Note: page number
references are provided in the following discussion, for your convenience.
The document seems to be starting from the premise of
Berger’s predecessor, Commandant Neller, who stated,
The
Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the
demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment. (p.1)
This Commandant seems to be taking the statement to heart
and looking to modify the Corps to be able to meet the requirements of future
combat, as he sees them. Fair enough. Let’s run through some of the major changes.
Force
design is my number one priority. … We will divest of legacy defense programs and
force structure that support legacy capabilities. If provided the opportunity
to secure additional modernization dollars in exchange for force structure, I
am prepared to do so. (p.2)
This seems to be suggesting that extensive termination of
legacy equipment and capabilities is coming.
Potentially, this is a very good thing as all the services have
extensive legacy equipment and capabilities that are ill-suited to our next war
– with China directly or Chinese proxies.
The danger here is that what Berger deems unusable legacy capabilities
may actually be quite useful. One such
example is tanks. The Marines have been
shedding tanks both from inventory (meaning active units) and from deployment
with tanks being left out of the inventory of deployed ARG/MEUs. There is a worrisome trend in the military,
today, to eliminate or de-emphasize firepower in favor of data and
networks. As we’ve discussed repeatedly,
this is misguided, to put it politely.
Since the guidance document offers no specifics, we’ll have to wait and
see what gets cut and what gets emphasized.
This also raises a larger question. The changes called for in the guidance
document look to be substantial, sweeping, and revolutionary. That begs the question, are they wise? This is all going to happen based on the
views of one person, Gen. Berger. If
he’s right that’s great but if he’s wrong we could see the Corps irreparably
harmed for decades to come. For example,
this Commandant seems to be continuing and reinforcing his predecessor’s
attempt to become part of the naval campaign – a very questionable proposition
that duplicates many existing naval capabilities to no good purpose. An example of the duplication is Berger’s
statement that he sees value in the ‘Lightning Carrier’ (the F-35B LHA)
(p.3). This is an attempt to move in on
the carrier budget with a decidedly inferior capability compared to the
Nimitz/Ford.
There has been no discussion of the proposed changes nor has
the Commandant invited any discussion.
In fact, the tone of the document strongly suggests that discussion will
be actively discouraged. That’s never a
good thing. This is the Emperor’s
Clothes scenario. Given the history of
Navy and Marine leadership, my confidence that this one person has the right
vision for the Corps is very low.
Moving on …
The Commandant describes the organizational force emphasis.
The
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) will remain our principal warfighting
organization; … III MEF will become our main focus-of-effort, designed to
provide U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (U.S. INDOPACOM) and the Commander, 7th Fleet
with a fight-tonight, standin force capability to persist inside an adversary’s
weapon systems threat range, create a mutually contested space, and facilitate
the larger naval campaign. (p.3)
Nice to see that he recognizes that China is the main
threat. Disturbing to see, again, the
attempt to move in on the Navy responsibilities by ‘facilitating the larger
naval campaign’. Commandant, you’re not
in the naval campaign business. Stay in
your lane.
Forward deployed forces are addressed.
The
majority of defense professionals continue to support our conclusions regarding
the efficacy of forward deployed forces …
This
is not intended to be a defense of the status quo as our forces currently forward
deployed lack the requisite capabilities to deter our adversaries and persist
in a contested space to facilitate sea denial. (p.3)
Again, good and bad.
The good is that the Commandant recognizes that our currently forward
deployed forces are incapable and bad that, despite that evidence, he wants to
continue the practice. The key will be
how and whether he can make those forces more capable.
One avenue the Commandant suggests, and another example of
duplicating capabilities, is using HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System) to launch anti-ship missiles. (p.3)
I have yet to hear anyone elucidate a viable CONOPS for such a
capability. Sensors, in particular, are
a weak link that no one has addressed.
Regarding the amphibious force structure, the Commandant
makes a noteworthy and wise statement.
We
must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the
exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the
fleet. (p.4)
He recognizes that our forces are too concentrated and
represent too big a risk,
…
illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary
will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the
preferred option. (p.4)
and calls for more numerous and lower end transport ships
so, good for that. However, he then
continues his expansion into trying to run the Navy with this statement,
…
the Navy and Marine Corps must ensure
larger surface combatants possess mission agility… (p.4)
I’m sorry but when did it become the Marine’s job to define
larger surface combatant capabilities?
He then blatantly states that he’s looking to expand the Marines by
absorbing some traditional Navy responsibilities.
…
we must engage in a more robust discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces
and
capabilities
not currently resident within the Marine Corps such as coastal / riverine
forces, naval construction forces, and mine countermeasure forces. We must ask ourselves
whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions, forces, and
capabilities to create a single naval expeditionary force whereby the Commandant
could better ensure their readiness and resourcing. (p.4)
He’s flat out saying that he thinks the Marines should be
running chunks of the Navy and that he, the Commandant, is the person best able
to run portions of the Navy. Simply stunning! The various services have always had a battle
for budget slice and responsibilities but this is a naked power grab.
The Commandant then rules out traditional amphibious
assaults.
Visions
of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China Sea
preparing to launch the landing force in swarms of ACVs, LCUs, and LCACs are
impractical and unreasonable. (p.5)
Okay, that being the case, why are the Marines buying
ACVs? Why are we maintaining a large
amphibious fleet that costs untold billions of dollars to buy and operate? To be fair, the Commandant notes that the
current amphibious fleet is not ideal.
He also correctly notes the vulnerability of the MPF fleet.
Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) … our MPF ships would be highly vulnerable and
difficult to protect. (p.5)
Disturbingly, the Commandant seems totally committed to the
mythical, hidden, forward operating base, dubbed Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations (EABO).
EABO
enable naval forces to partner and persist forward to control and deny
contested areas where legacy naval forces cannot be prudently employed without
accepting disproportionate risk. (p.11)
This is exactly the kind of vague, near-magical capability
that the Marines have been claiming without ever explaining how such a base
will be maintained, supplied, and conduct significant operations all while
remaining hidden and immune from enemy fires.
Until someone can explain that, this concept will remain pure fantasy. The belief that this kind of base can perform
all manner of combat miracles while ‘legacy naval forces cannot be prudently
employed’ is wishful thinking at its most extreme.
The intrusion into naval matters continues,
We
must develop capabilities to facilitate sea denial and sea control … (p.13)
Again, the Marine’s responsibility is forcible entry and
actions from the sea, not sea denial and sea control. The Marines lack the ability to execute their
own responsibilities let alone intruding on the Navy’s. Again, this intrusion is a budget grab, pure
and simple.
In summary, the Commandant clearly has a vision for the
Corps – a significantly different vision than any of his predecessors and he
makes it clear that he has no interest in entertaining any discussion of his
planned changes. That’s a very risky
position to take. Dissent or
disagreement is stamped out and rigidity is codified. If his changes are all correct then …
great. If not, no one will tell him and,
even if they do, he’s making it clear that he won’t listen.
To be fair, there is much to like in the document. Many aspects of it have been discussed in
this blog and I wholeheartedly approve.
However, there is much that is quite disturbing. The systematic grab of naval responsibilities
is the most troubling and is already leading to inefficient duplication of
capabilities while neglecting core capabilities and missions.
For better or worse, this Commandant seems determined to
radically change the Marine Corps for decades to come.
(1)Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2019, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant's%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700
I think of it another way and would love your thoughts on it. There has always been a rush to take certain missions or get rid of them in all services. With the increasing budget crisis only going to get worse over the next 20 years that will only get worse.
ReplyDelete1. USMC has riverine forces already. During war they work with the Navy. The Navy's riverine are for port security and working with allies. The working with allies is a duplication with the existing USMC who have been working with Southcom for decades. So give them all of it or give it all to the Navy. Split the port and river function. To me it makes sense for the Marines to do this. But either way it could be consolidated. This is probably the USMC looking for purpose for future budgets.
2. In the age of nuclear armed peers what land will the Marines take amphibiously? Perhaps retaking islands that we already occupy (meaning we lost them) or control since winning WWII? At what point will the U.S. occupying a peer nation result in nuclear escalation?
3. The Marines already have forward bases in Japan and their concept seems to me to be an attempt to bounce around friendly territory instead of being in fixed bases. I suspect this isn't going to work. Or if it could it won't work until the Navy decides to strike the enemy. That of course means striking Russia or China mainland.
4. And of course the Military occupies Guam and will have protect it.
5. Similar to #4 the Air Force is expanding it's Rapid deployments and will certainly be using a lot of islands that were made famous during WWII days. They will have to be defended. Historically, the Army has left that to the Marines in the Pacific. That seems to be the true need for the USMC at this time.
"To me it makes sense for the Marines to do this."
DeleteI note that, historically, the Navy has no real interest in riverine operations or any small craft. They only very reluctantly perform the mission and give it little training or resources. On the other hand, the Marines are looking for big ticket budget grabs such as sea control and MUX and I don't think the small craft type missions will give them the 'grab' they want so I don't think they'll really want it.
"what land will the Marines take amphibiously? "
I've stated repeatedly that I don't think there are any realistic amphibious scenarios in a China war.
One area to look at is the US Army Amphibious capability
Deletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14898/the-us-army-is-buying-new-boats-to-replace-vietnam-era-landing-craft
No , thats an overlap.
“1. USMC has riverine forces already... The Navy's riverine are for port security and working with allies. The working with allies is a duplication with the existing USMC who have been working with Southcom for decades…”
DeleteNo!
The USMC capability pales in comparison to NSW RHIBs, boats, and assault craft.
The Marine Corps largely did away with its riverine forces, which were largely based on a crappy little boat known as the “rigid raider craft”. https://www.snafu-solomon.com/2012/03/blast-from-past-rigid-raiding-craft.html
The “working with allies” or FID mission of USSOUTHCOM is generally tied to the CD mission run out of JIATF South, which has pretty much always been a USCG led operation.
GAB
"One area to look at is the US Army Amphibious capability"
DeleteUnfortunately, the Army just recently announced that they're eliminating much (all?) of their water craft.
his threats of treading on Navy responsibilities may not be a grab for the Navy's mission but more a threat to the naval command to basically "do your job or I will".
ReplyDeleteUsing HIMARS for anti-ship for example, doesn't really step too far out of bounds--Marine artillery fired on Japanese ships (for admittedly lackluster results) during WW2 for example. But the idea that SHOULD be the primary mission of the US Navy--sinking enemy ships--might be done by the Marine Corps may set a fire under the same geniuses that gave us the LCS debacle.
Well, that's an interesting take on it and it is conceivable that you could be right.
Delete"Using HIMARS for anti-ship for example, doesn't really step too far out of bounds--Marine artillery fired on Japanese ships"
You cite a good example that illustrates my point about stepping out bounds. It's one thing - and a perfectly acceptable thing! - to use artillery to counter a short range, immediate threat. It's another, entirely, to go looking for a long range, non-directly-threatening target - that's regional hunting.
Part of the issue I have with this is that it's not as simple as saying, hey, we already have HIMARS, why don't we use it to shoot at an enemy ship if we happen to see one (how did you see it, by the way, if it wasn't, essentially, inside the horizon - but I'll address that in a moment). It's quite another to say, let's develop purpose designed munitions (likely quite expensive) and an entire new sensor system (MUX?) so that we can see ships 100-300 miles away so as to take advantage of our long range munition. Now you're creating new weapons, new sensors, new logistics, new training, new doctrine, etc., all to duplicate existing Navy and Air Force long range engagement capabilities.
Are the Marines really so competent and well equipped and well trained in their core missions and have such excess budget that they can go looking for other missions to duplicate? Of course not! So, why don't they stay in their lane and figure out how to do what they're supposed to do instead of looking for someone else's mission to encroach on?
Admittedly, to your point about Navy leadership, the Navy is not earning a stellar reputation for wise decisions but is the Marine Corps going to take it on themselves to become a de facto Secretary of Defense and determine for themselves what missions they'll take and what they'll allow the other services to have?
CNO, you said the forthcoming naval warfare should be get in fast, hit hard, get out fast, and don't get tie down by ball and chain landed element (like tanks). The mil.planner is (my guess only) taking your advice by downsizing the Marines and move the budget to the Navy, AF, and missile corp.
ReplyDeleteWithout shots fired, USMC is the first casualty.
"CNO, you said the forthcoming naval warfare should be get in fast, hit hard, get out fast, and don't get tie down by ball and chain landed element (like tanks)."
DeleteNo, I never quite said that. I think you're incorrectly mixing together a couple of separate ideas.
I've stated that in war navies act by missions rather than deployments and that a given mission is a get-there-fast, execute, and get-out affair which is where I suspect you're getting part of your statement.
I've never stated not to get tied down by the land element. In fact, the land element is the ultimate objective (The seat of purpose is on the land). Also, quite the opposite, if one is going to engage in land combat then it should be with heavy armor and artillery, to the extent possible.
I have questioned the size and force structure of the Marines and the amphibious fleet but I have not explicitly called for a specific reduction in Corps size although if they aren't going to be able to execute their core mission (the Marines seem not know what their core mission is!) then they should be downsized or eliminated. On the other hand, if they will focus on their core mission then they should be upsized, if necessary.
In short, you seem to have incorrectly jumbled several thoughts together.
Marines(on defense) with HIMARC is a ball & chain because they have to be kept viable with logistic support. And I don't think Marines(on offense) are going to land on Taiwan or China (again, where the Marines are, Navy is there too.) Both will deny the naval movement you called for. Also, as far as I know, there is no 'land' portion in the air-sea battle or off-shore containment strategies.
DeleteYou're wandering all over with your comments!
DeleteThere is nothing wrong with getting tied to a location if it offers sufficient benefits. Guadalcanal was an example of such a location that was worth becoming tied to.
No one has suggested landing on China and a landing on Taiwan is almost as unlikely. Where did you get the idea of China/Taiwan landings?
I do see a limited involvement for land forces in a China war unless China invades a neighboring country that we want to recapture.
I think the Marines are suffering something of an identity crisis. I think back 40-50 years ago when the Royal Marines were facing a similar dilemma. They decided to repurpose themselves as a commando/special forces outfit. That worked pretty well in the Falklands.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if something pretty similar would work for the USMC. Let them take primary responsibility for commando/special forces/asymmetric warfare operations, and let the army and air force concentrate primarily on conventional warfare. It is clear that we could use a larger special forces component, even the likes of Chuck Schumer mentioned that in his book. It is equally clear that we are pretty clueless about asymmetric warfare, from Westmoreland's decision to fight Vietnam as a conventional war up to today. And the last time we gave the Marines something and told then to figure it out, we got the Higgins boat and Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Normandy, among other successes. And commando/special forces/asymmetric warfare are really not that far from the historic tradition of the Corps. They've kind of always been the folks to whom we gave the non-standard stuff.
It would take some reorganization of the Corps, and some redefinition of roles. You'd have to figure out how Green Berets and SEALs fit in. It's not perfected, but I think it might be worth some serious consideration, starting with spending some time with the Royal Marines to understand how they did it.
"Let them take primary responsibility for commando/special forces/asymmetric warfare operations, and let the army and air force concentrate primarily on conventional warfare."
DeleteHere's the problem with that: The Marines are currently funded as a major war organization. If we want to relegate them to low end operations, as you suggest, then we need to reduce their funding significantly to reflect that - starting by eliminating most of the amphibious fleet and then eliminating about 100,000+ Marine personnel.
With those adjustments in mind, your approach is worth considering.
“Let them take primary responsibility for commando/special forces/asymmetric warfare operations…”
DeleteAbsolutely not!
A little history: U.S. Special Operations Command was created specifically because of one failed operation after another prompting Congress to stiff arm the services into creating tailored SOF forces and *supporting them*. Mayaguez, Desert One and so forth are key examples of costly failures that led to the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater Nichols Act.
The Corps fought SOCOM tooth and nail until it abruptly decided to play nice, a recent venture.
SOCOM’s aviation programs alone far exceed the capability of the USMC to manage. Just look at AFSOC’s response to USMC attempts to arm the MV-22 and V-22; SECDEF took that program out of USMC hands and put the program under USAF control.
The Corps also lacks any FID or UW training capability like SWIC, or diving programs like the NSWC.
GAB
"Absolutely not!"
DeleteOkay … so if, by their own statements, the Marines are no longer in the serious amphibious assault business and you don't want them to do special ops, what role do you see for them?
If it's just low end embassy protection and the like then they are hugely oversized.
Port seizure, which I see as their main mission, the Marines seem to have zero interest in.
What's left for the Marines to do?
@CNO
DeleteGuarding embassies is the first mission the USMC should divest itself of! Having served in a few embassies and having drank beer with a few RSOs, we should keep in mind that:
1) The host nation is ultimately responsible for security of foreign embassies – every other nation packs up operations in the face of sustained security threats.
2) The State Department (specifically DS) is responsible for security of mission personnel and the Chief of Mission. DS, through the RSO, provides the security details for the Ambassador and Country Team, not the USMC.
3) Most embassies do not have USMC guards, and even when assigned, the marines are technically only responsible for classified material. Marines are good people and will try to do more in a crisis, but their *actual responsibilities* are very limited.
My view of a future USMC is a much smaller force with similar capabilities to a Ranger Regiment with armored capability (could be organic, or USA assets attached).
The USMC should continue to develop tactics, weapons, and procedures for forced entry operations, NEO in the few areas where it makes sense, an expeditionary defense capability for overseas bases (to include reinforcing USAF bases). Spearheading major river crossings is a potential derivative mission.
The first mission that should fall back squarely on the USMC is security of naval bases. I am not talking about standing gate guard, I am talking about providing a determined defense and counter assault capability against a terrorist attack, or raid on naval bases, which are woefully prepared as demonstrated by one NSM unit…
GAB
"It would take some reorganization of the Corps, and some redefinition of roles. You'd have to figure out how Green Berets and SEALs fit in."
DeleteIn the years after the Desert One disaster, former Army Chief of Staff Edward "Shy" Meyer proposed a separate service branch for special operations. Since we already have USSOCOM, I don't see a separate branch as an option. One possible solution would be to raise several Ranger-like Marine regiments that are part of MARSOC and under the command of USSOCOM to support existing SOF units.
"One possible solution would be to raise several Ranger-like Marine regiments that are part of MARSOC and under the command of USSOCOM"
DeleteThe whole redefine SOCCOM or redefine the Corps to fit in SOCCOM is a wasteful canard that will involve the destruction and wonton loss of organizational expertise of many of the nation’s finest units – why?
The USMC was formed as naval infantry; updating their roll to the 21st century implies they be trained and equipped to function against peer enemy forces. We can fuss about mission sets, but to me this implies a from the sea, ground maneuver warfare capability.
I would also argue that SOCCOM is already too large.
The issue isn't that there is a demand for more SOF, the issue is how valid is that demand, and how many high-quality troops the services can divert to SOF operators without hollowing the conventional forces.
SOF units being tasked with missions that could, or should, be done by conventional forces, the intel community, etc. was an issue in the mid-1990s. Some SOF units have been “loaned” to the intel services highlighting chronic underfunding/resourcing of certain agencies for decades.
In many ways, SOCOM behaves as a separate service (e.g. MFP-11 funding), and there is always a danger growing bureaucracies.
GAB
"The issue isn't that there is a demand for more SOF, the issue is how valid is that demand,"
Delete"SOF units being tasked with missions that could, or should, be done by conventional forces,"
Nailed it!
I don't necessarily think that downsizing will be the result. The Royal Marines actually upsized after taking on that role, and I'm of the opinion--as are others including Schumer--that something on the order of 150,000 might be the special forces we need. I wouldn't describe it as "relegating" it so much as recognizing that it's a capability that needs major upgrading, and giving someone primary responsibility may well be the way to go. I'm not sure about eliminating the amphibs, but they might take on some new and different roles in delivering commando forces. I do think the Marines might end up with a smaller--or at least reconfigured--air force in that model.
ReplyDeleteYou'd have a MAJOR case to make to justify 150,000 personnel for low end operations! The Royal Marines number around 7-8,000, I think.
DeleteAmphibs are required only for opposed assaults. For low end operations, that would not occur and simple administrative landings would suffice.
The early 1930s USMC end-strength was roughly 35,000 souls.
DeleteGAB
I think you can easily justify 150,000-200,000 if you include the asymmetric warfare mission. We could certainly have used that many who knew what they were doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think we have a woeful shortage of understanding how to fight those sorts of engagements.
DeleteWhat I'm proposing is basically to carve out everything other than straight-up conventional warfare and give it to the Marines. Let the Army and the Air Force concentrate on fighting traditional engagements, and let the Marines become the masters of everything else.
I'm not sure how that ultimately impacts the amphib forces. The Brits have gotten the Army much more involved in that area, and they have actually significantly increased their amphib capability since the Falklands. They were working off a much smaller base than we were, so I'm not sure that would extend to us. But I would transition our amphib capability from the too large and too expensive LHAs/LHDs and LPDs to a more traditional, smaller, cheaper, and more versatile mix of a smaller LHA/LHD, an LPH, a cheaper LPD/LSD, an LST, and your LPA/LKA. The Dutch JSS intrigues me as an addition, since it could basically be detached to handle the humanitarian stuff.
The other thing that would change is the nature of Marine Corps Air. It would probably become a smaller and vastly different organization.
"We could certainly have used that many who knew what they were doing in Afghanistan and Iraq."
DeleteI cannot agree with that statement, at all, UNLESS WE FORMULATE AN EFFECTIVE, COHERENT STRATEGY and that strategy actually requires that number. You basically say exactly that in your next sentence:
"I think we have a woeful shortage of understanding how to fight those sorts of engagements."
We have NO IDEA how to fight that type of engagement. Given that lack of understanding, how can you propose ANY numerical troop level???
Part of our lack of understanding about how to fight that type of engagement is the lack of a clearly stated goal/objective (victory condition). We seemed to just jump in with only some sort of nebulous, feel good, hope-for-the-best outcome but no idea of what that outcome should be. Tough to formulate a strategy with that kind of objective in mind!
With that said, your force level is just a vague, hope-it-does-the-job type of manning without really knowing what the job is. Please understand, I'm not criticizing you, per se, just pointing out the underlying problem with most of America's recent combat ventures. It's all too easy for us observers/commentators to get caught up in the same vague, ill-defined nonsense that the military and Administration falls (self inflicted, to be sure!) victim to.
So, now, what's your idea of how to fight such a 'war'? Why and how is 150,000 - 200,000 light infantry, spec ops Marines going to win such a war when decades of conventional military efforts have failed? Why wouldn't 50,000 troops suffice? Or, maybe you need 500,000 troops?
Define your victory condition and strategy to fight for it and you'll have your force number and it will be a well justified one.
Again, I don't mean any of this in a mean way. I'm just trying to nudge you into formulating a strategy for fighting such a 'war' since you readily, and correctly, identified the lack of a strategy as the problem. Give it some thought and tell me what you think the strategy should be.
And defining that is part of what I want the Corps doing. Obviously, there will be some inherent bias to defining it closer to the 500,000 range, and we will need to deal with that. Aside from knowing that we need more people who know what they are doing in that area, you're right, it's ill-defined at this point. What I'm saying is that I want somebody put on the task of defining it--what are realistic goals, how do we attain them, what do we need to do the job.
DeleteI still liken it to where amphibious warfare was at the beginning of WWII. We knew we were going to have to do it, we knew we didn't know how to do it, so we needed somebody to figure it out. That was the Marines, and learning how to do it is arguably what won the war in the Pacific.
I don't take any of this in a mean way. Your question about formulating a strategy is a reasonable and appropriate one. I know that I don't know the answer. And I firmly believe that until we task someone specifically with developing goals and strategy, we'll never know how to do it. I certainly don't know whether the right answer is 50,000 or 500,000. And I don't think anybody does. But I do think we need to figure it out.
"And defining that is part of what I want the Corps doing."
DeleteI can absolutely get on board with that! The problem with that is identified in your next sentence:
"Obviously, there will be some inherent bias to defining it closer to the 500,000 range, and we will need to deal with that."
LOL! Sadly, in their minds, the services exist to expand their budget slice. No service is going to recommend cutting their strength to accomplish a mission! Setting that aside …
You're a good thinker. I encourage you to take a shot at formulating a strategy and force requirement for your Marine/Spec Ops concept because the concept is, potentially, not without merit. It just needs some more concrete justification.
For example, if the Marines are going to handle the low end of the combat spectrum then they don't need F-35Bs. Super Tucanos would work just as well and be several orders of magnitude cheaper to buy and operate. Amphib ships are not needed since, by definition, there won't be any opposed landings. Troops can be landed at some nearby air base or port. And so on.
I actually have in mind the broad outlines of a strategy to fight these kinds of low end 'wars'. Without going into details, it starts with the adage: In it to win it or don't get in it. With the approach that logically leads to, a low end, spec ops force is neither required nor effective (at least, not by themselves). Thus, the Marine/Spec Ops force would not be relevant. But, my thoughts aside, I'd love to see you formulate an approach. Hey, might make a good post!
"In it to win it or don't get in it." Absolutely. I don't know that I really have the depth of skill and experience to formulate a strategic and tactical approach, but maybe I'll take a stab, and we certainly have enough expertise on here to take and run with it.
DeleteI agree that we don't need all F-35s for this kind of approach. As I think I wrote earlier, Marine aviation could and most likely would change substantially with this reimagining and repurposing.
I don't think the amphibs will disappear completely. Even if all you do is administrative landings, you still need something to haul the stuff around in, and gators do a pretty good job of that. Plus, the mix I propose gives you a lot of different options for getting stuff ashore, and you may very well need that if port facilities are either primitive or non-available. And obviously you would still have the capability to do opposed landings if needed.
On a somewhat related subject, do you have an opinion regarding the French L-CAT landing craft? It would seem to be one way to get tanks ashore with the landing force, and given its speed, could get them there quickly. Regardless of connector used, I think we need an amphib CONOPS that brings the ships in closer to the shore. I don't know how you can do even an administrative landing from 25-50 miles offshore, much less an opposed one.
I again ask the question why give the USMC responsibility for Special Operations?
DeleteThe Corps lacks fundamental institutional expertise inherent to USSOCOM and this will involve the destruction and wonton loss of organizational expertise of many of the nation’s finest units – how is this in the national interest?
We are talking about a massive reorganization of 70,000 USSOCOM personnel, another 190,000 USMC personnel, and rewriting an encyclopedia set of legislation – to what end? At what cost?
Why is the most efficient and cost-effective solution not to eliminate the USMC instead of SOCOM?
The whole redesign the USMC to replace SOCCOM is a wasteful canard that smacks of trying to justify the USMC.
GAB
"One avenue the Commandant suggests, and another example of duplicating capabilities, is using HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) to launch anti-ship missiles."
ReplyDeleteThe actual line from the report reads, "One possible future would be the forward deployment of multiple High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) batteries armed with long-range anti-ship missiles." I think the Commandant meant the HIMARS launch vehicle, or a similar vehicle, armed with antiship missiles.
Earlier in the year, Breaking Defense had a story on a new program called the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System or NEMESIS for short. The Marines are looking at using LRASM, NSM, or Harpoon fired from either the HIMARS M142 launcher, the Medium Tactical Replacement Vehicle (MTRV), or the Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR). The system is meant to provide offensive firepower to support the Marines Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB).
Notionally, and the EAB concept aside, I could see such a system used as a service center at a forward location, where missiles are fired at targets identified by a ship, aircraft, or another platform.
And, perhaps a land-based support element to a mining or naval blockade operation.
DeleteI like a lot of what the Commandant has suggested; where I disagree is: the distributed operations, company sized operations, and lack of clarity on organization/reorganization.
ReplyDelete“…Persistence inside the adversary WEZ” seems to be a nod to, but with no significant clarity or emphasis on armor, air defense, EW, counter battery artillery, and other elements necessary to fight in a high lethality war against a peer competitor.
There also is no emphasis on ground maneuver warfare and counter mobility – shocking, but not surprising.
If the USA is forced to fight a peer competitor on a numerically inferior basis, the Navy seems likely to be forced into a sea denial mode. The best thing the Corps may be able to do for the Navy is to secure naval bases, provide VBSS crews, and trade in a lot of marines so the USN can buy more submarines!
GAB
CNO, what would a port seizure USMC force look like?
ReplyDeleteWell, that's a topic for an entire post and, you guessed it, I happen to have such a post in the pipeline! Wait patiently. You'll enjoy it.
DeleteIn the meantime, why don't you offer your thoughts on port seizure? What would it take? What equipment and capability gaps exist? What are the main challenges?
Well, I'm not much of a Navy or Marine Corps expert. Many years ago I was an Army aviator, a scout pilot in an Air Cavalry squadron.
DeleteFrom that standpoint I'd look at it as a MOUT operation. That would mean lots of firepower.
I'd think that the Marines would need to land in force with as much firepower as could be rapidly pushed ashore.
I'd say that the Marines would need heavy armor to support the advance through the urban terrain that inevitably would need to be seized around the port area.
I'd want to have as much fire support as possible. Helicopter gunships would be nice, but even better would be naval gunfire.
If I could have whatever I wanted, I'd like to have 8" rounds with Copperhead laser guidance to hammer specific strongpoints as I advanced.
I'd also want to have 16" support beyond the FLOT to stop any attempts at counterattack, probably observed by drones in this day and age.
Bottom line, I'd want to push as much firepower forward as I could to try and seize the immediate area and set up defenses against counterattack before the enemy could get organized.
That's just off the top of my head, without thinking to deeply into the problem. I hope that adds something useful to this excellent blog.
"Many years ago I was an Army aviator"
DeleteWe won't hold that against you!
"as much firepower as could be rapidly pushed ashore."
You've got the basic idea down! Some of the practical problems and considerations include:
1. Tall buildings could, potentially, interfere with naval gun support. Of course, we don't actually have any naval guns so that's a moot point. Heavy mortars (120 mm in an armored vehicle) might be a useful source of firepower.
2. We wouldn't need to seize the entire urban area, just one road in/out to move supplies and, along with the road, clearing and sanitizing a buffer zone around the port and road.
3. Tanks. Yes!
4. Speed of seizure is the key element along with firepower.
For just off the top of your head, you've got the basics nailed. You should consider joining the Navy/Marines - you know, to atone for your past as an Army aviator.
Now, a question for you: how would you defend against enemy mortars? They are the weapon I fear most in this scenario because they can be fired from anywhere, can't be found in an urban area, can fire over buildings, and have good firepower. How do we mitigate that threat?
Good comment!
It would be nice to have an arty guy to answer this as they’re the experts, but the army has a system they use for this.
ReplyDeleteMy understanding is that they use AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars to track an incoming indirect round and figure out the firing position of the enemy artillery or mortar tube. I believe that they direct link to a standby artillery battery and get rounds out pretty quick.
The Marines may already have a system like that in place.
I like the idea of the 120 mm mortar mounted on an LAV vehicle for fire support. The range on that is probably only about 8 or so kilometers so it would be good to get a battery of 155 mm airlifted in to range out 20+ kilometers as soon as possible. Of course, airlifted artillery is pretty much fixed in place once it’s set up and vulnerable to the other guy’s counterbattery fire if he has that capability.
As far as the Marine Corps force structure, I think they have the same problem that the army has. There is quite a breadth of possible missions and they would need to have both heavy (mechanized) forces and light infantry available depending on the job at hand.
The light infantry could be the units that float around on the cruise ships (just kidding) and are available to be landed immediately in a low-intensity crisis.
But the heavier units would be needed for operations like a port seizure.
I would model them after the army’s Armored Cavalry Regiments. The ACR’s are designed to work semi-independently as screening units for an army corps and they pack a real punch. They have their own mechanized infantry, heavy armor, artillery, close air support in the form of helicopter gunships, air defense, etc., all closely integrated in one chain of command.
If I were the Marine Corps, I’d adapt that model to my specific needs.
"The Marines may already have a system like that in place."
DeleteThe Marines are developing the TPS-80 GATOR radar and one of its purported capabilities is target acquisition for counterbattery fire. Whether they've actually tied that into artillery, I don't know.
History is shown to win a war there are only two ways.
ReplyDeleteA. You create so much pain the enemy just surrenders eg Japan WW2 or
B. You occupy and rebuild eg Germany WW2.
With A as an extreme loads of nukes does it and you don't need any armed service's.
With B you need to get access to the country. If we assume the biggest opponent will be China (if you plan for the biggest situation you can down size for anything else),port seasure is crucial. With all the clever chaps in the back office you should be able to calculate how many ports this would be and the calculate personnel from that.
Now there could be a number of ways to capture a port, not necessarily "through the front door" eg beach landing and take it from the land size. With modern computer algorithms etc it should be possible to develop a force structure to meet this plan.
This is not to say the Marrines can not do other stuff, but training for port capture and defence of it would give them a wide set of capabilities that could be used when required eleware
"could be a number of ways to capture a port, not necessarily "through the front door" eg beach landing and take it from the land size."
DeleteQuite right about many possible methods. D-Day was an example of a beach landing intended to seize ports. The drawbacks to indirect landings are:
1. It offers more time for the enemy to destroy the port facilities although that's kind of a given to some extent so that's not really that big a deal as long as we have rebuild capabilities (which we do not, currently!).
2. You'll likely find yourself fighting your way through an urban cityscape to get to the port and we've seen in Iraq and elsewhere that modern urban fighting is very costly in time and casualties.
3. The more time it takes to get to the port, the more time the enemy has to organize and mount counteroffensives. It would be easy to get bogged down in fighting your way to the port and never actually get around to seizing the port!
Still, you're right that there a alternatives to direct landing/seizure and we should be exercising those alternatives. Unfortunately, the Marines have shown zero interest in port seizure. They do not consider it a mission responsibility.
Yep, I agree with you. I wasn't saying don't go straight in and take the port just it is always good to have a plan b,c,d etc.Not only does it give you options it keeps the enamy wondering what you are going to do and makes them spread their forces more thinly
ReplyDeleteI think this will probably be taken poorly by anyone who's not Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, or a Chinese dissident but I see the only way to defeat the PRC is to take the fight into the mainland and fight a war larger than WW2. Naval blockade and strategic leveling of the coast will only go so far, and most likely will produce a neutral peace which will just result in China coming back more tenaciously when we're weaker.
ReplyDeleteTherefore, the main mission of the Marines is in my view amphibious landing/port seizure, and secondarily participating in overland fighting afterwards alongside the army/allies.
So in my view, abandoning port seizure/amphibious assault, is writing up an instrument of surrender coming into effect 15-40 years from now.
" I see the only way to defeat the PRC is to take the fight into the mainland"
DeleteWell, you're certainly in the minority! You're not wrong, at least in theory, but you're glossing over a LOT of practical problems.
We conquered a large portion of Europe in WWII but that was fighting a country a fraction of the size of China and with a fraction of the resources and people that China has.
"produce a neutral peace which will just result in China coming back more tenaciously when we're weaker."
100% correct and this realization has to be the guiding force behind whatever strategy we use. The only thing worse than a war of this magnitude is having to do it a second time because we failed to end it properly the first time.
I encourage you to think of an alternate means of accomplishing the task of permanently ending the Chinese threat but in a more feasible manner. I've offered my own strategy in previous posts. See if you can't come up with an alternative!
I left out non (directly) military considerations, but politically offering an alternative to a unified China is probably a more effective weapon than 36 carriers.
DeleteThere's quite a lot of small regionalist movements throughout China, but interestingly, a lot reject "Han" as an ethnic grouping at all. In fact, some of them have published books that became quite popular in China itself, and they have strong standing evidence wise (quotes from Mao stating he had no conception of 'China' or 'Han' as a youth, and him leading an independence movement for Hunan in the 20s are just a few tidbits).
Dropping some green berets and a few billion dollars per province, and supporting political movements (most translations of core texts, if they exist at all, are extremely low quality and never put in print) will mean the difference between having to fight from the Yalu to Beijing and from Shanghai to Chongqing, and it'll probably save a lot of good men on all side's lives.
We'll also be able to build up formations of Chinese troops from PLA PoWs and civilians; this will mean less pressure on US, Korean, Japanese and Vietnamese forces in general.
That being said, we'll have to be doing land warfare at some point, but it'll be the most practical way of saving us the trouble of occupying most of China while actually winning the war.
"Dropping some green berets and a few billion dollars per province,"
DeleteThis sounds a lot like the 'hearts and minds' theory which is very appealing but has never worked despite being tried many times by many countries.
That said, splintering Chinese factions is a worthy objective but I'd like to see someone come up with a method that has actually worked somewhere!