Monday, February 20, 2023

Wrong Focus

USNI News website has an article describing the Marine’s efforts to establish battlefield networks that … you know … work.  The article, meant to laud the Marine’s efforts instead reveals one of the fundamental flaws in the US military approach to problem solving.  The US military believes, unwisely and incorrectly, that every problem has a technical/equipment solution rather than a ‘people’ (training, maintenance, etc.) solution.  Here’s a statement from Col. James Lively, I Marine Expeditionary Force assistant chief of staff, which amply illustrates the fundamental problem.
 
“How do we pick winners faster and put equipment in the hands of warfighters?” he said. “That’s our challenge at hand, for sure.”[1]
 
Every one of us has experienced, repeatedly, at home and/or work, the phenomenon of barely beginning to learn one new technology only to find it’s been quickly replaced by another and our learning process starts all over again, never to finish or even reach a minimal level of competence, far less a level of expert competence.
 
What Col. Lively fails to grasp is that putting equipment/technology into the hands of soldiers faster just guarantees that our soldiers will fall further and further behind the competency curve, never learning one system before the next one – the next flavor of the month - takes its place.

Recall the recent Burke collisions which were due, in large part, to the bridge crew's lack of familiarity with the navigation displays/equipment?  We're putting equipment into the field faster than we're able (or willing) to train to a level of competency on it.  

Of course, the inability to train is a conscious decision we've made to prioritize other activities over combat training.  We're finding all the time we need for sensitivity, ecological, wokeness, gender training  ...  but not combat training.
 
Our focus in problem solving needs to be on people as the solution, not technology/equipment.
 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Marines Testing Battlefield Networks for Future Conflicts”, Gidget Fuentes, 15-Feb-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/02/15/marines-testing-battlefield-networks-for-future-conflicts

9 comments:

  1. Like most things CNO, there is a balance to be had between the people, equipment/technology and appropriate/available training. If appropriate training is provided but the users do not us it, is it the fault of the training provided or the people who did not use the training in the appropriate work? I am guility of this myself so not casting stones, just voicing an opinion. Experience tells me that in many instances, the right training is available but for whatever reason not properly applied. As to new equipment arriving more rapidly, again, a balance. Having been on both sides of receiving and providing equipment / technology I learned many years ago that if the logistic trail is not well thought out and provided with the technology, less that satisfactory performance and acceptance is not far behind. DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities must be part of the offering/solution.

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    1. "balance"

      Yours is a well thought out approach. The post pointed out that the military's approach is purely equipment focused and the results are, unsurprisingly, poor.

      Obviously, we need new and better equipment from time to time. If not, we'd still be sailing wooden ships! However, when we install equipment/technology faster than we can effectively train for, and utilize it, nothing good will come of it.

      One recurring example of our focus on new equipment while ignoring logistics is the common phenomenon of putting new ships/aircraft into service and being immediately faced with shortages of spare parts.

      Delete
    2. Wars are won by the least incompetent force.

      Having systems that your military's people can operate competently goes a long ways towards winning.

      When the 1st Cav deployed to Vietnam in 1965, they initially fixed all their callsigns and frequencies. The belief was that the value of being able to communicate effectively for a helicopter-borne airmobile division outweighed the potential cost of the enemy intercepting signals and ID-ing units by their callsigns.

      They felt that they could out-execute their enemy.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    3. Thanks CNO, appreciate your comments. Decision makers need to manage these releases and be very careful about getting out in front of the logistic trail required. It is a fine balance.

      Delete
  2. Bravo CNO.

    This is a very similar critique Roger Thompson makes in his book on the US Navy, "Lessons Not Learned".

    His priorities are #1 Training, #2 Maintenance, and only then #3 Technology/Equipment. In other words, the exact opposite priorities of much of the current military.

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    Replies
    1. I'd like to take credit for some brilliant insight but the conclusion - and resulting priorities - seems pretty obvious to everyone except the Navy.

      Delete
    2. You are also in the company of the late John Boyd:

      "People, Ideas, and Technology. In that order."

      Delete
    3. It is hard to train people on equipment that doesn't work like it says in the book (if it works), or if the equipment can only be operated by SufiZenMasters and lowly contractors.
      So the Navy sticks to Six Sigma Multi Coloured Rock Painting, because powerpoint always works in training.

      Delete
  3. My hope was that Russian investment in jamming tech would show the need to lessen reliance on networking however their incompetence and the effect of Iranian drone techs will embolden the drone crowd.

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