Navy Alternative Force Structure Study

ComNavOps just read one of scarier documents he’s read in a long time.  The document was an alternative force structure “study” (I’ll explain why the word study is in quotes in a moment) requested by Congress as part of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The NDAA required the Navy to produce three “independent” alternative force structure studies including one from the Navy, itself.  Question:  How can a Navy study about the Navy’s force structure be independent?  But, I digress …

The “study” that the Navy produced (1) is claimed, in the opening paragraph, to not represent any official position of the Navy but is “just another independent approach to the problem” of force structure.

Before we go any further, let’s recall what the Navy’s official position on force structure seems to be.  The Navy’s position has the following main points:

• Distributed lethality
• Electromagnetic maneuver warfare
• Massive networking / unmanned vehicles

Now, rather than work carefully through the “study”, let’s jump right to the study’s main points.

• Distributed lethality (accomplished via massive networking / unmanned vehicles)
• Electromagnetic maneuver warfare
• Distributed agile logistics

Do you see any similarity?  The only thing new or different from the Navy’s current official position is the recognition of the role of logistics and for that I’ll give the study full credit.  Other than that, the “study” is just a duplicate of the Navy’s current official force structure philosophy. 

So, we had a Navy group commissioned by the Navy to study the Navy and their conclusion was a force structure vision identical to the Navy’s.  Shocking!  Who could have seen that coming?  Now you know why I enclosed the word “study” in quotes.  This wasn’t a study, it was a sales brochure for the Navy.  What a waste.

The only other point of interest is that the study calls for   - you’re never going to guess this - more ships!  A Navy study that calls for more ships - bet you didn’t see that coming, did you?

I thought about analyzing the individual points throughout the study but, upon consideration, decided that it would be pointless.  The study is just a collection of the Navy’s talking points and contains all the same inherent flaws that we’ve discussed repeatedly.  If you have an interest in reading the document, the reference is listed below.

I mentioned that this was one of the scarier documents I’ve read.  What’s scary about it is the lockstep mentality exhibited by a supposedly “independent” group of professional naval thinkers and the utter lack of operational and tactical awareness exhibited throughout the document.  I would hope for better from our professional warriors but, sadly, it’s not to be.  When we go to war, we’re going to have to relearn all about how to fight a war and the price for that learning will be steep and bloody.

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(1)Report to Congress, “Alternative Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study”,

27-Oct-2016, Navy Project Team,  Generated 2016Jun20, RefID: 9-6D51D88

LCS and Hellfire

Here’s an ever so tiny bit of good news related to the LCS.  The Navy has conducted the first test in a series intended to integrate the Hellfire (AGM-114L Longbow) missile into the anti-surface (ASuW) module (1).  Before you get too excited, the test firing was just a structural test to see whether the ship and its structures and fittings could stand the stress, heat, chemicals, etc. of a firing.  This was not a firing involving targets and integration into the ship’s combat control software.  Actual integration and fielding is probably a couple of years away, yet.  Still, it’s a first step to that end.

Hellfire, if it can be successfully integrated into the ship’s combat system, will give the LCS a credible small craft defense capability.  The missile has a millimeter wave radar seeker which gives it a fire and forget capability which will be useful in a swarm scenario.  Advertised range is around 4 miles which is just barely adequate against rocket armed swarm craft.

Let’s also bear in mind the limitations of the Hellfire-LCS.  This does not turn the LCS into a full fledged warship.  The missile has a warhead of around 20 lbs.  That’s not exactly a ship sinker!  Also, the 4 mile range is very short when it comes to dueling with enemy missile boats or frigates.  The LCS will be woefully outranged and “outgunned”.

What the Hellfire gives the LCS is a credible capability against small craft – nothing more.

For a bit of perspective, recall that the original ASuW module called for the NLOS missile which had a range of 25+ miles and was supposed to be capable of in-flight, networked, self-designation of targets and a 30 minute loiter capability over the battlefield, both land and sea.  When one compares that to the actual capabilities of the Hellfire, it is readily apparent just how much capability the ASuW module has lost.  The Hellfire is better than nothing but not by much.

Hellfire Missile

Aside from the challenge of integrating the missile with the ship’s combat system, the main challenge will likely be getting the vertically launched missile to tip over and acquire its target reliably.  Getting the missile’s seeker to quickly spot a small boat, partially obscured in wave clutter, from an initial 90 degree off-angle, is, I suspect, going to be difficult.  The missile seeker’s field of view is limited and the target, a small speedboat, will be moving fast.  If the seeker does not quickly locate the target, it will go dumb and miss.  Also, the initial vertical launch will use up fuel on a path 90 degrees to the target.  In other words, the missile will initially be using fuel but will not be moving towards the target.  That will reduce the missile’s effective range.  Whether that reduction in range is significant or not, I have no idea.  At a guess, I would think the vertical launch will knock a mile of the advertised range, bringing the missile’s effective range down to around 3 miles.  That’s just speculation on my part.

In summary, this is a tiny bit of good news for a program that rarely has any but it is not going to turn the LCS into a warship.

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(1)USNI News website, “VIDEO: Navy Tests Anti-Swarm Boat Missile on Littoral Combat Ship USS Detroit”, Sam LaGrone, 7-Mar-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/07/video-navy-tests-anti-swarm-boat-missile-on-littoral-combat-ship

Ill Served

Ill Served

As the Trump administration settles in and begins to formulate their geopolitical strategy, they’ll be looking to the military for viable options for that portion of the spectrum.  China and the South China Sea remain one of the major problem areas that need to be dealt with.  What kind of advice will the military offer?  What options does the Navy propose?  Navy Times details the Navy’s advice (1).

“U.S. Navy and Pacific Command leaders want to ratchet up potentially provocative operations in the South China Sea by sailing more warships near the increasingly militarized man-made islands that China claims as sovereign territory …”

What is the point of these Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)?

“U.S. Navy leaders believe that the FONOPS help clarify rights under international law and secure U.S. influence in the region.”

The previous FONOPS operations, those few that occurred, certainly did clarify things.  They clarified the fact that the US would not contest Chinese annexation efforts or hinder China’s illegal island building.  In fact, as we’ve previously discussed, the FONOPS solidified China’s illegal territorial claims by implicitly recognizing China’s sovereignty over the islands!

Did the Navy’s few FONOPS accomplish their goal?  No.  Did the previous administration’s policy of appeasement accomplish its goal?  No.

“I doubt it it's possible to compel China to withdraw from its newly built islands in the Spratlys. But the U.S. could develop a strategy aimed at preventing more land reclamation, capping militarization and deterring China from using its new outposts to intimidate and coerce its neighbors,” Glaser [Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. ] told Navy Times in an interview.”

The Navy defends its previous efforts,

“U.S. Navy officials are quick to point out that the U.S. has been operating there for decades and are maintaining the historic status quo. “

Status quo????  The Navy has stood by while the Chinese have successfully annexed the entire South China Sea!!!  That’s not maintaining the status quo.  That’s watching while a wholesale invasion takes place.

The Navy wants to continue to make carrier deployments to the region.

"There is nothing new about U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike groups deploying to the western Pacific,” said U.S. 3rd Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Ryan Perry.

“Our strike groups have patrolled the Indo-Asia-Pacific regularly and routinely for more than 70 years and will continue to do so. Regional security, stability and prosperity depend on it,” Perry said. “

Regional stability depends on it???  Again, I’ll point out that previous carrier deployments did nothing to prevent the Chinese from annexing the entire South China Sea.

So, having noted that previous FONOPS and carrier deployments to the South China Sea accomplished absolutely nothing, what is the Navy’s advice to the new administration?  - more FONOPS and more carrier deployments!!!!!

Seriously?  They accomplished nothing so the Navy’s most brilliant advice is to do more of them?  This is the best that our military professionals can come up with?  What a bunch of incompetents. 

President Trump is being ill served by Navy leadership.

Note:  This post is not about the politics of the situation.  It’s about the quality of advice coming from our professional military leaders.  You can agree or disagree with the geopolitics of the situation but the quality of advice is clearly lacking.

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(1)Navy Times website, “The Navy Is Planning Fresh Challenges To China’s Claims In The South China Sea”, David B. Larter, 12-Feb-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/articles/navy-south-china-sea

North Korean Ballistic Missile Tests

North Korea continues its insane saber rattling and its stone cold sober preparations for nuclear war with more ballistic missile tests.  NKorea also brazenly stated that the tests were practice for hitting American bases, as reported by the Washington Post website.

“North Korea was practicing to strike United States military bases in Japan with its latest barrage of missiles, state media in Pyongyang reported Tuesday …” (1)

The US, meanwhile, continues its policy of world wide appeasement.

At some point, it ought to occur to US government leaders that appeasement is not working. 

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, NKorea continues its inexorable march towards developing nuclear ballistic missiles. 

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, China continues to ignore international law by building artificial islands and militarizing them while making illegal and outrageous territorial claims in and around the South China Sea, Philippines, and Japan.

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement, Russia continues its program of annexation and  invasion while harassing US military aircraft and ships.

• Despite our best efforts at appeasement – and bribery! - Iran continues its inexorable march towards developing nuclear ballistic missiles while harassing US ships.

Here’s a thought for the new administration.  Instead of appeasing NKorea, why not station an Aegis/BMD cruiser off NKorea and shoot down the next ballistic missile they launch.  We can call it, “practice” for shooting down ballistic missiles.

The NKorean missiles fell within the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  If I were Japan, I’d think that was way too close to my land and I’d want to prevent any future missile shots.  What if the next one travels a little further (whether intentionally or inadvertently – NKorea is not exactly the most technologically accomplished country in the world – they may have little idea where the missiles will land) and impacts Japanese land?

We are way past the point where any reasonable person can claim that appeasement is working.  It’s time to insist that rogue nations behave responsibly and to back up that insistence with demonstrations of resolve and, if necessary, force.

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(1)Washington Post website, “North Korea says it was practicing to hit U.S. military bases in Japan with missiles”, Anna Fifield, 6-Mar-2017,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-says-it-was-trying-to-hit-us-military-bases-in-japan-with-missiles/2017/03/06/b375ad36-327f-4d9e-9dba-398a7cde8742_story.html?utm_term=.646875eaaaef

Iranian Harassment Post Update

Sharp eyed reader "Tim" pointed out that the photo I used in the post on the latest Iranian harassment of the Navy ship Invincible was a file photo, not an actual photo of the incident, despite being labelled as such in the source that I obtained it from.  Accordingly, since the photo was a significant aspect of the post, I've removed the post.  While the sentiments expressed remain completely relevant, the post is not valid as presented.  My apologies to the readers and thanks to "Tim" for the catch.

Future Naval Battle

We talk about individual weapons and sensors but almost always in isolation.  The more important question is how will the overall ships perform?  The Navy is experimenting with independent surface action groups.  How will they perform in combat?  What will happen when they meet an enemy surface action group?  Let’s have a little fun and speculate about future naval combat.  Specifically, what is a future naval surface battle going to look like? 

Well, at one end of the predictive spectrum, it may be a combined arms action with airborne, satellite, and subsurface surveillance contributing to the situational awareness and various air, land, and sea networked forces unleashing an exquisitely timed concentration of firepower on the opposing force – at least, that’s the Navy’s rosy view. 

At the other end of the spectrum, the opposing naval forces will be operating under a no man’s sky with only sporadic, if any, surveillance available and few, if any, other forces available for added firepower when the two “blind” forces stumble across each other, since all other forces will be tied up with their own, immediate concerns while the opposing air forces hammer back and forth at each other, largely uncaring about the naval situation beneath them, until they can establish aerial supremacy – at least, that’s ComNavOps’ and history’s realistic view.

So what happens when these two forces meet?  What will the resulting battle look like?

Let’s start by stipulating that the surface forces will consist of a few to several destroyer type ships, typical of modern navies.

Each side will have the same type of short range UAVs that may offer some “early” detection.  We’ll assume that both sides simultaneously detect each other at around 30-50 miles distance. 

An anti-ship missile exchange will ensue.  Of course, the US Navy has no anti-ship missile, currently, but we’ll assume that this hypothetical battle occurs far enough in the future that the USN has the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) or an equivalent.  Neither side will have enough anti-ship missiles (ASM) to overwhelm the other’s defenses.  The ships will have a relative handful of ASM’s each, unsupported by any electronic support or penetration aids.  The ASM’s will be going up against the other side’s Aegis-type defenses.  Odds will favor the defenses.  One or two ships may be damaged.  Perhaps one ship from each side will be mission killed or sunk.  This will leave both sides with their anti-ship missile inventories exhausted and their AAW inventories severely depleted.  Will the remaining ships choose to use their remaining, precious AAW missiles in the much-hyped anti-ship mode even though they can’t do much damage or will they elect to save them for the AAW role they were intended for since the commanders will have no idea whether the enemy has any anti-ship missiles left?  The prudent commander will save his AAW missiles.  Thus, we now have two surface forces, largely intact, headed towards each other and out of anti-ship missiles.

Why do I assume that the anti-ship missile exchange will be inconclusive and largely ineffective?  After all, aren’t many people scared to death of large, heavy, supersonic missiles?  Well, the answer is that the historic database on anti-ship missile effectiveness is pretty bleak (1).  Anti-ship missiles have just not proven to be effective in combat and until there is evidence to the contrary, I’ll stick with actual data.  Interestingly, there are as many proponents of impenetrable AAW defenses as there are unstoppable anti-ship missiles.  One of the two sides is wrong and history says it’s the unstoppable anti-ship missile that is overrated.

What happens next?

Assuming neither side veers off, a naval gun battle is what happens next.

Now, here’s what it could look like. 

Both sides have roughly similar naval guns, meaning 5”.  Burke class ships have a single 5” gun each.  Ticonderogas have two 5” guns.  The Type 051C, 052B, and 052C destroyers carry a single 4” (100 mm) gun.  The newer Chinese Type 052D destroyer and the upcoming Type 055 destroyer carry a single 5” (130 mm) gun.  Interestingly, the older Sovremenny type destroyers carry 4x 5” (130 mm) guns and would offer a significant advantage.

Firing would begin around 12 miles or so with a significant probability of hits occurring around 5 miles.

Structural damage would be light.  The 5” gun is not a ship sinker.  However, exposed sensors and weapons would be quickly damaged and destroyed.  Modern 5” guns are mounted in weatherproof, unarmored housings and, hence, are quite susceptible to shrapnel damage.  Guns would be quickly put out of action.  Sensors would be quickly damaged and degraded which would significantly decrease the accuracy and rate of fire of the surviving guns.  The ships would have to continue closing to make up for the loss of accuracy and the gun battle would devolve into an extremely close affair.  Neither side would be able to sink the other’s ships and the result would be individual ships breaking off and withdrawing as casualties mounted and effectiveness diminished.  The net result would be a gradual, mutual separation and withdrawal.

What could tip the balance is a couple of lucky, early hits that incapacitate the other side’s guns either via damage/destruction of the guns or damage to the sensors of the fire control systems.

The other aspect to this gun battle that bears discussion is torpedoes.  All destroyers carry torpedoes.  Both side’s ships typically carry 6 lightweight torpedoes (two triple tube launchers) intended for anti-submarine use but they presumably have an anti-surface mode.   The US Navy’s torpedoes have a range of around 6 miles.  Presumably, the Chinese and Russian versions are similar.  Thus, as the ships close in their gun battle, a second, parallel torpedo exchange could take place.  Given the lightness of construction of modern warships (US warships, at any rate – I don’t know about Chinese and Russian ships), torpedo hits, even from lightweight ASW torpedoes, could prove to be the ship sinker weapons that the 5” guns are not.  Again, victory could go to the side that achieves the greatest success in the torpedo phase of the battle.

Another aspect that could significantly impact the outcome is the presence of external support.  While we ruled that out for the purposes of our scenario, it is fair to note that the US will likely be fighting far from any air or naval bases and external support will be unlikely.  In contrast, any likely enemy will be fighting in their home waters and will have an abundance of external support in the region, if not readily available.  Thus, the odds that the enemy will actually benefit from external support is much greater than the odds that the US will.  That’s a significant factor to consider as the US heads down the LCS-reliant surface action group path.

Admittedly, one can reasonably debate my vision of a future naval battle but recognize that it is based on logic and what little actual data there is so if you want to argue, you have to account for the actual data regarding ASM performance and ship construction practices (lack of armor and structural strength, for example).  Finally, remember that this is a for-fun mental exercise.  Don’t get too twisted up about it!

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(1)http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b192139.pdf

The Last Two Posts

Well, that was interesting.  The discussion of the last two posts about civilians and war clearly revealed that we've forgotten what war is and unequivocally demonstrated the need for such posts and discussions.

Fascinatingly, despite many "don't kill civilians" comments, no one actually disagreed with my definition of civilians and the classification of civilians as non-uniformed enemy combatants! That, alone, makes any "don't kill civilians" comment hypocritical.  If you don't disagree with classifying civilians as combatants (albeit without uniforms) then you can't disagree with killing them.  It's logically inconsistent to classify someone as a combatant but be unwilling to kill them. That position simply reveals the squeamish emotions of people who have forgotten that war is an ugly, brutal business.

The last two posts also revealed that far too many readers are not reading the posts slowly and carefully.  Most readers completely ignored the "threat to national security" constraint of the post and leapt instantly into their own diatribe on the heartlessness of killing civilians under all manner of circumstances except the very circumstance that the post was written about, the "threat to national security".

These two posts simply reinforced my on-going contention that we have forgotten what war is.  I'll keep hammering on this theme in the future because it's too important not to.  We're preparing for a light, low end, precise, clean, dainty war instead of preparing for the ugly, brutal, high end massacres that are coming when we eventually engage Russia, Iran, China, or NKorea.

Yep, all in all, the last two posts were fascinating to watch!