The Navy still doesn't get it.
Here's a photo of the recent Reagan and Stennis carrier groups operating together in the Philippine Sea. (1)
 |
| Reagan and Stennis Groups |
Notice the number of escorts? There might be some other escorts detached for side missions but this is consistent with what we've seen over the last couple of decades. We're simply not training like we'll fight. Does anyone really think we'll send carriers into combat with only two escorts? Of course not! So why, then, are we operating with so few escorts? That's not training us for combat. We're not learning how to position, control, and tactically operate a large escort force.
Is a carrier and two escorts even a group? But, I digress.
ComNavOps has stated that carriers will have to operate in groups of four and even this little 'exercise' (more likely just a photo op) has only two carriers - still not like we'll fight. Setting that aside, if we went to the trouble of assembling two carriers, why wouldn't we provide a combat escort and really get some worthwhile training out of it?
The Navy simply isn't serious about combat and, therefore, isn't training for it. There isn't an Admiral in the Navy that has ever commanded a full combat carrier group. We'll pay for this when war comes - and it will.
Train like you fight. Fight like you train.
_____________________________________
(1)USNI News website, "Reagan, Stennis Carrier Strike Groups Conduct Dual Operations In Philippine Sea", Ben Werner, 16-Nov-2018,
https://news.usni.org/2018/11/16/38542
I did think it was interesting timing to see two carriers together after just reading some of your posts mentioning multi-carrier groups. Are they listening to you??😂 Seriously though, I think youre absolutely right. It seems as if the Navy is trying to get (albeit in their misguided way) their material condition together, but the scripted exercises, the lack of basic seamanship competency (ie,collisions), and the financially constrained amount of time doing serious, realistic training does not bode well for our future capabilities and survivability in a future conflict. I cringe at what the results would be of a Navy-wide war warning exercise where every ship is given a couple hours to get underway and steam out into a full red/blue, unscripted, anything goes exercise (which sounds like somthing that ought to be a monthly occurance). Even when I served 89-93, it seemed way too much like a 9-5 job than I expected. Its past due to start recreating a force of warriors, rather than administrators...
ReplyDeleteCBG's are supposed to have one or more subs. The Taiwan Strait is so shallow, 200-250 feet. The waters off the Philippines and the SCS are also. How do we fight with CBG in SCS? With no subs? We use the Northup Grumman B21 which is going to be based at Tinker. Only 35 mins away by air. I will fly around Tinker a lot and hope I get lucky. I won't take photos. I can't wait to see one.
ReplyDeleteNo carrier group is ever going to attempt to operate in the Taiwan Strait!
DeleteAs far as the SCS, looking at a depth chart of the region and eyeballing the area, 50% of the SCS is 4000m or deeper. Another 25% is 500-4000m and the remaining 25% (coastal waters) is 0-500m. Plenty deep enough to operate subs!
In a war, there will be plenty of subs in the SCS. In fact, it will be quite crowded with subs! For US subs, they'll be blockading ports, trailing/killing Chinese subs, patrolling for surface groups, sinking merchant traffic, launching Tomahawk strikes, laying mines (? - if we reconstitute that capability), and conducting surveillance/intel. Lots to do!
Hear, hear! I've had a couple of friends ask me when I spout off on this (and USAF and US Army issues), "So, what? Do you think they're all in the pay of the Chinese (or Communists in general, depending upon how leftist they lean)?" I counter, "What would they be doing differently if they were? I'm not saying they are by any means, but what's the functional difference?" Sigh. Quickest thing we could do (and that's a slow thing) is nearly double the size of our carrier air groups to that which the carriers were designed to operate. And that's too slow, I fear. And yet a lot quicker than replacing heavy attack aircraft, ASW aircraft, and real carrier-borne tankers.
DeleteThinking more deeply about 100% AAW cruisers, I think I'm in agreement with you. Along with arsenal ships with some AAW (sufficient [and then some] SeaRAM and CIWS) for (supersonic) cruise missiles, and ASW ships with some AAW.
Umm, replacing the heavy strike, ASW, and tanking aircraft that we've LOST in the past couple of decades or more.
DeleteQuestions,
ReplyDeleteDoes the Navy run fleet problems like they did in '30s ?
Do the AAW ships train in large (8+) groups against large
(30+) ASM raids ?
Has the Navy ever launched 30 Coyotes against some number of Ticos & Burkes in the real world.
Coach Orange
No
DeleteNo
No
One can't help but wonder what the Navy is preparing for since it clearly isn't war.
They’re preparing for..... their retirement to a think tank financed by contractors who got them to buy unarmed corvettes and carriers that can’t launch.
DeleteI somewhat wonder about the Pearl Harbor factor. You have two barely defended carriers on what are basically peacetime transits in waters. If a Chinese attack force engaged we could have two nearly irreplaceable (in terms of time to replace them) carriers damaged to the point of being offline for months or years. Are their radars actively looking for threats? Even the Israelis got complacent once and suffered a cruise missile attack because the CIWS wasn’t on.
ReplyDeleteIf this sounds like an unbelievable scenario to some, what about if you throw in assymetic thinking, the Chinese could have a merchant vessel take out an escort by ‘accident “ and while noisy rescue operations are underway a sub easily slip in to fire torpedoes. The ASW helos will be lifting off wounded, not laying down detection buoys, and dozens of small boats from the escorts or the escorts themselves rushing to help muddy the acoustics more. In slips slow moving but quiet torpedoes to their targets.
In fact a big 4000 TEU container ship could damage a carrier, especially if it just coincidentally had volatile chemicals among its cargo.
Would our peace loving naval command even let us sink a commercial ship if it was getting too close? When one looks at what 16 near collisions or close calls with Chinese vessels in the last two years, where all we did was either say “shame on you” or watch a Burke get nearly sunk...well, what do y’all think?
I gather that you're talking about a start-of-the-war Pearl Harbor type scenario. Remember, though, that wars don't start with no warning. There is ALWAYS an extended run up to actual war. Consider WWII and Pearl Harbor, for example. We had plenty of warning and knew within a time span of a few weeks when the war would start. We inexplicably chose not to act on the repeated warnings and move to protect our bases.
DeleteSo, given a run up to war and lots of warning time, if we let Chinese ships approach anywhere near out carriers then we deserve whatever happens.
With even a modicum of common sense, your scenario is not even remotely realistic.
CNO,
DeleteSorry if this is too off topic, feel free to delete, but I think it is sufficiently relevant to this comment at least.
I thought it was commonly understood that Pearl Harbor was a necessary casus belli to motivate the U.S. populace to support a major war. Even if we technically had casus belli because of the aggression abroad by the Axis powers, we needed popular support to maintain morale in the Total Force in the face of the reduced comforts of a wartime economy. We'd certainlybenefit from transitioning to a wartime economy now... it might be very beneficial to allow a single (hopefully not two!) carrier to martyr itself to get the vast majority of the Total Force onboard with The War.
"Pearl Harbor was a necessary casus belli"
DeleteThat is a conspiracy theory that has zero historical evidence to support it. Logically, the mere act of attack by the Japanese would have been enough to generate the required support. Deliberately sacrificing the entire battleship fleet would have been stupid and unnecessary.
The same applies to a modern scenario and sacrificing a carrier.
Books have been written on this supposed theory and none have been able to present any compelling evidence. In fact, quite the opposite. The US was going to war regardless of whether Pearl Harbor happened or not. Elements of the US military were already on war footing PRIOR to Pearl Harbor. Read "Battle Order Number One" about Halsey and Enterprise.
“Not even remotely realistic.”
DeleteMy only defense is too much egg nog.
CNOps: My apologies, I'm only vaguely aware of the conspiracy you're referring to which suggests that the whole battleship fleet was intentionally sacrificed. I only meant to imply that political leadership felt they had to wait for
Delete"the mere act of an attack by the Japanese."
Before going from war footing to warfare. I regret the US's sluggish war preparations then and now nearly as much as anyone.
I also don't mean to suggest placing a carrier in a situation with a very high probability of severe damage, just placing them at risk of needing defensive fire. Any unprovoked attack that fails to our defensive fire is useful casus belli.
"only meant to imply that political leadership felt they had to wait"
DeleteThis is a "failing" of the US when it comes to war. We have a seemingly inherent desire to avoid war as long as possible, even when it is clearly inevitable. It often does require a galvanizing act to trigger our response. This is militarily foolish but can also be viewed as a cultural, sociological, and moral strength. It is what it is.
It's interesting to consider how the war would have played out if the US, recognizing the inevitability of war with Japan, had opted to strike first. Where would we have struck? What would we have achieved? How would it have changed the course of the war? Hmm … sounds like the premise for a good alternative history book!
Yeah, it's a political issue which is unfortunate, but changing it is probably far outside the scope of this blog. The relevant question is; given the benefits of having the Total Force onboard with preparing for or initiating a war before it is most convenient for our enemy to strike first, what kind of risk to what asset in what situation would be most likely to produce an effective "galvanizing act" with a minimal cost?
DeleteI think an ideal situation would be to get a potential adversary (anything from Huthi rebels to Iran to China) to make a missile attack against a ship under the AEGIS umbrella - anything from a Burke to a carrier - and defeat the attack with AEGIS. What are your thoughts? How can we get an adversary to actually do this? Is it too risky? You seem to generally consider BVR attacks unlikely to succeed, so that shouldn't be an issue. Is there a better tactic than placing ships at (hopefully fake) risk which could still generate a galvanizing act?
"potential adversary (anything from Huthi rebels to Iran to China) to make a missile attack against a ship under the AEGIS umbrella - anything from a Burke to a carrier - and defeat the attack with AEGIS."
DeleteThis literally just happened! If you believe the Navy (and I've already stated that I don't) a Burke destroyer was attacked THREE times with half a dozen or more missiles off Yemen - and we did nothing.
Iran seized two US Navy riverine boats and their crews and we did nothing.
China forced down an EP-3 aircraft, stripped it, and held the crew and we did nothing - oh wait, we apologized.
So, what do I think of the idea of trying to prompt an unsuccessful attack? I think history makes it clear that won't accomplish anything.
I agree that we should have responded more aggressively to those events, but I'm not sure it invalidates the idea that an attack is necessary before we escalate - only that it isn't sufficient. Unfortunately, these were all "truly" unprovoked attacks which we were. (strategically, if not tactically) unprepared for. A baited attack might still have value if we were *actually ready* to use it as a justification for escalation, and to *actually* escalate... beyond hitting a few radar sites in Yemen.
DeleteCSG 5 just entered Hong Kong for a port visit. We have been baiting the IRG for ever off Kharg Island to no avail. Is that the purpose of our stupid HK port call? Am I missing something?
ReplyDeleteThe underlying culture at the top of the Navy views itself as a Police Force, not a war fighting organization.
ReplyDeleteViewed in this light, ALL modern decisions from the LCS to deploying single ships and minimally escorted capital ships make sense.
Sadly, you are largely correct.
DeleteI'm starting to think we really are looking at this from the wrong angle.
ReplyDeleteIt's not that USN should know better to have more carriers and especially more escorts in a TF. Forget history or just plain common sense....the USN leaders just don't know anymore how to deal with a REAL PEER ENEMY and therefore leadership doesn't see the need for more escorts and more training. On the contrary, USN leaders see no value in training and lots of ships around, it's just an expense and increases the chances a Capt might screw up and get into trouble. Far better to have just a few ships and a perfectly scripted exercises where everybody gets an A and all the boxes are checked....would be interesting to hear how well those 3 carriers, escorts and air wing operated off NK last year? Was everything great and no need to worry OR did USN leaders get so scared of what could have gone wrong,they thought "we ain't doing that again." My guess? They don't want to or know anymore how to operate 3 carriers with a big escort....too much loss of institutional knowledge and just plain too risky for careers.
Take a look at Marshall-Gilberts raids (Jan '42). Two carriers deployed with only two (heavy cruiser) escorts.
ReplyDeleteThere is a precedent of fast carrier forces deploying and operating as a raiding force with few escorts.
The raid accomplished little of military value although it was a morale boost. The early raids were not executed because they were good military ventures but because they were the best we could do with the limited assets available. Once we built up our forces, carriers never operated in single (or even pairs) again.
DeleteSo, yes there is a precedent for unproductive raids but it's not a good one. There's precedent for all kinds of bad military ventures but that doesn't mean we should do them!
I did a post on the raids, by the way.