Amphibious Assault Vehicle - Survivability Upgrade

The venerable Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) is undergoing a Survivability Upgrade (AAV-SU) while development of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle is proceeding.  The current plan is to upgrade 396 AAVs to the AAV-SU standard.

From the SAIC product brochure (1), upgrades include,

• integral aluminum underbody and crew compartment armor
• buoyant, ceramic-composite flank and roof armor
• integrated spall liner
• individual blast-resistant seats
• upgraded engine with increased horsepower and torque
• new, electronically-controlled transmission and Power Takeoff (PTO)
• new axial-flow water jets
• external fuel tanks
• upgraded vehicle controls and driver interfaces

AAV-SU

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned for 2019 with Full Operational Capability (FOC) following in 2023.

So, how is the project coming?  There’s some good and some bad.  Let’s take a quick look at the DOT&E 2017 Annual Report.

• Test units demonstrated desert and littoral operability – not exactly a surprise as the legacy AAV could already do that.

• Reliability is an issue with Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures at 10.7 hrs versus the required 25 hrs.

• The transmission rapidly overheats when the vehicle’s tracks are used for swimming.

• The transmission operation requires the vehicle to slow and pause during the transition from sea to shore creating a vulnerability during a critical moment.

• The braking system is subject to a condition that can cause loss of hydraulic power and lock the brakes which necessitates remedial action that takes place outside the vehicle – undesirable in combat!

• The vehicle was able to accommodate 17 troops.

• The troop commander could not egress with the troops, instead having to egress out a top-side hatch and then down the side.

• The AAV-SU median egress time was 29 seconds, which exceeds the user requirement of 18 seconds.

• The vehicle met its force protection requirements.

AAV-SU

Here’s an interesting recommendation from the DOT&E,

“Reduce the troop capacity threshold …”

The legacy AAV supposedly carries 21-25 Marines, depending on the source.  Whether that’s true in practice, I don’t know but derating the AAV to 17 with a recommendation to further reduce that capacity is noteworthy.

In short, the survivability upgrade has some problems but nothing that appears unfixable in a reasonable time frame.

The biggest negative would seem to be the time frame for the project.  Five to six more years to get a relatively simple upgrade to full operational capability seems excessive.

There’s no particular point to this post – just informational. 

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(1)SAIC product brochure, “Assault Amphibious Vehicle Survivability Upgrade”,

https://www.saic.com/media/126753/17-0353-aav-su_f.pdf

Aegis Battle Damage Resilience

While the circumstances were tragic, the Navy now has a wealth of damage control and battle toughness data available to consider related to the recent collisions of the two Burke class destroyers.

Consider the photo below.  There was not direct impact damage to the Aegis radar arrays but they were clearly affected.  You can see that the array to the right is partially unsupported and has a gentle curve or warp in it.  The array to the left seems largely undamaged although there is some involvement at the very bottom. 

Collision Damage Near Radar Arrays

The question is, were the arrays still functional immediately after the impact and, if so, to what degree?  One of the supposed benefits of arrays is resilience to damage given the modular nature of the elements that make up the array.  On the other hand, we’ve heard unconfirmed reports that the gentle grounding of the Port Royal threw the Aegis arrays out of alignment to the point that they could not be repaired.

Of course, the Navy is unlikely to release any information on this but, internally, the aftermath damage assessments should provide invaluable information about the resilience and battle toughness of the Aegis system.

The same kind of resilience and damage control information can be gleaned from the many other impacted systems and damage control practices.  There are a wealth of valuable lessons to be learned.  It would be fascinating to read an assessment, even a basic, unclassified one, of the battle worthiness of the Burkes. 

F-35 Concurrency Orphans

We’ve repeatedly noted the lunacy of concurrent development and production.  The Navy tried it with the LCS and failed badly.  They tried it with the Ford and failed badly.  However, the F-35 is the poster child for the idiocy of concurrency.  Now the consequences are starting to come out.  We’re faced with a no-win choice:  either rebuild these non-standard aircraft for exorbitant amounts of money on top of the already exorbitant amounts we paid to build them the first time around or leave them as non-standard, non-combat capable aircraft – essentially throw them away.  Sure, we’ll use a few as maintenance trainers but most will have no purpose.

The National Interest website (1) reports,

“The new F-35 program executive officer, U.S. Navy vice admiral Mat Winter, said his office is exploring the option of leaving 108 aircraft in their current state because the funds to upgrade them to the fully combat-capable configuration would threaten the Air Force’s plans to ramp up production in the coming years.”

That’s just the tip of the iceberg. 

“Left unsaid so far is what will become of the 81 F-35s purchased by the Marine Corps and Navy during that same period. If they are left in their current state, nearly 200 F-35s might permanently remain unready for combat because the Pentagon would rather buy new aircraft than upgrade the ones the American people have already paid for.”

National Interest astutely notes that these “concurrency orphans” are the ones that cost the most money because they were purchased earliest in the program.  These are the aircraft that cost $150M-$200M each.

Let’s look at that cost a bit closer.

For nice round numbers, let’s call it 200 concurrency orphans at $150M each.  That’s a total of  $30 billion !!!!!!!

$30B lost to concurrency.

That’s $30B worth of aircraft that will never be operational, never see combat, and will wind up sitting in storage somewhere while they are slowly scavenged for parts.

What could we have done with $30B? 

-          We could have bought 2 Ford class carriers

-          We could have bought 16 Burkes class destroyers

-          We could have bought 7 big deck amphibious ships

-          We could have bought 337 advanced Super Hornets (2)

-          We could have bought untold quantities of logistics support ships, minesweepers, ASW corvettes, and maybe, just maybe, a shell for the Zumwalt’s gun!

Worse, we are still producing non-combat capable aircraft and testing is still on-going so the final concurrency orphan tally will be markedly higher – perhaps 300 or so aircraft.

Come on, seriously, someone has to go to jail for this.

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(1)The National Interest website, “108 U.S. F-35s Won't Be Combat-Capable”, Dan Grazier, 16-Oct-2017,

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/108-us-f-35s-wont-be-combat-capable-22742

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Wants to Buy 80 More Super Hornets for $7.1B Over the Next Five Years”, Megan Eckstein, 13-Jun-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/13/navy-intends-to-buy-80-more-super-hornets-in-fydp-to-ease-fighter-shortfall

Navy Ignores SecDef

Here’s an item that speaks for itself, from the DOT&E 2017 Annual Report,

“The SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] directed in FY16 and reiterated in FY17 that the Navy fund long-lead items for an Aegis SDTS [Self Defense Test Ship] to be used for testing Aegis ACB-20, DDG 51 Flight III, the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR, a.k.a. AN/SPY-6), and Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) Block II; the Navy initially complied with the direction but subsequently removed all funding for the Aegis SDTS and the required aerial targets.”  [emphasis added]

The Navy, against “directions” from the Secretary of Defense, refused to fund an Aegis test ship.  Aegis - the main weapon system of the Navy and the Navy won't even fund a test ship for it.

There’s nothing I can add to that.  It speaks for itself.  CNO Richardson must be fired.

New DOT&E Director

After many years of Dr. Michael Gilmore at the helm of the Pentagon’s testing and evaluation group, Director, Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E), we now have a new Director.  Given that DOT&E was the only voice of truth in the developmental process of new weapons and systems, the presence and performance of a new Director is critical in the extreme.  A weak Director will result in unproven and flawed weapon systems making it to production and giving our forces flawed and inferior weapons.  Conversely, a strong, independent, and objective Director, as Dr. Gilmore was, will ensure that at least one group in the Pentagon will tell the truth about the weapons and systems we are developing. 

DOT&E has just issued its 2017 Annual Report.  Most of the work presented therein occurred under Dr. Gilmore’s direction so that doesn’t tell us anything about the new Director.  However, the new Director, Robert Behler, did write the introductory portion of the report and it offers some potentially interesting insights into his views and how he will seek to run the group.

Mr. Behler noted a few focus areas that he intends to concentrate on.  One of these is software testing.  As he notes,

“Today, the building material of choice for our weapon systems is software. The amount of software source lines of code in today’s weapon systems is growing exponentially. Software does not just increase the functionality of these systems, it fundamentally defines the weapon system. However, as the number of lines of code increases so does the complexity of the system and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. …  We are now making more changes that effect system capability through software than through hardware.”

Mr. Behler is astutely correct and his desire to place greater emphasis on software testing is completely correct.

He also recognizes the benefit of more realistic testing earlier in the developmental cycle.

“… DT events can benefit from greater operational realism. … My office has often observed that operational testing identifies system performance problems that should have been identified in DT&E.”

Pure common sense, of course!  Sadly, the military does not share that common sense which is why we need a strong DOT&E group.

Mr. Behler identified other areas of emphasis that are equally important but these examples serve to give us a glimpse into his views and I have to say that the initial impression is a good one.  I will be watching closely to see how he performs but the early suggestion is that he will continue the exemplary work of his predecessor, Dr. Gilmore.

Cruise Missile Characteristics Related To Detection and Engagement Range

The US Navy is committed to an anti-air warfare path of long range intercepts using the Aegis and Standard systems.  The wisdom of this is debatable for a variety of reasons.

Long range intercepts depend on being able to detect the target at long ranges.  You can’t engage what you can’t see!  For targets that obligingly fly at high altitudes, this is a viable approach.  For targets that fly at low altitudes or are less detectable due to small size and/or stealth, this approach is not feasible.  Unfortunately, the trend in anti-ship missile (ASM) technology is towards stealth and sea-skimming altitudes.  Many missiles have options for an initial high altitude cruise phase followed by a sea-skimming attack phase.  The question is how far out from the target does the cruise phase terminate and the sea-skimming attack phase commence?  If the cruise phase terminates and converts to the low altitude attack phase beyond the effective range of defensive missiles then the ASM is, for all practical purposes, a purely sea-skimming missile.  This is what seems to be the typical case today.  Thus, it is quite likely that a defending ship will never see, or at least not have the opportunity to engage, the attacking missile until it enters the radar horizon (20 miles or so).

Another problem with the Navy’s long range intercept path is that it’s very expensive.  For example, the Standard SM-6 costs around $4M each and has a claimed range of 150-300 miles.  Launching volleys of $4M missiles quickly becomes prohibitively expensive.  Of course, the cost of a volley of $4M missiles is, arguably, a bargain if it prevents the destruction of a multi-billion dollar ship!  Still, the price tag of Standard missiles does impact the budget and the number of missiles procured. It’s not just the missiles that are expensive.  The Aegis system that enables the Standard missile costs hundreds of millions of dollars and the developmental costs for the ever-changing software are astronomical.

Before we go any further, let’s take a moment to look at some characteristics of common potential enemy anti-ship missiles as provided by readily available open source information.  Note the attack altitudes and relatively small sizes.  These missiles will be hard to detect and engagement windows will be very short.

C-801

Speed   Mach 0.75

Flight Altitude  <20 m

Attack Altitude  <20 m

Range  40 km

Length  5.8 m

C-802

Speed  Mach 0.9

Flight Altitude  7 m

Attack Altitude  5 m

Range  120 km

Length  6.4 m

Exocet

Speed  Mach 0.92

Flight Altitude  2 m

Range  72-180 km

Length  4.7 m

P-270 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn)

Speed  Mach 3.0

Flight Altitude  20 m

Attack Altitude  <7 m

Range  90-240 km, depending on version and flight profile

Length  9.7 m

P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)

Speed  Mach >1.6

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  <25 m

Range  625 km

Length  10.0 m

P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile)

Speed  Mach 2.5

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  10 m

Range  370 miles

Length  8.9 m

Kh-59 MK (AS-13 Kingbolt)

Speed  Mach 0.8

Flight Altitude  7 m

Attack Altitude  ?

Range  285 km

Length  5.7 m

BrahMos

Speed  Mach 3.0

Flight Altitude  high

Attack Altitude  5 m

Range  280 miles

Length  8.4 m

Even if not designed as stealthy airframes, ASMs are small and have an inherently small radar cross section.  A small missile, in sea-skimming mode, down in the wave clutter, will not be readily detected.  First detection is likely to be inside the radar horizon.  Even the presence of an airborne radar plane will not greatly increase the detection range of an incoming sea-skimming missile. 

Also, detection and targeting are two separate issues.  An airborne radar may detect a missile further out but being able to maintain a steady lock sufficient to guide a defensive missile is another matter and likely will not be achievable until the attacking missile has gotten much closer to its target.

What is the overall point of this discussion?  It’s that I suspect that the actual targeting detection range of most ASM’s is going to be very short.  That being the case, one can’t help but ask whether the Navy’s focus on very long range Standard missiles is appropriate.  It would seem that the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (RIM-162 ESSM) would be a more likely and useful defensive system.  ESSM range is given as 27 nm which would seem to be an appropriate match to the expected detection range.

In fact, I have doubts that intercepts at ranges of hundreds of miles are even feasible given the cruise characteristics of enemy anti-ship missiles.  What enemy missile or aircraft is going to fly obligingly high, straight, and level for an extended period while we guide a Standard missile to it?  Ballistic anti-ship missiles do fly predictable paths and, for those, long range intercepts are both feasible and desirable – but that’s another topic.

If my conjecture is correct and the vast majority of anti-ship cruise missile engagements are going to occur at radar horizon ranges, shouldn’t the vast majority of our defensive systems also be optimized for those same ranges?  Wouldn’t it be better to emphasize ESSM defenses over Standard missiles?

Further, given engagement ranges of radar horizon and closer, shouldn’t we also greatly beef up our short range engagement capabilities such as RAM, SeaRAM, and CIWS?  Sure, debris from a successful short range intercept may still impact the ship and cause damage but it will be a lot less damage than having an intact, functioning anti-ship cruise missile hit the ship.  Consider that most Burkes have only a single CIWS for close in defense and, for a time, Burkes were built with none.  Burkes do not mount RAM/SeaRAM.  Our short range defenses are lacking, to put it mildly.

We need to do several things to beef up our medium range (out to 30 miles or so) AAW capability.

1. Install multiple RAM/SeaRAM launchers on every ship.
2. Provide at least 3 CIWS for every Burke.
3. Focus on electronic anti-missile defenses (soft kill).
4. Develop radars/sensors optimized for medium/short range use.
5. Develop methods to effectively launch and utilize high density volleys of ESSM and RAM.  This would include the ability to track the incoming target even in the presence of high clutter returns due to near miss defensive missile explosions.  Given the short engagement window, it is vital that we can continuously track and engage rather than have to wait for the radar picture to clear after a near miss.  The traditional engagement sequence of shoot-shoot-look is no longer viable.  The engagement sequence has to be shoot-shoot-shoot-keep shooting!  We also need to be able to track the incoming missile in the presence of many outgoing missiles.

The last point also suggests that Aegis is likely not the optimum AAW radar.  We don’t need bigger and longer range AMDR radars (well, we do for ballistic missile defense but, again, that’s a topic for another post); we need very high definition, very rapid response, enhanced capability medium/short range radars combined with much greater numbers of medium range ESSM and integrated fire control systems.  We need to greatly reduce our emphasis on Aegis/Standard and put far more emphasis on medium range engagement.

We also desperately need to improve our AAW electronic countermeasure (ECM) capability.  The venerable – and never all that effective, according to reports – SLQ-32 needs to be enhanced far beyond even the current SEWIP (Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program) block improvements.  We need massively more capable and powerful detection and active jamming/decoy systems (remember our discussion about an electronic warfare version of the Zumwalt?).

In summary, future naval AAW engagements are not going to be the long range intercepts that the Navy has designed for – they’re going to radar horizon, close range, short window, affairs that require an optimized radar fire control system capable of operating a continuous fire defensive system, backed up by extensive short range and ECM capabilities.

WWII LVT(A) Amphibious Tank

In WWII, the military quickly realized that amphibious assaults would require efficient and effective means of getting men, machines, and supplies ashore.  More to the point, they quickly learned from bloody experience that they needed to get heavy firepower ashore in the initial wave and they needed to provide better protection for the assault troops than the open and unarmored Higgins boat, the iconic landing craft.  The solution to both needs, firepower and protection, was found in the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) family of amphibious, armored vehicles.

I’d like to examine the armored firepower version, the LVT(A), of which there were several evolutionary variants.  The end result was the LVT(A)-4, essentially an amphibious light tank.  Take a look at the specifications.

LVT(A)-4 (1)

• Armament – M8 turret with 75 mm M3 howitzer or Canadian Ronson flamethrower plus 1x 0.50 cal machine gun or 3x 0.30 cal machine guns
• Armor – 6-38 mm
• Weight – 20 tons
• Speed – 20 mph land, 7.5 mph water
• Range – 150 miles land, 75 miles water
• Length – 7.95 m
• Engine – gasoline radial, 250 hp; 12.5 hp/ton

Around 1890 LVT(A)-4’s were built during the war and continued in service until the mid-1950’s.  They were first used in combat at Saipan in June 1944.  Being in the initial assault wave and then used at the front line of combat once ashore, the LVT(A)-4’s often experienced high loss rates.

LVT(A)-4

A few things jump out when looking at this vehicle.  First, the LVT has essentially the same specifications as today’s Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV).  That we have been unable to produce a significantly better vehicle in seventy some years is depressing and disturbing. 

For comparison, here are some specs on the AAV.

AAV (formerly LVTP-7)

• Armament – turret with Mk19 40 mm grenade launcher and M2 0.50 cal (12.7 mm) machine gun
• Armor – 45 mm
• Weight – 29 tons
• Speed – 20 mph land, 8.2 mph water
• Range – 300 miles land, 20 miles water
• Length – 7.94 m
• Engine – diesel, 400 hp; 13.8 hp/ton

Now, before anyone starts pounding out replies disputing some specification, just relax.  The exact specs are all over the map depending on exactly which version of the AAV we’re talking about and which upgrades it’s had.  The point of this comparison is not to discuss exact specs but to note the lack of significant improvement since WWII.

The most notable aspect of the comparison lies in the armament.  The LVT(A) had a heavy 75 mm howitzer whereas the AAV has only machine guns and grenade launchers.  To be fair, today’s AAV is not intended as a “tank” whereas that was exactly the purpose of the LVT(A).  The AAV is simply an armored personnel carrier and is not meant to provide heavy firepower.

LVT(A)-4 at Okinawa

While today’s military continues to flounder around with the dilemma of firepower in the initial assault wave the WWII military solved the problem with a light amphibious assault tank.  Today, China has developed light amphibious assault tanks and the US military views that as cutting edge and a controversial concept.  Hey, it’s just reinventing the WWII wheel.

We also need to keep the role of a light amphibious tank firmly in mind.  It's role is not to stand toe-to-toe with main battle tanks - no light tank can prevail in such a match up.  The role of the amphibious light tank is to provide heavy infantry support with suppressing fire and to reduce enemy strongholds, fortifications, and emplacements.  Thus, an amphibious light tank does not need to be a water-going Abrams - though figuring how to get an Abrams ashore in the initial assault wave would be great!

LVT(A)-4 Providing Infantry Support

We lack any kind of significant firepower in the initial assault wave and the Navy has doctrinally stated that they will not risk ships close enough to shore to be able to use even the small 5” guns.  Airpower, against a peer, will be only sporadically available and, in any event, is unable to provide the sheer volume of sustained heavy firepower needed to support an assault. 

The only viable solution is to provide heavy firepower in the assault wave and the only way to do that is with a tank of some sort.  We would do well to consider the lesson of the WWII LVT(A)-4 as we continue to ponder our amphibious assault doctrine and operations.

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(1)World War II Database,

http://ww2db.com/vehicle_spec.php?q=301