Sunday, January 7, 2018

Defective F125 Frigate Returned To Builder

We complain about the incomplete and, in some cases, damaged ships that the Navy accepts from the builders and we wonder why they don’t enforce any warranty repair actions (turns out that most shipbuilding contracts don’t have any warranties!).  We also wonder why every other country’s ships are better built than ours.

Well, the better built part is easy to explain – they aren’t!  We just are more aware of our ship’s problems because we have much more open information sources for our ships.  Other countries have the same problems but they just aren’t publicized.

Anyway, here’s a bit of news that addresses both the warranty and the quality of build issues.  Germany has just returned the lead F125 frigate to the builder, after delivery, for repair of defects found during trials – and there’s a lot of defects and they appear to be pretty serious.

Here’s some of the problems as reported by Naval Today website. (1)

  • software and hardware issues
  • problems with the frigate’s operations room
  • listing problem - they list 1.3 degrees to starboard
  • overweight

Here’s an amusing bit of related information.

“According to the German Navy, the new frigates will require only half the crew necessary to operate the Bremen-class frigates. They will be able to stay at sea for up to 24 months and thereby reduce the transit times for the crews. The crews will swap in regular intervals directly in the areas of operations which means that the ships will have to make fewer port visits.” (1)

Does that sound like the failed LCS program?  I anticipate that the German Navy will find the same thing we did – that minimally manned crews can’t perform well, will be overworked and undertrained, and ship maintenance will suffer.  Well, good luck to them.


F125 Frigate

Back to the main point …    Hats off to the Germans for sending a defective ship back to the builder.  Maybe their example will inspire the U.S. Navy to do the same.

It is also worth noting that this disposes of the myth that other countries build better ships than we do.  A lot of observers want the U.S. to buy and/or build foreign ships and use foreign shipyards.  I have no problem with that, in concept, but the reality is that no one is building problem-free ships.  We just document and hear about our problems more than other country’s.



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(1)Naval Today website, “Germany returns lead F125 frigate to builder, report”, 22-Dec-2017,


Friday, January 5, 2018

UUV Seizures

In the latest slap in the face for the Navy, Houthi rebels have reportedly captured a Navy REMUS 600 unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) off the coast of Yemen. (1) 

In a similar incident in Dec 2016, the Chinese Navy seized a U.S. UUV about 50 miles northwest of Subic Bay in the Philippines as the drone was in the process of being recovered.  The UUV was later returned.

These incidents raise some interesting issues regarding UUV operations.

Sovereignty

According to Peter Cook, Pentagon press secretary, the UUV is a sovereign American vessel just as any Navy ship is.

“The UUV [unmanned underwater vehicle] is a sovereign immune vessel of the United States.” (2)

The Maritime Awareness Project website affirms that position.

“… the seizure was unlawful because the drone enjoyed sovereign immunity as a U.S. vessel.” (4)

If UUVs are sovereign US vessels then their seizure in international waters is illegal, at best, and an act of piracy or war, more likely.  This is tantamount to a foreign country seizing a US naval warship which would be an act of war.

Clearly, the US has no policy for dealing with this occurrence other than strongly worded notes of protest.  Evidence for this is that the US has failed to defend or, indeed, take any action in the past when foreign countries have seized our military assets.  Recall the Chinese force-down, seizure, and dismantling of the EP-3 in April 2001 or the recent Iranian seizure of two riverine boats and crews.  No action was taken by the U.S. in either case.

We need to establish a response policy and, preferably, one that recognizes the illegality of the action and responds accordingly and forcefully.

Protection

If drones are going to be seized, we need to give consideration to providing protection for them.  We need to have ships or aircraft available to respond to seizures.  For example, the Chinese seizure of the UUV should have elicited a SEAL retrieval operation and/or sinking of the Chinese ship.  It is clear that the Chinese are not in the least deterred by either international law or U.S. military forward presence.  What is needed is a swift and brutal response that makes it clear that we will not accept the seizure of sovereign U.S. property.  You don’t placate a bully, you punch them hard in the nose.

Safety

Referring to the Dec 2016 seizure by the Chinese, a Chinese spokesman had this to say.

"The Chinese navy discovered the device -- and identified and verified it in a responsible and professional manner. … And they did so to prevent it from harming navigational and personnel safety of passing ships." (3)

While the statement is just the usual lies and spin from the Chinese, it does raise an interesting point – who is responsible for the operation of UUVs when they come in contact with commercial or naval ships?  Will a UUV apply the navigational and safety rules of the sea?  Are ships under any obligation to avoid UUVs?  Who is financially responsible if a UUV causes damage to a ship?  Who is responsible if a UUV causes a death?

The US seems to be operating UUVs on an ever-expanding basis and without enough positive control to even avoid seizures so what makes us think that we can avoid potentially detrimental interactions with ships?  True, a UUV is not big enough to substantially damage a ship of any size but they can certainly foul fishing nets, drag nets and equipment away, foul and damage rudders and props, and potentially cause collisions as ships attempt to steer out of their way.  They could certainly severely damage or sink fishing boats and put lives at risk.

We need to carefully think through our operational policies as they pertain to commercial and naval shipping.

Area of Operation

The Houthi UUV seizure suggests that we are operating UUVs within other country’s territorial waters.  This is not surprising as it is generally acknowledged that we operated submarines within enemy territorial waters during the Cold War.  It does, however, mean that we need to think through the ramifications of being caught operating within territorial waters.

Does the procedure of Innocent Passage (as defined in UNCLOS) apply to a drone?  If it does, can Innocent Passage be claimed if a UUV is conducting surveillance or even benign oceanographic surveys?

If one of our UUVs is caught operating in another country’s territorial waters is that an illegal act, as we would undoubtedly accuse anyone of who would do that to us, and would we acknowledge the illegality of it?  Are we prepared to accept the hypocrisy inherent in those positions?  Our behavior in the Cold War would suggest we are.  If so, that undermines our moral high ground as we criticize China’s manifold territorial transgressions.  Are we comfortable with that double standard?

Technology

If seizing American UUVs is going to become the new international sport, are we comfortable with the loss of technological secrets that goes with that?  If not, and referring back to protection and sovereignty issues, are we prepared to use force to protect our UUVs?




We have more than enthusiastically plunged into the production and use of unmanned vehicles/vessels without taking the time to think through the associated issues.  I would urge the military and government to think about these issues and formulate relevant policies before the various events discussed herein occur.



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(1)Navy Times website, “Video reportedly shows Houthi rebels with captured underwater Navy drone”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 3-Jan-2018,

(2)The Guardian website, “Chinese warship seizes US underwater drone in international waters”, Julian Borger, 16-Dec-2016,

(3)CNN website, “China returns seized US underwater drone” Steven Jiang and Kevin Bohn, December 20, 2016,

(4)Maritime Awareness Project website,




Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Military Sealift Command Maintenance To Be Audited

The Department of Defense Inspector General is going to conduct an audit of the Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) maintenance of Pre-Positioning Ships, according to a 26-Dec-2017 memo. (1)  The audit is in response to a GAO report highlighting material deficiencies in the surge sealift and combat logistics vessels. (2)  The GAO report was, itself, in response to Congressional direction contained in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. (2)

Highlights from the GAO report:

  • The average of the ships in the surge sealift fleet (the collective MSC and Maritime Administration, MARAD, fleets) is 40 years.

  • MSC’s combat logistics fleet consists of 29 auxiliary ships that provide underway replenishment support to the surface fleet.

  • MSC yearly ship casualties have increased from 3 per year in 2012 to around 43 per year in 2016. (from Fig 3 of the GAO report)

  • 83% of MSC ship scheduled maintenance periods during the 2012-2016 time frame took longer than expected, indicating worse than expected material conditions.

  • Readiness test scores for no-notice ship activations have declined and the number of tests have been inadequate with at least one ship never having been tested.

  • Combat logistics ships are not meeting their stated availability goal of 270 days per year.

  • Mission-limiting casualties for combat logistics ships have increased from 69 per year in 2012 to 122 per year in 2016. (from Fig 4 of the GAO report)

The Navy claims to be “in the process” of developing a plan to deal with the declining readiness of the ships but has not established funding or any concrete plans.

The Navy will stop at nothing to fund the LCS and other new warships but is completely ignoring the more important surge sealift and logistics support ships.  This is the very same mentality exhibited by the Navy towards all the other non-glamorous functions such as mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, naval gunfire support, etc.  Navy leadership is focused on the new, shiny, and sexy carriers and Burkes but is ignoring the foundational capabilities of a functional and effective naval fleet.

This GAO report alone should be sufficient to make CNO Richardson resign in shame or be fired by Congress for dereliction of duty.

What will the audit find?  It will find the same things that every other investigation of the Navy has found – that Navy leadership has knowingly and willfully abrogated their responsibilities to the Navy and the nation.



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(2)Government Accounting Office, “Navy Readiness Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets”, Aug 2017, GAO-17-503,


Sunday, December 31, 2017

Tomcat Eyes

Observers are looking with excitement and anticipation at the development and eventual inclusion of an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor into the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.  This will be a significant advance for the Hornet and broaden the aircraft’s capabilities.

The Boeing/Lockheed Block II IRST, under development in an $89M contract, will be housed in the nose section of an external centerline fuel tank.  Development is scheduled to be completed in 2020. (1)

"IRST is yet another addition to the Super Hornet Block II arsenal, and it will truly change the nature of the air-to-air fight," said Capt. Donald "BD" Gaddis, U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G program manager, PMA-265.” (2)

This revolutionary, first of a kind capability will …huh? … what?  …  Hold on a minute.  Someone is interrupting me.  What?  It what?  Back then? 

Uh, I’ve just been informed that this state of the art IR sensor may not be quite as revolutionary as I thought, having been lead to believe, by the Navy, that nothing like this has been achieved before.  Apparently, I’m told, the F-14 Tomcat had this sensor capability, and more, decades ago.  Okay, let’s take a look back and see what the ancient, outdated, hopelessly outclassed Tomcat had in the way of sensors.


The Tomcat’s non-radar sensors were mounted in distinctive chinpods under the nose. 




ALQ-100 E/F/G/H-Band Track-Breaker – The early F-14A had the ALQ-100 mounted under the nose.  While not a sensor, the electronic countermeasure device was a prominent chin-mount and I mention it for clarity.

ALR-23 IR Seeker - The early F-14A had an IR seeker in a chinpod mount.  The seeker could be slaved to the radar or used independently and was gimbal mounted and could be steered.  I’ve been unable to find much additional information about the sensor’s capabilities or how it was used tactically.

AXX-1 Television Camera System (TCS) – The Northrop TCS was an optical sensor consisting of a telescopic television imager and cockpit display and provided telescopic images of targets far beyond unaided visual range.  Identification ranges are stated to be 10 miles for small fighters and out to 85 miles for large bombers and cargo planes. (4)   The TCS had a 30 degree conical field of view and could be slewed at a rate of 30 degrees/second and was gyroscopically stabilized in pitch/yaw at up to 150 degrees/second.  Thus, the TCS was unaffected by the aircraft’s maneuvering within the field of view.  The TCS also had a tracking-lock capability to enable the target to be continuously followed.  Automatic scan-lock was another built in feature which allowed automatic target detection during continuous scanning.  The Tomcat’s AWG-9/71 radar could be slaved to the TCS or vice versa.  The TCS was first fitted to the late model F-14A.  Additional information is available in a summary report (5).


TCS System


AAS-42 IRST – A more advanced IR sensor, the AAS-42 appeared on the F-14D in 1990.  The sensor provided search and track capability as well as IR imagery.  From Deagel website,

“Operating in six discrete modes, the AN/AAS-42 provides the aircraft mission computer track file data on all targets while simultaneously providing infrared imagery to the cockpit display.” (3)

F-14D’s often utilized a potent side by side, dual combination of IRST and TCS which may have had detection ranges as much as 110+ miles, thereby greatly enhancing air-to-air targeting and useful missile launch ranges. (6)

 
AAS-42 IRST and TCS


While the Navy is loudly and proudly proclaiming the coming use of IRST on the F-18 Hornet, we see that the reality is that effective IR and optical sensors existed on the F-14 Tomcat long ago.  Why the Navy abandoned these sensors when the Hornet was developed is baffling.  Today, as we look at the F-35 and all its problems and costs, we view the Hornet fondly and think of it as a good, if not great, aircraft.  The reality is that the Hornet was a very compromised and, as regards combat effectiveness and range, a very ineffective aircraft.  The addition of IRST is a welcome development but, good grief, we had that and better in the F-14 many decades ago.  Even with the IRST, the Hornet will still lack the F-14’s highly effective TCS.

The eyes of the Tomcat were highly effective combat enhancers that the Navy is only now, and only partially, matching with the Hornet’s cobbled together IRST/fuel tank conglomeration. 

As the Soviet pilots of the era knew well, the eyes of the Tomcat were always on them.  We need to remember the capabilities we had decades ago and begin designing actual combat aircraft again that can at least match what we once had.  What passes for a combat aircraft today is a sad reflection of what once was.


Note:  I’m well aware that other aircraft in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s also had similar sensors – no need to list them in a comment.  Again, it just shows how far we’ve drifted away from actual combat aircraft design.



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(1)Defense Systems website, “Navy integrates new F-18 infrared sensor”, Katherine Owens, 20-Jun-2017,

(2)Boeing website,


(4)Air Power Australia website, “Electro Optical Systems”, Carlo Kopp, Mar 1984,

(5)Forecast International,



Wednesday, December 27, 2017

Light Or Heavy - Either Could Work

The US military has for some time been pursuing a path of “lightness”.  The Marines have drastically scaled back their tank companies and dropped the 120 mm towed mortar, for example.  The navy has totally abandoned armor for ships and considers the non-survivable LCS to be a warship.  The Army pursued a vision of lightly armed Strykers.  All manner of light “jeeps” have been pursued.and procured.

I guess the theory is that our speed of movement will cancel out and overcome the enemy’s firepower, numbers, and armor – a questionable proposition, at best.

We’re now trying to mount 20-30 mm guns on top of jeeps.  We’re looking seriously at developing light/medium “tanks” that have large guns and only lightly armored bodies.  Hit hard, move fast, I guess.

Is this trend to lightness viable on a modern battlefield?

Well, consider this.  The Russians and Chinese are developing artillery that fires submunitions that are far deadlier than previous conventional artillery shells.  These submunitions include enhanced fragmentation and thermobaric explosives.

“Over the past 20 years the Russians have improved on our steel rain technology by developing a new generation of bomblet munitions that are filled with thermobaric explosives. These munitions generate an intense, blast wave of exploding gasses that are far more lethal than conventional explosives. A volley of Russian thermobaric steel rain delivered by a single heavy-rocket launcher battalion produces a lethal area 10 times greater than an American MLRS battalion firing conventional, single-point detonating warheads.” (1)

Imagine that firepower being applied against a bunch of US soldiers running around the battlefield in essentially unarmored jeeps.

Or, consider the prospects of a bunch of light tanks when confronted by a bunch of heavy main battle tanks like the new Russian and Chinese ones.

So, are we saying that a light, mobile, unprotected force can’t win on the modern battlefield.  This is probably going to surprise you but the answer is that they can win, however, there is a massive caveat.  The caveat is numbers/attrition.  If the light force has sufficient numbers and is willing to accept significant attrition, they can win.  Those light tanks will suffer massive casualties (and their crews with them) but with sufficient numbers can eventually kill the heavy tanks.  Those soldiers running around in JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle) “jeeps” will suffer massive casualties when exposed to firepower but with enough of them they can achieve their objectives. 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

The degree of attrition will be massive but victory can be attained.  The problem is that the US military has neither the requisite numbers of vehicles nor personnel to absorb the kinds of losses that such a force would suffer.  Neither do they have the transportation capacity to get such numbers to the battlefield even if they had the numbers.  Further, the degree of callousness required to plan for and accept that level of attrition is beyond any mentality the US has shown in recent times, if ever.  The closest we’ve come to accepting that kind of horrifying attrition is the Civil War and that’s because we didn’t know any better way of fighting.

The other approach, the heavy approach, will also work and with a lot less casualties.  A thermobaric bomb, or heavy artillery, or cluster munitions, or armored divisions can prevent a lot of friendly casualties and seems the far more sensible way to approach war.

We need to carefully evaluate our approach to war and make sure that we are fully committed to whichever path we choose and we need to thoroughly understand the ramifications if we choose the path of lightness.



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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Bring Back Artillery Submunitions; Russian Threat Too Great” Bob Scales, 21-Oct-2016,




Saturday, December 23, 2017

The Inmates Are Going To Run The Asylum

We all believe that the Pentagon acquisition system is badly broken and needs to be reformed.  How to do that, however, is highly debatable.  The latest trend sees the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) pushing the milestone decision authority back down to the individual services (1).

“Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, logistics and technology, or AT&L, said her intention is to continue to hand off the day-to-day running of programs to the services, preferring her office serve as a kind of high-level group providing overall guidance.

… Lord said she intended to shift the “bulk” of major defense programs from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD, down to the services …”

For the Navy,

“The same [transfer of milestone authority to the services] is happening with the Navy. James Geurts, the newly confirmed service acquisition head, testified that the Navy currently has milestone decision authority for 40 ACAT 1 [Acquisition Category 1] programs, including the future Guided Missile Frigate and the MQ-25 unmanned system, a change from before the 2016 NDAA. More importantly, the service is in charge of five of its 10 ACAT 1D programs, the biggest efforts that require the most oversight.”


What could possibly go wrong?

The concept is to allow program managers in the services manage their programs with less oversight.  The hope is that this will streamline and speed up the overall acquisition process – and it will!

Now let’s look at why it will.

The Navy is famous for battling DOT&E, the military’s testing organization.  The Navy consistently makes claims of progress and performance that are proven to be largely false when subjected to DOT&E testing.  The DOT&E test results are currently factored into the milestone decision process and the Navy is not very happy about that because the program failures are brought to light and the programs are delayed, modified, or cancelled as a result. 

With milestone decision authority now resting with the Navy, it’s a pretty safe bet that almost nothing is going to be negatively evaluated or delayed.  This will essentially relegate DOT&E to irrelevance since the Navy can freely ignore the test results.  We are going to see a slew of bad weapon systems getting approved with nothing but glowing statements about how they will revolutionize warfare.

How did this change start?

“The drive to push milestone authorities out to the services originated with the office of Sen. John McCain, the Arizona Republican who chairs the SASC. He included such a demand as part of a wide-ranging package of reform efforts in the 2016 NDAA.

Not everyone agreed with the changes.

Such a move was opposed by Frank Kendall, who led AT&L [Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ] from May 2012 until President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January of this year. Part of Kendall’s opposition was about oversight, with concerns that the services would run wild without AT&L keeping a close look at what they were doing.” [emphasis added]

What was Sen. McCain’s response to these concerns?

“While we have empowered the services, that doesn’t mean you can go and do whatever you like,” the chairman admonished his witnesses. “The services must let OSD set strategy and policy and do real oversight. That means being transparent — providing data to, and following the guidance set by, OSD.”

Yes, that should work because the Navy is all about transparency – you know, other than refusing to provide data to DOT&E and refusing to allow an accounting audit!

I’m all in favor of acquisition reform but this isn’t the way.  Giving the services, who have consistently botched every program and lied about performance, more acquisition decision authority is not the way to do it.

The inmates are going to run the asylum.  I can’t see anything going wrong with this.



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(1)Defense News website, “Policy shift: DoD is pushing major program management back to the military”, Aaron Mehta, 11-Dec-2017,

Wednesday, December 20, 2017

National Security Strategy

As long time readers know, one of ComNavOps overarching themes is that all things military flow from a national geopolitical strategy.  Military actions and acquisitions should follow this simplified chain of actions:

1)      Geopolitical Strategy – sets the nation’s goals and defines our desired relationship with the rest of the world
2)      Military Strategy – defines how to achieve our geopolitical goals via military means
3)      CONOPS – defines the role and use of specific, individual military assets and lays out the tactics that the asset will employ within the context of the military strategy
4)      Acquisition – having defined the needs and characteristics of specific, individual assets, we can now acquire them with assurance that they will prove useful

Sadly, the U.S. has not had a valid national geopolitical strategy for many years.  Because of this, the U.S. military has been adrift, having no guidance as to what it should do.  The lack of guidance has resulted in haphazard acquisitions where the military has been focused on acquiring technology rather than assets that would actually be useful in a specific region and against a specific enemy.  Thus, we get the LCS which has no useful purpose, the Zumwalt which has no mission, the Marine’s expansion into aviation which duplicates and conflicts with existing national aviation forces, the F-35 which is an international jobs program with dubious combat value, etc.

The lack of a geopolitical strategy has also paralyzed the military’s actions regarding potential enemies.  Having no guidance, the military has defaulted to appeasement.  This has given us the Iranian seizure of our boats and crews with no repercussions, the uncontested seizure of the entire South and East China Seas by China using largely illegal measures, our passive acceptance of the unremitting and unsafe harassment of our military units by Russia, and an unhindered build up of NKorea’s nuclear ballistic missile program.

In short, due to the lack of a geopolitical strategy, the U.S. has been drifting aimlessly on the world stage for many years and has accomplished little and, likely, worsened many situations.

Now, for the first time in many years, the government, in the form of President Trump, has put forth a National Security Strategy (1).  Let’s examine it. 

Note:  I don’t care whether you support President Trump or not.  We’re going to examine the National Security Strategy (NSS) document as it relates to the military.  We’re going to determine whether or not it provides the guidance necessary for the military to regain a sense of purpose and direction.

The NSS begins on a positive note by laying out an underlying foundation:

“Putting America first is the duty of our government and the foundation
for U.S. leadership in the world.”

Aside from being one of President Trump’s campaign slogans, this also provides a clear basis for all subsequent strategic considerations.  Agree or disagree but it’s quite clear.

The document then goes on to list four “pillars” of the strategy:

               I.      Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life

              II.      Promote American prosperity

             III.      Preserve peace through strength

            IV.      Advance American influence

Clearly, these pillars are based on the “America First” principle as stated in the introduction to the strategy.  This is a geopolitical strategy that approaches international relations and events from a very specific perspective – an American perspective.  This provides ample guidance to the government and the military as to what path to follow, what shape our international relations should take, and what rationale our actions should be based on.

If the document contained only those few words and no others, this would almost be sufficient.  However, the strategy also enumerates specific enemies, threats, and actions that further define the pillars.  Here are some of the noteworthy items:

            1.      Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life
a.      Deploy a layered missile defense aimed at Iran and NKorea
b.      Control weapons of mass destruction
c.      Strengthen border control and immigration policy
d.      Eliminate terrorist safe havens
e.      Dismantle transnational criminal organizations
f.       Defend against cyber attacks

          2.      Promote American prosperity
a.      Put an end to unequal and unfair international trading practices
b.      Promote domestic economic prosperity via regulatory and tax relief
c.      Pursue energy dominance

          3.      Preserve peace through strength
a.      Recognizes that war is a spectrum of actions, most of which are non-violent but still threatening
b.      Reestablish military overmatch
c.      Improve readiness
d.      Reverse the decline in size of our military forces
e.      Protect and promote the domestic manufacturing and defense industrial base
f.       Use diplomacy to advance American interests
g.      Maintain our position as the preeminent economic force in the world
h.      Modernize the military

          4.      Advance American influence
a.      Encourage partnerships that advance American interests
b.      Exercise leadership
c.      Champion American values


The strategy concludes by addressing specific regional concerns.

“The United States must tailor our approaches to different regions of the world to protect U.S. national interests. We require integrated regional strategies that appreciate the nature and magnitude of threats, the intensity of competitions, and the promise of available opportunities, all in the context of local political, economic, social, and historical realities.”

This very wisely recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to geopolitics and it recognizes that individual regions and enemies have specific characteristics that the government and military need to be aware of and account for.

The regions addressed are:

  • Indo-Pacific
    • enumerates the threat posed by China and NKorea
    • stresses the need for regional partnerships
    • espouses military forward presence and regional missile defense
    • maintain strong ties with Taiwan while recognizing the “One China” policy and the “Taiwan Relations Act”
  • Europe
    • recognizes Russia’s subversive activities and intimidation
    • calls on European countries to increase defense spending
  • Middle East
    • recognizes the threats posed by Iran and terrorists
    • deny Iranian nuclear progress
  • South and Central Asia
    • strengthen ties with India
    • pressure Pakistan to increase its counter-terrorism activities
  • Western Hemisphere
    • combat international crime
    • strengthen economic ties and trade
  • Africa
    • encourage governmental reform and sanction repressive governments
    • strengthen trade partnerships
    • counter terrorist encroachments


There you have it – the gist of the National Security Strategy.

Unlike “strategies” put forth by previous administrations, this one is has a central theme (America first), names enemies and details their threats, and offers a surprising amount of specific actions to be taken.  In short, this explicitly defines our view of other countries and the nature and basis for our relationships with them.

Here are few specific thoughts on the strategy.

  • The willingness to name enemies and specifically describe their threats and negative actions is realistic and refreshing.  For example, no longer will we be forced to try describe a “Pacific Pivot” but deny that it is aimed at China.  You can’t fight an enemy if you won’t even speak their name (Obama’s refusal to say “radical Islamic terrorism”).  The level of detail about the illegal, immoral, unethical, and unfair actions of unfriendly countries is stunning in comparison to all previous Administrations and strategies.

  • The strategy specifically recognizes the return of great power competition and the impact that has on America, our military, and the world.  This recognition provides the basis for addressing our own military issues of force sizing, readiness, procurement, budget, and modernization. 

  • Refreshingly, after several years of retreat from the world stage, the strategy emphasizes the need for American leadership and the value and benefit of that leadership for the world.

  • The strategy recognizes that America is the standard for the world and the hope for the future of the world.  This is a complete reversal from the previous Administration’s policy of constant apologies for American existence.

  • In one of the notably ambiguous issues, the strategy is still trying to walk the tightrope on the Taiwan-China issue by expressing strong support for Taiwan while acknowledging the One China Policy.  This ambiguity will not assist the military in formulating actions and operations.

  • The strategy is notably weak on African specifics and defaults to generic statements about trade, economics, and politics.  Given that Africa is a rapidly growing host for terrorism and is one of China’s focal points for expansion, this region should have been addressed in much more detail and specifics.

  • The strategy stops short of defining exactly how far we are willing to allow China, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Iran and NKorea to go in their endeavors.  For example, it does not say whether we will allow China to expand globally, try to contain them regionally, contest their existing expansion, or something else.  Similarly, it does not describe how far we are willing to allow Russia to go.  Will we allow Russia to complete a takeover of Ukraine and expand into other countries?  The strategy’s consistent theme is “America first”.  Does that mean we’ll allow Russia to continue invading countries as long as American interests are not adversely impacted?


While not perfect, this strategy is a vast improvement over anything that has come before it and even considered in isolation is quite adequate.  It defines our enemies and their threats and details specific actions we need to take.  Just as importantly, it provides a consistent basis and rationale for our relationships and actions.  This is exactly what the military needs to formulate military strategies.  Given this document, the military should be able to develop clear and specific strategies for each region and each enemy that we face. 

The Administration has set a viable geopolitical strategy and it is now up to the military to support that with specific and effective military strategies.  There is no longer any excuse for the aimless drifting that has characterized American military behavior for the last few decades.

You can agree or disagree with this National Security Strategy but it must be acknowledged that this is a clear, consistent, and fairly specific strategy.  This is the geopolitical strategy that ComNavOps has been calling for.  The ball is in the Pentagon’s court now.  The President has provided the military with the guidance it needs.  The challenge for the military is to now pick from the range of potential capabilities and actions those that will best support the NSS and assemble coherent strategies for each region and country.  This is exactly what a professional warrior should be able to do.  Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that we do not have professional warriors leading our military.  If the military does not quickly provide the President with the required military strategies then he should initiate wholesale firings of military leadership.

One last time:  the point of this post is not to agree or disagree with the geopolitical strategy presented but to evaluate whether it is a viable, effective guidance for the military.  In that respect, it absolutely is.



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