What’s the solution?
Well, how about some common sense?
Instead of short tours with little at-sea time, how about
making command tours last multiple years, maybe 3-5 years? Let a ship’s captain become thoroughly
familiar with his ship, its capabilities, his crew, and have plenty of
opportunity to master ship handling.
What’s the drawback? Well, there
really isn’t one. We’d have less officer
career movement but is that really a bad thing?
Let’s find the good captains and leave them in place for extended
periods. Yes, there would be fewer
command opportunities but we’ve clearly seen that simply tossing bodies through
brief command stints isn’t producing ship handlers and I think it’s safe to
extend that to say that we’re probably not producing good combat operators and tacticians,
either. Give the captains time to not
only master ship handling but also combat operations and tactics with their
ship, type, and squadron. Let them
experience many exercises in command and become proficient at combat. Isn’t that what we ultimately want?
After the initial command tour of 3-5 years, let’s put our
now very experienced captains to work and choose the best of them to command
larger and more valuable ships rather than immediately shipping them off to
shore or staff assignments. There may be
a portion who, for various reasons, don’t want to continue with at-sea
commands. That’s fine, they can fill the
staff and shore positions. This might
mean a smaller pool of staffers but does anyone think smaller staffs are a bad
thing?
Of course, this might also shrink our pool of prospective
admirals but does anyone really think that’s a bad thing?
Hand in hand with this approach, we can provide far more
extensive training to our prospective captains by establishing a
captain-in-training status. This would
be a prolonged, multi-year program whereby a prospective captain sails with a
ship and captain as a trainee. He would
NOT be the Executive Officer but, instead, would be outside the ship’s chain of
command. He would be a supernumerary
whose only task or purpose is to learn to be a captain. He would observe and practice. For example, when docking, the ship might dock and undock
multiple times to allow the captain-in-training to learn the techniques. Yes, it might be a bit tedious for the crew
but, as we’ve seen, they need all the seamanship practice they can get, too!
The culmination of this training would be Master Mariner certification. Additionally, a multi-year captain-in-training program would also allow us
much more time to evaluate the prospective captain-in-training and, hopefully,
we’d avoid a lot of the firings that now plague and embarrass the Navy.
The captains-in-training can be rotated each year so as to
expose them to other ship types and allow them to be evaluated by other
captains.
At its core, what am I really suggesting, here? I’m suggesting that we make command at sea
the pinnacle of a career rather than a momentary stopping point. Let’s make command at sea something to aspire
to, to hold on to, to excel at, and to be the focus of a Navy officer’s career. Let’s also reward these people appropriately
in terms of pay, pension, benefits, etc.
Let’s make command at sea something really special.
T o go along with that we may want to extend career and tour lengths. One of the common refrains from officers (at least in the corps) is that about the time they really master/ learn a job they move on to another. This would maximize proficiency all around while minimizing the cost.
ReplyDeleteAgree totally with your "pinnacle of a career instead of a stop along the way. I agree totally with the idea of longer tours, for the reasons given. I can't really think of a legitimate reason not to.
ReplyDeleteI have long felt that we need to put all PCO's through something like the Royal Navy's Perisher course for prospective submarine captains. Quoting from Wikipedia:
"The Submarine Command Course (SMCC), previously known as the Commanding Officers Qualifying Course (COQC), and informally known as The Perisher because of its supposed low success rate, is a training course for naval officers preparing to take command of a submarine.
"Created by the Royal Navy during World War I, the course was originally intended to address the high attrition rate of submarine commanders, as the previous method of handing down knowledge from officer to officer was prevented by wartime deaths. Following World War II, the Royal Netherlands Navy became involved in the course; the Dutch later partnered with the British to run the course, and following the British conversion to a fully nuclear submarine fleet, took over responsibility for running the course for diesel-electric submarines. Officers from other nations regularly participate.
"The four-month course is run in four stages, the first and third involve learning ashore in simulators, while the second involves learning at sea. The fourth phase is the assessment, during which the candidates (of which the maximum is six) show their ability to command a submarine unaided during war-like conditions. The success rate for the SMCC is 70% and, on failing, candidates are prevented from serving on submarines in any capacity."
Another RN policy/process/procedure that I like is that they separate line officers into engineering officers and deck/warfare officers. The engineering officers run the ship and the deck/warfare navigate and fight it. Early on, deck/warfare officers receive shiphandling training equivalent to the required of a master in the commercial shipping industry. Only deck/warfare officers are eligible for command at sea. The equivalent jobs for engineering types are major shore commands, including shipbuilding (if they still have any) and major maintenance facilities.
yes. The idea of waiting till an officer becomes CO is usually too late. Like the merchant marine, the deck officers often have a masters ticket well before they assume command, so the fundamentals are established early and the real challenge of being in Command comes after many years of experience.
DeleteCouple things wrong with your suggestion showing you dont grasp naval life. first off, if the co of a ship happens to be a fine example of toxic leadership. said ship would have abysmal crew morale and many sailors would only have fleet experience with a command that gives 0 shits about them. second, you talked about how a "portion" that want to go back to shore should go. even though we are sailors, very few want to stay on ships for that long. The lifestyle sucks and is very demanding. very few of these officers are going to be volunteering to stay sea duty for more than one tour.
ReplyDeleteTrent, was there no other way to phrase your comment that could have been more polite and constructive?
DeleteThat aside, you're also assuming things I never said. For example, I never said that a bad captain should be left in place for years at a time. As has always been the case, if a captain exhibits 'toxic leadership', to use your phrase, of course he should be replaced. You might also have noted the part of the post where I pointed out that this kind of program would also allow much more time to evaluate prospective COs, hopefully weeding out those who might tend to 'toxic leadership'.
As far as people not wanting extended sea time, this is a decision for each individual. I'm confident that we can find a sufficient supply of qualified officers who would like nothing more than to be at sea and in command. It's not as if a, say, 5 year command tour means that the captain never sets foot on shore for 5 years. In our current deployment system, the ship and crew/captain are home for extended periods. If we adopt the mission approach that I've advocated, instead of deployments, ship and crew would be home even more.
Finally, in addition to attempting to criticize, you might try offering constructive suggestions. For example, you might have suggested that COs be granted an extended leave period every couple of years, if they wish, to help balance out the family/sea issues.
I would also note that life at sea is demanding and is not suited for everyone. Those who relish command a sea for extended periods are special and deserving of respect. This is part of what makes such an arrangement the pinnacle of a career rather than a brief stop on the career path.
The vast majority of people I've talked to and read about all say that command at sea was the highlight of their career and they would gladly have stayed with it, if they could.
I look forward to your next comment that will, undoubtedly, demonstrate that you grasp polite and constructive discussion.
You point out a potential problem, one that might be adressed at the recruiting level(??) The Navys purpose is to send warships to sea.
Delete" the lifestyle sucks"
Sure, its not easy. But if someone doesn't want that life, then maybe they should have joined the Air Force. Sure, being away from home and family can be tough. But we volunteered for it. For whatever reason, we chose the life. Shore duty isnt and shouldnt be a priority for someone, officer or enlisted. I loved being at sea, and preferred it. Thats what being a sailor is...
"Shore duty isnt and shouldnt be a priority for someone, officer or enlisted. I loved being at sea, and preferred it. Thats what being a sailor is..."
DeleteQuite right! And, there's no need to make it any harder than it is. As I've demonstrated, we don't need to make endless, pointless deployments that accomplish nothing except wearing out ships and crews. My mission model for utilizing the Navy would eliminate pointless time at sea and maximize the value of time at sea. The mission model envisions home porting much of the time with frequent, short training exercises. Thus, it is almost certain that the number of days at sea would be less than in the current deployment model and the sea time would consist of shorter, more frequent chunks which also means more frequent time at home - the best of both worlds!
Great idras!! Admittedly Im unfamiliar with an officers path, length of tours, etc in their careers. But it certainly seems that seagoing commands should be progressive upward steps, with amount of stripes proportional to the commands displacement, and length of tour. Any missteps along the way should be opportunities for further (re-??) training and evaluation, not necessarily a "career ender" While captains are ultimately responsible, their failings recently are indicative of a service-wide problem, and sacking COs isnt truly fixing anything. We need more emphasis of growing leaders and warfighters, and less on proficient administrators.
ReplyDeleteCommand of a warship should be the ultimate goal, and pinnacle of a career for a sea-going sailor. Evidently thats changed (??) Once attained, no, EARNED, the tour(s) should be long, so as to give the ship maximum benefit of having a superlative leader. Gaining Admirals stripes should be the reward for decades of proficient at sea leadership, and a mastery of warfighting skills, not administrative prowess.
I served under two COs at sea, and they were at absolutely opposite ends of the spectrum. My first was a Tomcat pilot and recruiting-poster Naval Officer. An almost supernatural shiphandler. A strict, by the book leader, yet willing to bend rules when necessary, and very in touch with his men. Someone that 100% of the crew would follow into battle without a thought. Frankly, he was the guy we all wanted to be when we grew up!! He was replaced by a self serving bureaucrat who literally only cared about his career. He couldnt drive the ship, or manage the crew. Morale was horrible, ships performance was pathetic, and our ship gained a bad name on the waterfront. I dont like buzzwords, but "toxic leadership" is probably appropriate. Serving under him for another 8 months before reassignment was an unbearable thought, and I left the Navy instead. I imagine this is more of a common problem today. Thankfully his absolute lack of leadership quality was discovered (in no small part by me) and he never had another command.
I like your ideas on this, and it seems like a thorough revamp of officer career paths, priorities, and how we grow true leaders and warfighters is overdue.
CNO,
ReplyDeleteLove your ideas, but the focus needs to be placed on training officers at the beginning and mid-point of their careers, not just 17+ years into it when they are identified as a PCO.
We should also realize that it is not just “putting in time” to develop competency, the fact is that quality of training counts much, much more; todays junior officers get much less practical experience in ship handling.
Tactical formations are much looser, or non-existent: a reality of the need to disperse formations due to CBR weapons, the push to reduce O&M (fuel) costs, and reduced underway periods – priority going to deployments where much of a cruise is spent essentially in near stationary position off the coast so we can threaten some 3rd world illiterate goat herders with missiles or bombs.
Our officers also get ever fewer command opportunities as the pool of small and minor combatants disappears. I recall a USCG 110’ patrol boat coming to El Salvador and the MILGRP Commander, an USA Colonel falling out of his chair when he found out the CO was a USCG lieutenant and her XO was a LTJG. That young CO did a great job in the face of crappy sea state and currents. The USN needs to find more command/OIC opportunities.
One final point, war, is a young man’s game, the USN does not have the liberty of waiting decades to develop competent COs and ship handlers.
GAB
Of course training should start as early as possible in an officers career! What I described was just the culmination of that training.
DeleteYour point about quality of training versus 'putting in time' is spot on and this concept extends to all our exercises, as well. We run scripted, simplistic exercises that are very low quality.
"USN does not have the liberty of waiting decades to develop competent COs and ship handlers."
We do not. We also do not have the luxury of allowing incompetent COs/ship handlers and blindly assuming they'll somehow perform better in combat.
So, again, Im admittedly unfamiliar with officer career paths and such, but what about more ship-specific schooling? Of course knowing the capabilities of other warships is important, what about taking those successful captains and creating "Top Guns" for each class? Somthing warfighting/shiphandling oriented as a command prerequisite, maybe as an XO?? Maybe even an initial primer at the same school for incoming JOs? I understand that staying in a specific class may not be possible, as a carrier command, for instance, has a prior deep-draft command stipulation(which usually is an auxilliary ship), but since the majority of combatants are Burkes and soon (ugh) LCS, most SWOs are going to be on one or the other. So it seems like type commanders should have their own training schools, using previous COs (the best of the best)as instructors. Is there anything like that currently?? Maybe creating ship specific career pipelines could concentrate the proficiency and experience, so that COs snd XOs are "experts" beyond what being an SWO?? Im a believer in learning-by-doing but whatever we are doing now doesnt seem to be working...
ReplyDeleteI cited the carrier-command example, and in retrospect it was a poor/irrelevant one since theyre mandated to be aviators....
DeleteThis is members-only content, but this story about the Royal Navy’s Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) program from the July's issue of Proceedings seems to dovetail with this post. If anything, it sounds like something the Navy should emulate.
ReplyDelete