As reported by Naval News website, the Navy has awarded a
multi-year contract for the purchase of three San Antonio LPDs and one America
LHA.
Savings – The supposed savings is estimated at
$1B. In the aggregate, that sounds
impressive. A billion dollars! Wow!
However, across four ships that’s just $250M savings per ship. That’s not nothing but it’s not a miraculous
savings, by any means. More importantly,
you know those savings will never materialize.
With 100% certainty, the ships will come in over budget and behind
schedule with a litany of excuses like supply chain disruptions, parts
shortages, design modifications, and all the other usual suspects. There won’t be any savings. The absolute best case is that the ‘savings’
(let’s be optimistic and assume there will be actual savings) will slightly
reduce the magnitude of the inevitable cost overruns. Again, better than nothing but let’s not kid
ourselves into thinking we’re actually going to save money.
Make no mistake, the Navy didn’t do this to save the
taxpayers any money; they did it to lock down budget commitments. The Navy doesn’t care what a ship costs. It’s not their money. Congress will always give them more money. They did this to lock down budget share.
Doctrine – This is the real puzzler. Neither the Navy nor the Marines have any
intention of ever again doing an amphibious assault. The Marines have publicly and explicitly
stated that they are out of the assault business. The Navy doesn’t care about amphibious
assaults and, indeed, balked at procuring more amphibious ships when they
instituted a ‘strategic pause’ in amphibious ship procurement.
Similarly, the Navy’s total indifference to the Marine’s
Light Amphibious Warfare ship is yet more evidence of their disdain for
amphibious operations.
Further evidence is the Navy’s total abandonment of naval
gun support for amphibious operations and the doctrinal decision to move
amphibious ships 25-50 miles off shore – a distance at which it is impossible
to conduct an amphibious assault with current technology.
The Navy is never going to conduct another amphibious
assault so why are we continuing to buy more amphibious ships?
Legality – By law, multi-year procurements can only
be applied to a single design that is mature and stable. While I’m not a lawyer, the mix of ship types
and the inclusion of a single (not multi) LHA would appear to be illegal. Of course, this would hardly be the first
time the Navy has ignored the law. Here’s
the verbiage describing the main requirement for using a multi-year
procurement.
Discussion
So, with no savings and no intention (Marines) or interest
(Navy) in ever conducting an amphibious assault, tell me again, why are we
continuing to procure any amphibious ships?
It seems clear that the only viable reason for the Navy
going down this path is the desire to lock in budget share.
Layer the potential illegalities on top of this highly questionable
contract and it becomes even more clear that this is a budget machination, not
a sincere attempt at saving the taxpayers money.
____________________________
The deal, which will fund three San Antonio-class LPDs and one America-class Flight II LHA, will save taxpayers an estimated $1 billion.[1]I have a couple of problems with this contract award.
FAR17.105-1(b)(3) There is a stable design for the supplies to be acquired, and the technical risks associated with such supplies are not excessive [2]This is intended to be applied to a single, stable design. The Navy is most certainly violating the spirit and intent of the law, if not the actual verbiage.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/us-navy-finalizes-first-amphibious-multi-year-buy/
"can only be applied to a single design that is mature and stable. "
ReplyDeleteWho define "mature and stable"? There is a large room to manipulate.
The LCS is mature and stable, it is old and no one is trying to fix it.
Delete"Who define "mature and stable"?"
DeleteThis question kind of sums up what's wrong with our society - well, one of the problems, at any rate. Everyone understands what 'mature and stable' means. It's a design that has been done several times, at least, without modifications and has been successful. Instead, however, we want to debate like a bunch of lawyers trying to win a semantics trial with the goal of cheating on something or manipulating the common understanding so as to achieve something that shouldn't be done.
In short, we've let the letter of the law supplant the spirit and intent of the law. Everyone knows what 'mature and stable' is. Only lawyers and the Navy (meaning a bunch of bilge sucking sea lawyers) debate the meaning.
For those who follow American football (the ONLY real football), this is analogous to the 'process of the catch' debacle. Everyone understands what a catch is when they see it. Then a bunch of pseudo-lawyers got involved and invented the 'process of the catch' which only created even more problems.
"The LCS is mature and stable"
DeleteNO! It is the very antithesis of mature and stable. As an example, even now, at the end of the production run, they're still trying to figure out how to design a combining gear that actually works.
Another example, is the Mk110 gun. It still doesn't work at speed.
And so on, endlessly.
There is nothing mature or stable about the LCS design. Yes, it's been around for awhile but 'mature' implies that the problems have been worked out and that is clearly not the case with the LCS. Every LCS is different as the continue to try to fix problems so 'stable' does not apply.
San Antonio class LPDs are $2.1 billion each and they design has over 15 years in service. Value engineering unnecessary items can provide significant savings by getting rid of LCAC facilities and limiting MV22 facilities to only 2 since they never use the full 4 MV22s in the design. This should save a few million.
DeleteSome of the savings can go to adding 4 sixpack launchers of HIMARs on the fore deck where the ESSMs were originally designed to go to provide limited Fire Support for landing forces.
"adding 4 sixpack launchers of HIMARs on the fore deck where the ESSMs were originally designed to go"
DeleteI'd much rather have the ESSMs! 24 rockets are the proverbial drop in the ocean when it comes to ground fire support. A WWII assault fired something on the order of 50,000 shells and rockets.
In my opinion the Navy & congress should be spending money on infrastructure to maintain, sustain & build. our battle fleet. Sometime ago it was reported that only 22 attack subs were available ! We also have huge problems in acquisition ( no CONOPS followed) / construction & of new ships costing the payers lots of money ! We are only manufacturing 1 sub / year . The priority should be fixing problems with the battle flee & not acquiring more amphibs.
ReplyDelete"priority should be fixing problems with the battle flee & not acquiring more amphibs"
DeleteI've stated that there should be a moratorium on new construction until the Navy demonstrates that they can take care of the ships they have.
"until the Navy demonstrates that they can take care of the ships they have." Seems to me that the Navy needs to figure this out soon !
Delete"Seems to me that the Navy needs to figure this out soon !"
DeleteYou're right but the Navy has had more than enough kicks in the teeth to learn some lessons and haven't so I wouldn't hold out any hope. It's going to take a war and some serious losses for us to figure out how to design a proper WARship.
So much of any potential change in fleet structure was delayed or lost by making this deal to keep the shipbuilding death spiral going.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure exactly what you're driving at but I think you may by one to something important. Please expand on your thought.
DeleteThere have been some comments from Navsea people that making this deal directly delayed things like LSM/LUSV/MUSV and the development timelines for SSNX and DDGX. Pyric victory.
DeleteI've not heard anything along those lines. Do you have a reference/link?
DeleteThat aside, the LSM/LUSV/MUSV are extremely marginal (meaning worthless) projects so having them delayed is a good thing, as I see it. Of course, this amphibious ship buy is equally worthless - and hugely more expensive - so there's just no good outcome from any of this.
I don't worry about future xxx(X) designs because history assures that they won't survive in whatever their current form is and they'll be just as worthless as the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford have been so if they're delayed ... who cares?
Pretty sad commentary on Navy WARship designs, huh?
Is there any existing navy ships from any country that you would consider worthy of simply copying?
Delete"Is there any existing navy ships from any country that you would consider worthy of simply copying?"
DeleteThere are no major combatants in any country's navy that are good WARship designs. They all lack armor, redundancy, survivability, naval guns, passive sensor search/track fire control, endurance, combat crew size for attrition and damage control, K.I.S.S. principles, and specialization among other lacks.
There are some smaller frigates, corvettes, and patrol boats that are decent designs from what I can tell, depending on how they are intended to be used (CONOPS).
Are there any copy-worthy ships out there that you'd want in your navy?
I think they would only be mine sweepers, and perhaps corvettes if I drilled down. But, the Japanese seem to have decent destroyers but I suspect using your list of features they would fail too. What surprises me every time is the lack of weapon density compared to WW2 - I know we've moved to missiles primarily, but why not two barrel gun mounts and more self defense weapons that have small footprints?
DeleteOne of the major lessons from WWII was that there's no such thing as too many weapons. You can't have enough!
DeleteTo enable Amphibious Operations we need ships that can bring Marines ashore. This means LPDs and not LHA/LHDs because no sane commander would risk putting LHA aviation in firing range of enemy beaches just to land Marines.
ReplyDeleteMarines need to practice as they fight running MEUs with only LPDs supported by a Fly In Element of Fixed wing fighters / C130s. The LHAs should be used to do carrier missions where the threat is not high enough for a proper CSG to allow the carriers a little more rest for maintenance.
You may be overlooking a few facts.
Delete1. An LPD carries only about 700 troops. Compare that to a typical WWII attack transport which carried around 1500 troops. We currently have only 13 San Antonio class LPDs which would limit our assault to 9100 troops. A typical WWII assault required something on the order of 20,000 - 50,000 troops. Worse, an LPD can only generate an initial assault wave of 14 AAV/ACV which is only around 210 troops. An LPD-only assault is simply not viable.
2. An LHA typically only carries 6 fixed wing aircraft. That's woefully insufficient to provide aerial protection and ground support. Even in max-aviation mode, the LHA can only carry around 22 aircraft, according to the Navy. Again, insufficient.
You should review WWII amphibious assault operations to get a feel for the roles of the various components.
LHAs can only support 22 A/C as a Lilly pad. The max they can transit with is 12 which is insufficient for supporting an assault but enough for a low intensity presence mission like patrolling the Red Sea or counter piracy instead of wearing out a nuke carrier.
Delete"LHAs can only support 22 A/C as a Lilly pad. The max they can transit with is 12"
DeleteI've never seen that and it seems unlikely as they have plenty of deck and hangar space. They normally carry
12 MV-22B
6 F-35B
4 CH-53K
7 AH-1Z/UH-1Y
2 MH-60S
for a total of 31 airframes. Thus, operating 20-22 F-35 in a max aviation role seems doable. In fact, they've done at least one mini-deployment with that arrangement.
This article explains it well:
Deletehttps://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/lightning-carrier-isnt-either
20 F35s require lots of fuel and munitions which are quickly exhausted and takes away maintenance space. A more practical scenario is 12 to 14 but with enough maintenance to fix issues and enough ordnance. It also allows for 2 CH53s which are needed to do ship to ship and to lift F35 engines off the ship for swaps.
"This article explains it well"
DeleteActually, no, it doesn't. The article is badly flawed with inappropriate comparisons. The author compares a "light"ninig carrier to a fleet carrier (both Essex in WWII and today's fleet carriers) and, unsurprisingly, finds it wanting. The valid comparison should have been to the WWII escort carriers which were the "light" carriers of the time.
The author does NOT demonstrate that 20 or so F-35Bs could not operate from a LHA. In fact, he acknowledges that they can albeit with munitions supply challenges.
In fact, the author notes the Bataan's deployment as proof of the max-aviation concept. There have been a couple other such deployments since then.
The author criticizes the Bataan's need for protection/assistance from fleet carriers without also noting the WWII escort carrier's need for protection/assistance from fleet carriers, battleships, and cruisers.
The author made the wrong comparison and drew incorrect conclusions.
All that said, the lightning carrier is a bad idea but not for the reasons the author gives and, indeed, an LHA most certainly CAN operate 20 or so F-35Bs.
OT, but here is a Marine some time ago who seems to have had almost exactly my idea for an automated connector to haul combat vehicles to the beach. Guess that makes my idea his idea, except about 15 years later. https://www.academia.edu/4419381/The_Waterborne_Delivery_Craft_A_Potential_Answer_to_the_Question_of_our_Amphibious_Future?email_work_card=view-paper
ReplyDeleteThe article you linked requires account information which I won't give so I can't read it. Perhaps you could summarize the key points?
DeleteIt discusses the need to separate the AAV role into a connector and a personnel carrier / IFV. Why give up so much in the design such you have to haul it when most of the time the functionality is never used. Plus, why complicate maintenance.
Delete- Suggests the connector be controlled from the vehicle it is delivering. Returning empty to ship as a USV.
- Suggests the need for a hydraulic system to replace tie downs for quick release.
- Actually thinks it needs a basic tread or tires to get to the high tide line on the beach.
- Really advocates for versions specific for the assault vehicles and another for general vehicle delivery over the beach.
"discusses the need to separate the AAV role into a connector and a personnel carrier / IFV."
DeleteThe problem with that concept - and the AAV, in general - is that it's not optimized (meaning it's not very good) for either role. It's a vehicle that attempts to be multi-function and, like all multi-function assets, fails at each function.
The AAV is a poor landing craft. Compare it to, say, the classic Higgins boat and you can see the difference between a truly good landing craft and the AAV.
The AAV is a poor APC/IFV. Compare it to, say, the Bradley IFV and you can see just how poor it is in the IFV role.
Compare it to any dedicated APC and, again, you can see how poor it is.
So, I'm all for separating the roles but not while keeping the AAV/ACV. We need to make true landing crafts, APCs, and IFVs - three separate functions requiring three different and highly optimized vehicles not one badly compromised vehicle. We tried to make one badly compromised aircraft fit three distinctly different roles in the F-35 and, inevitably, failed badly. Compromise to achieve multi-function ALWAYS fails.
That is the heart of the proposal.
DeleteNo, unless I misread it, the author was calling for the SAME vehicle (the AAV) to fill all three roles with, perhaps, minor modifications. That's the opposite of building purpose-designed, separate, optimized vehicles for each role.
DeleteWe tried this one-vehicle-fits-all-roles with the LCS and the F-35 and both failed badly. We're in the process of trying to turn the San Antonio LPD into multiple roles (amphib, BMD, distributed anti-ship, mine mothership, etc.) and, if that happens, it will fail, too.
Honestly the ACV entrants, the Terrex and SuperAV, are fine as off the shelf APCs. You still need some swim for an APC, because rivers are a thing, but that's an entirely different kettle of fish to swimming for miles across the sea to hit the beach.
DeleteWe really need somethibg like the LST, but fastr, where it can hit the beach, drop ramp and the APC and IFV rolls out to support the troops in their push up the beach. Either that, or do what the Chinese did and make ourpose built amphibious IFVs and assault guns.
It's really hard for me to understand why we keep building LHA's, especially when the Navy and Marine Corps seem to feel that we're out of the amphibious assault business.
ReplyDeleteIt seems like the LHA was someone's 'good idea' to make it a one-stop shop, a one man band of sorts. If they would have thought to include an 8" gun it would be its only miniature Normandy invasion.
But it seems that this class of ship has gotten in the way of being able to execute an actual landing.
The LHA is a little aircraft carrier. It is too valuable to be close to the beach where is could be vulnerable to attack from land with modern weapons.
But it is also an attack transport, which needs to be close enough to shore that assault craft can realistically move from it to the beach.
These roles are mutually exclusive, and since they are combined in one ship....we are at an impasse.
Clearly they need an attack transport.
Something that carries no more than a combat battalion to disperse the risk.
Something that is festooned with CIWS to protect it from missile or aircraft attack.
Possibly something that could be an EW platform to protect the amphibious assault from drone attack.
Lutefisk
we used to have attack cargo ships, Charleston class LKA. 350 troop capacity (not counting cargo hold space). The same design could be converted to carry more troops than cargo. Served on LKA 113, good ship. We carried our own ship shore connectors ( four LCM 8, five LCM 6 and seven LCVP.
DeleteIf we took the attack transport role away from the LHA's, what would they do?
DeleteI would take the America class ships (two built, two building) and I would convert them into the modern equivalents of the WW2 escort carriers.
They would be modified to have an angled deck with cats and traps.
The freed-up space from removing the landing craft and the marines and all their stuff would provide extra space for aircraft, fuel, munitions, maintenance bays and some room for a boiler to make steam for the catapults.
These little aircraft carriers could perform two different missions, with the only needed change being the aircraft.
The first mission would be as a CAS carrier. These would fly navalised A-10s and/or new construction A-1 Skyraiders, depending on the enemy threat level.
The second mission would be to support ASW operations. These would fly S-3 Vikings. These ships are too slow to keep up with carrier strike groups or surface combatants. But they could provided long-range submarine search for convoys, ASW screening operations, or searching a specific area that would have a high probability of enemy sub activity.
We also have seven Wasp class LHD's. I would keep them in the role of helicopter carrier.
They would have the lift and attack helicopters needed to conduct air assaults.
Those air assaults might be a limited part of an amphibious assault, or they might be part of an ongoing operation.
An example of an ongoing operation might be something like fighting an insurgency in the Philippines. You could use these LHD's as airfields without needing to seize, construct, maintain, and defend an assembly area in a semi-hostile environment.
It might look something like this:
Three Wasp class LHD's off the coast with a battalion of light infantry with each. Two battalions are lifted in to fight while the third is kept in reserve.
The lift helicopters are available to assist the infantry as needed while the Cobras provide close-in direct fire support.
Close air support is provided by a modified America class LHA flying A-10's and Skyraiders.
A Des Moines class cruiser provides NGFS.
One of CNO"s Midway class carriers provides top cover with F-18's for the operation.
And another America class LHA flies S-3 Vikings to help screen the task force from enemy submarines.
None of this would require the navy to siphon off any fleet carriers from other responsibilities.
Lutefisk
"Three Wasp class LHD's off the coast with a battalion of light infantry with each. Two battalions are lifted in to fight while the third is kept in reserve."
DeleteHave you done the arithmetic on the lift capacity relative to two battalions of infantry?
"An example of an ongoing operation might be something like fighting an insurgency in the Philippines."
If you're fighting an insurgency, you don't need top cover from a CV/CVN or ASW protection. Insurgents don't have aircraft or submarines.
"It's really hard for me to understand why we keep building LHA's"
DeleteYou recall this post, "Eliminate Aviation Amphibious Ships"
"They would be modified to have an angled deck with cats and traps."
DeleteHave you looked at the length and width for a conversion? The Midway, a very small carrier, had a beam of 121 ft and a flight deck width of 238 ft (97% larger) after being modified to an angled deck. The America class has a beam of 106 ft, 15 ft narrower than the small Midway. For the same 238 ft angled flight deck, the increase would be 124%!
The Midway had stability problems so I imagine the converted America class would have even more severe problems.
The Midway was 1001 ft long. The America is 844 ft long. I suspect that's not enough to support both a landing area and a forward catapult area.
The lack of length would result in significant overlap of the landing area and the forward cats and would just about eliminate any deck parking during operations. The air wing size would be very limited - 15-20 aircraft, maybe? It would be just what could fit in the hangar and maybe a few deck spots?
I suspect an angled deck conversion may not be possible and would be iffy and problematic, at best, if it was possible.
Run the numbers on the various issues I've raised and see what you think.
"Have you done the arithmetic on the lift capacity relative to two battalions of infantry?"
DeleteI didn't realize how much a Wasp class could carry. That operation could probably be run out of 1 ship.
"If you're fighting an insurgency, you don't need top cover from a CV/CVN or ASW protection. Insurgents don't have aircraft or submarines."
I wasn't thinking of a tightly realistic scenario...just what is possible. Without thinking too realistically I was thinking of a Chinese led insurgency during active hostilities....but I hadn't really crafted anything to reflect any probable reality.
"The Midway had stability problems so I imagine the converted America class would have even more severe problems."
What I actually was thinking of were the Essex class. I know some of them were converted with angled decks and I believe that they fulfilled the role of ASW carrier during the Cold War. But I don't know much else about them, their sailing characteristics after the modification, or how well they performed in the role.
Really what I was doing was trying to figure out what to do with these stupid things.
We have 7 Wasp-class and 2 America-class with 2 more being built.
We're going to have 11 of these things and I can't conceive of what other productive uses they could serve.
Lutefisk
"I didn't realize how much a Wasp class could carry."
DeleteThe issue isn't how many troops can a ship carry but, rather, how many troops can the ship get ashore in the initial wave(s). To be ridiculous, a ship with a million troops aboard but that only has transport for a hundred in the initial wave is useless. This is exactly what we've failed to consider in our current amphibious ship designs. We lack the ship-to-shore capacity to get enough troops ashore in the initial wave to be successful. That's why I asked about the arithmetic of the ship-to-shore transport.
"We're going to have 11 of these things and I can't conceive of what other productive uses they could serve."
Sometimes there is no productive use. Like the LCS, sometimes the best thing you can do is admit a mistake and retire them and move on ... and try not to repeat the mistakes.
"Sometimes there is no productive use."
DeleteAnd they're too expensive to be a reef.
"We lack the ship-to-shore capacity to get enough troops ashore in the initial wave to be successful."
I wonder if that is why the Marines use big aircraft like the CH53 and Osprey to move infantry around?
The army uses the Black Hawk, which only carries an infantry squad each. That disperses the risk of losing a lot of infantry when an aircraft goes down. But that would take up a seemingly prohibitive large amount of deck space.
The Marine aircraft carry almost a platoon's worth of infantry. That's a lot of risk in one aircraft, but it probably makes the limited deck space less of a problem.
Lutefisk
"they're too expensive to be a reef."
DeleteWell, no, not really. They're already paid for. It's a sunk (pardon the possible pun) cost. Whether they're a reef, parked in reserve, or expended in a SinkEx, the cost is already over and done.
Now, the operating cost is still an issue and this is where debating possible alternative uses comes into play. The yearly operating cost for a large ship with a large crew is ... well ... large. Thus, the VALUE of any proposed alternative use has to be sufficient to justify the large operating cost especially when one considers the associated opportunity cost.
So ... too expensive to be a reef? Not necessarily. In fact, depending on alternative scenarios, a reef might be the best use.
"probably makes the limited deck space less of a problem."
DeleteDeck space won't be any problem after a single pass over a battlefield. The survivability rate of helos over a battlefield is very poor as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has thoroughly proven. There will be lots of spare deck space because many/most of the helos won't be coming back!
As a sidenote on amphibs, a good read if you can find it is "Mighty Midgets" by Robin L Rielly. History of LCS(L) ships that were converted to inshore gun support ships for amphib landings during WW2.
ReplyDeleteThe LCS(L) was a useful stopgap measure. The much better solution was the LSM(R) which could deliver overwhelming rocket suppression fire.
Delete