Satellite Space

If you’re like me, you’re aware that GPS satellites exist as do various surveillance satellites but you probably have no idea where they’re located (orbital height above sea level) or what this means in terms of war in space and satellite survivability.
 
Most people assume that all orbiting objects exist at more or less the same altitude but this is not the case.  There are various bands of orbits at various heights out to around the geosynchronous orbit at 36,000 km (22,500 mi).  Further than that is the so-called graveyard orbit where satellites are parked at the end of their operating lives if they are not de-orbited.
 
The two main orbital bands of interest for us are: 

• Low Earth Orbit (LEO) (<2000 km / 1,200 mi)
• NavStar GPS Orbit (20,180 km / 12,540 mi)

As a point of comparison, the Earth is around 4000 miles in radius (center of the Earth to the surface of the oceans)
 
Space has become a crowded place. 

US Space Command, which currently is responsible for monitoring the heavens, is tracking some 41,000 pieces of space junk bigger than 10 centimeters … [1]

… NASA, tracks over 25,000 objects larger than 10 cm in LEO, the estimated number between 1 and 10 cm in diameter is 500,000. The amount of particles bigger than 1 mm exceeds 100 million.[3]

It’s becoming even more crowded by the debris fields of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests.  Russian and Chinese ASAT test debris accounted for 20% of orbital collision warnings in 2022.[1]
 
A National Interest website article suggests that China has the capability to achieve anti-satellite kills at orbits out to Geosynchronous altitudes (35,786 km / 22,236 mi).[4]
 
One of the implications of the crowding of orbits is that when war with China comes and anti-satellite weapons are used by both sides, the number of objects (debris) in orbit will increase by orders of magnitude likely resulting in a cascade of collisions (at orbital speeds, any collision is probably totally destructive) with surviving satellites resulting in ever more debris and ever more collisions.  In other words, at some point, a chain reaction will occur which will destroy all satellites in a given orbit.
 
Legitimate uses are also contributing to the crowding. 

… the 700 to 900 kilometer band of LEO, a region that is increasingly crowded due to advent of mega-constellations such as SpaceX’s Starlink communications satellites. That orbital altitude also is being used by the Space Development Agency for its planned Transport Layer of 300 to 500 high-speed, high-volume communications birds.[1]

LEO confers interesting capabilities and limitations. 

Unlike geosynchronous satellite, satellites in LEO have a small field of view and so can observe and communicate with only a fraction of the Earth at a time. This means that a network (or "constellation") of satellites is required to provide continuous coverage. Satellites in lower regions of LEO also suffer from fast orbital decay and require either periodic re-boosting to maintain a stable orbit or launching replacement satellites when old ones re-enter.[3]

As a reference and point of interest, the 20-Feb-2008 shootdown of satellite USA-193 by a SM-3 Standard missile launched by USS Lake Erie occurred at an altitude of around 250 km (155 miles).
 
Space is a lot more complex, in terms of military use and combat, than most of us realize and the implications of combat in space are poorly understood by almost all of us.
 

 
________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Debris from ASAT tests creating ‘bad neighborhood’ in low Earth orbit: Analyst”, Theresa Hitchens, 16-Jun-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/debris-from-asat-tests-creating-bad-neighborhood-in-low-earth-orbit-analyst/
 
[2]Wikipedia, “Global Positioning System”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System
 
[3]Wikipedia, “Low Earth Orbit”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Earth_orbit
 
[4]National Interest website, “How China Could Win a War Against America: Kill The Satellites”, Zachary Keck, 3-Oct-2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-china-could-win-war-against-america-kill-satellites-85176

Reserve Fleet – Nuclear versus Conventional Power

In times past, we kept conventional ships in reserve after they concluded their active service but we never kept nuclear ships, as best I can determine.  This makes sense, I suppose.  I assume that leaving nuclear reactors unattended for years on end, as a reserve ship, is not safe or feasible.  This leads to an obvious question:  is this an additional argument against nuclear ships and for conventional ones?
 
Admittedly, the argument is moot as we no longer maintain a reserve fleet (see, “What Reserve Fleet?”) but, still, it’s an interesting question.
 
As an isolated example, the conventionally powered carrier USS Kitty Hawk stayed in various ‘reserve’ status from her retirement in 2009 to 2017 when she was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register.  In contrast, the nuclear powered Enterprise (CVN-65) began defueling and scrapping almost immediately upon retirement and never spent time in any reserve status.
 

USS Kitty Hawk

We’re beginning to reach the retirement age of the Nimitz class.  With the rising threat of China, wouldn’t it be wonderful to have a reserve fleet of supercarriers?  Unfortunately, even ignoring the Navy’s policy of no reserve fleet, it would appear that nuclear ships can’t be held in reserve status.
 
If we ever returned to maintaining a reserve fleet, the inability to include nuclear powered ships – carriers, obviously – might suggest that conventional power would pay an additional benefit upon termination of a ship’s active status and that future carriers should be conventionally powered.  What do you think?

Carrier Scouting

ComNavOps constantly harps on targeting (see, “Weapons Don’t Matter”).  As I always say, a million mile missile is useless with ten mile targeting.  Closely related to targeting is scouting.  You want to know where the threat is and is not.  In a sense, targeting is a subset of scouting; the final ‘phase’ of scouting before the strike. 
 
Unlike targeting which is purely offensive, scouting supports both offense and defense.  If you know where the threat is, you can prepare your defenses accordingly.  Scouting provides the commander with situational awareness and, as such, it is just as important to know where the enemy isn’t as where he is.
 
Let’s look a bit closer at carrier group scouting.  As always, we begin with historical examples.
 
 
WWII
 
Many of us don’t realize that the standard operating procedure of American carrier groups in WWII was to send a dozen or so scout planes (generally SBD Dauntless aircraft) out at dawn every morning to search the surrounding seas for any sign of enemy ships or aircraft.
 

SBD Dauntless

In the book, Queen of the Flat-Tops, Lt.Cmdr. Mort Seligman, executive officer of the Lexington (CV-2) had this to say about scouting: 

“We are under a handicap out here.  The limited range of our scouts makes it necessary for us to be forever on our toes.  If we want to find out what the enemy is doing we’ve got to move up to within easy range of his land-based aircraft to find out.
 
“On the other hand, the Japanese, by using these 3000-mile Kawanishi [flying] boats, can see a lot farther than we can.  They range out over the ocean and watch every movement within some 1,000 miles of their bases.  There’s little we do in daylight that they can’t know about.  It costs them a plane every so often because we shoot them down every time we come across them.  But with these clouds out here this isn’t always possible because even though we know they are there we can’t always find them.
 
Once their day patrols have come out and they know their waters are clear for 500 miles around, they can relax.  Even if they find us they have time to bring up air defenses before we can get in our poke.  That limits our attacks almost to early morning only after an all-night fast approach.  And it makes it very difficult for us to gain the advantage of the element of surprise which is a much more important factor in war than most people realize.”[1]

Lt.Cmdr. Seligman succinctly defines both the problem and solutions for the carrier group:
 

• Problem:  Our carrier scouts were shorter range than the Japanese land based scouts.


• Solution:  Seek out and destroy the enemy’s scout planes (counter-scouting) and conduct high speed, night run-ins to the target to launch dawn strikes before the enemy can get their scouts out and alert their defenses.

 
Of course, in the open ocean, out of range of land-based scouts, the enemy naval forces had the same scout range limitations we did and the scouting contest was even;  both sides had an equal chance of finding the other first.
 
Prior (or in addition) to carriers, one of the functions of cruisers was to operate floatplanes to conduct scouting.  The Brooklyn class cruiser, for example, operated four floatplanes using a pair of stern catapults and a recovery crane.
 
That summarizes the issue for WWII surface and carrier groups but how does the issue translate to modern times?
 
 
Today
 
The same general issue and constraints apply today with the carrier at, perhaps, a somewhat worse disadvantage. Let’s consider some aspects of modern naval scouting.
 
Scout Planes – Part of the problem is that we have no carrier scout aircraft.  The E-2 Hawkeye is most emphatically not a scout aircraft and they are never deployed too far from the protection of the carrier.  We lack a dedicated scout aircraft with great range and great sensors (passive and active).  Instead, we would have to use F-18 Hornets as scouts and the Hornet simply hasn’t got the range (or sensors) to be an effective scout.  The F-35C offers a slight improvement in range and survivability but is still not an effective broad area maritime scout.
 
Conversely, China has very long range, land-based bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, and UAVs that can serve the scout function, just as Japan did in WWII.
 
Sensors – Enemy scout assets include land-based, very long range aircraft, satellites, UAVs, etc. which, in the aggregate, offer potentially multi-thousand mile scouting as compared to our few hundred mile range carrier scouting capability.  Of course, we also have the possibility of using satellites and UAVs as scouts but given that we’ll be operating far closer to China than to any US bases, we’ll be much more limited in the degree of scouting support we can expect.
 
Strike Range – WWII carriers only had to scout a couple hundred miles out to be assured of safety since that was the limit of carrier aircraft strike range.  Today, cruise and ballistic missiles have extended the potential strike range – and, hence, scouting range requirement - to thousands of miles.
 
Counter-Scouting – One of the F-14 Tomcat’s roles was counter-scouting.  Their job was to eliminate the Soviet Tu-95 Bears before they could find our carriers.  Counter-scouting, today, includes countering satellites, submarine surveillance, over-the-horizon radars, SOSUS-type listening arrays, aircraft, etc.  This can no longer be done just by the carrier’s organic assets.  For example, countering satellites is a strategic responsibility outside the carrier’s capability (barring ship launched anti-satellite missiles).  Countering sea bed listening arrays is, again, a strategic responsibility.
 
 
Conclusion
 
While we may optimistically hope that we can get land-based scouting support, the reality is that our nearest source of scout aircraft in the Pacific theater will be Guam or some such base that is thousands of miles from likely carrier operating areas and that makes any scouting support sporadic, at best, and utterly ineffective, more likely.  Our carriers need an organic scout aircraft that is available whenever and wherever needed
 
Night, and the corresponding dawn search from WWII, is no longer sufficient given that darkness is no longer the ‘shield’ it once was.  We need to be able to scout 24 hours a day and, again, land-based scouts simply cannot provide that capability on a sustained basis.
 
Interestingly, the F-35C could serve as an effective scout plane if it were given a dedicated set of effective passive and active sensors.  The F-35C has a useful degree of stealth, though not up to modern combat standards, and this would allow it to conduct scouting missions survivably and with a fair chance of not being spotted, in turn.
 
The F-35C can also effectively perform the counter-scout role against non-combat aircraft and would even have a chance against combat stealth aircraft, though not dominantly so.
 
It’s clear to see that counter-scouting must extend many hundreds of miles in all directions, on a continuous basis.  This last part is vital.  Given the speed of modern aircraft, it is no longer sufficient to scout/clear an area once a day.  We must have nearly continuous coverage.  An enemy scouting asset can appear far too quickly and cover far too much area to assume an area once cleared will stay clear of enemy scouting assets.  This suggests a heavy reliance on long endurance UAVs.  Ideally, we’d have long endurance, stealthy, UAVs operated by the dozens from a dedicated UAV carrier (a converted merchant ship).
 
The Navy has to start getting serious about combat instead of just being focused on new hulls.  We need to focus on mine warfare, mine countermeasures, logistics, large caliber naval gun support, long range fighters, small ASW ships, close in defensive AAW weapons, and scouting  …  you know, all the things that aren’t shiny and sexy but that win wars.
 
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Johnston, Stanley, Queen of the Flat-Tops, Bantam Books, 1942, ISBN: 0-553-24264-4, p.130

Lead Before You Ask Others To Follow

As you undoubtedly know, Iran has been increasing its attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf.  These attacks can be categorized in one of two ways: 

1. Acts of war against the victim’s home (flagged) country
2. Acts of piracy

In either case, the appropriate response, as allowed by international law and treaty, is, at a minimum, destruction of the attacking force.
 
Rather than taking legal, allowable, forceful action, the US Navy has stood by and watched, doing nothing.  An article by two retired Navy admirals, and others, calls for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, whatever that useless phrase means, as the way to address Iran’s increasing lawlessness. 

In order to convince Tehran to stop its illegal activities in some of the world’s most important sea lanes, determined American leadership is necessary to convince our partners to accept greater responsibility for protecting freedom of navigation.[1]

So, rather than take forceful action, the authors would have the Navy beg other countries to do something.  What that something might be is left unarticulated. 

… the epicenter of US-led naval cooperation in the Middle East, Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), recognizes the need to more effectively encourage and integrate regionwide cooperation, including by leading the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). This 38-nation partnership includes five task forces addressing freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and, most recently, training for partner navies. However, amid this most recent bout of unchecked reprisals from Tehran, the United Arab Emirates suspended its voluntary contribution of maritime assets to CMF task forces.[1] 

The problem with begging other countries for help is that it sends the clear message that we, far and away the most powerful force in the region, are unable/unwilling to do anything.  The result of that is that other countries will wonder why they should contribute resources when the US isn’t willing to take any forceful, productive action.  As the authors note, 

Despite these admirable efforts, they are apparently insufficient to convince our partners that the United States is fully committed to countering Iranian aggression and, thus, will also be inadequate to deter or deny further Iranian aggression.[1] 

We’re attempting to substitute group hugs, meetings, and wishful thinking for forceful, effective action.  This is why no amount of forward presence can accomplish anything.  We could have ten carriers in the Persian Gulf and it wouldn’t deter Iran in the slightest since we clearly won’t take any action.  Iran is seizing ships and shooting at others and we merely watch.
 
Rather than calling for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, perhaps we should try leading.  If we would exert some force then other countries might be more willing to contribute resources.
 
If we want others to follow us, we have to actually lead and that means taking forceful, effective action.  No one is going to follow a trembling coward.
 
This mindset, as evidenced by these two admirals, demonstrates the lack of courage endemic throughout the Navy today.
 
 
 
____________________________ 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “To counter Iran at sea, US must sell partners on doing more”,Donegan, Miller, Ruhe and Cicurel, 12-Jul-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/to-counter-iran-at-sea-us-must-sell-partners-on-doing-more/

Submarine Shortfall

You’re probably heard, recently, that the attack submarine (SSN) force is declining in numbers and is projected to reach a low of around 40 (versus the publicly stated, desired target of 60-70) over the next decade and naval observers and Congress are suddenly worried.  However, this is not a new development.  The shortfall was predicted at least two decades ago.  For example, the 2014 Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan noted that the SSN level would fall from the 2014 level of 55 to less than 50 in 2020 and ultimately down to a low of 42 in 2029 and would not recover to 50 subs until 2038 and would stay at that level through 2043. 
 
The looming shortfall was not only anticipated but embraced by the Navy in 2005. 

The Navy announced in late March 2005 that it planned to reduce its attack submarine fleet to 41 from its current level of 55.[1]

Thus, the SSN shortfall was not a surprise event.  In fact, it was long anticipated and intentionally inflicted.  The Navy actually planned the shortfall !
 
In fact, given that we just noted that 18 subs are sitting in extended idle status awaiting maintenance (see, “SSNMaintenance Backlog”), the predicted low point could be closer to 30 deployable subs!
 
How did this happen?  It’s not a trick question.  For the last couple of decades we’ve been retiring subs faster than we’re building them.  For example, the 2014 30-year shipbuilding plan called for 52 retirements versus 47 launches.  That’s a net decrease of 5 subs over that time period … hence, a decrease and a shortfall. 
 
Despite anticipating the shortfall decades ago, the Navy allowed a several year gap in submarine construction between the last Los Angeles and the first Virginia.  The last Los Angeles class submarine was launched in 1995.  The first Virginia class submarine was launched in 2003.  That’s an 8 year gap.  Yes, there were two Seawolf class subs mixed in there but it was an 8 year gap between major submarine classes.
 
Even when the Virginia class began production, construction was limited to 5 launches, less than one per year, from 2003-2008, inclusive. 
 
So, facing a known shortfall, the Navy’s response was to program in an 8 year gap in production and build less than one per year for the 6 years subsequent to the gap.  Clearly, the Navy was unconcerned about the looming shortfall.  Now, however, the Navy is attempting to deflect by placing the blame and responsibility on industry for somehow failing to have adequate production capacity.
 
And still the Navy is not serious about mitigating the shortfall.  For example, the current 5-year plan calls for 10 retirements which is two per year.  Compared to the build rate of 1.2 subs per year, it’s obvious why we have a worsening shortfall.
 
According to industry, US submarine production capacity is currently limited to a theoretical maximum of two subs per year, however, the actual production rate is barely more than one per year.  The entire Virginia class has, thus far, seen 25 launches in the 21 years from 2003-2023, inclusive.  That’s a sustained production rate of only 1.2 subs per year.
 
In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive.  That’s a build rate of 2.8 subs per year, nearly three per year!  Now, we’re down to barely one per year.
 
The Navy talks publicly about building three subs per year but that’s clearly a fantasy that’s entirely disconnected from reality.
 
The Navy had two decades to address the shortfall and consciously chose not to address it.  They are only now attempting to address it because a panicking Congress is beginning to ask questions and, even so, the only real effort the Navy is making is to try to place blame on industry instead of themselves.  That’s not addressing the shortfall, that’s addressing the public relations.
 
 
Options
 
So, what could have been done over the preceding two decades and what can we currently do to mitigate the shortfall?
 
Retirements - The obvious, immediate, short term solution is to stop retiring subs.  We early retired a dozen Los Angeles class subs with less than 20 years service (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls and Retirements”)!  Many more have been retired with less than 30 years.  Even subs nearing the end of their scheduled service life can be retained in an idled status against the advent of war.
 
Operational Patterns – We could have, and still should, stop deploying subs on extended cruises.  Going to a home-port maintenance and training concept, as we’ve frequently discussed, would reduce the ‘dive cycles’ and full power nuclear use which depletes the nuclear fuel and would extend the life of the subs.
 
There is value in submarine missions that map out the underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density, currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines, monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat submarines.  A much reduced capability submarine could be built for the specific purpose of monitoring, as just described.  Non-combat SSKs would be a cheap and highly effective platform for the types of data collection just listed while the bulk of the SSNs remain in a home-port training/maintenance condition, preserving and extending their life spans.
 
Capacity – The Navy had two decades to promote and develop additional production capacity and, perhaps, an additional shipyard but opted not to.  Programming in an 8 year production gap followed by 6 years of one sub per year is the opposite of building production capacity.  Instead, the Navy allowed industry’s production capacity to decrease as shipyards adjusted to lower production demands and allowed skilled workers to retire without replacement.  As industry noted, 

The presidents of both shipyards [General Dynamics and Newport News] recently said they believed they could handle three SSNs a year but that they and their suppliers would only invest in the additional infrastructure, machinery and people if the Navy sent a clear demand signal and committed to higher shipbuilding rates for a long duration.[2]

The Navy’s haphazard production program does not give industry the confidence to increase production capacity.  You may recall the 29-boat Seawolf class that was truncated to just three?  Not exactly confidence-inspiring.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The incompetence and willful disregard by the Navy in addressing the shortfall has been nothing short of stunning and constitutes dereliction of duty by a succession of CNOs, each of whom should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Finally, let’s close this out with an hysterical lie by the Navy.  Referring to production capacity, Rear Admiral David Goggins had this to say, 

He said the Navy would not build the ships if they couldn’t properly maintain them … [2]

That’s hilarious!  Hey, Admiral … I’ve got some bad news for you.  The Navy isn’t properly maintaining any of their ships!
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/scn-sub.htm
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Confident It Could Build 3 Virginia SSNs a Year, Though More Study Needed On Shipyard Capacity”, Megan Eckstein, 18-Nov-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/11/18/navy-confident-it-could-build-3-virginia-ssns-a-year-though-more-study-needed-on-shipyard-capacity#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20just%2050%20SSNs%20today%2C%20is,goal%20of%20as%20many%20as%2080%20by%202045.

SSN Maintenance Backlog

We just read about the USS Boise (SSN-764), which has been idled since Jan 2015 awaiting dry dock availability and is finally beginning its maintenance period.  The optimistic unrealistic hope is that Boise returns to service in late 2023 or sometime in 2024 which would be an 8-9 year period of idleness.  You would hope that this is some sort of sick April Fool’s joke but it isn’t.  This is the sad reality of our naval maintenance effort.
 
Was Boise just a bad luck, bad circumstances, fluke?  How is the rest of the SSN submarine fleet doing as regards maintenance?
 
According to a just released CRS report, 37% of the SSN fleet is currently idled in, or awaiting, depot maintenance, overhauls, and dry dock availability and are non-operational.[1]  That’s 18 of the 49 SSN subs in the fleet that are sitting idle, leaving just 31 operational SSNs in the US fleet.
 
China doesn’t need to worry about our submarine fleet … it’s sitting idle.
 
Sure, we couldn’t keep SSNs, arguably the most lethal component of our military, in service but we made sure we kept building LCS so that we could retire them as they completed construction and we made sure that we built all the Zumwalts and we pushed the Ford through despite having utterly unreliable catapults, traps, and weapon elevators.
 
New hulls … yes!
 
Maintenance … no.

Our Submarine Force?

 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, 6-Jul-2023, RL32418

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss

Marine Corps Commandant Berger’s term of office has ended.  While that is cause for celebration, the celebration is exceedingly short lived and subdued due to the fact that his presumed successor, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith, is almost certainly a clone of Berger.  Berger’s number two is assuredly a near carbon copy of Berger or else he wouldn’t have been Berger’s number two.
 
I hope Smith will be a better Commandant but the odds on that are vanishingly low.  We’ll see …