Iran War Status

Time for a quick Iran war status update.
 
As we’ve discussed many times on this blog, what are the requirements to actually win a war?
 

• Clear Objective and End State – This is mandatory before the first shot is fired.  If you don’t have a crystal clear objective/end state then you are guaranteed to fail.
• Total Commitment – In it to win it or don’t get in it.  Half measures have never won a war and lead, inevitably, to failure.
• Centers of Gravity – You can’t formulate an effective political or military strategy if you don’t correctly identify the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, meaning the “things” that are absolutely vital to the enemy and represent both the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities.  Every center of gravity is simultaneously a strength and, because it can be destroyed, a vulnerability.

With those basic requirements in mind, let’s check the status of the Iran war.
 
 
Objectives and End State
 
Although there has never been a formal, public listing of our objectives, certain objectives have clearly emerged.  They are:
 

• Decapitate Iranian leadership, meaning, kill the mullahs.  This has been achieved.  The leadership role has passed to (or been taken by) the Iranian military (IRGC).  We clearly failed to anticipate that this would happen.
• Destroy Iran’s nuclear capability forever.  This appears to have been totally or largely achieved based on the few public reports we have.
• Eliminate Iran’s ability to strike neighboring countries.  This has not been achieved although Iran’s strike capabilities have been severely degraded.  They are no longer capable of launching hundreds of missiles and are now reduced to a few launches at a time.
• Eliminate Iran as a functioning, rogue nation.  This has been partially achieved as Iran’s Navy has been destroyed, missile production has been severely degraded, missile stockpiles have been significantly reduced, Iran’s air force is non-existent, and Iran’s financial wherewithal has been crippled, all of which significantly reduce, but have not eliminated, Iran’s ability to export terrorism.

 
Total Commitment
 
At the start of hostilities, it seemed that the US was fully committed to the listed objectives.  Certainly, we were using significant portions of our military might.  However, after a few weeks, the force commitment declined sharply and became sporadic demonstrating that we were not fully committed.  A plausible, alternate explanation is that our weapon stockpiles have been reduced to levels that preclude additional, significant expenditures while maintaining an “adequate” reserve for dealing with China.
 
 
Centers of Gravity
 
Iran has a few readily apparent centers of gravity that should have been prioritized in any war.
 
Leadership – Iran was run by the dictatorial mullahs, as opposed to the people, and that group determined the country’s goals and objectives.  Eliminating them was vital.  This was achieved but the assumption of power by the IRGC was not anticipated and an adjustment should have been made when it became apparent what was happening.  For unknown reasons, the US has declined to go after the IRGC leadership in any significant manner.
 
Nuclear – Iran’s main world wide bargaining power stemmed from its nuclear threat.  Without a doubt, this had to be eliminated.  Without a nuclear threat, Iran is a severe nuisance but not an existential threat to anyone.  This was the true source of Iran’s geopolitical power.  It has been largely or totally eliminated.
 
Strait of Hormuz – Along with its nuclear threat, control of the strait was another source of geopolitical power for Iran and the importance of control of the strait was painfully obvious to all.  The US failure to quickly and thoroughly establish control is inexplicable and the continued failure to establish control is even more baffling.
 
Finance – Though of a somewhat lesser degree, Iran’s financial resources represented a source of power and great vulnerability.  The US has imposed sanctions and degraded Iran’s financial resources and access to an extent but has stopped well short of total financial war.  Much more could be done, as evidenced by the periodic announcement of additional sanctions.  Obviously, if additional sanctions can be imposed then that means that financial combat options were left unused which is inexplicable.
 
Financial combat is one of the overlooked “domains” of modern regional war.  It can be devastating and the US has the ability to pretty much totally isolate and “starve” Iran financially but, for inexplicable reasons, has opted not to do so.
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that the US has recognized a couple of Iran’s centers of gravity while missing/ignoring or only partially acting on a couple others.  This points back to the war requirement of total commitment.  It is clear that the US is not completely invested in winning this war and, thus, has worked itself into a stalemate despite achieving some goals and inflicting a great deal of damage.  Unless the situation changes drastically, the cost of this war will continue to rise while the gains stagnate.  This is what happens when you enter a war without total commitment and a clear vision of the desired end state.  To be fair, I suspect that the Administration did have a clear vision of the end state but it did not match reality and now we are floundering.  We have overwhelming strength but no clear idea how to best use it.
 
As I have posted in the past, failure to pursue a war to total victory inevitably leads to having to refight the war down the road.  Disappointingly, it seems we are firmly on that path.
 
 
Note:  This is purely a military assessment and we will not be discussing the political aspects and I will not tolerate personal attacks on President Trump.  Discuss his military policies, if you wish, but refrain from personal attacks.  You are warned.