Naval Ballistic Missiles

Now that the US is officially withdrawing from the INF treaty, the Navy is free to develop short and medium range ballistic missiles.  While the INF treaty allowed naval ballistic missiles, the prevailing political climate and limited applicability and associated high costs precluded naval ballistic missile development.  Now, we're free to develop missiles that can be used by any/all the services, thereby taking advantage of commonality and economy of scale.

We already have a thousand mile cruise missile, the Tomahawk, however, it is old and bordering on obsolete.  The Tomahawk is subsonic, not maneuverable, non-stealthy, and carries no on-board electronic countermeasures or penetration aids.  Its effectiveness as a long range strike weapon is highly questionable against a peer defender.  Consider … would we have any great difficulty shooting down Tomahawks?  I don’t think so.

Setting aside the Tomahawk’s shortcomings, we need tactical ballistic missiles with ranges out to 3000 miles or so.  Just as the US is struggling to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles, so too would any enemy struggle to stop a ballistic missile of ours.  The advantages of these missiles in both the land attack and anti-ship roles (assuming we can solve the targeting challenge) are obvious.

Many readers are terrified about using tactical ballistic missiles because the Chinese might ‘misunderstand’ their intent and respond with nuclear weapons.  Well, the Russians and Chinese, in particular, see no problem with the use of ballistic missiles and any potential ‘misunderstanding’ over their type and intention since they are fully committed to producing and using them.  Oddly, the same readers who are terrified about US ballistic missile use seem to have no concerns about Chinese ballistic missile use or our ability to discern their true nature.  Apparently, in their minds, the onus of risk is completely on the US.  That’s just ridiculous.  Turnabout is fair play so let’s develop our own.

I’ll leave the question of land based ballistic missiles to the Army other than noting that such missiles have two issues: range and vulnerability.  We have very few useful bases for ballistic missiles in the Pacific theatre (Guam being the notable one) and those we have are thousands of miles from China.  Further, the limited number of bases and the fixed or semi-fixed nature of any land based ballistic missiles makes them susceptible to first strike elimination.

This is a naval blog so let’s look at ship based ballistic missiles.  The obvious advantages of ship based ballistic missiles are:

Mobility/Survivability – Ship based ballistic missiles are more survivable simply due to the mobile nature of a ship.  Ship mounting would also ensure a survivable, retaliatory strike capability against a surprise, first strike attack whereas land sites are susceptible to first strike destruction.

Range – Ships can move closer to the target prior to launching, thereby reducing the range, if necessary. 

Stealth – In the case of submarine based ballistic missiles, the launching platform is about as stealthy as is possible.  Even for surface ships, the mobility of the ship confers a degree of stealth.

For surface ships, ballistic missiles are dependent on the Mk 57 VLS (the Zumwalt VLS system) being able to accommodate the desired missile or else a new launch system will have to be developed.  To refresh,

Mk 57 VLS Specifications
Missiles	4
Width (ft)	7.25
length (ft)	14.2
Height (ft)	26, 7.93
Weight (lb)	33,600
Max. canister width (in)	28
Max. canister length (in)	283
Max. encanistered weight (lb)	9,020

While the Mk57 VLS is not much larger than the standard Mk41 VLS, Raytheon claims that the big difference between the MK41 and MK57 is thrust capacity.  Raytheon product brochures claim the system can handle up to 45 percent greater rocket motor mass flow rate thereby allowing for much more powerful booster designs.  The Mk57 also allows for heavier canister weights:  9000 lbs vs. 6000 lbs for the Mk41.

Whether a missile with the desired performance characteristics can fit in a Mk 57 VLS is unknown.  If not, one has to seriously wonder what the rationale was behind the Mk 57 since no current or developing missile requires the extra capacity of the Mk 57.  But, I digress …

Back to naval ballistic missiles …

What specific ships would make good naval ballistic missile platforms?

Battleship - A modern battleship would make an excellent ballistic missile launch platform.  It would offer sufficient size for a significant loadout and excellent armored protection.

Submarine – A sub would obviously make an excellent ballistic missiles platform as demonstrated by the existing SSBN and SSGN vessels.

Arsenal Ship – This is another good possibility with the vessel being, essentially, a mobile ballistic missile barge.  Theoretically, the Zumwalt could be converted to a ballistic missile launch platform if a suitable missile could be designed that would fit the Mk 57 VLS.

As demonstrated by the concerns and the enormous effort the Navy, and military, in general, is putting into stopping enemy ballistic missiles, naval ballistic missiles would offer significant striking power on mobile, survivable platforms.  With treaty limitations no longer a concern, there is no reason not to develop tactical naval ballistic missiles and every reason to do so.

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(1)Navy Matters blog, “Mk57 VLS”, 18-Jul-2016,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/07/mk57-vls.html

What If - D-Day In Reverse

It’s time for the big ‘what if’!

We just discussed the ‘what if’ idea of how Germany might have been able to stop the Allied D-Day invasion.  In addition to what we talked about, there was one other possibility to stop the invasion and that would have been for Germany to invade England, first.  In fact, Germany formulated plans for exactly that operation, calling it Sea Lion.  Most post-war analysts and historians do not believe the plan could have succeeded and, indeed, Hitler’s own military leaders expressed little support for the idea.  Still, could it have worked?  Sounds like another ‘what if’!

As it happened, the invasion was war gamed in 1974 at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.  Wiki has a good write up on the event and it makes for fascinating reading. (1)  Let’s examine Sea Lion as a ‘what if’ and take a look at how the war game played out.

Let’s start by looking at the war game results.  To put it succinctly, the game demonstrated that the initial invasion wave was readily able to cross the channel and land.  However, the follow on waves were decimated and the invasion died due to lack of supplies.  The German forces in England were defeated and surrendered.  As I said, Wiki has a nice description of the game and I won’t make any great effort to repeat it but there are a few items that are noteworthy.

The game was heavily biased against the German effort and in favor of the English.  This started with the initial inclusion of a map of the landing area which instantly triggered a massive surge of units straight to the area as opposed to maintaining the landing site uncertainty that would have accompanied a real invasion.  We saw the negative impact that site and timing uncertainty had on German defenses and there is no reason to believe that the same uncertainties wouldn’t have negatively impacted English defenses.

The German cross-channel transport vessels were severely underrepresented in the game, leading to limited troop and supply transport.  From the Wiki article,

The Germans had only converted river barges available as transport ships. Not a great deal was known about the invasion fleet at the time of the wargame. This represented a gross simplification relative to shipping plans discovered later, which involved nearly 4,000 vessels, including 150 merchant ships and 237 light or auxiliary close escorts, in four invasion fleets.

The invasion fleet naval assets were limited to some E Boats, U-Boats, and destroyers.

The British Home Fleet was sent south to interdict the invasion force contrary to historical intent.  From Wiki,

In real life, both Admiral Charles Forbes, commander of the Home Fleet, and Admiral Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, said they would not send capital ships into the Channel unless the Germans did so, too.

The first two days of the game included weather conditions which prevented the German invasion fleet from launching.  Nonetheless, the previously mentioned map issue which revealed the landing site enabled the English to spend two days surging ground forces to the future landing site secure in the absolute knowledge of the site’s location.  Thus, the English had a two day start on the game.

The initial assault wave was able to land relatively unimpeded and managed to advance 12 miles inland and captured the ports of Folkestone and Newhaven.

German minefields shielded the invasion force.

The Luftwaffe conducted bombing attacks on London instead of directly supporting the assault forces.

The game was decided when the German’s second assault wave was intercepted and destroyed by a Royal Navy (RN) force of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers.

Clearly, the game was heavily slanted towards the British.  Despite this, the initial assault wave made it ashore in good order and achieved some degree of success.

Now, let’s ‘what if’ the concept the right way and see if it could have succeeded.  Of course, being a ‘what if’, we wouldn’t invade Russia, thus doubling our available resources!

We need to start with defining the goals of an invasion and there would be two main goals. 

1.  To seize a port for follow on unloading of troops, supplies, and equipment.  Only a functioning port can provide the volumetric throughput of supplies necessary to support a large scale invasion.  Depending on a detailed study of available resources, seizure of a second port would be a desirable goal, as well.

2.  To seize an area suitable for an airfield.  This could be an existing airfield or just an open flat area that could be quickly converted to an airfield.  The purpose of such a field would be to allow critical supplies to be flown in and to allow local staging of the Luftwaffe rather than having to sortie from mainland Europe.  Local staging would enhance fighter cover and allow effective close air support by enabling aircraft to launch, attack, and land to refuel and rearm in short cycles.  Additional fields would be developed as the invasion progressed.

To accomplish this, our version of ‘what if’ starts out with many of the aspects discussed in the previous post and include:

• Refocusing the U-boat effort on sealing the northern approach to the English Channel, hunting British cruisers and destroyers, and bottling up the Home Fleet.
• Extensive laying of minefields at both ends of the channel and in lanes protecting the invasion fleet’s approach routes.
• Use of the Luftwaffe to destroy bridges, railways, and roads that would be used to move British reinforcements to the landing area.
• Use of the Luftwaffe to hunt British cruisers and destroyers.
• Co-ordinated use of the German battleships and heavy cruisers to screen the invasion fleet from British cruisers and destroyers.
• Use of E Boats to screen the German naval force.

With those measures in place, the actual assault would consist of the following operational steps,

• Airborne assault to secure the selected port.
• Airborne assault to secure the selected airfield.
• Amphibious assault to support the port seizure and isolate/screen the port from counterattack.
• Amphibious assault to support the airfield seizure.

Students of history will note the similarity between this operational plan and the Allies D-Day plan.  Many people think the D-Day assault was all about pushing troops across the beach and then straight on to Germany but the real purpose was to seize ports for the critical follow on supply effort which was the only way the subsequent large scale European combat could be supported.  The actual D-Day landing was all about seizing the ports.

Having laid out the goals, plan, and methods, we are now led to ask, would it have succeeded?

The wargame, even heavily slanted towards the British, demonstrated that the initial assault wave would have successfully landed and moved inland.  In our ‘what if’, we’ve enhanced the chance of success with more numerous, more substantial, and specific measures aimed at isolating and screening the invasion fleet.  Thus, there is every reason to believe that the initial assault would be quite successful.

Recall that the Allied D-Day assault landed in the teeth of extensive fortifications at the beach.  England had no such defenses, never believed an invasion was a real threat, and had no plans to fortify beaches.  There is every reason to believe the assaulting forces would have been able to land and move inland with only minimal resistance.

Airborne forces always enjoy initial success in terms of landing.  The question becomes whether they can assemble and organize once on the ground to the extent necessary to enable them to become combat effective and achieve their objectives.  As seen by the Allies’ D-Day efforts, the airborne element did succeed, though at a cost.  The Allied airborne effort was hampered by landing dispersed in somewhat featureless and difficult terrain which made assembly and subsequent effective combat problematic.  I would submit that landing an airborne force in and around a port city would be far more practical and easy.  Orientation of the forces, once on the ground, would be easier because a city is full of recognizable landmarks and the confusion factor for the defenders is immense.  I would aim a portion of the airborne landings directly on the port facilities and the remainder in and around the city to screen the port.

In the game, a port was seized.  Thus, there is every reason to believe that the initial port seizure objective could be accomplished quickly and easily.

The same reasoning applies to seizure of an airfield area.  Being, presumably, out in the country and isolated, an airborne landing and follow up support from amphibious troops would almost certainly ensure the successful seizure and establishment of a functioning airfield.  Thus, the assault would benefit immensely from the rapid establishment of a local airfield for fighter cover and close air support.

Where the game failed for the Germans was the second wave was intercepted by British cruisers and destroyers and completely destroyed.  This resulted in the initial force being ‘starved’ of supplies and the invasion died out.  It is no great surprise that the entire assault hinges on the follow on effort.  This is the logistics portion of war that ultimately determines military success or failure.  The measures we’ve outlined here should have been sufficient to ensure the success of the follow on supply effort.  That being the case, the entire assault would have had a fair chance of success. 

The importance in this ‘what if’ of Germany not attacking Russia cannot be overstated.  Being able to double the resources available to be brought to bear against England would have been incalculably beneficial.

We see, then, that the concept of an invasion of England was feasible and would have had a fair chance of success.  However, it would have been necessary to gear the entire German war effort toward this goal.  From the beginning, the Germans would have had to have been working toward this goal by not squandering U-boats and their surface ships, not attacking Russia, working to lay minefields and isolate the English channel, etc.  In other words, they would have needed a strategy on day one of the war that had this goal in mind. 

The importance of a coherent strategy cannot be overstated and offers a lesson for us, today.  What is our strategy towards Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea?  We haven’t got one.  How can we expect success, then?  But, I digress …

Had Germany been able to successfully invade England, how would the war have progressed beyond that point?  Would the US have prosecuted a war against Germany without England as a base of operations or would the US have attempted to negotiate a peace settlement of some sort?  If the US had opted to continue the war, would Africa have become the base of operations?  What role would Russia (not having been attacked by Germany) have played, subsequently?

What if?

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(1)Wikipedia, “Operation Sea Lion (wargame)”, retrieved 11-Mar-2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_(wargame)

What If - Stopping D-Day

It’s time for an invigorating round of historical ‘what if’.  The discussion portion of our recent post on Chinese amphibious capabilities took an inexplicable detour (as post discussions often do!) to debating what Germany could have done differently to defeat or prevent the Allied D-Day invasion.  The usual list of suspects was discussed including unified command and control, air superiority, better intel, etc. 

ComNavOps, always believing that the best defense is a good offense, suggested that, rather than waiting on the defensive and then trying to stop the assault, the Germans would have been better served to go after the buildup of troops, supplies, and equipment in England and stop the invasion at its source, before it ever started.  This is analogous to conducting ASW not by fighting subs out in the open ocean but by attacking the factories that produce the subs and the ports where they are serviced.  It’s easier to destroy the source of submarines and their support facilities than to battle them one-on-one at sea.

Had Germany been able to significantly impact the buildup, the invasion would have been indefinitely delayed.  Of course, this is easier said than done.  Let’s kick around some ideas and see if it could have been done.

D-Day - Could This Have Been Prevented?

First, it is necessary to understand that the Germans would not have had to destroy 100% of the men and materiel – an on-going destruction of, perhaps, 20% would likely have been sufficient to disrupt the training and buildup to the point of causing perpetual delays in the assault timing, thereby accomplishing the goal of ‘defeating’ the invasion before it ever began.

So, understanding the fairly limited scope of the task, what methods could the Germans have used to accomplish this task?

Strategic Bombing – Instead of focusing on bombing London, the Luftwaffe could have focused on troop, supply, and equipment concentrations.  Yes, men and material were dispersed across England but it’s impossible to prepare a D-Day size invasion and not have significant concentrations of men and materiel.  In fact, the very dispersal that was used, to the extent it was, would have worked against the RAF’s defensive efforts since they would have had to disperse their defending aircraft as well.

Recognizing that, ultimately, an amphibious assault depends on transport ships, the bombing should also have focused on the transport ships.  These would have been relatively known, fixed point locations and easy targets (neglecting, of course, the surrounding anti-aircraft (AA) defenses and RAF!).

It is also worth wondering if, instead of massed bombing attacks, the Germans should have engaged in smaller, low level, nighttime aircraft raids.  Launched against known depots, troop concentrations, and transport vessels, such raids ought to have been difficult to detect, nearly impossible to predict the targets, difficult to defend against, and fairly effective since total destruction would not have been the goal – 20% overall destruction should have been fairly easily achievable.

German Bombers Attacking Depots, Troop Concentrations, and Transport Ships

Commando Raids – The very short distance across the English Channel and North Sea (ranging from 60 miles at the SW end to a narrow point of around 20 miles at the Calais-Dover area and back out to 100 miles between Belgium/Netherlands and England across the North Sea) lends itself to undetected transport of small raiding units across the Channel.  Raids from Company down to squad size units would have been undetectable and difficult to defend against.  E Boats were able to routinely operate undetected in the Channel and nighttime, small transports would have been very difficult to detect and interdict.  Again, total destruction would not have been the raider’s goal.  Constant disruption would have sufficed to indefinitely delay the planned invasion.

German Brandenburg Commandos Attacking Allied Supply Depot

U-Boats and Mining – The Germans might have been better off concentrating a portion of their U-Boats not to direct sinking of ships in convoys in the mid-Atlantic but to continual clandestine laying/re-laying of mines at each port.  It doesn’t matter how many ships arrived from the US if they couldn’t get into a port to unload.  This would also have had the effect of avoiding direct combat with the Royal Navy (RN), thereby preserving U-Boats.  Of course the RN would have heavily patrolled the port approaches but without the U-Boats ‘announcing’ their presence in the form of revealing attacks, detection would have been much more difficult.  Extensive mining would also have taken a toll on the RN destroyers and rendered their defensive efforts much more difficult and dangerous.

Type TMB Mine Being Loaded Aboard U-Boat To Seal The English Ports

E Boats (Schnellboot) – German E Boats should have focused on finding and destroying landing vessels more so than merchant vessels or warships.  Sneaking near or into ports and sinking transports would have definitely caused invasion plans to be postponed.

E Boat Attacking Transport Vessels

Naval Bombardment – The time frame in question, here, is 1940-1944.  Especially during the early years, Germany had the use of Bismarck (later Tirpitz) and several heavy cruisers.  With co-ordinated support from the Luftwaffe, dedicated Luftwaffe anti-torpedo plane screens (English torpedo planes of the time were barely advanced beyond WWI levels and should have been easy prey for German fighters), E Boat screening, and U-Boat support and mining to prevent the British Home Fleet from approaching, bombardment raids aimed at the Allies transport vessels could have been conducted with a reasonable chance of success. 

Bismarck Attacking Transport Vessels

Shore Artillery – Though not capable of direct attacks on Allied men and materiel in England, shore artillery at the Calais-Dover chokepoint could have sealed the northeast entry to the Channel from RN naval forces.  The fact that such artillery was fielded and produced very little success wouldn’t have changed the thinking at the time that the RN couldn’t risk that approach.  Combined with mining, the northeast approach would have been secured from Allied naval intrusion thereby facilitating the above listed methods.

Calais-Dover Shore Artillery

Summation and Lessons for Today - With some effort and refocusing of priorities, the Germans could have turned the English Channel into an A2/AD zone and a fairly secure base from which to indefinitely disrupt the Allied buildup for the Normandy invasion. 

The major lesson to be gleaned from this is that defense, ultimately, seldom succeeds.  The best defense is a good offense.  This is relevant today for the US Navy.  Our entire fleet is heavily slanted towards defense (Aegis, AMDR, BMD).  Our carriers with their shrinking and short ranged air wings have almost reached the point of existing merely to protect themselves.  We have produced no offensive ship or weapon in decades.  Navy leadership has recently publicly acknowledged exactly this and now claims to be focusing on offensive operations – yeah, we’ll see.

Another major lesson is strategic thinking.  The German military’s strategic thinking was dominated by Hitler, personally, both in his explicit orders and the stifling effect he had on his military leadership.  No one ever accused Hitler of being a strategic genius.  Had Hitler not elected to attack Russia in June 1941, Germany would have had double the men and materiel to oppose the Allied invasion and would have been in a far stronger position to carry out the actions listed above.  Today, our military and Navy suffer from the same complete lack of intelligent strategic thinking.  Witness our absolutely floundering and nearly non-existent response to the Chinese annexation of the South China Sea.  Witness our complete lack of a military strategy for war with China.  We need to begin serious offensive strategic thinking and wargaming.

Mine warfare is another obvious lesson for us, today.  The power of mines has been demonstrated time and again throughout history and yet, for practical purposes, the Navy has no offensive mine warfare capability.  We need new, more capable mines and multiple ways to deliver them.  We need to integrate mine warfare into our operational planning (you know, whenever we get any operational planning).

This kind of ‘what if’ thought exercise is not only enjoyable but it offers insights and lessons applicable to our situations today.

Chinese Amphibious Capabilities

In our recent post about the Chinese Type 075 LHD (see, “Chinese Type 075 LHD”), the discussion turned (okay, I nudged it towards) to the role of Chinese amphibious forces and the need for major amphibious ships and forces.  As we examine Chinese amphibious capabilities, it is wise to note that air force and naval power can deny an enemy access to territory but only ground forces can seize and hold territory.  Thus, the ultimate purpose of amphibious forces is to seize and hold territory.  Yes, they can conduct raids, rescues, embassy security, and other missions but the main mission is seizing territory.  This is the lens through which to view Chinese amphibious capabilities.

With that in mind, it is important to recognize the purpose of China’s amphibious forces as opposed to the US.  We are tempted to compare the raw numbers of ships and Marines and conclude that China is only a minor amphibious threat.  This conclusion, however, fails to grasp the purpose behind China’s amphibious force (as well as their amphibious force growth rate!).  Remember that the US has military commitments and presence all over the world.  Whether that’s wise is a subject for another time.  It means, though, that the US has amphibious forces in the Middle East, Pacific, or anywhere else at any given moment.  Also, the US operates far from home waters. 

In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force operates only in the very localized home waters of the recently annexed South and East China Seas.  Whereas the US needs several amphibious groups to cover all its potential commitments, the Chinese only need one or two to cover their limited region. 

Because of the distances involved and the time required to prepare for, and deploy to, the areas of concern, the US is compelled to maintain a force of 30+ amphibious ships in order to provide a constant forward presence of two or three Amphibious Ready Groups.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is based in their home waters and can almost instantly transition between maintenance, training, and deployment as desired.  Thus, they do not need the 30+ ships of the US amphibious force in order to accomplish the same degree of ‘forward’ presence.

We also need to understand the missions that the Chinese amphibious force is intended for.  The US amphibious force, while theoretically capable of a wide range of missions throughout the combat level spectrum, is intended for major assaults during high end combat.  That we can’t actually execute that mission is irrelevant for this discussion.  In contrast, the Chinese amphibious force is not intended to conduct major assaults against the US.  The Chinese amphibious force is intended to support their low end annexation efforts against the various territories surrounding the South and East China Seas.  This does not require the 30+ amphibious ship fleet of the US.

It is also important to understand that China views military-enabled territorial expansion as perfectly legitimate and acceptable.  In other words, their amphibious force is intended to be used whereas the US force is intended, ideally, to be an unused deterrent.  Even unused, there is a difference.  China’s amphibious force is intended to intimidate as opposed to the US intention of deterrence and, increasingly, humanitarian assistance.

Chinese Amphibious Light Tanks

As we contemplate a map of the East and South China Sea regions and the pattern of expansionist behavior of China, it is clear that it is only a matter of time until China begins knocking on the doors of the various small countries bordering the E/S China Seas.  When China knocks, standing right behind the smiling Chinese face at the door will be the amphibious force, ready to kick the door in if they don’t get what they want.

I think this leads to another aspect of Chinese amphibious operations philosophy and that is the use of overwhelming force.  I strongly suspect that the Chinese have observed the US example/lesson of the use of overwhelming force as exemplified by Desert Storm and the various Iraq/Afghanistan operations.  They’ve seen that the best results are obtained when the attacker has massively superior power.

We’ve seen hints of this in recent Chinese actions.  They send three ships when one is sufficient.  Their interactions with Vietnam, Philippines, and others are executed with vastly superior force when possible.  I think this is an operational tendency that is going to become more pronounced as their naval assets increase in number.  Thus, the Chinese may view a full up amphibious ship and amphibious group as desirable for actions that the US would be content to use a single, lesser ship or group for.

Finally, it is important to note that while the anticipated US opponents are peer or near-peer enemies which would require large amphibious forces to attack with, the Chinese anticipated opponents are far less capable.  While China’s eventual goal is to confront the US, toe to toe, the nearer term use for their amphibious force is against second or third rate militaries such as Vietnam, while they expand and consolidate their periphery around the South and East China Seas.  Thus, for the near to moderate future, China does not require as large an amphibious force as the US because their opponents are far less powerful and capable.

We see, then, that the US and Chinese amphibious forces have very different reasons for existing.  With this understanding, we can now better assess the Chinese amphibious force rather than just, simplistically, comparing it by the numbers to the US amphibious force.

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The link below (1) offers an excellent summary of Chinese amphibious capabilities although the article is strongly pro-Chinese/anti-American.

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(1)South Front website, “Military Analysis: Chinese Amphibious Capabilities”, Brian Kalman, 10-Mar-2016,

https://southfront.org/military-analysis-chinese-amphibious-capabilities/

Carrier Truman Early Retirement

The Internet is abuzz with the reports that the Navy plans to skip the carrier Truman’s 2024 mid-life refueling and overhaul (RCOH) and then retire the ship around 20-25 years early (2).  I’m sure regular readers expect ComNavOps to go off on a rant but the reality is that this is a big to-do about nothing.  The Navy is just playing budget games.  They have no intention of skipping Truman’s refueling/overhaul and retiring the ship. 

You’ll recall that the Navy made exactly this ‘threat’ just prior to the Washington’s 2016 (delayed until 2017) RCOH.  The result?  Congress allocated more money for the Navy.  What a surprise.  And now, the Navy is once again floating the idea of retiring the next carrier due up for refueling.  What a surprise.  This is just a transparent attempt to get more money from Congress.

Consider a few factors that demonstrate the fraudulent nature of this threat:

Supposed Savings – Supposedly, an early retirement would save several billion dollars in overhaul costs plus twenty some years of operating costs for a total of, perhaps, $30B spread over the 20-30 years of the carrier’s projected remaining lifespan.  These savings figures are inflated but, even so, represent only around $1B per year – almost peanuts by Pentagon standards.  If the Navy were serious about cutting costs they’d scrap the worthless LCS and all its manning and operating costs … but they haven’t so this is just another budget game.

Law – The Navy is bound by law to maintain 11 operational carriers (1).  Congress doesn’t need to do anything in response to the Navy’s threat because the Navy can’t legally retire the carrier.  It’s an empty threat.

Precedent – Retiring a carrier early would be all the precedent and motivation that Congress would need to institute punitive budget cuts and flag officer cuts, neither of which the Navy will risk.  Again, retiring a carrier is an empty threat.

Air Wings – This entire issue is almost irrelevant since we only have 9 air wings anyway.  So, whether we have 10 carriers or 11 is a moot point since we can only supply 9 carriers with aircraft.

The Navy is already getting the reaction it wants which is Congressional outrage.

Top lawmakers are blasting the Pentagon’s decision to retire one of the Navy's 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier two decades early, with one prominent Senator calling the move “mind-boggling.” (3)

The next step in the Navy’s plan is for Congress to pony up more money for the Navy.  I can almost hear the Navy’s Admirals snickering behind their closed doors.

Although the threat to early retire a carrier is just a budget game and Congress doesn’t need to take any action, they should take action – they should fire CNO Richardson for attempting to blackmail Congress.  This kind of action by the Navy is reprehensible and despicable.  CNO Richardson and the Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, who obviously approved this blackmail attempt, must be fired.

Come on, Congress.  It’s past time to remind the Navy that they work for you, not the other way around.

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(1)Title 10 › Subtitle C › Part I › Chapter 507 › § 5062: (b)The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon To Retire USS Truman Early, Shrinking Carrier Fleet To 10 ”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 27-Feb-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/pentagon-to-retire-uss-truman-early-shrinking-carrier-fleet-to-10/

(3)Breaking Defense website, “Carrier Cutback Plan ‘Mind Boggling’: Sen. Kaine”, Paul McLeary, 1-Mar-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/carrier-cutback-plan-mind-boggling-sen-kaine/

Chinese Type 075 LHD

It’s always good to review a potential enemy’s weapons, platforms, and systems.  Today, let’s take a look at one of China’s latest amphibious assault ships, the Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD).

As the name implies, the ship will feature an amphibious assault combination of helicopters and landing craft launched from a well deck.  The design includes Command and Control facilities.  The ship is expected to be launched in 2019 and enter service in 2020. 

The Type 075 is reported to be around 40,000 tons, 820 ft long, and capable of carrying 30 helos with six operating spots (2).  The ship, as described, is very similar in size and capability to the US Wasp class LHD-1 which is 843 ft long and can carry around three dozen helos and Harriers in various combinations along with three LCACs and 1900 troops.  One key difference is that the Chinese do not, as of yet, have a Harrier/F-35B STOVL or MV-22 type aircraft in operation.  Unconfirmed reports, however, suggest that they are developing such aircraft and, given the demonstrated speed of their military development programs, should have the capability within five years.

Wiki reports that armament is limited to a pair of short range HQ-10 SAMs and a pair of point defense CIWS.

Type 075 LHD

The LHD will complement the Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) amphibious ships which are analogous to the US San Antonio class LPD-17.  The combination will provide the Chinese with a very credible amphibious assault capability.

This begs the question, why is this ship needed?  Here’s the official Chinese answer.

“The South China Morning Post reported earlier this month, citing military sources, that the navy planned to increase the size of its marine corps from about 20,000 to 100,000 personnel to help protect its increasing interests overseas.” (1)

Okay, that states the obvious that more ships are needed to carry more marines but it doesn’t say why a large amphibious assault force is needed to begin with.  This is simply more evidence that China is gearing up for a major war.  This kind of ship is not defensive in nature.  China is preparing for major offensive amphibious operations.  While the obvious targets are Taiwan and neighboring countries, China may also be planning amphibious operations in Africa and other world wide locations.  As I’ve repeatedly said, China has aspirations of global domination.

In any event, this ship class provides a significant increase in vertical assault capability and mobile, close air support for ground troops.  Such capabilities can be especially useful in intimidation actions by the military aimed at neighbors such as Vietnam.

The US is engaged in a military arms race whether they want to be or not and, while still ahead, are losing ground rapidly.

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(1)South China Morning Post website, “China building navy’s biggest amphibious assault vessel, sources say”, Minnie Chan, 30-Mar-2017,

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2083109/china-building-navys-biggest-amphibious-assault-vessel

(2)The National Interest website, “China's New Amphibious Assault Ship: A Big Waste of Time?”, Dave Majumdar, 31-Mar-2017,

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-new-amphibious-assault-ship-big-waste-time-19961

Scout Ship

We recently discussed the Navy’s ill-conceived plan to use unmanned vessels as sensor scouts out in front of a surface group (see, “Navy’s Manned-Unmanned Fleet Concept”).  We noted problems such as small size, limited endurance, questionable speed, high cost for an expendable vessel, broadcasting their own location (due to active sensors), and lack of defense.  The alternate option is to use small UAVs which would accomplish all the same goals at a fraction of the cost.

The Navy is correct in their desire for long range sensing – just wrong about how to accomplish it.  As we begin to procure some longer range missiles (LRASM, NSM, anti-ship Tomahawk), longer range targeting becomes critical.  As I’ve said many times, it’s pointless to have a ten thousand mile missile when your sensor is only good to the horizon.  So, good for the Navy for recognizing the need but they missed the mark on how to do it.

In addition to UAVs, there is another option for long range sensing that is actually closely related to the Navy’s unmanned sensor vessel yet solves most of the small sensor vessel’s drawbacks.  The option is a  larger, manned, scout ship sensor vessel but with a different concept of operations (CONOPS).  Let’s take a closer look.

The biggest problem (that’s actually debatable because the vessel has a lot of problems and they’re all pretty major!) with the Navy’s planned 130 ft long sensor vessel is that it will have to use active radar to find anything and get a targeting location.  Think about it … a tiny vessel will have a very low radar mounting.  A vessel that size will have its radar mounted perhaps 20-30 ft above the surface.  That makes for a very short radar horizon – something on the order of 12 nm or so (there are radar horizon calculators readily available on the Internet if you care to play with the numbers).  Using active radar will give away the sensor vessel’s location long before it can find a target.  Plus, with a sensor field of view that small, the vessels will be nearly useless for providing area coverage unless there are a LOT of them and large numbers simply compound the problems we’ve already identified.

The alternative is to use passive sensors.  The problem with this approach is that passive sensors generally provide a bearing but not range.  Of course, the passive sensor can, over time, develop a range by moving and triangulating – this is what a submarine does.  Alternatively, two or more sensors operating at different locations can work together to fairly quickly establish the target’s position.  The problems with small vessels remain, however.  They are poor sea keepers, have limited endurance, and are too expensive to be the expendable asset they would need to be when used the way the Navy intends.

Alternatively, let’s consider a significantly larger, corvette-size vessel that operates not in front of a surface group but around the periphery, offset well to the sides, and uses only passive sensors.  Due to the nature of the various signals of interest and the effects of atmospheric phenomenon (ducting and the like), passive signal detection can occur far beyond the horizon.  Thus, passive detection range is much greater than active sensors.  The trade off, as we noted, is that passive detection provides only a bearing, not range.  This is where using two or three vessels comes in – they can combine their data and triangulate.  The vessels would be offset hundreds of miles to the sides of the area of interest rather than grouped directly in front of the surface group.  Given the much greater range of detection and area of coverage, only a few vessels are required rather than the Navy’s vision of mini-fleets of sensor vessels.

Wait … communicate and triangulate?  How can they communicate?  Haven’t I repeatedly stated that we won’t be able to maintain a viable network of data in peer war, electromagnetically challenged environment?  Yes, I have.  The difference is that this approach does not require constant communication because there is no need for real time data fusion – thus, no network.  Occasional bursts of minimal data are sufficient.  If a burst doesn’t get through, you try again – no harm done.  Further, this requires only minimal data:  conceptually, the sensor ship’s location and the threat bearing it detected.  The smaller and shorter a signal transmission is, the easier it is to get through any interference.  The point of these vessels is not to establish real time targeting data with constant transmissions but to develop situational awareness of a broad area – though we’ll gladly take a targeting quality datum if we can get it.  With broad situational awareness, we can then allocate additional sensors (the UAVs we mentioned earlier or an F-35 or whatever) to the known threat locations and establish the final targeting data – or, we can avoid the area if we want to stay hidden.

Visby Scout Ship

We see, then, that with this approach we can establish broad area situational awareness with just a few vessels that won’t give themselves away and won’t have a negative impact on the surface group’s movement, speed, or endurance and, being far away from the likely area of action, the vessels won’t be at exceptionally high risk and will be capable of limited self-defense, if needed.

What kind of ship fits this requirement?  The Visby would be a good starting point (see, “Ship Stealth and Visby”).  It is corvette size but with adequate sea keeping and the potential for good endurance and range.  It is very stealthy and has the basis for SeaRAM/CIWS self-defense.  Most importantly, it has the size to accommodate all the signals analysis sensors, computers, and analysts that are needed.  In short, it would be a very capable, very survivable vessel for the role.

USS Palm Beach (AGER-3) - Electronics and Signal Intelligence Ship

Repackage in a Visby-Type Hull

A Visby-type scout ship could also be equipped with acoustic sensors (towed array optimized for long distance, passive, convergence zone detection) which would further enhance the usefulness of the vessel.

The ES-3A Shadow (S-3 Viking variant) once performed this signals intercept and analysis role for carrier groups but that incredibly powerful and valuable aircraft was retired without replacement.  In addition, it could only operate from carriers whereas this scout ship can operate anywhere.

This CONOPS offers the advantage of providing detection without the enemy realizing they’ve been detected.  The Navy’s proposed small sensor vessels, using active radar, would be easily tracked and offer no advantage of surprise.

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Note that this is not a case of mutually exclusive, one-or-the-other options.  I’m not looking to replace every sensor platform the Navy has with just this one scout ship.  This is just another option that better accomplishes the Navy’s intent and complements the other sensor options.  What I’m saying is that I don’t want to hear any comments debating one-over-the-other scenarios because that’s not what’s being proposed.