The previous post about landing craft was informative and
somewhat disappointing as far as the comments are concerned. Too many people want to ignore the lessons
that we paid in blood to learn in WWII.
People want to acquire large landing craft outfitted with all manner of
sensors and weapons and then cram dozens/hundreds of troops and vehicles on the
craft while completely ignoring the lessons of dispersal of risk, efficiency of
unloading, procurement cost, and ease of production.
Similarly, many people are ignoring the lessons about how to
conduct an amphibious assault. What is
the proper role of a carrier group? What
is the role of aircraft? What is the job
of the escorts? What is the expenditure
rate of munitions in an assault? How
much weight of munitions do we need for fire support and how can we delivery
the required volume? We’re also ignoring
the history of helo survivability over a battlefield. And so on.
All good discussions must begin with a
consideration of history and its lessons.
Before we even begin to contemplate changing doctrine and
tactics, we’d better be absolutely certain we understand why the doctrine and
tactics exist instead of whatever it is we’re thinking about doing. We learned our lessons in WWII and paid the
blood bill for the learning. That doesn’t
mean we can never change anything but it does mean we’d better be awfully sure
we’re making a change for the better and, again, that means thoroughly
understanding what already exists and why.
LCIs carried 180-210 troops and participated in several initial landings. The smaller boats also carried 36 as that was the army platoon size at the time. Today, a Marine Infantry platoon isn't riding in a single ground vehicle and at best can hitch a ride in the CH-53 with several sitting on the floor. Again, these boats will have a longer trip to the beach and need to do so in the same amount of time. Look around for other clues. Cutter boats and navy RHIBs are between 7-11m because they are doing VBSS and get only so much space on a smaller ship and are generally at close range when being placed in the water. The Seals have their CCA sized to drop out a C-130 or 2 out a C-17, the CCM to fit a C-17, and the Sea Lion which fits a C-5 and may even fit a C-17 with a special trailer system. Those requirements to fit in plane limit their box and their boats are still all as large or larger than what is being discussed here. Yes, those boats are faster, and stealthier. They also carry a smaller team that is being suggested here and certainly didn't prioritize an easy ramp function over other qualities needed to make it to the beach.
ReplyDeleteWell, do keep in mind that the Coast Guard, Navy RHIBS, and SEALS aren't really relevant to this conversation since the missions of those folks do not include opposed landings against capable militaries who are shooting at you. Just sayin ....
DeleteYou're drifting way off topic. That's okay, the information is interesting even if not relevant.
DeleteWhile I'm sure the LCI participated in some initial landing somewhere in WWII, that was not the common usage. They were commonly used as follow on transports and were fine in that role. Many/most seem to have been converted into specialty craft (smoke laying, raids, mines, surveillance, and whatnot).
Bob, I can't speak for the Coast Guard, but I think they plan for the possibility they might get shot at. The Seals certainly do. CCA is too small for an M2 CROWS but CCM has one. They all have armor protection and we know they have plans to add loitering munitions in 8 round launchers similar to LRUSV to CCM and likely CCH.
DeleteAndyM, of course they plan on the possibility being shot at. But they don't plan on storming a beach defended by a substantial military force that is shooting at them, potentially with artillery, rockets, missiles, and whatnot.
DeleteI'm not a SEAL expert, of course, but my understanding is that their ideal mission is to quietly infiltrate, either past (under the noses of) a thin security force (most likely at night) or by landing in a place that's undefended. While they certainly allow for the possibility of encountering some fire, if they get into a large scale firefight similar to what the Marines would face during a contested landing, they've probably already lost.
Obviously when the SEALs get to their ultimate goal, there may be an assault then (as with OBL) but they don't expect to fight a whole battalion or brigade there, right?
Delete"didn't prioritize an easy ramp function over other qualities needed to make it to the beach"
DeleteYou're describing a special forces CLANDESTINE unloading at the beach NOT an opposed landing into the teeth of gunfire. Unloading under fire MANDATES the fastest possible unloading. It is the primary characteristic by a wide margin.
The British seemed to have forgotten a lot of lessons by the time of the Falklands war (which was pretty much a peer war) like getting troops dispersed and ashore as quickly as possible. They dithered about disembarking troops from Sir Galahad until she was hit by an air strike.
ReplyDeleteWell the KISS principle pretty much defined the main amphibious assault vessel of the war, the Higgins boat. Used by Army and Marines, they set the standards of shallow draft, and easy and cheap to mass produce.
ReplyDeleteAs the US military industrial complex has forgotten to do anything cheap and mass produced, perhaps we need to look elsewhere. There are still plenty of smaller ship/boat manufacturers out there. The Higgins boat was the ancestor of other shallow draft boats that Andrew Higgins designed and built for the lumber industry, and (according to Wikipedia) rum runners during prohibition. Here we have a large boating sector for high speed sports fishing and yachting, and a well proven larger vessel production for the oil and gas industry. Perhaps we should turn to them instead of the same people who brought us the LCS.
The Spec Ops folks turned to
AdmiralObvious
DeleteYou are on the right track. Our small boat, yacht and offshore builders are the missing link in fleet expansion.
DeleteSorry, network went wonky for a bit. What I started to say is that the Spec Ops folks turned to the guys building sport 4-wheelers when they needed lightweight scouting vehicles and chose a COIN plane recently that was from a company that modified a crop dusting aircraft design to a poor man's A-10.
ReplyDeleteThe Marines are using a Polaris atv for lmadis that is essentially the reincarnation of the jeep.
DeleteThe saying that those who forget history are condemned to relive it is mostly true. But it shouldn't stop us looking for things that have changed since the Pacific war. I agree with you that there is no point in stuffing whatever platform with sensors there are still a lot of differences between the sensors that were in use in 1945 and what is installed today. It is also true that most warships and aircraft have a lot more sensing abilities now (anything remotely close to a sophisticated RWR or a digital camera on an Hellcat or an Iowa class ?). Since it can be assumed that the potential enemies will use them don't you think that it would be worthwhile to think about how to use them and mitigate the problems they generate (data overload, maintenance issues, software reliability, hallucinations ... etc) while taking advantage of they can bring to the fight ? That would be a nice subject I think.
ReplyDeleteThe Jacques Cassard fan club.
"don't you think that it would be worthwhile to think about how to use them"
DeleteOf course it would! What idiot would say otherwise?
As you know from your careful reading of the comments, the anti-sensor/weapons/etc. sentiment is being applied ONLY to landing craft whose purpose does not require sensors, weapons, and whatever else anyone can imagine.
Escorts, whose JOB it is to protect against threats to the landing craft, certainly need sensors and weapons.
"That would be a nice subject I think."
This entire blog has been about the dangers of overly complex technology and how to work around them as well as describing how to EFFECTIVELY integrate required technology into tactics, doctrine, and operations.
Royal Marines use LCVP Mk5 and LCU Mk10, analogous to WW2 landing craft. They are fine but issues that you have identified several times cannot be taken out of the equation
ReplyDeleteMass - without critical mass where losses are expected, and factored in then contested landings are not happening.
Support - naval gunfire, CAS, etc etc etc. Without it any landing craft is just a water borne coffin. You have made the point that 5inch guns are severely deficient in terms of capability. Current NATO vessels have no way of replicating the level of gunfire support available at Normandy or in the Pacific and I believe in the flying pig version of whatever plane we have being able to dominate the beaches and beyond with enough accuracy to permit a successful landing.
Even if we had enough landing craft, how are they going to get there. I'm sure the USN/RN are going to want their very expensive LPDs to be in such a contested environment.
Unless governments are serious about having assets that they are comfortable about losing then give up the pretence.
"Current NATO vessels have no way of replicating the level of gunfire support available at Normandy or in the Pacific"
DeleteAnd that alone completely negates the possibility of an opposed amphibious assault of any significant size.
We continue to discuss assaults because the Marines still technically claim to be capable of doing assaults even though their leadership has publicly stated they are out of the assault business.
We also discuss amphibious assaults because the possibility exists that we may someday want to rediscover assaults and we need to maintain our institutional memory about how to conduct them. As you can see from the comments, that institutional memory is a fleeting thing and has clearly been lost to many people.
Fundamentally you're asking us to read more, and exercise critical thinking, to gain knowledge. That notion applies to lots more than just responding to your posts in today's age.
ReplyDeleteYep! You got it!
DeleteMy KISS idea involves port seizures. Buy a couple small, used common looking merchant ships with cranes and flag them Panamanian or Liberian as is common. They can support peacetime ops, but will be used by Marines to practice surprise port seizures.
ReplyDeleteAll ports are defended especially in wartime. There are always security infantrymen around and a back up force nearby with regular military units in the area. So this merchant ship simply sails up to dock at the port, then suddenly hundreds of Marines start running off, maybe some swinging from the ships. Ship cranes start swinging LAVs to the pier, as confused locals just watch the show. The Marines quickly push into the port, exchange some gunfire and prepare to repel the local military forces while Navy destroyers show up for fire support and other cargo ships arrive.
I realize a prepared enemy will intercept such ships with boats and ask questions, but most ports have lots of traffic and local military officers who would never think a bold port seizure may be attempted
"So this merchant ship simply sails up to dock"
DeleteIn a war, with the threat of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons, to say nothing of massive conventional weapons or, simply, the age old practice of sinking a ship in a channel to render the port useless, no country is going to allow an unidentified ship within two hundred miles of a port. ANY unidentified ship will be sunk as a matter of course, hundreds of miles from port.
I mean, come on, put yourself in a commander's shoes. You're charged with defending a port. Are you going to take the slightest chance of allowing an unidentified ship, quite possibly an enemy ship, to get anywhere near your port? Of course not! You'll do what any sane commander would do and assume it's an enemy ship and sink it.
I hear a lot of these ideas about disguising weapons on merchant ships because the enemy won't know if they're friendly or not and they'll be confused. They won't be confused! They'll just sink anything they can't positively identify. This has been the way of war since ships were invented.
"I realize a prepared enemy will intercept such ships with boats and ask questions"
No they won't! They'll sink it and ask questions after the war, if they happen to remember.
This is analogous to a carrier group allowing an unidentified boat to approach the carrier because they don't know for sure if it's friendly or not. THAT WON'T HAPPEN. The boat will be sunk a hundred miles out as a matter of routine.
War zones are so named because there is no quarter given or expected. You kill anything that you can't quickly and positively identify.
In WWII, our carrier pilots were told in no uncertain terms that if they failed to follow the proper 'safe' flight paths while returning to the carrier, the escorts would instantly open fire on them without bothering to try to get an ID. No one is going to risk a carrier on a 'maybe' or 'I'm not sure'. The same would apply to a port.
If a ship can't be identified on the port's expected shipping list, it gets sunk.
We currently track thousands of ships every minute of every day. That tracking will only intensify in a war. There won't be merchant ships just sailing randomly around. Every ship will be making every effort to be known to the destination port. If a ship is unidentified, it's pretty safe to assume it's an enemy.
I can't emphasize this enough.
A lesson in blood which you have not mentioned is Surface Ship Fire Support.
ReplyDeleteAny Assault without Fire Support is suicide. Provide both long range precision and close in high volume suppression before discussing an opposed assault. Even Somalis put up a fight against amphibs and had to be suppressed.
Transports matter much less when you can safely close the distance because the enemy is getting shelled and keeping his head down.
Lets start with some low hanging fruit like cheap close in fire support using mortars and work our way up to larger weapons.
What ship can we bring close to shore to fire our 105mm or 120mms from?
"Lets start with some low hanging fruit like cheap close in fire support using mortars"
DeleteThat might seem like an appealing notion but when you begin to examine it you quickly realize it has absolutely no value. What can a mortar - let's say 120 mm, for sake of discussion - do in the context of an amphibious assault?
The 120 mm mortar shell has around 2 kg (4.4 lb) of explosive in a thin walled body (so no concentration of effect). In comparison, 16" and 8" shells have around 150 lbs of explosive and even the lowly 5" shell has around 8-10 lbs, depending on variant plus naval shells are thick walled for concentrated effect, as we examined in a recent post.
The mortar is a firecracker, by comparison - useful against small clusters of exposed infantry but that's about it.
An amphibious assault requires several tens of thousands of large caliber rounds to be effective.
While the general notion of starting small and building up is a valid approach to developing anything, the 'small' solutions have no practical use. We're not going to conduct an assault using mortars as our fire support - at least we won't conduct a successful assault. Until you approach WWII levels of fire support, you're not going to succeed.
"A lesson in blood which you have not mentioned is Surface Ship Fire Support."
DeleteAbout half the posts on this blog mention fire support in one way or another!
I mean, the next step up is 5" guns. The Fletchers started with 5 guns, the Gearings had 6. Sure, the shells individually are small, but with 6 guns on a hull you can do a constant barrage.
DeleteI think close fire support monitors could be built cheaply enough that they could be built in bulk, so you can have numbers on your side. Yes, it doesn't have the sheer penetrative power of 16", but the chinese aren't making the Siegfired line on their beaches.
Mass produce a fire support ship using GMLRS and FSV hull, yes. Your 5" monitor will start at 2500-3000 tons and will get here as fast as am Offshore Patrol Vessel. The 120mm mortar can happen on an FSV too.
Deletehttps://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/01/knee-jerks-and-paradigms.html
ReplyDeleteCNO just reminded me of this...
You could likely have an 5x8in gunned ship under 4ktons, and relatively inexpensive. And it could dump 13000 lbs on a beach per minute. Scaling up by weight, based on the 5in, the rounds would cost $6k. And that's probably overstated by 25%+. But fine, $6k. So that 13klb per minute would cost $300k. How many guided rockets do we get for that? Arent they about $170k per( for the old cheap version)??How many lbs do those 1.4 rockets send downrange for $300k?? How long can each system continue to do it's job before needing a reload, and how easy is it to reload each one, at sea? What do the delivery systems ( gun mount vs VLS) cost??
ReplyDeleteI'm not seeing any metric where a guided rocket can compete with a relatively imple old gun...
Rocket artillery is used when you want salvo density, a single pulse of as much firepower as possible (especially if you're using them for area bombardment, which is what the submunition GMLRS is intended for). Tube artillery trades a significantly lower salvo density for a steady stream of fire on the target. Both have their purposes.
DeleteIn an ideal world, you'd have rocket and gun monitors for shore bombardment. The rocket monitors would use GMLRS for a single devastating area bombardment salvo to cover the target zone (a single M270 launcher can clear a grid square on its ownsome), with the gun monitors then providing follow up fires to mop up the pre-identified targets, and supporting the landing force's calls for fire.
So let's look at the economy of this:
Delete100 GMLRS costs $17M.
$17M puts 10t of ord on the beach.
2833 8in rounds cost $17M.
2833 rounds puts 368 tons of ord on the beach.
One 5/6x8in ship could carry, and expend those rounds in about an hour.
OR, let's look at it another way:
To put same weight of ord on the beach:
368t of 8in = 3680 GMLRS
3680 GMLRS costs $6.25B!!!
That's 60+ F-35s, or 83 Super Hornets, or nearly 3 DDGs!!
And how many ships are needed to carry 3680 GMLRS? Well if you assumed you could quad pack (which you can't) it would still take the VLS capacity of over seven Ticonderoga cruisers- 920 cells. Now if we had seven of our 5x8in gun ships, we could put 45 tons of ord on the beach PER MINUTE.
While I'm all about having the most effective weapon first, and cost being a lower priority, the budget still gets a vote. And whether you get a single pulse of fire, or a sustsined hour of it- I can't see the GMLRS being even a remotely viable substitute for an 8in naval gun.
Note: for the above I used:
Delete* $6k per 8in shell, extrapolated from current 5in round cost of ~$2k. Probably overestimated.
* Published cost of rocket of $177k-~$500k. Rounded down to 170. Probably underestimated.
*Published GMLRS weight, unitary warhead, 200lb.
*Published 8in shell weight, 260lbs. Did not use 355lb superheavy as weight option, although it did exist, and is possible, skewing numbers even more significantly.
*Published 8in ROF of 10-12rpm, used 10. Assumes continuous fire, no breakdowns.
It's basically a tradeoff for time. Guns can certainly be used to do area bombardment, but they will take longer to do so versus rockets - I've seen a Soviet firing table that suggests that a single gun would need to fire 15 rounds to do an area bombardment on a grid square. A 155mm SPG, firing at a sustained rate of 2 rounds per minute, is going to take 8 minutes to perform that fire mission. Assuming 10 rounds per minute sustained fire, an 8" gun will take 1.5 minutes to bombard one grid square.
DeleteI'm not saying that the rockets are the end all be all. Of course guns are gonna be cheaper. I'm just saying that both are tools and they have their merits. They're complementary weapons.
As I said at the start: we open up with the submunition rocket barrage for our mass area bombardment, THEN we follow up with our guns. I'm not expecting the rockets to equal the same throw weight as our guns.
DeleteAnd to be quite frank, 17 million dollars is chump change, really. We dumped over 835 million dollars on preparatory bombardment for OIF (700 TLAMs + 5000 JDAMs alone, not counting other weapons used).
"suggests that a single gun would need to fire 15 rounds to do an area bombardment on a grid square."
DeleteIf all you've got is one gun, you shouldn't be conducting an amphibious assault. Naval guns aren't fired single. A WWII Fletcher, for example, had 5x 5" guns and an amphibious assault fleet had hundreds of guns of various calibers for shore bombardment.
"100 GMLRS costs $17M."
Delete"17 million dollars is chump change"
Cost, while a consideration, is not the real issue. PRODUCTION is! We can produce shells by the tens of thousands per year in a war. We can produce GMLRS M30 series rockets by the hundreds per year in a war. WWII assault bombardments required something on the order of 50,000 shells per assault. It would take us a decade to produce enough M30 series rockets for a single assault! MLRS is a niche weapon for specialized situations. It is not, in any way, a viable general assault bombardment weapon.
War is about logistics and logistics is about production. If you can't produce enough then it isn't a viable weapon.
Add cost to the assessment and GMLRS is even less desirable!
We had this figured out in WWII. The LSM(R) rocket support ships were used to produce a suppression pulse at the moment of landing. Large caliber naval shells were used for the pre-assault area bombardment and post-landing fire support. The LSM(R) rockets were dirt cheap and easy to produce by the tens of thousands.
Stop ignoring the lessons of history!
"a single M270 launcher can clear a grid square on its ownsome"
DeleteWhere did this misinformation come from? Yes, it can clear an area if the targets are standing out in the open and/or are thin skinned.
Forces that are dug in (caves, bunkers, shelters, fortifications) or under armor are largely immune. Consider the example of WWII amphibious assaults in the Pacific. We conducted pre-assault bombardments using tens of thousands of large caliber naval shells over relatively small areas and when the troops landed they inevitably found that the majority of the enemy forces were still alive and fighting. GMLRS isn't going to do anything that densely overlapping 16" shells failed to do.
Somehow, MLRS has taken on mythical status. Like any weapon, under the right circumstances it can be an effective weapon but it's not a miracle weapon and, as noted in the preceding comment, it's not easily produced and it's not affordable in the quantities that would be needed.
"If all you've got is one gun, you shouldn't be conducting an amphibious assault."
DeleteTo clarify, this is Soviet doctrine for targeting and controlling their guns during an area bombardment. Multiple guns, up to two entire artillery battalions (48 guns) would be firing; however, each gun would be assigned a specific grid square to service.
Establishing some assumptions for discussion:
- the notional gun monitor is Spruance-sized
- the notional gun monitor holds 5 x 8" guns
- the notional 8" gun's rate of fire is 10 rounds per minute
- 10 rounds of 8" is sufficient to fully service a grid square
We can see then, that our notional gun monitor can perform simultaneous engagement of five grid squares in one minute. Having a naval gunfire squadron of four ships working in concert brings that up to 20 grid squares in a minute.
To put that into context, Utah Beach, 4000 meters wide by 30 meters deep, has an area of 120,000 square meters, equal to 24 football fields, or 12 grid squares. Omaha Beach is 1.4 MILLION square meters, or 140 grid squares.
If we want to service landing space in a reasonable amount of time, we need lots and lots of gun monitors (I personally would argue we should have a naval gunfire force at least 40 ships strong, so that we can rotate them off the gunline to reload and keep the pressure up, and to absorb attrition from counterbattery fire).
Jjbatie has misunderstood me. I'm not advocating for equal numbers of rocket monitors and gun monitors. The force mix has to skew more heavily to gun monitors for fire support. I'm just applying the lessons learned: an initial pulse of rocket artillery for suppression fire, followed up by a large force of gun monitors to conduct sustained fires.
"Forces that are dug in (caves, bunkers, shelters, fortifications) or under armor are largely immune."
Quite true, but the Chinese aren't interested in building the Siegfried line on their beaches. What fortifications they make are going to be field fortifications dug and constructed by combat engineers, so that means at best we're looking at trenchlines, sandbags, Hesco barriers, concrete roadblocks. I'm intending the GMLRS bombardment to be conducted with DPICM cargo rockets, which drop a spread of antiarmor shaped charges and antipersonel frag charges across target area; DPICM was invented to address the growing protection of IFVs and APCs against standard artillery airburst frag, and it's shown its anti-vehicle effectiveness in the Gulf War and Ukraine. Of course, it's not going to win the bombardment all on it's own, but it's a useful tool, and that usefulness shouldn't be ignored.
Anyhow, I'd think that if we were observing the Chinese building the Siegfried Line for themselves, those would be a prime target for the cheaper simpler cruise missiles we should be developing (or, failing that, fire Tomahawks at them).
"an initial pulse of rocket artillery for suppression fire, followed up by a large force of gun monitors to conduct sustained fires."
DeleteYou've actually got that backwards. A pre-assault bombardment is conducted at a 'leisurely' but steady pace with tens of thousands of rounds fired. This is area bombardment intended to destroy every structure, piece of equipment, fortification, etc. as well as troops. Of course, it never quite fully accomplishes that.
After that, as the initial assault waves approach the beach, a giant pulse of gunfire augmented heavily by rockets is applied as suppression fire to keep the enemy from firing on the landing craft.
After the landing, naval gunfire is used to address specific targets or problem areas.
"the Chinese aren't interested in building the Siegfried line on their beaches."
I'm relieved that you have detailed information on their plans. That aside, the Japanese produced some amazing defenses with just local engineers and equipment. I would expect the same or better from the Chinese.
"if we were observing the Chinese building the Siegfried Line"
I get the impression that you think the Chinese will build their defenses right out in the open as opposed to utilizing caves, underground bunkers, concrete fortifications, tunnels, etc. and that the Chinese will simply park vehicles out in the open in neat rows, ready to be destroyed.
My point is that this sort of construction activity isn't stealthy, and can't be done quickly. It's the sort of activity we can see and addreas in our planning.
DeleteThe fast tactically relevant fortifications are trenches, sandbags and razor wire. That said, don't ubderestimate razor wire! My section once stalled out an armor advance by laying razor wire 10 rows deep. I don't care how big your tank is, 10 rows of razor wire will gum up your tracks real good.
I expect enemy vics to be dug in. Bulldozers dig shellscrapes for them, in hull down fighting positions where they only expose their turrets to fire. That still leaves their turret roofs exposed and vulnerable to DPICM, let alone a direct hit from.a HE shell. Of course they can use foliage and camo nets to hid from air recon, but that's why we're prefiring an area bombardment!
Again, I'm arguing for a force od at least 40 gun monitors. At 5 guns per ship, that gives us 200 guns. Surely we could do useful things with that many guns!
"It's the sort of activity we can see and addreas in our planning."
DeleteThe Israelis probably thought they had a good handle on the Hamas tunnel efforts but they turned out to be way more extensive than Israel was aware of. A smart enemy can always produce more extensive defenses than you're aware of.
"I'm arguing for a force od at least 40 gun monitors."
DeleteA Spruance size ship with 5x 8" guns is not going to be cheap. You're looking at near Burke costs, $1B or more, and you envision 40 of them. Given the rarity (I would suggest strategic impossibility) of amphibious assaults, what would you envision these monitors doing when they aren't conducting an amphibious assault? The reason we could apply so many battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to amphibious assaults in WWII was that they were highly useful for many other missions as well as amphibious assaults. What else can a 'simple' monitor do? If you start adding equipment to allow them to do other tasks (like VLS, high end radars, etc.) then the cost balloons.
How much equipment does a monitor need to have? All it needs is the guns, the ammo, navigation radar, and comms so that it can be linked to the tacnet so the troops can call in fires.
DeleteHonestly, I don't see why this would be so expensive, my monitor concept is essentially your Missing Destroyer concept, but even further simplified in systems. No ASW, no ASuW, a no frills ship purely focused on shore bombardment.
If you want to find a peacetime use for these ships, use them for counterpiracy patrol and presence tasks, the kind of things that we're wasting Burkes on. What's wrong with having a specialised ship purpose built to fullfill a specific mission? trying to be multimission is a problem in our current designs - attempting to do too many things, and none of them done well.
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-missing-destroyer_47.html
" I don't see why this would be so expensive"
DeleteIt shouldn't be but you're overlooking some reality data points.
1. The LCS, half the size and complexity of your monitor, costs around $500M, partially finished upon delivery. A Spruance size ship with 5x 8" guns and a much larger crew would cost at least double an LCS so $1B+.
2. As we've demonstrated in previous posts where we presented an itemized list of the Burke costs, the major cost, far and away, is the basic hull. In other words, the old adage that steel is cheap and air is free is completely false. The bigger the ship, the more expensive it is. So, again, a Spruance size hull means Burke level costs.
"If you want to find a peacetime use for these ships, use them for counterpiracy patrol and presence tasks"
That would be an enormous operating cost for a very small (non-existent) benefit. Peacetime tasks should be done by patrol yachts.
"What's wrong with having a specialised ship purpose built to fullfill a specific mission?"
Nothing! I call for that all the time. The caveat is that the specialized purpose has to make sense, be affordable, be a commonly needed use, and offer the greatest value for the dollar. A monitor is questionable under those criteria.
When I think of the various specialized ships we ought to have (ASW, MCM, mine layer, scout, true destroyer, etc.) a monitor is at the bottom of the list and becomes even less desirable when the cost is factored in.
"Of course guns will be cheaper"
ReplyDeleteBut the VAST difference in price, not even counting the delivery vehicle (ships), to me, makes it almost crazy to advocate for.
It's 360 times more expensive.
➡️$17M vs $6.2B!!!⬅️
I'll adjust my plans and give our DDs an extra few minutes of shooting time before the boys hit the beach to save six billion dollars... Id rather have a few more DDGs (or our notional gun DDs)or another squadron of fighters...
My brother in christ, I'm not advocating for a 1:1 force mix of rockets to guns, but GMLRS rockets firing DPICM submunitions are a useful tool and we shouldn't just ignore that.
DeleteBut at the end of the day, it's not a question of "should we spend 17 million on guns or rockets", the way I see it, we should get both. We're not trying to get rockets to deliver the same throw weight as guns, we're trying to get enough rockets to do a suppression bombardment that the guns can then follow up with sustained pre-targeted fires, AND be available for TIC calls for fire.
"trying to get enough rockets to do a suppression bombardment that the guns can then follow up with sustained pre-targeted fires"
DeleteAs explained in a preceding comment, you've got it backwards.
"GMLRS rockets firing DPICM submunitions are a useful tool"
DeleteYou know you can't just bolt a MLRS to a ship and think you've got a weapon, right? You'd need to develop an entire launch/mount stabilization system (ships pitch and roll), a fire control system, an armored and fire resistant magazine system unless you envision a single shot weapon, a weapon hoist system from magazine to launcher, a weapon strike down system for magazine loading, a completely new launcher that is marinized against corrosion (all new materials of construction, new and redesigned seal systems, waterproof connections, etc.), and so on. There's a reason why so few land weapon systems have ever been successfully converted to sea use. Ask the Germans about MONARC!
Off topic, but wow, a retired General has finally spoken out about our insane overseas base locations.
ReplyDelete"Our basing strategy is outdated and poorly positioned to meet the central threat in the region: Iran," McKenzie said. "By developing a flexible western basing network for America’s air assets, we will complicate Iran’s ability to target our forces and raise the cost of aggression."
https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-posed-overwhelm-us-bases-gulf-former-centcom-commander-warns
That's interesting but I have several problems with the General and his thoughts.
Delete1. Where was he with these insights when he was serving? He retired in Apr 2022 so he was plenty recent enough. Nice that he's speaking out now but how about when he was serving and in a position to do something about it?
2. From the article,
""They can throw more weapons into the fight than we can defend"
Okay, again, where was the good general while he served? Why didn't he build up our base defenses?
3. He suggests relocating our bases farther from Iran. That's essentially a victory for Iran both politically and militarily. The opposite approach is to stack forces around Iran in a de facto military blockade and dare Iran to do something about it. This puts us in position to initiate an immediate and overwhelming assault on Iran should circumstances warrant (like the next time they mine or seize a ship in international waters).
4. From the article,
"improvements to these bases in the west of the country benefit the Saudis more than anyone else.
"These are going to be dual-use bases," McKenzie explained. "We're basing there under certain conditions to actually assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia"
Does this create another Europe situation where we become the forever defender, on our dime, of a country that is/should be capable of paying for its own defense?
5. From the article about deterrence,
""Deterrence is only obtained by a credible demonstration of will "
Where was this demonstration of will during the General's time in command? Was it us standing by and watching the Iranians mine and seize ships? Was it us standing by and allowing the Iranians to seize our riverine boats and crews? Was it us sending pallets of cash to Iran? Was it us allowing Iran to harass our ships? Was it us standing by while Iran enriched uranium? Was it us watching while Iran exported terrorism around the world? All the bases and forces in the world are useless if all we do is stand by and watch which is exactly the good general's legacy (admittedly, it's ultimately a political decision, not military, but where was his advocacy for kinetic demonstrations of will?).
As a general statement, I have no respect for any flag officer who speaks out AFTER they retire. Speak out while you're in service and, if you can't get any attention, quit in protest to send a message (remember the Revolt of the Admirals?).
I later read the actual report. He didn't offer any hard specifics, other than joint use of Israeli bases so that the US military takes over much of their cost. And if neighboring nations strike back at Israel, Americans are killed. So the General was hired by a Jewish neocon group to promote their idea.
DeleteBut we really a port in the region outside the Persian Gulf for carrier visits.
"port in the region outside the Persian Gulf for carrier visits."
DeleteWell, China snatched up Djibouti. Perhaps Maldives? This is the kind of thing our State Dept should be doing routinely but I see no evidence of State Dept activity along these lines, whatsoever. Very disappointing.
What is there in the Middle East that is worth expending American blood or treasure to defend/secure? Ensuring that China is able to buy 1 million barrels per day of Iranian crude?
DeleteThe only worthwhile thing I see there of any interest to the US is the country of Israel.
In my opinion we should de-ball Iran.
-Knock out their air defense system.
-Destroy as much of their nuclear program as can be done with airstrikes.
-Smash their oil shipping facilities to the extent that it takes years to put back online. (This would be a great place to have 16" and 8" naval gunfire capability).
-Leave the region.
-Burn our maps.
If we need to support Israel we can do that without an established presence in the Middle East. We have a power projection navy and they are located on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. As long as we have access to the Mediterranean we have access to Israel.
Lutefisk
"What is there in the Middle East"
DeleteYou're welcome to discuss the military aspects but let's avoid the purely political. Thanks!
Sorry, I didn't mean to sound political. I was thinking of resources. We no longer need their oil so I question the extensive military presence we have there...that's sounding a bit political isn't it.
DeleteLutefisk
"What is there in the Middle East"
Delete" I was thinking of resources."
Discussing resources as they impact the military is a perfectly acceptable discussion.
Along those lines, one of the major reasons for being, and remaining, in the region that is often overlooked is terrorism. Iran, and other actors, export terrorism. Even if we were to do everything you suggest in your comment to knock down Iran, they'd still export terror in terms of ideology, weapons, financing, etc. If you want to stop terrorism - and the US military has been tasked with doing that - then the best place to do so is at the source which is, to a major extent, the Middle East. That, alone, offers a major justification for keeping a military presence in the region. Of course, remaining in the region and standing idly by while terrorism spreads - as we're doing now - is pointless.
If I were tasked with organizing a marine amphibious assault I would set it up as follows:
ReplyDeleteFirst off, NGFS is essential. We should reactive the Iowa class battleships and build Des Moines-esque 8" gun cruisers for this purpose (and others).
My initial assault would be with AAV's. This brings infantry to the shore relatively protected. The AAV has a .50 cal mg and a Mk19 40mm automatic grenade launcher which provides some solid suppression support.
To supplement that I would include AAV's that had been modified to carry a 20mm Vulcan gun (as used on the M163). These modified AAV's would not carry infantry, just copious amounts of 20mm rounds. These bullet hoses would help to suppress bunkered fighting positions or light vehicles.
Following on would be Higgins boats landing craft to bring in more infantry to expand the foothold that the AAV wave had established.
Along with the Higgins boat assaults would be LCM-8's with M10 Booker medium tanks. This 40-ton medium tank mounts a 105mm tank cannon and would be useful to knock out any remaining strong points and prepare to defend against any local counter attacks.
To protect against drone attack, a patrol craft would need to be developed. It would need to be of shallow draft to get in near the beach. This craft would need EO/IR search capability to identify drones. It could then neutralize with electronic jamming (indicating a need for electrical power generation). If the jamming wasn't effective it would need a weapon like a GAU-19 with a targeting radar to shoot them down. There needs to be a man in the loop for firing that weapon as it would be dangerous as hell firing streams of .50 cal bullets at moving drones in the middle of an amphibious assault.
I would also use a limited amount of helicopter assaults. These would be used like airborne troops in WW2 assaults, but on a much much smaller scale. They would seize key points inland like bridges or road intersections or important pieces of terrain.
It would be very important to find relatively secure infiltration and exfiltration routes for the aircraft. Helicopters are very fragile and can't just go blazing over the top of just anywhere and expect to survive.
Close air support would be provided by Marine navalized A-10's and/or new production A-1 Skyraiders depending on the threat level. They would be flying off of Midway-esque light carriers.
Helicopters and CAS aircraft would be the only aircraft flown by the Marines.
Drones would be used to surveil the battlefield and work as spotters for NGFS or aircraft strikes to interdict farther inland.
Then push inland and pile on the troops and supplies.
Lutefisk
You've just put more thought into this than the military!
DeleteIn a post some time ago, you mentioned the amount of effort to mitigate the hazard of mines before a major amphibious assaut at D-Day forv example. As you stated recently, we are not prepared for mine mitigation for amphib assaults or protecting our ports ! But perhaps we need some landing craft/ amphibs for less formidable landing sites !
Delete"perhaps we need some landing craft/ amphibs for less formidable landing sites"
DeleteWe already have them. They're LCACs, LCUs, LCMs which are all fine for unopposed or very low threat landings. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your comment? Feel free to explain further.
I have seen posts where prioritization should be less amphib production or landing craft and more "shooters" plus building infrastructure for ship repair,sustainment & ship construction.
Delete"I have seen posts where prioritization should be less amphib production"
DeleteI, personally, see very little likelihood of a strategic need for amphibious assaults. However, since the Navy/Marines/Congress continue to claim it as a core capability, we'll continue to discuss it.