How often have we seen comments stating that our carriers
are hopelessly outmatched against China because a carrier has only around forty
combat aircraft (160 in a 4-carrier group) and China has thousands of
aircraft? As good naval analysts always
do, let’s turn to history to see what lessons we can learn that might be
applicable. A salient example is the US
Navy’s WWII attack on Japan’s Truk island bases on 17–18 Feb-1944.
Truk was the major Japanese base in the South Pacific and
was referred to as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor" and "the
Gibraltar of the Pacific”. It was
believed to be heavily defended, fortified, and nearly impregnable with five
airfields and a seaplane base and large numbers of warships.
It was feared that an attack on Truk would be quite costly
and might well not succeed. Despite
this, an attack was ordered (Operation Hailstone) and conducted by three
carrier task forces consisting of 5 fleet carriers (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and
Bunker Hill) and 4 light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens) along
with seven battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, and many cruisers and
destroyers.
The US carriers employed their usual run in under cover of
night and pre-dawn launches to begin the attacks and achieved total
surprise. The result was a completely
lop-sided victory for the US and Truk was never again a significant threat.
As it turned out, the Japanese had already begun withdrawing
major naval units from Truk prior to the attack but that does not lesson the
courage and skill of the attackers.
What can we learn from this?
Surprise –
Surprise has forever been a major contributor to success on the battlefield and
there is no better instrument for achieving surprise on the naval battlefield
than a carrier group (submariners might argue that!). In WWII, carriers conducted high speed run
ins to their target under cover of night.
Today, darkness offers less cover but the tactic is still valid. A carrier at sea is generally “invisible” and
can show up anywhere at any time. An enemy’s
superiority can be decisively overcome if surprise can be achieved. The art and task of the military planner is
to arrange matters so as to achieve surprise.
Localized Superiority
– It doesn’t matter how many assets the enemy has in its total inventory. What matters is how many are instantaneously
available at the point and moment of attack – a concept that seems to elude
many of today’s naval observers. The
Japanese had superior numbers of aircraft when the initial US fighter sweep
arrived but the Japanese aircraft were largely caught on the ground (see,
Surprise, above) thus enabling the US to establish and maintain local,
effective superiority. As long as the
attacking force doesn’t hang around too long, local superiority can be achieved
and maintained for the duration of an operation. Thus, the oft claimed superiority of numbers
of Chinese aircraft in their total inventory is meaningless. What matters is how many they can put into
the air at the moment of attack. Even
having superior numbers locally is meaningless if surprise is achieved and the
aircraft are caught on the ground.
Firepower – In
addition to the hundreds of attacking aircraft, the US utilized large caliber
naval guns on its battleships and cruisers to bombard bases and facilities on
the islands and sink several fleeing ships, thus effectively supplementing the
carrier aircraft. As devastating as the
air attacks were, nothing compares to large caliber naval gunfire for
effective, sustained, unstoppable (with air superiority established!)
destruction. This is a lesson the Navy
has completely forgotten. We have no
surface firepower and will one day rue the absence. Large caliber naval guns are a devastating
weapon and it is the responsibility of the naval planner to recognize that and
work to bring that firepower into play, as appropriate.
Another aspect of firepower is numbers of delivery
platforms. The attack on Truk succeeded
due to the immense numbers of carrier aircraft involved (500 aircraft). An aircraft can only deliver a very limited
amount of firepower and has no ability to sustain that delivery without
returning to its base/carrier to rearm which means aerial firepower can only be
applied sporadically. This limitation
was overcome at Truk (and throughout the war) by applying huge numbers of
aircraft. Each individual aircraft
carried an almost insignificant amount of firepower but numbers
compensated. Our carrier air wings,
today, consist of only around thirty actual combat aircraft (subtracting out
combat aircraft relegated to tanker duty because we idiotically gave up our
tankers without replacement). We’ve
forgotten that quantity matters when it comes to delivering firepower.
Courage – Last
but not least, Truk teaches us the importance of courage. At the time, there was a great deal of
trepidation about an attack on Truk but we went ahead anyway. Today, we have far too many Chicken Littles
who see nothing but doom and gloom and are unwilling to take the slightest
risk.
Who Dares, Wins
Fortune Favors the Bold
These are the mottos and philosophies we should be living
by, not
What Will the Chinese Think?
We Can’t Risk Escalation
Look at all the people, including within the military, who
are terrified by the mere thought of engaging Iran, a third rate military, at
best, certain that we cannot win.
As with any battle throughout history, there are important
lessons to be learned and, as with every battle throughout history, the Navy is
deaf, dumb, and blind to the lessons history is screaming at us.
Fortune Favors the Bold
We Can’t Risk Escalation
Can we still achieve surprise anymore? I believe this blog has said before that the South China Sea is a Chinese lake, with them having complete information on our movements within the SCS, the Taiwan Strait, and the Chinese seas.
ReplyDeleteIf we attempt to sail straight into the South China Sea then, sure, we'll be detected. That would be stupid. As with the Japanese in WWII, we would roll back the defense and conduct strikes from OUTSIDE the forward edge of battle not, stupidly, inside. Strikes from outside, properly conducted, would achieve surprise almost assuredly.
DeleteYou're got to think operationally.
It should be noted that the 40-odd aircraft of an American air wing is roughly numerical parity with the average chinese coastal airbase, which usually houses a fighter wing.
ReplyDeleteHowever, the Chinese will never ve able to surge the full strengthnof their air wing becsuse they have to keep flying CAP patrols and standing ready 5 alert. This eats into aircraft uptime and forces them to be cycling their aircraft for maintennance, because if you try to keep all your aircraft up at the same tine, they'll all go down at the same time.
Now, the same applies to us, but because we're the satacker, we get to choose when to strike. We know our schedules. We can work around them. We know just how much we have to push.
I'm missing something. This blog is about the lack of Conops, the stupidity (or worse) of admirals, the numerous ship design mistakes ... etc. And now you want to convince us that the Navy, possibly with some help from the Air Force, would be able to easily counter a China agression againts Taiwan, Guam, Japan ... etc ?
ReplyDeleteWow! You didn't grasp ANYTHING about the post. I can't even be bothered to set you straight. Have a good day!
DeleteTruk is an ISLAND, easily isolated from resupply and reinforcements via a naval blockade. You proposed attacking Chinese coastal cities- presumably on the Chinese MAINLAND- which are NOT easily isolated from reinforcements and resupply. (It would be another matter if you proposed attacking Chinese island bases in the South China Sea.)
ReplyDeleteWhat happened to your STRATEGIC thinking?!
Where did you see a proposal to attack the Chinese mainland????
DeleteThe seat of decision is on land.
DeleteAlso, let's look at things strategically. The worthwhile targets to strike are on the mainland. Sure, China has the atoll airbases, but these are small potatoes and easily taken out. If we want to be forcing pauses to their industry, causing chaos in their forces, attriting their outgoing fires aimed at Taiwan, we're going to have to attack targets on the mainland.
"we're going to have to attack targets on the mainland."
DeleteOf course, but not with carriers parked a hundred yards off shore. Stealth bombers, thousand mile cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles are the weapons of choice for that until defenses have been extensively rolled back.
The nice thing about strike fighters is that, in effect, they're a reusable first stage for cruise missiles.
DeleteUsing the F-35 and the JSM missile on a Hi-hi-lo flight path gives us a combat attack radius of 1000 miles, which is the same as Tomahawk, which does 1000 miles. Assuming 4 squadrons and the a modest load of 4 JSMs, that's a throw weight of 192 missiles, which is quite a respectable salvo to add to the DDGs, which would likely be able to throw up a salvo of some 180 missiles (assuming 6 DDGs in the CSG, carrying mixed general purpose loadouts).
Now I dunno about y'all fellas above, but I'm just saying, 300 missiles is a hell of a salvo to defeat.
"reusable first stage for cruise missiles.
DeleteUsing the F-35 and the JSM missile on a Hi-hi-lo flight path gives us a combat attack radius of 1000 miles, which is the same as Tomahawk, which does 1000 miles. Assuming 4 squadrons and the a modest load of 4 JSMs, that's a throw weight of 192 missiles"
You're somewhat correct. Bear in mind a few things.
1. The Navy planned to reduce the F-35C squadrons to 10 aircraft instead of 12 and only plans on a single F-35 squadron per air wing.
2. The F-35 can carry two JSM internally (4 externally) but as the loadout increases the stealth and range decrease.
3. The current JSM inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 100 missiles and production rates are very low.
I think we would be wise to assume that the Chinese know exactly where all of the six or so ‘at sea’ carriers are at any particular moment.
ReplyDeleteA combination of old fashioned espionage, satellite imagery, sonobuoys, sub-sea listening cables, passive sonar, long range reconnaissance drones and reporting from their hundreds of thousands of fishing trawlers, would make it hard to hide a CSG, vast as the ocean is.
"I think we would be wise to assume that the Chinese know exactly where all of the six or so ‘at sea’ carriers are at any particular moment."
DeleteIn peacetime, yes. In war, no. Setting aside the well known live experiment against the Soviets, in war we'd deplete Chinese satellites, sink all Chinese vessels on sight, eliminate long range patrol aircraft, destroy SOSUS type equipment, arrest Chinese agents in the US, etc.
Yes we’d likely try to do most or all of those things, but it seems statistically improbable that we’d be 100% successful.
DeleteSonobuoys for example are small, cheap and passive (until they transmit a triangulated fix) by which time it’s too late to take them out (obviously); maybe we already know where they all are, but I would doubt it. Fishing (or spy) boats ditto, and successively destroying them would give away both position and direction of travel. Maybe we could manage a clean sweep of all the Chinese spies in the country, but that also seems unlikely (sleeper agents etc.).
So I still think we’d be wise to assume in our planning that even in wartime Chinese would have a good idea of the locations of our CSGs, and in peacetime are likely making this the number one priority in their own planning.
"seems statistically improbable that we’d be 100% successful."
DeleteWhat would possibly lead you to either believe or expect 100% success in war?
You seem to have some very unrealistic ideas about fishing vessels in war, sonobuoys, etc. There aren't that many deep sea fishing vessels and in a war they'll stick close to home or be sunk. We won't be encountering any fishing vessels in the middle of the Pacific and, if we do, they'll be instantly sunk (see the history of WWII naval warfare to see exactly how this plays out). Sonobuoys are not area sensors. They're short lived, very short ranged, pinpoint sensors used to pin down a submarine that's already been detected. You may be thinking about SOSUS like listening arrays but those are completely different. They're fixed and susceptible to being destroyed. And so on.
Consider the real world example of the Malaysian airliner that vanished several years ago in the middle of one of the most heavily travelled and radar and satellite monitored regions of the world and no trace has ever been found.
Detecting anything in the middle of the ocean is a challenging task.
You have some very unrealistic ideas about detection.