The Flower class corvette was the epitome of a single
purpose vessel (to be fair, most ships were in WWII). It was designed and built to provide coastal
convoy escort, specifically, anti-U-boat protection although it later proved
adaptable to open ocean convoy escort thanks to its impressive range for its
size. While not designed or intended to
hunt and kill U-boats, the class nevertheless managed to sink some fifty
U-boats.
Design Concept
It’s important to understand the ship’s intended role. It was a convoy ASW escort. Its responsibility was to deliver convoy
ships not sink U-boats. In other words,
was designed to ensure that convoy ships arrived safely. It was not designed to go hunt and kill U-boats. The designers recognized that a mission kill,
meaning forcing a U-boat to break off an attack, was just as good as a kill in
that it delivered convoy ships safely to port.
Thus, the designers, wisely, didn’t try to load every known ASW weapon
and sensor onto the ship. That would
have increased the size, cost, and complexity of the ship resulting in far
fewer vessels being built which would have defeated the purpose of the
class. It is vitally important to
recognize this concept: greater
individual ship capability would have negatively impacted the overarching goal
of getting convoys safely to port.
We have completely lost sight of this balance between mission intent and
individual ship design. By insisting on
building uber-capable Burkes (to the dubious extent that they still are) we’ve
been forced to give up building true destroyers, frigates, and corvettes thus
hurting our overall naval capability.
- ASW fit sufficient for its task but no more than that which contributed to its affordability
- Buildable at small shipyards
- Affordable in large numbers (394 ships built)
- Good range at 3,500 nm at its cruising speed of 12 kts; compare to a Burke with a range of 4,400 nm at its cruising speed of 20 kts
- Commercial machinery operable by reserve and merchant sailors
- Sufficient speed (16 kts) for its purpose
- Built to the minimum requirements not the maximum
- Moderate stealth shaping (no exotic coatings)
- 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART
- 2x Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launchers
- 2x RBU
- VDS
- Hull mounted, small, multi-frequency sonar
- SQR-20 Multi-function towed array
- Acoustic isolation
- Low end radar
- 18 kt top speed
- 5,000 nm range
- 1x CIWS/SeaRAM/RAM
Since Americans can no longer tolerate naval battle ships having limited purpose, every frigate program will end up like Constellations. Many interest groups exploit this sentiment so Congressmen supported by them will add things - guess what, most Americans support adding things.
ReplyDeleteYou cannot put everything in a 3000 - 5000 ton ship at the same time ask for sailing long range. Israel's Saar 6 has very strong fire powers but trade its sail range.
"Since Americans can no longer tolerate naval battle ships having limited purpose"
DeleteThis isn't even remotely true. Americans, meaning the public at large, have no idea about ship design in the slightest and, therefore, neither know nor care about single versus multi-purpose.
Americans listen to "if this ship doesn't have ***** than it is ******".
DeleteAs politely as I can ... you have no idea what you're talking about. The average American couldn't name a single weapon found on any ship. Please don't comment further on this. Thank you.
DeleteMeh. Most modern submarines are equipped with ASCMs. A warship without VLS is basically a target.
ReplyDeleteA submarine is going to be very reluctant to waste its very limited supply of missiles, if it has any, on a tiny corvette. This was true in WWII and is true today. Further, no submarine is going to want to reveal its location by launching weapons at a tiny corvette. A flaming datum is a detection. A target's small size confers a degree of safety!
DeleteYou're falling into the trap of one versus one thinking. Sure, a sub can defeat a corvette but in the overall picture, which is how we should be thinking, a sub that attacks a corvette reveals its own position and wastes precious weapons it would prefer to use on better targets.
Submarines didn"t have ASCMs in WW2. And a cruise missile only gives away a subs position if an observor happens to be looking in the "right" place.
DeleteI am afraid you are failling into WW2 era paradigm of a submarine as a torpedo boat. Modern subs are.really more like submerged, networked TELs.
I would wager Iranian or North Korean midget submarines would be fine with a successful attack on a corvette in the right political scenario. Limited war's impact on public perception makes the corvette a solid target. Ukraine has been plunking civilian ships left and right this week, and our drone strike on Bandar Abbas seems to have gotten more attention domestically. That said, I wouldn't mind a manned version of one of these MUSVs. The Liberty Class by Blue Water autonomy uses containerized gensets to electric propulsion. My guess is it is very quiet.
DeleteWe're looking at this the wrong way. The ASW corvette's job is to do ASW sweeps to suppress the movements of enemy submarines. The enemy submarine is not going to use ASCMs on the ASW corvette, the ASCMs are going to be fired at the convoy the corvette is protecting. What this means therefore is that there needs to be other assets that can do area AAW defense of the convoy.
DeleteTo an extent, while I would really prefer having purpose-built escorts, China's Q-ship concept that they've shown off has some merit as a wartime emergency escort to provide area AAW for a merchant convoy. It has a reasonable radar, point defense, and with 24 SAMs, that's a decent number. It won't completely defeat an attack on its lonesome, but then it doesn't have to be alone - the chinese can just churn out Q-ships with Ships Take Up From Trade.
The other option, of course, is something we ourselves did with the Perry-class frigates, which were expected to provide area AAW as best as they could in their role as convoy escorts. The AAW-grade radar on the Constellation is overkill for an ASW frigate, but it makes a little more conceptual sense if we assume the frigate is providing local AAW coverage to the convoy while working in concert with ASW corvettes.
I would argue that the ASW corvettes should have a modest form of radar, if only for defensive engagements against enemy missiles. The TRS-4D and Sea Giraffe radars used on the LCSs are affordable, proven SHORAD radars, and are already in service with other NATO navies as the platonic example of the minimum viable radar for small combatants.
"ASCMs are going to be fired at the convoy the corvette is protecting. What this means"
DeleteCongratulations! You're one of the very few who are looking at the big picture and, therefore, able to see the correct conclusions.
"Perry-class frigates, which were expected to provide area AAW"
Just for clarity of terms and at the risk of being picky, Perry's were not area defense ships. Ticonderogas (and now Burkes) are area defense ships. Perry's were medium/short range, local/self defense ships.
"I would argue that the ASW corvettes should have a modest form of radar,"
With no Standard or ESSM missiles, only a very low end radar is needed, as the post called for. In fact, if SeaRAM is used, the radar is part of the weapon! Beyond that, something slightly better than a navigation radar is adequate. Depending on the cost, a TRS-3D/4D may be overkill.
TRS-3D can cost as low as 10 million USD per unit (1), which is quite a fair bit cheaper than SeaRAM, which has an estimated system cost around 30-40 million USD. You've mentioned having the 76mm gun with DART ammo for arming the corvette, and if so, it'll need a radar good enough to guide the DART point defense rounds.
DeleteIt would actually seem that the single face rotating TRS-3D offers a decent value proposition as a radar capable of cueing the 76mm Super Rapid in point defense mode, and as a general purpose radar, and being cheaper to boot than the SeaRAM installation. SeaRAM "only" acts as a point defense system, whereas the 76mm can be used for point defense and for the usual things you would use a 3 inch gun for.
("only", he says, as if that isn't a critical function, lol!)
(1) https://www.everythingrf.com/news/details/17225-hensoldt-secures-10m-contract-for-trs-3d-baseline-d-radars-from-the-us-coast-guard
"Perry's were medium/short range, local/self defense ships."
You're right, I was conflating the ranges a little. Anyhow, my point is, the Perrys were expected to provide a modicum of air defense cover for REFORGER convoys. They were inherently less capable than the Ticonderogas and other AAW ships we had in the fleet, but that was a compromise accepted to get as many workhorse ships in the fleet and to free up our most powerful warships so they could be concentrated against the Soviet navy.
Well the first thing to define is the scenario the ship should be capable to operate in. Is it the convoi duty of old? Is it to clear certain areas of submarine movement? Where is the main area of operations? Is it alone or it intended to operate in cooperation with other units? Can it count on there been superior forces to handle the higher end threats from opposing forces, be it from land, air or ship? In the end its the definition of the ships mission and its concept of operations (which you always emphasize, and rightly so, I might say) to determine the shape of the ship. A ship to do primarily escort duty in the Atlantic should be different from a ship clearing the seas from Chinese subs in the South Pacific. And thats the problem of today: Nobody in command wants to commit to a certain scenario, they all want to hedge their bets and there you are with your Burkes or ill fated Constellations and nothing else. They can do those things just fine but you can’t pay for enough of them (and you certainly couldn’t man them even if you had them).
ReplyDeleteSo if you do a South Pacific scenario for example, you should include destroyer tenders for support and need to address the air threat, whether in putting that on the tender or distributing it over the frigates. It wouldn’t work without sufficient air cover in today’s world. Otherwise you specs are fine, maybe add VTOL drones to drop sonar buoys to give it a larger search area and maybe a boxed ASROC/NSM but that would be maybe worthwhile but certainly more than your stated goal of a minimum viable ship.
Oh, and you need to address crewing. If you want to man more than a few of them you need to have a high level of automation if you want to crew them in today’s environment. If you only need to provide crews in an all out war with conscription and mobilization then you can man them without further thinking but with today’s recruitment system you would be struggling to man more than a few.
Delete"crewing. If you want to man more than a few of them you need to have a high level of automation if you want to crew them in today’s environment."
DeleteLOL! You haven't done your homework, have you?
In the 1980's we had a 600 ship fleet, fully manned, with around 550,000 active duty personnel. That's 916 men per ship. Today, we have around 280 ships and an active duty force of around 344,000. That's 1228 men per ship. We have MORE men per ship today and yet you believe we have a manning problem? LOL
What we have is an allocation problem. The Navy claims to have around 140,000 at sea personnel. The rest are shore based. The Navy also has a couple hundred thousand civilians employed. Thus, the vast majority of the Navy is on shore duty and much/most of that is useless. The Navy has more than enough personnel to fully man any size fleet we can build if we eliminate useless shore billets and transfer those people to sea duty. Consider the admiral staffs, alone! Twenty or thirty people per admiral and we have a couple hundred admirals too many. That's thousands of sailors who could be assigned to sea duty!
You're concerned about needing a few to several hundred sailors to man these vessels when we could easily free up tens of thousands! LOL
Look up the keyword "manning" in the archives. I've done posts of this with exact numbers.
I think defining the specific mission is even more important than in the WWII era. If we are plotting a corvette, is convoy duty going to be the focus? Is it ever intended to be part of a CVBG or no? Because in wartime, where the ship will be determines if it needs radar and anything beyond point defense. Whatever it's protecting ( convoy, battle group etc) is likely important enough to have AAW capable ships in company, so the ASW ships would be operating under their umbrella, and only need last-ditch defenses. If you expect the corvette to operate outside comprehensive air defense, and equip it to do so, then you can't have a cheap ASW focused mass produced ship, because you're back into multi-mission, do everything territory... and you end up with frigates or DDGs instead of corvettes...
Delete"ships in company"
DeleteAnd this is the point that so many refuse to see, wishing instead to turn everything into a one vs. one comparison. The reality is that no ship operates alone, in a vacuum. Ships operate in groups and it's the specialization that allows the ships to be mixed and matched to the mission.
Agreed. The FLEET needs to be flexible... not so much the individual ships. If you're escorting a convoy, or BG, you best-guess the threats to it, and add the appropriate number of AAW, ASW ships to counter said threat. Right now all we can do is...Send Burkes!! There absolutely is a need for smaller ships that are mission focused. Like your Fleet Structure spells out, different destroyers, frigate, corvettes... all have a place, not the least of which is saving wasted money on larger ships snd on systems that will be installed and never/hardly ever used... like ASW gear on a Burke, when it and it's trained sailors would be much more useful on a frigate or corvette!!! Im an absolute champion of single purpose ships, even though it's seemingly lost on most people...
Delete"Send Burkes!!"
DeleteSpot on!
Chase pirates in skiff? Send a Burke!
Conduct line handling cross training with the Republic of Antarctica's rowboat navy? Send a Burke!
Our single-type navy has severely limited (eliminated) our flexibility. You are one of the few who grasp the concept. Well done!
Mk32 fires lightweight torpedoes that have shorter range than submarine-launched 21-inch torpedoes. With your listed armament, a submarine could outrange the ship and fire at will with no chance of retaliation.
ReplyDeleteIf you want to be able to threaten subs you need a weapon with at least the same range, meaning 21-inch torp tubes, a new long-range ASROC we don't currently have, or helicopters/helicopter drones.
Also you probably need more air defense (short range, at least) to defend against drones when near land, unless there's another ship doing that. (Not to mention sub-launched missiles as stated above.)
"a submarine could outrange the ship and fire at will with no chance of retaliation."
DeleteI don't know whether to laugh or cry about this. Using your logic, because there are ships that have thousand mile cruise missiles, every ship must have the same or longer range weapons or they'll be unable to retaliate.
"21-inch torp tubes, a new long-range ASROC ... helicopters/helicopter drones ... more air defense "
You've tacked on everything but 16" guns! Well, there goes the cheap ship that can be built in large numbers for a specific, limited role.
Come on. Please use just a little bit of common sense.
My interpretation is that several of these corvettes would be escorting. If a submarine were detected, one corvette might veer off to prosecute the contact. The submarine captain would have to make a decision whether to back off or fight. (Putting the submarine in this situation is a form of deterrence.) If the submarine were to launch a torpedo, the corvette would take evasive action and use its ASW mortar to attempt to deflect the torpedo, as described in the short story Shallow Water ASW https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/03/shallow-water-asw-story.html
DeleteIf the enemy submarine is in range, the corvette can launch torpedoes at it. And if the submarine backs off, that's a mission kill and the convoy is safe.
Is that quite right?
Since we lack the ships to properly escort aircraft carriers, we'll have none to escort replenishment ships for the carriers. This idea might be sold to fill this gap, with maybe half the ships manned by reservists. Otherwise, enemy subs can easily loiter along supply routes and sink big undefended replenishment ships with no risk.
ReplyDeleteIf by "replenishment" ships you mean true fleet underway replenishment ships, they don't follow any supply routes. They are moved as needed to support specific operations.
DeleteIf you mean general cargo ships that would typically be sent in convoys to supply far off bases then, yes, they would have somewhat predictable routes. Of course, enemy subs wouldn't need to go find the routes; they know the destination so they could simply wait outside the destination port (Guam, for example).
Yes, I meant normal routes out of the main supply ports. It would be a good idea to base several of these at supply ports to patrol the immediate area. I'd call them the Ward Class, based on the USS Ward's action on Dec 7, 1941, since subs might enter ports too!
Delete“Ward Class”
DeleteLove it!
As an aside, I would highly recommend watching the classic 1953 British war film “The Cruel Sea”, It is the story of a fictional Flower class Corvette. Yes it is black and white, but still brilliant.
ReplyDeleteD.K. Brown's
Delete"Atlantic Escorts: Ships, Weapons and Tactics in World War II" is an excellent companion to the movie.
D.K. Brown was a naval architect in Britain.
This. Just this is one of the immense frustrations I feel as I look at the way history is repeating. Design a focused/small wartime emergency build ship for a critical role, build one, test it until it falls apart. Design another one. Repeat. A fraction of the price of half the less valuable programs we see. It is completely implausible that anyone thinks the Navy is going to have enough Burkes to escort all the convoys they will need to win any future Pacific War. It just seems so obvious and painful to watch.
ReplyDeleteThe issue is single purpose warship is oxymoron. Vessel thru history were always adapted to accessory usage beyond its intended purpose. The main point is designing a warship is difficult to accommodate its roles or anticipated roles but modilularity and thinking about role for expansion. A US ship without access Aegis combat system is useless for anything other patrol duty. Frigate still reigns in finance driven navies.
ReplyDelete- Dutch outsourced hulls it's newest frigates to Lithuanian and Estonian shipyards.
- Smaller, but still potent An/SPY system adapted outfit exterior of hull
- frigate doesn't need full hangar bay just enough deck space to land.
- BAE Peripheral launch system can add much needed weapons so can revival Armored box launcher giving frigates Tomahawk/cruise missiles capability.
-Nuclear power scoffed as expensive but Trumps push modulation nuclear for National defense and July 4th mandate driven 4 companies to design modular reactors to provide power for otherwise occupied fuel thirsty diesel/gas turbines. They consume 70 gallons per Megawatt vs core design woth 5-10 MWe available in C17 transportable
"A US ship without access Aegis combat system is useless for anything other patrol duty. "
DeleteNot every ship needs everything. That's why there continue to be ship programs that get canceled... because they become too expensive for what they are. The Constellations needed to be ASW frigates... not SPY/AEGIS mini-Burkes, and they deserved to be canceled, because they became a terrible, pointless ship. Adding every gadget to every ship "just in case" is why we have $2B destroyers. Multipurpose ships are the bane of a proper large, flexible fleet. Single purpose ships aren't an oxymoron, they're the key to getting the fleet back on track... a key that nobody seems to want to understand or use.
"Vessel thru history were always adapted to accessory usage beyond its intended purpose."
DeleteWhat you may be failing to realize (from not having reviewed the archives) is that the term "single purpose" does NOT mean it can only perform one function. Single purpose means that the ship is designed and optimized for one role and nothing is added to that if it affects the cost or the ability to perform that one role. With that in mind, there is nothing wrong with performing other, lesser tasks. For example, battleships were designed and optimized for surface combat but proved useful in AAW and land attack. In fact, almost every ship throughout history has been designed and optimized for a single purpose. It is only recently that we've begun the unwise practice of trying to design "everything" ships and we've seen the results with ships that have no purpose and are retired early or that have insufficient combat capabilities for the roles they're thrust into.
"A US ship without access Aegis combat system is useless for anything other patrol duty. "
You fail to understand what true tactical flexibility is. When a task force commander spots a submarine threat and has only a Burke available, he has to either send it after the sub, thereby losing his AAW protection or hold back and lose his ASW protection. True flexibility is having BOTH a specialized ASW and an AAW vessel available and being able to address BOTH needs.
We have thoroughly discussed this. You need to review the archives and come up to speed.
Why British Corvettes Cost 1/10th of a Destroyer — But Sank More U-Boats
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-7XymeZ1To
What is the point of a 76mm for an ASW ship ? And I really question the efficiency of Strales/Dart except against a solitary drone.
ReplyDeleteI mean, the historical Flower had a 4 inch gun despite being an ASW corvette.
Delete"What is the point of a 76mm for an ASW ship ?"
DeleteYou're clearly new to the blog because veteran blog readers know the hundreds of times we've described the many benefits of having an appropriately sized gun available. I'm sure if you put your mind to it, you can come up with many uses. Have a go at it and then come back and tell us how you were wrong!
There's a debate that can be had as to the appropriate caliber for a corvette - valid arguments can be made for both the Bofos 57mm or the OTO Melara 76mm. It all boils down to CONOPS and how we intend to use this gun.
DeleteYou may be sceptical of the efficiency of DART, but some point defense is better than no point defense at all, and the gun at least has its utility uses for when it's not being used as point defense.
"You may be sceptical of the efficiency of DART, but some point defense is better than no point defense at all,"
DeleteWhich is why ALL my proposals, including this one, call for CIWS. Until someone can show me a realistic exercise showing that a 57mm or 76mm gun is effective in aerial defense against anything more than a slow flying drone, I'll continue to go with all of history which demonstrates, repeatedly, that guns are ineffective for AAW.
Lots of people claim the miracles of DART but no one has yet shown me a realistic test on which to base that claim. I have yet to see a manufacturer put a gun/DART on a barge and shoot a missile at it to see what happens. Presumably, this is because they know what the result will be ... failure.
The Chinese were investing heavily in gun based PD at one point - I've seen a research paper from a PLA-affiliated body that argued that you needed a minimum of 12 rounds to guarantee a hit on a maneuvering target - and a 76mm projectile has longer range and faster velocity than RAM.
DeleteTheir intent is to go to a tiered system of point defence, using consolidation with the 76mm gun for industrial economies of scale:
- patrol vessels and corvettes use the76mm as PD and their 40mm CIWS as PD
- frigates and destroyers use 76mm and the PLAN's RAM equivalent
- cruisers use laser, CIWS and RAM.
Their thinking is that since their lighter combatants are carrying a gun anyway, they might as well make it a PD weapon and reap the benefit of the magazine. You can run CIWS and RAM dry in one engagement, but you're not likely to run out a 76mm magazine with hundreds of rounds.
As we can see, as the higher the ship class goes, the more options are carried, because the intent is for a layered defense. (Albeot the cruisers dont use 76mm PD because the Chinese do not have a Sovraponte equivalebt and have chosen not to develop it; this is where their lasers come in).
Correction of a typo: the Chinese CIWS is 30mm, not 40mm.
Delete"and a 76mm projectile has longer range and faster velocity than RAM."
DeleteOf course, neither range nor speed is most important. Accuracy is and accuracy is achieved through high volume of fire or guidance and RAM is guided.
"minimum of 12 rounds to guarantee a hit on a maneuvering target "
That's pure conjecture (fantasy) and I'm unaware of any realistic test supporting that type of claim.
"carrying a gun anyway, they might as well make it a PD weapon"
DeleteThere is no gun larger than a high volume 30mm that I'm aware of that has been proven to be even remotely effective in the point defense role. I'm still waiting for anyone to give me a link or reference to a realistic test. So far, no one has.
"laser"
I hope China commits to using lasers for point defense! They're completely ineffective against anything more than a very slow, non-maneuvering drone and even then it requires extended contact times.
These 76mm rounds are also guided - the Chinese are well aware that unguided rounds for AAW just don't work. Their thinking is that guided 76mm and RAM are essentially complementary systems to be used in concert to protect the ship.
DeletePurely from the kinematics and physics angle, guided gun rounds have the advantage of higher muzzle velocity, which translates to higher range and faster time on target. Firing at the maximum extent of its range, a guided 76mm will impact an incoming missile 10km away in about 8 seconds. RAM will impact in about 15 seconds or so. Now, sure, that's just a 7 second difference, but every second counts in combat. You open up with the 76, fire RAM as the missile gets closer, and uncage CIWS in the last ditch defensive effort.
On the other hand, guided rounds don't have quite the same maneuverability as missiles. Their guidance fins and glide fins are by necessity smaller than missiles, and while they have a tremendous amount of muzzle velocity, they'll bleed energy with every turn, whereas RAM doesn't suffer energy loss quite as bad as the missile remains powered for most of the duration of its flight, and is better able to respond to aspect changes by the incoming target.
There's a question, however, as to how much maneuverability does a point defense interceptor (gun or missile) actually needs. No antiship missile in terminal attack is going to be performing wild 30G maneuvers; the typical corkscrew and weave maneuvers are around 10G or so, because if the missile maneuvers too wildly it's liable to put the target outside of its seeker cone (especially if it's a supersonic seaskimmer).
My personal hot take is that the use of the 76 as a PD weapon is really more of a morale boost for the crew than anything else; it's a way to instil confidence in them by giving them another point defense weapon. Whether it actually works is irrelevant, what matters is that the crew BELIEVES they have an additional form of protection, and are therefore more willing to fight more aggressively. I'm reminded of the hillbilly armor schemes used by Sherman crews in the ETO. A lot of these "armor" schemes didn't actually work, and in some cases actually REDUCED armor protection, but the crews fought more aggressively and confidently.
Some people have emotional support animals; some navies have emotional support point defense.
We also cannot discount cultural factors - in conversations with a Chinese acquaintance of mine, he's mentioned that there is a certain institutional culture in the PLAN that still behaves as though they are a fast attack gunboat navy. The US Army has its Cult of the Rifleman, with the idea that the rifleman is going to be firing at the enemy and outshooting him from a mile away with a precision rifle; the Chinese Navy still has an affection for fast boats with rapidfire guns engaging in gun duels with the enemy.
Delete"Purely from the kinematics and physics angle,"
DeleteIn theory, we only need a single shot, even from an unguided gun, to shoot down any incoming object because our fire control software perfectly predicts where to fire the shot to intercept the object. The reality is that larger caliber, low rate of fire guns have a near zero chance of hitting anything.
In theory, guidance should ensure a hit with every shot, however, I have yet to see a single realist test demonstrating that.
"personal hot take is that the use of the 76 as a PD weapon is really more of a morale boost"
And that's a correct way to look at it. If you have the gun, go ahead and use it. You might get lucky. Guns are for other uses, not AAW (with the exception of low, slow drones).
"The reality is that larger caliber, low rate of fire guns have a near zero chance of hitting anything."
DeleteIndeed, and it's a similar problem with our interceptor missiles. On one hand, missiles, especially the larger interceptors like ESSM, are theoretically better able to deal with maneuvering targets. On the other hand, our historical records for hardkill missile interceptions are frighteningly low.
The advantage with missiles, we at least get to launch a massed salvo of interceptors to defeat a massed wave of incoming missiles. The gun has to cycle and load a new round, and even though the OTO Melara has a decently quick sustained burst rate of fire of 2 rounds per second, it also needs pauses for cooling the barrel. Meanwhile, we can flush the 21-cell RAM launcher or the 8-cell Sea Sparrow mount as fast as we can, because these are indivudual missiles in individual cells. 12 guidance channels shared between 3 director radars on a single Burke isn't going to cut it anymore when our adversaries can generate missile salvos in the dozens.
Idk fam, are those pauses really an issue? You still have doctrinal pauses in firing RAM in order to validate kills.
Delete"In theory, we only need a single shot, even from an unguided gun, to shoot down any incoming object because our fire control software perfectly predicts where to fire the shot to intercept the object. The reality is that larger caliber, low rate of fire guns have a near zero chance of hitting anything."
Delete"https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/08/return-of-broadside.html"
Just FYI, you're arguing here that a broadside of 16" shells will be sufficient to defeat a decent number of antiship missiles. 9 rounds.
" you're arguing here that a broadside of 16" shells will be sufficient to defeat a decent number of antiship missiles. 9 rounds."
DeleteI'm going to be as polite as I can be. You didn't grasp the 16" AAW concept at all, did you? Go back and reread the story and try to understand the concept.
I've always found the Flower-class, and the various smaller modified Trawlers, interesting.
ReplyDeleteThe Flower-class was modified from an in-service whale chaser. It may offend modern sensibilities, but they did have a civilian in-service design somewhat adapted for chasing submersible targets in terms of weight margin and speed. The foreward 3 inch gun was placed where the harpoon gun was.
It's weapons fit was extremely limited, but it had a tiny bit of everything it needed. And Wikipedia suggests that plans to fit 40mm AA were stymied by just lack of 40mm guns, so some ships just had 7.7mm for AA. So they ran right up against the hard limits of weapons that CNO mentions.
The sheer number of ships commissioned, and early in the war, is the keypoint, as CNO attests to. Tiny though their armament was, they were there.
And although designed for coastal escort, they were so good at it (looking at the combined Flower force, not individual ships), that they were good enough for ocean convoys too. Although this may be a function of the parent design.
They had a ship design almost ready to go when they needed it. Do we?
In a different world, the LCS could have been the Flower-class corvettes of our era: littoral ASW corvettes that were flexible enough to serve as oceangoing ASW corvettes, while being flexible enough to perform 2ndline policing tasks that Burkes are overkill on.
DeleteIt's a failure of execution, not concept.
"It's a failure of execution, not concept."
DeleteGotta mildly disagree. The very concept was flawed. The idea that a ship with no crew, no onboard maintenance, needing a formal maintenance stop every two weeks, requiring foreign maintenance bases (where would those be in war???), modules based on non-existent technology, mythical fast module swapping, all for $200M was pure fantasy from day one.
Even the non-existent modules would have been useless in convoy escort. For example, the ASW module (since abandoned) was envisioned as a STOP in place process while the ship deployed remote unmanned vehicles to set up barriers and "trap" submarines. Convoys can't stop. The ASW module would have been useless for convoy ASW even if the module existed. Similarly, the mine hunting was not a mobile mine hunting. It was a STOP and slowly search process. Again, a convoy can't stop.
So, no, the LCS really couldn't have been a Flower-ish convoy escort.
The LCS was a failure of concept even more than it was a failure of execution (and it was certainly a failure of execution!).
It's surprising that they envisioned a stop and sweep methodology for ASW LCS, since the MFTA towed array sonar is already in use with multiple users and platforms, who use it for mobile sweeping.
DeleteI would imagine that trying to do convoy rscort ASW would need muktiple ships and would need to be done like submarines: the ASW corvettr sprints ahead of the c9nvoy to start sweeping, while other corvettes do close in defense.
"It's surprising that they envisioned a stop and sweep methodology for ASW LCS"
DeleteIs it surprising? Do I need to recite a list of the Navy's "surprising" (to put it charitably) decisions? The Navy hasn't made a logical decision in decades. Why would you expect something different for this?
"MFTA towed array"
The MFTA was not part of the original ASW module specification. The Navy later looked at adding it (and a variable depth sonar) but wound up canceling the ASW module entirely before that could be implemented.
What they really.should.have given up on was the modular design and just build that shit in, with know provisions for swapping out equipment.
DeleteThere's an argument that being able to go back dockside and swapnout the damaged shit to get worked on while you go out and donother things is a good idea, but realistically if your ASW gear breaks you probably.are.also dying on account of eating missiles.
Or your shit just don't work, like the Helen Keller frigates.