretty good shape for ASW until it started decomming the Knoxes, Sprucans, and Perrys, along with taking S-3s off carriers.
ReplyDeleteI would have liked to see a somewhat modified Perry that moved the 76mm gun to the foc'sle, with a couple of RBUish devices behind it, and put a number of Mk41s where the gun had been, say 32 cells total, with 32 ESSMs quad-packed, 12 ASROC, and 12 NSM. Give it a lower and wider superstructure, with stealth shaping as much as possible, and (depending on cost) CODLAG/IEP and upgraded hull/bow sonar and that would be a major ASW asset.
I'd say also pack in a bit CIWS and also avoid the minimal crew thing.
DeleteNSCs with full navy gear would have been the ideal Perry replacement. Still would be better than anything planned.
Delete"I'd say also pack in a bit CIWS and also avoid the minimal crew thing."
DeleteI'd say something like 2 SeaRAM (fore/aft) and 2 Phalanx (P/S) at a minimum, moving up to 2/4 for the next largest ship (FREMM/Zeven Provincien/Sachsen, not Constellation) and continuing to increase as ships get larger. At about the 2 SeaRAM/6 CWIS level, I'd consider subbing a Goalkeeper or similar for one of the Phalanxes on each side in order to get the increased stopping power of the 30MM). Also, I would opt for a lot more armor, particularly including armored internal bulkheads, and definitely larger crews for improved DC. Better DC was a big factor in winning WWII in the Pacific, and will be in any future conventional conflict (another reason why the LCS makes no sense).
"I'd consider subbing a Goalkeeper or similar for one of the Phalanxes on each side in order to get the increased stopping power of the 30MM"
DeleteThere is no evidence that a 30 mm has any more stopping power than a 20 mm. It might be true but no one has demonstrated it with any testing. For example, one could claim that a .45 cal bullet has more stopping power against a missile than a 9 mm and that might be technically true but would be indistinguishable on a practical basis. The might be true for a 30 mm versus a 20 mm. The physics might suggest it would be better but would it produce any real world improvement? No one knows.
While it has somewhat better range, the downside to the 30 mm Goalkeeper is reduced magazine inventory and slightly slower firing rate. It also introduces yet another non-standard piece of equipment that requires its own supply line, on board spare parts storage, additional training/technicians, etc. I think it may require deck penetration as opposed to the Phalanx. It weighs considerably more than the Phalanx.
Before you commit to Goalkeeper and its drawbacks, find us some data that proves it has a practical benefit. It would be fascinating to see some test data/results.
"Before you commit to Goalkeeper and its drawbacks, find us some data that proves it has a practical benefit. It would be fascinating to see some test data/results."
DeleteI did not say commit, I said consider. That means obtaining answers to the questions you raised before committing.
"I said consider."
DeleteYes, I understand. Do you know of any actual tests and data for Goalkeeper? I've been unable to find any.
My vague understanding is that the main Goalkeeper round is a sabot case with 21 mm penetrator. If so, then it's not a 30 mm round. It's one mm larger than the Phalanx. Once upon a time, Phalanx used a depleted uranium round but I think that's been discontinued.
Per Navweaps the Phalanx also fires armor piercing discarding-sabot rounds with a .5 inch diameter penetrator.
DeleteLess and less bright high school graduates choose STEM. This trend has been going on for more than two decades. Most STEM graduate students in majority universities are foreigners. Attitude toward let them stay has changed to negative. Once old defence engineers retire, what do you then expect?
ReplyDeleteYes, on politically correct, I should not complaint bright students not choose STEM since not so bright students are also voting citizens and many are still patriotic. Reality is that they cannot produce as good results as more bright ones.
Look around you, what most high school graduates around you choose to study in college? I mean people with really high GPA, not people flatter them as "bright".
A hyper individualist consumer society hasn't helped. People now want instant gratification and constant egoboosts.
DeleteI wanted to do maritime engineering but sadly my mathematical abilities and in particular ability to understand more complex maths is non existent (I literally failed theoretical maths in Grade 12 whilst excelling in every thing else).
"Most STEM graduate students in majority universities are foreigners"
DeleteNo you just making that up. And you are ignoring the fact the majority who do graduate tend to stay in the US.
"Most STEM graduate students in majority universities are foreigners"
Delete"No you just making that up"
Let's not make unsubstantiated statements. Provide data. Let's also recall that this is a naval blog so tie the statements back to naval matters.
There are plenty, just give two:
Deletehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-graduate-students-in-stem-are-mostly-foreign/2019/09/25/65b28098-de37-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2021/08/19/international-students-remain-a-primary-source-of-us-tech-talent/?sh=60cedec9650d
I am an engineer in civilian sector. It takes years for engineers to mature after graduate from college. Lots of real knowhows are company specific which you cannot find in text books or online. You can read a patent through without knowing how to make things claimed in that patent.
DeleteGoing back over several years of this blog, the STEM issue has grown tiresome. I have yet to see anyone link it to any specific naval concern. Given the very limited aircraft and ship design/building industry in the US, only a very small number of graduate engineering students are needed each year. Thus, the numbers or demographic breakdown of students is irrelevant. Let's terminate this discussion and leave STEM for education blogs while we return to naval matters.
DeleteOn problem is that to be a good engineer you need to try and do. With the project time of today there is about 1 program per two generations of engineers. Before the 70-ties a design engineer, both naval and aeronautical would work on several projects from starts. Without this learning new designs get problems and flaws, are more prone to failures and cost overruns.
DeleteDo big and long projects are the problem. Aim for 15 year life and always start a new project with the lessons learned from the previous.
Another failure would be the TFX/F-111B. The Navy and DoD forgot everything it learned from this with the F-35.
ReplyDeleteA4-M was the finest attack aircraft.
ReplyDeleteGreat post but looking back at the Spruance class would not class as excellent mainly because the aluminium superstructure, aluminium has lots of downsides compared to steel. It melts at lower temperatures as seen with USS Belknap after the collision with Kennedy and subsequent fire, can be subject to excessive cracking, primary problem is that aluminium and steel have different rigidity factors, they flex at different rates and the aluminium structures cracks eg as with Perry's which had to have supplementary heavy plates welded to hull midsection to correct the problem and with Tico's with mention of 3,000 plus cracks in superstructure, Navy said they used wrong type of aluminium! also have seen mention aluminium subject to exfoliation due to salt water corrosion, sheets of it will come off, galvanic corrosion/electrolysis if you put aluminium, steel and salt water together, and you’ve virtually a battery and aluminium as the less noble material acts as the sacrificial anode and turns to white powder, its not as strong as steel eg USS Worden was hit by two HARM anti-radar missiles and the warhead hardened penetrators penetrated the aluminium deck house with ease, slicing through the several decks until being stopped by the steel main deck.
ReplyDeletePS The reason for the Spruance and other ships used aluminium superstructures was that that radar antennas were relatively heavy and need to be mounted high on the mast with their support equipment including heavy motors to turn the antennas plus electronics. Assumed it was deemed steel superstructures plus the big antennas and their support equipment made ships too top heavy for stability, presumably chosen to keep a high L/B ratio for highest max speed.
The hollow Navy is heartbreaking. That the rot extends to other services follows without surprise.
ReplyDeleteDid a program have conceptual roots prior to 1964? With some theoretical work underway? Seems that the farther one is from the true end of the Cold War that the less likely are ideas much less actual weapons any success. At least that we are led to believe (official failures include those that simply go off-radar).
De-pegging the dollar from gold — and rampant inflation — made the citizen-observer irrelevant. Complain to a Congressman about generalities?
Missile technology & EW appear successful. (Cake icing).
How does the increase in flag rank officers chart against the above graph?
The rot is top-to-bottom. A clean slate new set of commanders (fulfill anyones idea of a new broom) can’t change a road that’s narrowed to one destination.
.
I am amazed at how acquisition "professionals" have no concept of how much testing is required to bring a new product to market. They only see a new car model (minor tweaks) every year and ignore that major models take 3-5 years to develop. They don't even look at what parts of each model are built using existing major portions. The drive train for most models is used for 5-10 years and takes 5 years to develop a new one. Alot of that development time is testing to make sure when you turn the key it starts and it doesn't die while going down the highway. And these are things designed by dedicated folks that ONLY do drive trains. And they still have their version of the Munson road test that they spend thousands of hours driving on. Professionals study and know what in their profession works and what does not. Does anyone in the Navy remember the LPD-17 Engine alignment bolt issue that ate reduction gear sets in the first 5 ships before it was identified?
ReplyDelete"One of the entries that is sure to generate a reaction is the Burke rating. So many people believe the Burke class is an example of an outstanding ship design and a well run program. Unfortunately, this is not true."
ReplyDeleteYou are 1 for 2, sir. Correct in what you thought this entry would do, and completely incorrect in your assessment of the class and program. Why you think it necessary to denigrate the best surface warship by far constructed over the last 35 years is puzzling. Proof points:
- The first ship is still going strong over 30 years after commissioning. It has been upgraded against threats that developed over that time and it is forward deployed TODAY, earning its keep as it was designed and built to do. In contrast to the lies that the Navy is accused of when they say projected ship life is 30 years or more and then decomm the ships well prior to that, this class is keeping its commitments. If the ship design was not "outstanding," we would not still be building them and they would be retired early. Not seeing that occur, are you?
- Many (I believe more than six) major combat systems upgrades and three flight upgrades to add significant capabilities, pace the threats, and keep the ships relevant have been done, while maintaining procurement cost relatively constant. That is no easy task, and proof that the program is indeed well run. It would take too long to tell you how that happened, but the specifics are categorized under "innovative and engaged program management."
The BURKE class is a tribute to "evolutionary acquisition" which means not biting off more than you can chew, as contrasted by things like DDG 1000, where no risk was too big to take on. And the ship was designed with well developed CONOPS, something you go off on repeatedly with good reason for programs which flounder. No argument with your embarked helo comment, but I can say it was not for lack of trying - take that complaint up with Operational Navy leadership at the time and John Lehman. Sometimes, you gotta play the hand you are dealt. And more than two thirds of the class is fitted with capability that addresses what you complained about. Seems like vindictive hindsight to me.
"Why you think it necessary to denigrate"
DeleteFirst, an objective analysis is not 'denigrating'. It's just an analysis.
Second, you need to carefully read the analysis. For example, I stated,
"Flt IIa versions were solid, bordering on good"
That's hardly denigrating, is it?
My critical observations were the initial lack of a helo, the near total absence of close in defense (SeaRAM/CIWS) and, as the program continued on, inadequate stealth, insufficient weight margins, and inadequate power to meet today's equipment and combat demands. Those are facts, not opinions. Facts cannot be denigrating. They simply are what they are.
Since you didn't read the passage carefully, I'll repeat it. The Burkes started poorly, became solid to good with the initial Flt IIa, and have fallen behind current standards as the program has dragged on. They are no longer world class combat vessels, lacking stealth, margins, close defense weapons, and power/utilities for current radars. Pure fact and analysis.
The overall Burke program, therefore, cannot be rated more than average.
What you see as a 'good Burke' is merely something that is less bad than LCS, Zumwalt, and the like. Less bad is not the same as good.
"The BURKE class is a tribute to "evolutionary acquisition"
DeleteThe BURKE class is a tribute to "evolutionary stagnation". By not improving its stealth, close in defenses, power, weight margins, it has stagnated and fallen behind the current world standards. Chinese Type 055 sets the new standard. Some SKorean vessels appear to be excellent, as well. The Swedish Visby sets the standard for stealth.
Admittedly, it's almost impossible to improve those characteristics significantly on an existing ship which is why the Burkes should have been terminated a decade or two ago and replaced with a truly superior and modern design.