Just
as perfect is the enemy of good, sometimes secrecy is the enemy of readiness.
F-22
The
F-22 is artificially limited in its performance during training exercises out
of fear of revealing too much about its capabilities.
F-22 pilots may be
restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat -- due to
security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities," the
report said. "These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can
result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. (1)
On
a related note, this may be an explanation for those occasional stories about
foreign aircraft/pilots who claim to have defeated F-22s – along with the
desire by the American military not to embarrass foreign militaries during
training exercises.
For
many years, the Air Force refused to commit the F-22 to operational missions –
missions which would have yielded vast amounts of actual performance data. F-22 IOC was declared in 2005 but the first
combat sortie did not occur until 2014 in Syria
Secrecy
has crippled the ability of the Navy to evaluate the Virginia
Because Navy security
rules prevent the ability to collect useful operational test data from Virginia Virginia
Refusing
to test against a primary threat because of secrecy concerns is insane.
B-2 Bomber
For
many years, the Air Force refused to commit its B-2 bombers to operational
missions – missions which would have yielded vast amounts of actual performance
data. The first B-2 was delivered in
1993 but the first mission did not occur until 1999 in Kosovo.
Electronic Warfare
The
US military has many electronic warfare (EW) platforms and the Russian’s Ukrainian
and Syrian involvements would seem to offer an excellent opportunity for some
real world EW testing but, so far, we seem to be withholding much of our EW
capability although it has been noted that EC-130 aircraft have been ‘disrupted’
over Syria. EW is an area that is very
difficult to find definitive information on so, to be fair, it’s difficult to
determine the exact extent to which our EW is, or is not, being actively
employed. However, circumstantial
evidence strongly suggests that we are greatly throttling back our EW other
than monitoring Russian performance.
Conclusion
While
there is a strong argument to be made for secrecy, if it is taken to the
extreme where we don’t even know how our systems perform then it’s been taken
too far.
Another
key point is that there are very few real secrets anymore. Cyber hacking by Russia, NKorea, Iran, and
China has been so successful that attempting to preserve ‘secrecy’ is probably
pointless. The benefits of actual
testing now far outweigh the dubious preservation of secrecy.
As
an example, when the F-117 was developed the Air Force kept it under tight
wraps, refusing to even admit its existence until it was used in Desert
Storm. At the time, this was probably
appropriate and effective. Today,
however, the Chinese are probably seeing our F-35 technical data in near real
time! Thanks to the Internet and
proliferation of networks, the days of physical isolation of a secret platform being
able to ensure secrecy are long gone.
We
need to start vigorous, real world testing and find out what works and what
doesn’t. Secrecy is no longer possible.
(1)Military.com
website, “Air Force Missing Out on Opportunities to Employ F-22, Report Finds”,
Oriana Pawlyk, 20-Jul-2018 ,
(2)DOT&E
Annual Report 2011, p. 176
A minor correction. The Air Force publicly revealed the existence of the F-117A Nighthawk in 1988. They were first used in combat a year later when two Nighthawks dropped two bombs on the Rio Hato airfield in Panama.
ReplyDeleteI agree that secrecy can cut both ways and can limit the use of an aircraft or missile in a training exercise. But, what about classified testing? The F-117A and B-2 were developed and tested in secrecy before their existence was revealed to the public. In the example of testing diesel submarines against the Virginia class, is it possible this was done later in a classified test?
Quite right about Panama. Good reminder.
DeleteAccording to DOT&E, there have been no tests of the Virginia against SSKs and, in fact, DOT&E goes further and annually calls out the Virginia program for a general lack of testing (not necessarily all related to secrecy).
So, is it possible that later, classified tests occurred? Yes, it's possible but there is no evidence of it and a fair amount of indirect evidence against. For example, the Navy leased a foreign SSK for exercises for several years and was quite public about. That lease expired and there are no publicly acknowledged SSK lease arrangements now.
The Navy has publicly stated that Virginias are not allowed to participate in ASW exercises with other countries.
I'd have to conclude, no, there have been no tests.
You'd figure in the Navy at least, the MK14 Torpedo fiasco would be burned into institutional memory.
ReplyDeleteIf I were commanding a Virginia, I'd pay good money to spend time in a SSK hunting my ship.
The French Millatreuse was so secret, that the Army hadn't figured out how to use it correctly, since most of the Army didn't know it existed.
Practice makes perfect, every place except the Navy.
Re ASW: if we can't trust our allies to keep secrets, why do we have joint commands? I know Japan lost Aegis secrets to China, but is there a reason to believe they are worse than us in that regard? We have the 5 eyes agreement, and we can't trust the Aussies to keep secrets?
ReplyDeleteThe reality is that we can't trust our allies and they can't trust us. The US was caught spying on Germany and many US companies sell military related tech to China. Israel spies on everyone and is selling military tech to various unfriendly countries. Australia sold China its original aircraft carrier. Turkey is buying military tech from Russia and the US and undoubtedly swapping confidential data with both sides. A Canadian company sold stolen satellite tech to China. And the list goes on and on. No one is innocent. So, there is very good reason to believe that any information revealed in exercises and tests could be passed on, either knowingly or inadvertently via cyber espionage, to unfriendly countries.
DeleteThat said, the point of the post was that the benefits of testing outweigh the need for secrecy given the extent of foreign cyber hacking that is occurring. There are no secrets anymore.
Not releasing the results of testing would be secrecy to protect a secret edge like the F-117 everyone mentions. Not testing at all keeps it secret from everyone....especially Congress who keeps asking why the military is buying expensive toys that don’t work. That is why they probably refuse to test. Can’t have a multi-billion sub—our only sub—be outshined by vessels costing less.
ReplyDeleteThey don’t send the F-22 out because if stealth isn’t as perfect as claimed, the F-35 is less useful than an upgraded F-16 or F-18.
F-22s have been operating in Syria for a couple of years.
Delete"F-22s have been operating in Syria for a couple of years."
DeleteThe References to the F-22 relate to exercises and tests. The post noted the use of the F-22 in Syria.
We don't know what limitations the F-22 is operating under in Syria, if any.
The US has stated that we will stay in Syria as long as the Iranians do. The US has admitted we do have a base in Israel.
DeletePart of the reason for all the secrecy is to keep the adversaries in the dark. The adversaries being the People of the United States, the US Taxpayer, you and I.
ReplyDeleteThe logic of we can't test to hide a needed secret is deceptively simple. However I find I agree with many of the comments. All too often the cult of secrecy and classifying everything seems a way to deflect having to justify costs or hide errors or BS about performance.
ReplyDeleteThe secrecy around the F-22 certainly allowed the Air Force to wave away its Hypoxia problems longer than it should have been allowed.
I think there's two separate secrecy issues here.
DeleteOne is the technical secrecy trying to hide performance from potential enemies.
The other is performance secrecy from Congress in an attempt to protect funding.
Neither is good or beneficial in the long run.