Sea Hunter

DARPA is testing a large, unmanned sub-hunting surface vessel (USV) dubbed Sea Hunter (1).  This is an interesting concept and well worth the effort.  The vessel is a bit smaller than a Cyclone class patrol ship and is intended to track and trail submarines using on-board sonar.  It is capable of 27 kts and can operate up to Sea State 5 and survive up to Sea State 7.  Endurance is 70 days.  Cost is $20M.  The vessel is currently unarmed although adding weapons would, presumably, not be difficult.

The type of sonar(s) has not been specified and there is no indication whether it is active, passive, or both.  Note, though, that the size of the vessel is quite small.  Thus, the sonar will be small and not very powerful.  This means that the search volume will be correspondingly small.  This is not a vessel that's going to search and sanitize a thousand square miles every minute!  Lacking any definitive information, I see this as a somewhat more powerful, mobile sonobuoy but not much more.  Other than dumb luck, I don't know how it will acquire a target to track.

What’s interesting is to contemplate the intended mission.  From what little the Navy has revealed, the mission is to find and trail enemy submarines.  During peacetime, this is a good way to keep track of enemy submarine movements and, presumably, gather acoustic signatures data.  During war, the mission would presumably be the same (ignoring weaponization of the vessel), however, the usefulness becomes questionable in much the same way as the P-8.

These vessels are not claimed to be stealthy and they have no self-defense, whatsoever.  In fact, they're fairly large, as unmanned vessels go and, I would assume, quite readily detected.  In war, they would simply be floating targets and easily eliminated.  The obvious question, then, is what is the wartime role?

One can imagine swarms of these vessels sent to chokepoints to pick up submarine movements.  As long as the chokepoint is under friendly control this will work.  Conversely, sending swarms into enemy controlled air/water space would simply be throwing them away.  While the $20M price tag confers a degree of expendability, simply throwing them away is pointless.  Of course, if we were to build thousands of them, the price tag would come down somewhat, one would hope.

Perhaps the vessels can be used to scout ahead of ship movements although, again, how to keep them afloat in the face of enemy action is a mystery.

Further compounding the problem is the requirement to maintain contact with, and control of, the vessel.  As we’ve often discussed, in war the vessel will have to operate in a heavy ECM environment and the ability to maintain communication is suspect under those conditions.

Sea Hunter USV

As with the P-8, I’m missing the wartime role.

Another interesting aspect of the peacetime role is the unmanned nature.  Given China’s willingness to forcibly confront the US (EP-3 forcedown and various naval encounters) I strongly suspect that the Chinese won’t hesitate to sink these boats.  It’s quite easy to deny any knowledge of an unmanned vessel that vanishes at sea.  UAVs disappear all the time.  Why not USVs?  These vessels would also provide excellent live fire training exercises for Chinese submarines.  Not to neglect the Iranians, if they’re willing to seize US boats and crews, I can’t see them not seizing an unmanned, defenseless vessel.  I assume Russia and NKorea would similarly seize or destroy any vessels they find.  If deployed in this role, I suspect we’ll see large numbers of the vessels disappear for no apparent reason.

Looking at the broader picture, the third offset strategy championed by Bob Work is filled with this kind of highly questionable product that sounds good on paper but fails the test of combat logic.  We’re banking on a highly questionable strategy while conceding numerical superiority and quality.  That’s a good way to lose a future war.

_____________________

(1)Breaking Defense website, " DSD Work Embraces DARPA's Robot Boat, Sea Hunter”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., April 07, 2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/dsd-work-to-christen-darpas-robot-boat-sea-hunter/

You Can't Surge A Modern Navy

In recent years, in response to budget constraints, there has been discussion of homeporting major elements of the Navy and simply surging them, if needed.  The claimed benefits include reduced physical wear on the ships since they would remain docked most of the time, reduced manpower requirements since the ships would need nothing more than a caretaker crew, and reduced operating costs due to the reduced crew and curtailed deployments.

For purposes of this discussion, let’s set aside surge-related issues like forward presence and deterrence and just examine the surge capability, itself.  Can a modern navy even surge an idled fleet?  Let’s be clear – we’re not talking about surging a ship that’s currently between deployments and is somewhere in the non-deployed maintenance/training cycle.  Instead, we’re talking about ships that are long term idled.  This is what one line of thinking is regarding fleet size and budget.

Of course, on a practical basis, the Navy is currently partially in this condition.  Budget limitations have resulted in carriers sitting pierside for extended periods with somewhat reduced crews.  Air wings have been nearly idled with pilots barely flying enough hours to remain flight certified.  Aegis cruisers are sitting in a nebulous “modernization” state with their crews having been disbanded.

So, can we surge such a navy?

Let’s look at technology.  Aegis, the prime weapon system of the fleet, requires exquisite care by highly trained and experienced technicians.  Even so, the Aegis system has become significantly degraded, fleet wide, and the Navy has instituted one of their infamous Admiralty chaired focus groups to try to remedy the problem.  Unfortunately, Aegis is so complicated that it requires a degree of expertise to maintain that is simply not widely available in the fleet.  In the early years, Aegis was maintained by the very best of the Navy’s technicians and heavily supplemented by contractor support.  Over the years, that degree of attention and resources faded resulting in the degraded system of today. 

This phenomenon is true, to a greater or lesser degree, with any technology.  The personnel to maintain technology cannot be surged.  They either already exist for will take a year or more to train new personnel.  Whether it’s nuclear engineers, propulsion plant engineers, fire control specialists, radar operators, computer and electronics techs, or culinary specialists, the highly trained personnel needed to effectively operate and maintain technology can’t be surged out of thin air.

Let’s look at tactics.  ASW is more of an art than a science.  Knowing how an enemy sub commander thinks is just as important, or more so, than having a new sonar.  The art of ASW is a highly perishable skill that requires constant practice to maintain proficiency.  Disbanded or skeleton crews and idle ships don’t practice.  Carrier group tactics, especially the multi-carrier groups that we’ll actually fight a war with, are not being practiced now and would be neglected even more with a homeported, idled fleet.  You can’t surge tactical prowess.  Tactics are something that have to be constantly developed, refined, and practiced.

Let’s look at modernization.  Ships that are sitting idle and not anticipated to be used (they never are prior to being needed!) are far less likely to be kept modernized, especially in an era of severely constrained budgets.  Surging ships whose equipment is out of date and whose physical condition is substandard is not a recipe for success.

Let’s look at manpower.  Ships whose crews have been disbanded or are maintained by a skeleton caretaker crew are lacking the most important feature – a highly trained crew intimately familiar with the ship and its equipment.  Crews, especially in today’s technology-heavy Navy, can’t be thrown together on a moment’s notice and be combat effective.

Let’s look at aviation.  Even today we see non-deployed air wings whose monthly flying has dropped to the bare minimum necessary to remain flight certified.  Little or no tactical training is occurring.  Some reports have put the flight hours at as little as four hours per month.  In addition to the pilot’s proficiency, the maintainers must be proficient.  Again, that takes constant work on real aircraft.  It’s just not possible to surge idled aviation.  Bringing an individual pilot, mechanic, or air wing up to combat readiness takes months.  You can’t surge aviation.

Now, all of this discussion assumes a homeported fleet that exists in an idled state.  There is an alternative that could provide a constantly surge-ready fleet.

Rather than homeport and idle the fleet, it could be homeported but maintained with full maintenance and full crews.  The fleet would have the opportunity to conduct thorough maintenance and training without the “distraction” of actual deployments.  The ships would put to sea to conduct tactical training as needed and then immediately return for maintenance.  This would greatly reduce the wear and tear on ships and crews while maintaining the highest level of readiness.  As we’ve seen, though, given the opportunity to do exactly this, the Navy has opted to let carriers sit idle, Aegis crews have been disbanded, maintenance is being deferred or ignored, and worthwhile tactical training is almost non-existent.

Lest you think I’m advocating for this route, I’m not.  There is value in actual deployments.  Conducted properly, which the Navy is not, ships and crews on deployment get to experience real world conditions in areas that they might have to fight.  They experience the weather, sea conditions, geography, etc.  They also get face to face experience sailing and flying against potential enemies.

This was simply an examination of the concept of homeporting/surging a fleet.  Properly done, it has some advantages but it also comes with disadvantages.  However, done as the Navy and many supporters would have it, a modern Navy cannot be surged and the Navy is unintentionally proving it right now.

2015 Commissionings and Decommissionings

According to the USNI Proceedings 2015 Naval Review, here’s a list of the ships that were decommissioned last year.

FFG-41   McClusky

FFG-55   Elrod

FFG-60   Rodney M Davis

FFG-48   Vandegrift

LHA-5   Peleliu

FFG-50   Taylog

FFG-58   Samuel B Roberts

FFG-51   Gary

FFG-59   Kaufman

FFG-56   Simpson

SSN-706   Albuquerque

Here’s a list of the ships that were commissioned (In Commission –Full)

SSN-785   John Warner

LCS-5   Milwaukee

LCS-6   Jackson

Marine Aviation Readiness

How bad is maintenance in the Marines?  Here’s a glimpse courtesy of Breaking Defense website and Lt. Gen. Jon Davis who testified before the seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) (1).

“Chronic maintenance problems with the aging F-18 Hornet are hobbling the Marines, leaving them with less than 60 percent of the strike fighters they need to conduct training and operations, the deputy commandant for aviation told the Senate this afternoon.

“I pulled up our readiness data just yesterday,” Lt. Gen. Jon Davis told the seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “We have 87 aircraft that were mission capable.”

Now, you know that people are fudging readiness figures to try to look good.  So, that 87 number is actually a lot less but we’ll take it at face value for purposes of this discussion.  How many aircraft should the Marines have ready?

“How many Hornets should the Marine Corps have ready to go? Under the current, shrunken force structure, 150: a training squadron of 30 and 12 combat squadrons of 10 aircraft each.”

So, the Marines have 87 aircraft that are mission capable out of a requirement of 150.  That’s not good.  I wonder if that counts the F-35s that are only fictitiously combat capable?  But, I digress …

There’s another, hidden, problem here.  The number of aircraft needed is also fictitious. 

 “Until 18 months ago, that figure was 174 — 30 training aircraft and 12 squadrons of 12aircraft each — but the Marines decided to shrink each squadron to reflect the reality of insufficient aircraft.”

This is deeply disturbing.  Rather than fix problems, the Marines are resorting to lowering the number of aircraft per squadron to appear better?  I thought manning and equipment was determined on a strategy and operations based assessment of threats and needs, not simply setting an arbitrary number to try to make things appear better than they are.

Do We Have Anything That Can Fly?

I note that the Marines are still ensuring an uninterrupted supply of funds for the purchase of new F-35s.  Shouldn’t we be fixing and maintaining the equipment we have before we start buying new stuff?  Weren’t we all raised to take care of what we have before we start asking for new things?  The Marines neglect to maintain what they have and we reward them with new aircraft?  Won’t they simply neglect to maintain those, too?  Is this responsible care of taxpayer’s assets?

The Marines funding for new purchases should be cut off until they get their current aircraft up to 90%+ readiness and they demonstrate that they can take care of what they already have.

Heads should roll over this. 

___________________

(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Are Flying Only 60% of F-18 Hornets They Need”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 20-Apr-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/marines-are-flying-only-60-of-f-18-hornets-they-need/

Payoff In The Making?

This is beyond insane.  The Navy is going to pay Lockheed Martin to study the LCS.

“Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $74.6 million contract modification by the U.S. Navy to help the service branch conduct special studies, reviews and analyses of the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship development initiative.” (1)

Is there a defense program in history that has been more thoroughly studied and critiqued than the LCS?  And now we’re going to pay LM $75M to conduct more studies?  Come on, Navy.  Just read this or any of dozens of blogs and you’ll have a pretty good understanding of the LCS problems. 

I’ll tell you what, Navy, send me just ten million dollars and you can read my blog as often as you want and you can keep the remaining $65M for the annual LM-Navy office Christmas party.

This is absolute kookoo bird, nuthouse crazy.  How many Admiral chaired oversight panels has the Navy established to study and guide the LCS program?  What were those Admirals doing?  Couldn’t we ask them about the LCS since we’re already paying them?

Every time I think the Navy has hit rock bottom in terms of dumb decisions, they dig a little deeper and lower the bar still further.  

Seriously, you know what this is?  This is some Admiral(s) paying off LM for non-existent, unnecessary work in exchange for future employment on the board of directors when they retire.  No other explanation makes sense.  You’ll have to excuse me.  I’ve got to go vomit.

___________________

(1) ExecutiveBiz website, “Lockheed to Help Navy Evaluate Freedom-Class LCS Program”, Ramona Adamson: April 29, 2016,

http://blog.executivebiz.com/2016/04/lockheed-to-help-navy-evaluate-freedom-class-lcs-program/

MAC Update

Here’s an update on the P-8 Poseidon’s Multi-Static Active Coherent (MAC) sonobuoy system from the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2015 Annual Report.

MAC, you’ll recall, is a sonobuoy system that uses active acoustic transmitter buoys combined with passive receiver buoys to enhance detection capabilities.  In other words, one buoy transmits and the others listen.  MAC was the key ASW enhancement provided by the P-8.

Here’s what DOT&E had to say.

“DOT&E assessed that the MAC system provides the P-8A and the P-3C aircraft with a wide-area ASW search capability in some environments and for select target scenarios, but that MAC falls short of what the fleet identified as the capability needed to protect high-value units.   … DOT&E assessed MAC detection performance was similar to the P-3C’s performance and independent of the aircraft platform.” [emphasis added]

Further,

“The data also show operators are only able to recognize a small fraction of valid system submarine detections as a possible target and spent time assessing and prosecuting false targets.”

This is hardly surprising.  ASW has always been conducted against a backdrop of a high rate of false contacts and their corollary, missed contacts.  The reality is that finding very quiet targets in a very large and noisy ocean is an exceedingly difficult task.  That we would believe this new system somehow changes that basic reality simply demonstrates the arrogance of our belief that technology can magically set aside reality. 

We see, then, that MAC offers no demonstrable improvement over the traditional sonobuoy approach.  Theory suggests that there ought to be some improvement and perhaps there will be, eventually, as the system is exercised and developed but the reality is that there is no improvement as yet and no hard reason to expect that there will be.

This again illustrates the folly of developing an entire product, the P-8 in this case, based on a non-existent technology.  The P-8 was supposed to offer a vastly improved wide area ASW capability due to the MAC system.  Instead, we have a P-8 that offers no improvement and may be slightly inferior to the P-3 because the MAD sensor was deleted!

We previously talked about the wisdom of building new P-8s versus upgrading exiting P-3s and this finding suggests that there was even less reason for new builds.  Of course, new airframes are always nice even if the capabilities remain unchanged but the cost is significant for no gain in capabilities.

The point of this post is not to re-examine the P-8/P-3 new or upgrade debate.  The point is that this is another example of a non-existent technology that was pushed into production before it was ready.  MAC should have been developed as an R&D product and if it ever panned out then it could have been integrated into whatever ASW aircraft we would have at the time.  Instead, we have a hugely expensive new aircraft whose core ASW capability appears no better than the aircraft it replaced.

We need to leave developmental products in R&D until they’re ready.

Rationalize Survivability

All too often, today, requirements are downgraded and then rationalized to explain why the downgrade wasn’t actually a downgrade.  Wake up!  Yes, it was a downgrade.  Of course it was a downgrade.

Consider the highest level military requirement that sets the priorities, force structures, acquisition programs, etc. for the services.  Originally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the requirement was to be able to fight and win two major regional wars simultaneously.  That has since been watered down to being able to win one regional conflict and holding in another.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review put it this way,

“As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. Maintaining this core capability is central to credibly deterring opportunism—that is, to avoiding a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere… “

Despite that straightforward statement, we have downgraded the requirement to fighting one regional conflict and holding on in another and have rationalized that it’s a good thing.  Why did we downgrade the requirement?  It wasn’t because the threats decreased.  It was simply because our military spending was becoming greater and providing less return than in the past.  Since we could no longer afford the force structure required to simultaneously fight and win two major regional wars we opted to change the requirement rather than change our procurement and spending habits.

Or, consider the Navy’s carrier requirements.  After the Cold War, the requirement was for 15 carriers.  It has subsequently worked its way down to 11 with serious discussions about permanent reductions to 8-10.  Our need hasn’t changed.  What’s changed is that carriers are pricing themselves out of existence, slowly but surely.  Each step of the way, the Navy rationalized the reductions.

Or, consider the Marine’s requirement for amphibious lift.  Depending on the source, the requirement is as high as 54 amphibious ships.  Another common number is 38.  The Marines have “bargained” with the Navy and settled on 33-34 as sufficient.  The actual number is 30 ships.  The Marines and Navy have rationalized the reductions every step of the way.  Again, the requirements didn’t change – only our ability to meet them changed so we rationalized our acquisition failure.

The point is that downgrades are imposed by outside factors, budget being chief among them although stupidity is also right up there, and then rationalization is applied to make the downgrade seem palatable or even beneficial and preferred.  Rationalization does not, however, change the underlying facts of the matter or the requirements.  If we needed 15 carriers, we probably still do.  If we needed to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts at the same time, we probably still do.

Well, that sets the stage for our discussion of survivability.

By the end of WWII, we pretty thoroughly understood what ship survivability meant and how to achieve it.  BuShips set the standards and ensured that new construction met those standards.  Now, BuShips is gone and accounting trumps survivability.

For decades, survivability has been defined by a very concise and crystal clear document, OpNavInst 9070.1, issued from the CNO’s office on 23-Sep-1988.  It is a remarkable document characterized by fundamental, concise, and obvious statements of requirement.  For example, the basic need is acknowledged by the statement,

“Survivability shall be considered a fundamental design requirement of no less significance than other inherent ship characteristics, such as weight and stability margins, maneuverability, structural integrity and combat systems capability.”

Clear.  Simple.  Obvious.  So, too, is this statement.

“Ship protection features, such as armor, shielding and signature reduction, together with installed equipment hardened to appropriate standards, constitute a minimum baseline of survivability.” [emphasis added]

The document goes on to define three levels of survivability in short, simple, and unambiguous terms.

Level I (lowest) represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability for designated ship classes to sustain operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region. In — this category, the minimum design capability required shall, in addition to the inherent sea keeping mission, provide for EMP and shock hardening, individual protection for CBR, including decontamination stations, the DC/FF capability to control and recover from conflagrations and include the ability to operate in a high latitude environment.

Level II (middle) represents an increase of severity to include the ability for sustained operations when in support of a Battle Group and in the general war-at-sea area. This level shall provide the ability for sustained combat operations following weapons impact. Capabilities shall include the requirements of Level I plus primary and support system redundancy, collective protection system, improved structural integrity and subdivision, fragmentation protection, signature reduction, conventional and nuclear blast protection and nuclear hardening.

Level III (highest) the most severe environment projected for combatant Battle Groups, shall include the requirements of Level II plus the ability to deal with the broad degrading effects of damage from anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMS), torpedoes and mines.

The document even defines which ships shall have which level of survivability.

Ship Type                                                       Level

Aircraft Carriers                                               III

Surface Combatants                                       III

Frigates and Amphibious Warfare                   II

Underway Replenishment Ships                      II

Patrol Combatant and Mine Warfare                I

Strategic Sealift                                                 I

Support Ships                                                    I

All Other Auxiliary Ships/Craft                           I

Clear.  Simple.  Obvious. 

This should be the end of the story.  However, the Navy ran into a little problem:  the LCS.  The LCS was designed with a sub-Level I survivability.  The Navy claimed that it was designed with some made up Level I+ survivability but we already totally debunked that.  The Navy flat out lied about that.  In any event, because they made the claim of survivability that was untrue and because the ship was designed with sub-Level I, the Navy received much criticism and bad publicity.  They fought the negative perception (the reality, actually) for years but could not overcome the criticism especially because their own policy, OpNavInst 9070.1 contradicted their claims and showed that the LCS should have been built with Level II.

Eventually, after fighting a losing battle for many years, the Navy decided that if they couldn’t defend their claims, the easiest solution was to change the survivability standards so that the LCS would meet the new, downgraded standards and the conversation would end.  To that end, the Navy made up a new survivability “standard” which is documented in OpNavInst 9070.1A and was issued by CNO Greenert on 13-Sep-2012.

The new document takes a previously simple, clear, straightforward, and logical requirement and turns it into a nearly incomprehensible mishmash of generic and interlocking statements that offer no specific guidance or requirements.  It has reduced a very specific process to a vague collection of “feelings” about survivability.  That was, I believe, its intended purpose – to so obscure the survivability issue that the Navy can now claim the LCS meets the “standard”.

The document incorporates aspects that have nothing to do with survivability.  For example, it introduces cyberwarfare as an element of survivability.  Cyberwarfare and cyber vulnerabilities may affect a platform’s ability to accomplish its task but it is not a survivability issue.

Even the very definition of survivability is flawed.  Read it.

“Survivability. A measure of both the capability of the ship, mission critical systems, and crew to perform assigned warfare missions, and of the protection provided to the crew to prevent serious injury or death.”

This definition is incorrect and has nothing to do with survivability.  The measure of the ability to perform missions is not survivability.  Ability to perform missions is effectiveness.  Even the protection for the crew is only somewhat related to survivability.  Survivability is, pure and simple, the ability of the ship to remain afloat in the face of combat and damage.  The Navy can’t even define survivability!

The document then goes on to list three principal disciplines of survivability: susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability.  The subsequent definitions of these disciplines are as flawed and irrelevant as the definition of survivability.  I won’t even bother quoting them.  You can read the document if you’re interested.

Ultimately, the document goes on to offer tables and flowcharts of survivability, none of which offer any concrete requirements.  Everything is fluid.  Survivability can be anything you want it to be.  This takes today’s “feel good” movement and codifies it in Navy documents. 

We’ve taken a perfectly simple, logical, and useful survivability requirement, downgraded it to the point of uselessness, and rationalized it under some all-encompassing assessment that has little to do with survivability.  Why?  Because the Navy got tired of continually defending an expensive and non-survivable ship. 

If you can’t change the survivability of the ship, change the definition of survivability!  A typical Navy solution.