Ford Minimal Manning

Minimal manning always fails and the Navy always winds up increasing the crew size.  Despite this, the Navy keeps justifying new ship classes based, in part, on reduced manning and anticipated cost savings from the reduced crew size.  Let’s take a look at how this is working out with the USS Ford.

 

Ford was ‘sold’ partly on the basis of significantly reduced crew size and, hence, reduced Operating and Support (O&S) costs compared to legacy carriers.  The table below, adapted from Table 4 in the GAO report (1, p.42), shows the crew size and O&S costs for the Nimitz class, the Ford’s initial estimates upon which the design was ‘sold’, and the Ford’s current levels.  Critically, the Ford’s berthing capacity is 4660.(2)  Thus, Ford is already at or beyond its berthing capacity.

 

 

	Nimitz	Ford - Initial	Ford - Current
Crew Size	5200	4476	4656 – 4758 b
Annual O&S Costs a, $M	490	278	391

 

^a costs adjusted to constant FY2000 dollars

^b from DOT&E annual reports, ref. (2); ship berthing capacity is 4660

 

 

We see that the Navy sold the Ford as requiring 724 fewer crew resulting in a 43% drop in O&S cost.

 

The current reality is a 544 – 442 drop in crew size and a 20% drop in O&S cost.

 

Without a doubt, crew size and O&S costs will continue to increase as an actual deployment approaches, sometime in the next few years, perhaps.  However, the Ford has already reached the limit of its designed berthing capacity of 4660.

 

… the Navy has already increased the size of the planned crew to the maximum allowed by the ship’s design. Nonetheless, additional crewing concerns persist for key systems—including the weapons elevators, advanced arresting gears, the machinery control system, among others—that are not yet well understood and may require additional sailor support to operate and maintain. (1, p.53)

 

The history of the LCS, Zumwalt, LPD-17, and Ford demonstrate, with near 100% certainty, that the Navy’s estimates, whether crew size, O&S costs, or construction costs are always wrong and always significantly underestimated.  Despite this, the Navy keeps pumping out fraudulent estimates (fraudulent, because they know they’re wrong) and Congress keeps lapping them up.

 

Increased crew sizes over and above initial estimates have occurred for other ships and the increases have resulted in increased O&S costs.

 

Similarly, DDG 1000, LCS, and LPD 17 program officials also reported that increasing crew sizes was a major contributor to higher sustainment costs for these programs. (1)

 

The Navy has made a habit of assuming cost savings from unproven practices only to have the practices fail and the supposed savings turn into added costs.  For example,

 

Further, the shipbuilding programs we reviewed made assumptions based on unproven initiatives, in conjunction with reducing crew sizes that ended up having a greater effect on the cost of maintaining ships than initially estimated. For example, for four ship classes—SSN 774, DDG 1000, LPD 17 Flight I, and LCS—the Navy originally planned to use a maintenance initiative called performance-based logistics, which called for the use of contractors to conduct maintenance instead of sailors on board the ships.  … Shipbuilding program officials stated that the Navy has now largely abandoned this approach after attempting to contract for performance-based logistics and discovering that it was much more costly than planned.  (1, p.42-43) [emphasis added]

 

There’s your entire LCS manning and maintenance model … gone.  Wouldn’t you have thought that around day two of the LCS concept, someone would have actually made a few phone calls and priced out the contractor support instead of making a ridiculously optimistic estimate, based on nothing?  But, I digress …

 

One of the crippling aspects of the designed-in minimal manning assumptions is that the berthing capacity is physically limited.  Ford has already reached or exceeded the limit of its berthing capacity with more crew increases sure to come and the LCS long ago exceeded theirs.  I’ve heard reports and complaints from the LCS about doubling up racks and other, less than desirable berthing accommodations but I can’t independently verify them.  If you recall, one of the selling points about the LCS was that it was going to provide ‘luxurious’ accommodations, by comparison to other ships.  Well, that selling point has vanished.  It will be interesting to see what Ford does to squeeze in more berths.

 

The Ford is yet another example of the abject failure of minimal manning (and that’s before we consider damage control and combat casualties) and yet the Navy resolutely continues down that path.

 

 

 

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(1)Government Accountability Office, “Navy Shipbuilding - Increasing Focus on Sustainment Early in the Acquisition Process Could Save Billions”, GAO-20-2, Mar 2020

 

(2)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), FY2019 Annual Report, Dec 2019, p.123

Mishap Rates

The National Commission on Military Aviation Safety (NCMAS) has published a report analyzing military mishaps for the last decade or so.  For those of you who, like me, have no idea who/what this organization is, it is a commission established by Congress in 2019 to examine the rates and causes of military aviation mishaps.

 

The report identifies the many causes in great detail though they have a tendency, I think, to emphasize funding over other causes.  Funding is an issue, certainly, but is a secondary one.

 

I’m not going to bother listing all the findings of the report.  They’re what you’d expect and you can read the details for yourself, if you’re so inclined.  Instead, I want to pick out a few key aspects and apply my own analysis.

 

The following table from the report shows the combined Class A-C mishap rates for the various services and shows that the Army and Air Force mishap rates from 2007 – 2018 have held steady, on average.  In contrast, the Navy rate increased steadily from 15 in 2007 to 24 in 2018 and the Marine rate increased from 11 in 2007 to 32 in 2018.

 

 

 

My takeaways and analysis for the increased mishap rates for the Navy and Marines:

 

Simulators – As supposed budget constraints (a fraudulent meme, by the way) have been imposed, simulator usage has increased in an attempt to reduce expenditures.  However, as simulator usage has increased, so too have mishaps.  Simulators are simply not a viable substitute for the sheer overwhelming physical sensations of actual flight.  A simulator is a nice way to review emergency procedures but it is not an effective method of learning to fly.  There is a reason why naval aviators qualify on the boat, not on simulators.

 

Monthly Flight Hours – Monthly flight hours have been severely cut back.  Minimum flight hour waivers are now commonplace.

 

Navy aviators said they are not getting 11 hours per month unless they are preparing to deploy. Although the Marine Corps’ goal for CH-53E pilots is 15 flight hours per month, one pilot said, “We too often are in the single digits for flight hours per pilot per month, a dangerously low number of flight hours to be decent at a very difficult trade.” Many Marine Corps aviators said they averaged about five hours per month. (1, p.61)

 

Waivers – There are only two solutions to insufficient flight hours: increase the hours or use waivers.  Which do you think the Navy chooses?

 

With fewer flight hours, pilots risk losing currency. The Commission found evidence that the Services have increased their reliance on waivers to operate despite currency and proficiency shortcomings. (1, p.61)

 

Do you recall the last time a discussion of waivers came up?  That’s right.  It was during the aftermath of the two Burke collisions with cargo ships when it was found that numerous required certifications were being routinely waived.  How did routine waiver use turn out then?

 

What happens when waivers are routinely used?  The report put it quite nicely:

 

The proliferation of waivers represents a new normal and acceptance of degraded standards. The Commission found senior leaders and safety officials unaware to what appears to be an erosion of safety. (1, p.62)

 

Waivers represent failure.  Failure to adhere to standards.  Failure to make the hard choices.  Failure to correct known, on-going problems.  Failure of leadership.  Failure.

 

Pressure – The pressure in the military to make do and always respond in the affirmative is enormous and has been cited in almost every plane and ship incident report.  ‘Gung ho’ makes a great advertising slogan on a recruiting poster but a lousy safety philosophy involving multi-billion dollar ships and multi-hundreds of million dollar aircraft.  Unceasing ‘can do’ inevitably turns on itself and results in mishaps and fatalities as we’re witnessing over and over again, today.

 

The immediate result of ‘can do’ attitudes is the acceptance of shortcuts.  In the report, the Marines were identified as the biggest culprit in maintenance and procedural shortcuts.  It’s hardly surprising then, that the Marines also demonstrated the biggest rise in mishap rate.

 

 

Summary

 

The Navy and Marine mishap rate increases are not a random occurrence.  They are not an Act of God that can’t be controlled.  They are not something that just happens, like catching a cold.  Instead, they are a conscious choice by Navy and Marine leadership to have more mishaps.  Wait, what now?  No way!  No Navy or Marine leader would make a conscious decision to have more mishaps, you say?  Well, you’re wrong.  No decision IS a decision.  The decision to do nothing about the ever-increasing use of waivers IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  The decision to do nothing about the use of simulators over actual flight hours IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  The decision to do nothing about the increased use of shortcuts and maintenance deficiencies IS a decision to have and accept more mishaps.  Make no mistake.  Navy and Marine leaders have chosen to have and accept more mishaps.

 

 

 

 

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(1)National Commission on Military Aviation Safety, Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, 1-Dec-2020

Army Admits Abject Failure

I know this isn’t a Navy matter but this is too important to ignore.  Here’s a stunning admission of failure from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

 

In addition to reaching something of a stalemate, where the Taliban can’t conquer the U.S.-backed Afghan security forces, and the U.S. can’t bring the Taliban to its knees, Army Gen. Mark Milley said Wednesday during a Brookings Institution event, the U.S. has probably done all it can do.

 

“We believe now that after 20 years, two decades of consistent effort, that we he have achieved a modicum of success,” he said.

 

Since the first boots hit the ground in October 2001, more than 2,400 American troops have died and nearly 21,000 have been injured, along with close to $1 trillion spent on trying to stabilize Afghanistan enough that it won’t again become a training ground for terrorist groups.

 

 

Are you kidding me????  Twenty years of effort and we have achieved a ‘modicum of success’?  And you know he’s spinning that in the best possible way.  The reality is much less rosy than even that marginal claim.

 

2400 deaths

21,000 wounded

$1 trillion

 

A ‘modicum of success’?

 

Let’s consider some of the issues this raises:

 

• Why are we pursuing high tech when we couldn’t even beat a bunch of goat herders with no technology?  How would even more technology produce a better result?  What’s going to happen when we go up against China?
• Is this an example of our misguided focus on technology, networks, and data at the expense of actually killing people in the most efficient manner possible – meaning with the greatest degree of overwhelming firepower?
• Is 20 yrs and a ‘modicum of success’ the standard of success for our professional military leaders?  Shouldn’t heads be rolling by the dozens?
• Why are we continuing to jump into conflicts that have no possible successful outcome?
• Do we have the will to win these types of conflicts or has our military (and, to be fair, our civilian leadership) become so feminized that we no longer have the stomach to do what has to be done to achieve victory? 
• Has avoidance of casualties, both ours and the enemy’s, become so ingrained in our military that we can’t be brutal enough to win?  What will happen when we fight China?
• Why are we entering conflicts without clear victory conditions?

 

 

This reprehensible abomination of a result would be beyond the comprehension of our WWII military leaders.  They would be in total shock over this.  They won a world war in a few years and today we can’t even defeat goat herders in 20 yrs.

 

We’re paying for a standing military that can’t even defeat third world terrorist goat herders.  We spend $700B/year to maintain a military that is, by the admission of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manifestly incompetent and incapable.  We could have abolished the military, saved all that money, not gotten involved in Afghanistan at all, and wound up in about the same place.  What did our investment in the military get us?

 

We need to either drastically downsize the military or drastically upsize our standards and clean house of all current flag officers and then start demanding actual performance from the next group of leaders.

 

If Gen. Milley had an ounce of integrity he’d fire every flag officer and then resign in disgrace and embarrassment.  That he doesn’t is symptomatic of what’s wrong with our military.  This man disgusts me.

 

 

 

(1)Military Times website, “Military’s top officer says we’ve had a ‘modicum of success’ in Afghanistan”, Meghann Myers, 2-Dec-2020,

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/12/02/militarys-top-officer-says-weve-had-a-modicum-of-success-in-afghanistan/

Unthinkable

Unthinkable. 

 

Untouchable. 

 

Inviolable. 

 

There are some things related to the military that are constants and can never be changed.  As we discuss the various issues, I often see this attitude reflected in comments.  People scoff at certain ideas because they see them as constants, as givens.  This introduces and promotes a degree of rigidity of thought;  an unwillingness to even consider certain ideas.

 

What is a real world example of what I’m talking about? 

 

Over the last few years, I posted that the Marines were moving steadily down the path of becoming light infantry and that they would shed their armor and firepower.  This notion was roundly and soundly dismissed and mocked with statements such as:

 

‘The Marines are never going to drop their tanks.’

 

‘The Marines are never going to reduce or drop artillery.’

 

‘The Marines are never going to abandon amphibious assault.’

 

And yet, all of those unthinkable things have come to pass.  The people who held fast to their inviolable beliefs were wrong.  Completely and totally wrong.  The unthinkable not only happened but it happened with stunning speed.

 

The point of this post is not to mock those who were wrong, the point is to note that the unthinkable can, and does, happen and we have to at least consider the possibility. 

 

With that backdrop, I’d like to consider some unthinkable possibilities for the Navy.  Please note that just because I mention these, it does not mean that I favor them or believe them likely to happen.  In fact, I’m far more likely to be violently opposed to them but they need to be contemplated so that we can watch for their appearance and react appropriately.

 

So, here are some previously unthinkable actions that could come to be:

 

 

Burkes Early Retired and Replaced With Umanned Vessels – I have made this statement many times and the common reply is mocking and scoffing and yet the Navy has stated publicly that Burkes will be replaced, if not on a one for one basis, with unmanned vessels.  I suggest that it is possible that the entire Burke fleet may eventually be replaced with unmanned vessels and far sooner than anyone might think.

 

Carriers Reduced to 9 – The Navy has tried multiple times to early retire one of the carriers only to have Congress stop them.  We only have 9 air wings so you can see where the Navy is planning to go with carrier numbers.

 

Air Wing Size Reduced To Less Than 60 Aircraft – Air wings have dropped from around 90 to the current mid 60’s and the Navy has already stated that when the F-35C joins the fleet, F-35 squadron sizes will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10.

 

Entire LCS Fleet Retired Early – Would this one really be a surprise?  The Navy has already announced that the first four ships are being early retired and the remainder have no mission.  Given the Navy’s obsession with reducing manning, do you really see them continuing to crew ships that have no mission?

 

Ballistic Missile Submarines Eliminated – The Navy already rationalized a reduction in SSBNs from the current 14 with 24 Trident missiles each, to 12 with 16 Trident missiles each.  Given the enormous cost of construction and operation and the unlikeliness of ever using them, is it really unthinkable that they would be eliminated?  The Navy could build a lot more unmanned ships if they didn’t have to pay to build and operate SSBNs.

 

Amphibious Ships Eliminated – The Marine Corps Commandant has publicly stated that the Marines are out of the assault business and has called for small transports instead of large amphibs.  I suspect the amphibs will be early retired without direct replacement.

 

 

Summary

 

I strongly suspect that most readers would instantly claim that none of the above could happen (with the possible exception of the LCS fleet being retired) and would mock the very notion.  However, all available evidence suggests that some or all of these will happen.  Recall that we’ve seen the Air Force attempt to eliminate the A-10, the most effective close air support aircraft ever built.  Who would have ever thought that?

 

Once you recognize the Navy’s real objectives – to put new hulls in the water and to reduce manning to zero – many of the above possibilities become much more ‘reasonable’ and likely from the Navy’s warped perspective.

 

So, with all that we’ve seen, go ahead and tell me how none of the possibilities I’ve listed could ever happen!  Or, tell me what unthinkable possibility you see.

F-35 On Carriers? Sorry, Can't Use 'Em

When the USS Ford was being built, we all assumed, quite logically, that the ship would be able to operate the F-35 which had been around for twenty years or so, in various stages of development.  The timing was looking about right – the carrier and the F-35C would both be ready about the same time.  Well, in yet another disappointment for the Ford, it turns out that the carrier wasn’t actually built to operate F-35s.  No, this is not an April Fools post or some ComNavOps comedy piece.  This is real.  The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate the F-35.

 

As it turns out, most of the Navy’s carriers and amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) can’t operate the F-35. 

 

Yes, the F-35C can take off and land on the carriers but the ships lack the communications, data integration, and maintenance facilities to fully utilize the supposed capabilities of the F-35 – those much hyped surveillance capabilities.  Without the proper comms and data handling facilities on the carriers, the F-35 can collect data but can’t effectively relay it to the carrier and allow the carrier to make use of it. 

 

On a related and stunning note, the US Navy has almost no ability to transfer F-35 engines to carriers.  The Ford is the only carrier that has the equipment to receive an engine.  The MV-22 has demonstrated the ability to transport a single engine to a carrier but this can only be done over very short distances.

 

As far as the amphibious ships, none can land the F-35B due to its excessive exhaust heat which damages the flight deck unless it has been specially modified.  You’ll recall that even the new USS America was unable to operate the F-35B, as the ship was built.  It had to be modified with special deck heat treatments, thermal and structural modifications to compartments immediately beneath the flight deck, and relocation of equipment in the path of the F-35B’s downward landing exhaust in addition to numerous communications and data handling facility installations and modifications.  Yes, America, the ship that was purpose built for the F-35B was unable to operate the F-35B without extensive and expensive modifications.

 

In fact, of 11 carriers and 33 amphibious ships, currently only 4 amphibious ships can fully operate the F-35.(1)  The lucky four are listed below.

 

• USS Essex
• USS Makin Island
• USS America
• USS Wasp

 

Even with the modifications, the F-35B can only land on a couple of limited spots.  For the America, the F-35B can only land on spots 7 and 9.(2)

 

It is worth noting that none of the supercarriers can operate the F-35.

 

The USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6, which recently suffered a massive fire that burned out of control for several days, would have been the fifth ship altered to operate the F-35.  The Bonhomme Richard is now, officially, being scrapped.

 

So, for those of you who envision air armadas of Navy F-35s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, that vision is still a long way in the future because we only have four amphibious ships that can even operate the F-35!

 

It is worth noting that the modifications required to operate the F-35 require many months and hundreds of millions of dollars to install (I assume the F-35 proponents are dutifully adding that to the cost of the F-35?).  It is not a capability that can be quickly installed when needed.  It will take decades to bring the current ships up to the standard required to handle the F-35.  If a war were to start today, we’d be limited to four amphibious ships operating our F-35s.

 

What is all this telling us?  What lessons are being demonstrated (and ignored!)?

 

• In our pursuit of technology, we created an aircraft too complex to even communicate with our carriers.
• Concurrency kills.
• Even the modified ships have only a limited F-35 operating capability and, in the event of battle damage, we might lack the ability to operate the aircraft due to damage to the couple of specific landing spots.
• In pursuit of the big, expensive, flashy toys, we’re ignoring the mundane support and infrastructure needed to even fully operate the toys.

 

 

 

Just a reminder … When the F-35C reaches squadron service, the Navy is planning to reduce the squadron size from the current 12 aircraft to 10, further shrinking the already shrunken air wings.  The F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving!

 

 

 

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “USS Bonhomme Richard Heads For Scrapyard After Devastating Fire ”, Paul McLeary, 30-Nov-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/uss-bonhomme-richard-heads-for-scrapyard-after-devastating-fire/

 

(2)Jalopnik website, “Navy Builds Ship For F-35, Ship Needs Months Of Upgrades To Handle F-35”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-Apr-2015,

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-builds-ship-for-f-35-ship-needs-months-of-upgrade-1697523492

• 
  

Weapon System or Jobs Program?

As we’ve so thoroughly demonstrated, our professional military has forgotten what real war is and is no longer producing weapon systems based on combat effectiveness.  Instead, other factors have become paramount in weapon system design and acquisition.  The F-35, for example, was clearly designed as a jobs program and accounting exercise rather than a truly effective combat system.  The LCS very quickly demonstrated that it was not an effective combat system and yet production continues, even today.  Why?  Jobs program.

 

Here’s an example that demonstrates that this phenomenon is not limited to the US.  Below is a graphic advertising the Franco-British Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) project.(1)  Note what system attribute is displayed with the largest typeface number.  That’s right, it’s a claim that the project will support 215 jobs.

 

The West has pretty much abandoned any pretense that it is designing combat systems.  Instead, it’s designing jobs programs or accounting projects or budget balancing exercises or public relations demonstrations.  Of course, if the project just happens to have some actual military value … well … that’s a bonus but it’s not a requirement.

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “MMCM Program Enters Manufacture Stage with Initial Production Contract Award”, Nathan Gain, 26-Nov-2020,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/uks-mmcm-program-enters-manufacture-stage-with-initial-production-contract-award/

Open Post

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