5 Years or You Didn't Know What You Wanted

ComNavOps so often hears comments to the effect that we can’t consider new weapons because it would take many years to produce a product and we’ve already spent too much time on the current version, however flawed, to start over.

Nothing could be further from the truth.  This kind of thinking is the result of having witnessed so many horribly mismanaged programs that we’ve come to believe that it’s normal.

The F-35 is the poster child for mismanaged programs.  Consider these time frames.

F-35 Lightning

RFP (Request for Proposal)            1996

Contract Award                                 2001

First Flight                                         2006

IOC                                                    pending

Squadron Service                             pending

That’s 10 years from RFP to first flight and 5 years from contract to first flight.  We’re still waiting, 20 years later for IOC (neglecting the Marines publicity stunt declaration of IOC) and it’s going to be a few more years before the Navy achieves IOC, yet.

By comparison, the F-14 Tomcat went from RFP to first flight in 2 years and IOC in 5 years, as shown below.

F-14 Tomcat

RFP (Request for Proposal)            1968

Contract Award                                 1969

First Flight                                         1970

IOC                                                    1973

Squadron Service                             1974

We can build a first rate aircraft in 5 years if we follow basic, common sense rules:

• No use of non-existent technology
• No change orders
• No initiation of production without full design documents
• No concurrency

If we do that, there’s no reason we can’t build a very good aircraft in 5 years, from start to full rate production.  If we can’t do that and we feel we have to change things as we go then we clearly didn’t know what we wanted in the first place.

Hand in hand with being able to build an aircraft in 5 years has to go penalties for failing to do so.  Here’s what needs to happen.

• Program managers must be assigned for the full 5 years to ensure accountability.

• Programs must be terminated after exactly 5 years if they have not reached full production.  No exceptions.  No extensions.  On the day after the 5 year anniversary, the program is automatically terminated regardless of how close the program managers claim it is (programs are always on the verge of completion – just ask the LCS or F-35).

• Production can only start with DOT&E’s approval.  This will prevent stunts like the Marine’s IOC for the F-35 even though the aircraft is in no way combat ready.

• If a program is terminated, the program managers must all be terminated from service and employment.  The only exception is if the program managers themselves recommend early program termination prior to the start of the 4^th year.  If you don’t know within 3 years whether the program is viable then you shouldn’t be a program manager.

• Successful program managers should receive major financial rewards.

The preceding must be Congressionally mandated – it must be law.

There you have it.  That’s how to prevent LCS/Ford/F-35 program failures and ensure timely introductions of new platforms.  If we can’t produce a new platform in 5 years then we didn’t really know what we wanted in the first place.

It’s a simple system.  Most great ideas are.

CUSV for LCS MCM

Well, here’s one that somehow slipped by me.  Textron’s Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) has been selected to tow the unmanned influence sweep system (minesweeping) for the LCS MCM module.  The CUSV is an 11 meter unmanned surface craft.  It has self-righting capability, a draft of a little over 2 ft, data links, remote operator control station, max speed of 28 kts, 24 hr endurance, 1200 nm cruising range, can operate up to sea state 4, and can tow 5000 lb at 10 kts.  The payload bay is 14 ft x 6 ft x 3.5 ft.

Textron has a $34M contract to provide a CUSV for the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS).

This sounds like a nice little craft for the minesweeping task other than the potentially slow speed and questionable towing capacity.  As a point of reference, the standard helo-towed Mk105 minesweeping sled weighs around 9000 lbs fueled and operational.  Given the manufacturer’s claim of being able to tow 5000 lb at 10 kts, the 9000 lb Mk105 would most likely be beyond the ability of the CUSV to tow.  I’ve been unable to find a detailed description or specs on the UISS so I don’t know the weight of the equipment.

CUSV - Enough Power To Tow?

I would desperately like to believe that someone in the Navy looked at the CUSV towing capacity before committing to this but we all recall the fiasco of the original Seahawk type helo being found unable to safely tow its intended MCM equipment.  Is this another example of that?  Until someone tells me that this craft can actually tow the UISS, I’m going to remain nervous about this.

So, this is a nice little craft that may or may not be suitable for the task.  Of course, there’s also the issue of whether it can actually meet its specs.  We’ve seen that the MCM module has nice specs but the equipment can’t meet the specs despite years of development.

I’ll keep an eye on this.

Operational Maneuver From The Sea

One of the serious problems with current military thought is that far too many concepts are being accepted with little rigorous examination to validate the ideas.  For example, "littoral" was accepted with no discussion - instead, discussion leaped straight to implementation.  Most recently, the third offset strategy has been christened with no rigorous analysis, simply a statement of faith that it will work.

With that in mind, let's take a look at Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and attempt to analyze it.

Whatever the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) means to proponents today, it seems that it differs from the intent of the original concept both in theory and practice.  Let’s take a closer look at OMFTS.

The original document, authored by Gen. Krulak in 1996, is focused on a better method of conducting littoral warfare (1).  It is vital to understand that the document defines “littoral” as meaning both the water and the land as opposed to our use of littoral today which has come to mean the shallow waters near land.  OMFTS sees the land and water as one and the same – areas that are interchangeably used to conduct maneuvers aimed at a single operational objective.  This is a point of semantics, in a sense, but a key one to keep in mind when evaluating OMFTS.

The next key point to understand is that OMFTS is conceived as a means of forcible entry.  It is a method to conduct opposed landings and it is assumed that the landings will be opposed.  Too many people today believe that OMFTS is a magical means of conducting unopposed landings by going ashore where there is no enemy and the enemy has no reach.  OMFTS makes clear that nothing could be further from the truth.

“The heart of Operational Maneuver from the Sea is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bid for victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemy weakness in order to deal a decisive blow. Mere movement, which may lead to indecisive results or even be counterproductive, does not qualify as operational maneuver.  That is to say, operational maneuver should be directed against an enemy center of gravity—something that is essential to the enemy's ability to effectively continue the struggle.”

Thus, we see that OMFTS is directed at a significant enemy strength, a center of gravity.  By definition, that point will be heavily defended.  As the document states, merely landing forces at some far distant point just because it was safe to do so does not constitute OMFTS.  OMFTS must strike a significant target.  Of course, if forces can be landed away from enemy response and then move to the desired objective, that would be perfectly acceptable.  The problem with that is that by landing so far away the logistics tail will become enormous and vulnerable.  Further, the force will still have to fight its way to the significant objective in the face of steadily increasing enemy resistance and having given away any element of surprise by landing so far away.

Having set the stage for a description of OMFTS, the document then describes the single biggest assumption which provides the foundation for the entire concept:  OMFTS will succeed because the need for the traditional build up of a supply dump ashore will be bypassed.  This is not only the key to the concept but also its biggest weakness.

“For most of the 20th century, the usefulness of sea-based logistics was limited by the voracious appetite of modern landing forces for such items as fuel, large caliber ammunition, and aviation ordnance. As a result, the options available to landing forces were greatly reduced by the need to establish, protect, and make use of supply dumps.  Concerted efforts were delayed and opportunities for decisive action missed while the necessary supplies accumulated on shore.

In the near future, improvements in the precision of long-range weapons, greater reliance on sea-based fire support, and, quite possibly, a decrease in the fuel requirements of military land vehicles promise to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the need to establish supply facilities ashore. As a result, the logistics tail of landing forces will be smaller, ship-to-shore movement will take less time, and what were previously known as "subsequent operations ashore" will be able to start without the traditional "build up phase." In other words, landing forces will move directly from their ships to their objectives, whether those objectives are located on the shoreline or far inland.

The significant reduction of logistics infrastructure ashore will also facilitate the rapid re-embarkation of the landing force”

This is clearly the key to OMFTS – the ability to operate without shore based supply dumps.  The needed supplies are envisioned as flowing directly from the supply ships to the troops.

Of course, this is tantamount to stating that in the future we’ll eliminate the traffic congestion in cities by moving the commuters directly from their homes to their destinations without needing to use cars and roads.  The concept is good, the technology is non-existent.

How do we get the supplies directly from the ships to the troops?  The document offers no solution other than foreseeing an, apparently, hugely reduced requirement for supplies due to precision weapons, sea based fire support, and a decrease in fuel requirements of land vehicles.  This is both optimistic, bordering on fantasy, and ignorant.

The optimistic aspect is clear.  Not only have today’s land vehicles not reduced their need for fuel, the need has increased as vehicles have become larger and heavier.

The ignorant (I use the word in its clinical, not emotional, sense) aspect is that munitions make up only a small portion of the needed supplies.  Any reduction in the number of munitions due to precision guidance is swamped by the need for food, water, fuel, parts, etc.  The “dump” requirements aren’t going to be eliminated or even significantly reduced just because we need a few less munitions.  Also, the vast bulk of munitions is probably unguided bullets, bombs, and rockets.  The number of precision guided weapons employed by troops on the ground is limited.  While an argument can be made that aircraft have reduced their munitions requirement due to guided weapons, the same does not hold for ground troops.

Sea based fire support is another aspect that has proven problematic.  The Navy’s doctrine is to stand 50+ miles offshore – well beyond the range of any naval gun.  Further, the explosive effects of 5” guns are minimal even if the Navy were willing to stand inshore.  Finally, the number of 5” guns in the fleet is woefully inadequate for the task of fire support.  Consider the number of naval guns used in a WWII amphibious assault.  A single Fletcher class destroyer had almost as many guns as an entire modern amphibious assault force would have!

The net result of this ambitious concept is that the enemy will be stunned into inactivity.

“When combined with a command and control system oriented towards rapid decision-making at all levels of command, the additional speed and flexibility offered by these new techniques translates into a high tempo of operations. Vulnerabilities can be exploited before they are reduced, opportunities seized before  they vanish, and traps sprung before they are discovered. In short, we will be able to act so quickly that the enemy will not be able to react effectively until it is too late.”

Again, this is an example of the type of one-sided thinking that pervades military thought today.  Everything we do will work flawlessly and nothing the enemy does will have any effect on us.  With that assumption, every concept sounds good!

One final shortcoming in this concept is that it ignores the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities of the enemy.  The assumption in the concept is that we will have complete freedom of maneuver throughout the littoral waters.  Admittedly, this is a document geared towards land combat and the author can be forgiven, to a slight degree, for leaving the naval and A2/AD issues to the Navy.  However, the author recognizes that the land and sea issues are linked as a fundamental pillar of OMFTS and yet fails to address it.

Today, OMFTS has morphed into some kind of aviation assault concept accepted as utterly valid by its proponents without any critical examination – examination which reveals foundational flaws!

OMFTS has some aspects that are worth further contemplation but the foundations of the concept are flawed.  The reduction in logistical supply necessary to realize the concept is unattainable, bordering on fantasy.  The ability to instantaneously transport those supplies that are needed directly into the laps of the ground troops is glossed over.  The shortcomings created by assuming away ground based fire support are hand wavingly reduced to a Navy issue that is not recognized for the problem it is.  The lack of acknowledgement of the enemy’s capabilities is stunning.

As a preliminary concept, all of these flaws are acceptable.  The concept can be exercised and shortcomings solved – or the concept can be found to be unrealistic and dropped.  The problem is that OMFTS has been seized by proponents as proven gospel despite the lack of any rigorous examination. 

The real danger from this is that implementation of the concept leads to an assault force that is woefully inadequate for the task if the concept proves flawed in practice.  Implementation will hamstring our proven (though currently badly lacking) assault capability for the promise of a fantasy operation.

(1)“Operational Maneuver From The Sea”, General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCCP%201%20Operational%20Maneuver%20from%20the%20Sea.pdf

P-8 and PBY

ComNavOps has long had doubts about the wartime role of the P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft.  The doubts arise from the combination of the aircraft’s slow and defenseless nature plus the necessity that it broadcast its presence (operating its radar) when performing the maritime patrol function (MPA).  Thus, the enemy is given a free location fix against a high value, slow, defenseless asset.  In other words, the P-8 is a sitting duck in combat if used as envisioned. 

“Used as envisioned”, of course, brings up the subject of the concept of operations (CONOPS).  How will the P-8 be used?  What will its main function be – ASW, MPA, both?  Will it perform its searches actively or passively?  Will it be defended by fighter aircraft or used independently? 

Most importantly, how close to the contested air/water space will it be used?  Certainly, the further back from the front line, the safer.  Of course, the flip side of that is that the further back from the front line, the less useful and effective it is.

The next question is where is the front line?  Well, that’s a nebulous concept that depends on the weapons being considered.  Considering an enemy rifleman, the front line is a hundred yards or so.  Considering enemy surface to air missiles which would be targeted at a P-8 aircraft, the front line is the range of the SAM systems which is 250 -300+ miles.  Here’s some range data on Russian SAM systems for consideration.

S-200 (SA-5)             190 miles

S-300 (SA-10)           121 miles

S-400 (SA-21)           250 miles

S-500 (?)                   250 – 300+ miles

Of course, the reported Russian SAM ranges are, undoubtedly, maximum theoretical ranges.  Effective ranges are probably half that.

Now, compare the SAM engagement ranges to the P-8’s detection range which is reportedly up to 200 miles for large targets with low resolution.  An effective range is probably more on the order of 100 miles. 

Comparing the SAM ranges and the P-8 detection range, it’s clear that the P-8 will have to enter the SAM’s engagement range to see anything assuming the SAM systems are on the front line.  The point is that unless we’re willing to consider P-8s as expendable, they’ll have to be held well back from the front line.  With that in mind, what will the P-8s be looking for? 

So far, this is considering only SAM ranges.  If thousand mile fighters and UAVs are considered, the P-8’s will be pushed even further back from the front line.

Knowledge of the location and movement of enemy units behind the front lines is immensely useful.  Knowledge of the location and movement of enemy units many hundreds of miles on our side of the front line is useful (certainly!!!) but highly unlikely other than the odd submarine.  In simple terms, the P-8 will offer us no intelligence about what’s happening inside the Chinese first island chain which is exactly the kind of intel we’d like to have.

P-8 Poseidon - Useful in War?

Let’s switch gears, momentarily.  ComNavOps is ever one to study and learn from history and it occurs that the WWII PBY Catalina is a relevant comparison to the P-8.  The PBY was designed as the MPA aircraft of its time and, indeed, functioned in that role for the first couple of years of the war before being superseded by long ranged, land based aircraft.  Like the P-8, the PBY was large, slow, and defenseless.  Data is difficult to come by but here’s the best summary of the early PBY loss rates that I could assemble, divided into the two main operational areas.  The operating area is followed by the number of PBY’s deployed and then the number of PBY’s lost.

Location                     Deployed       Lost

Pearl Harbor                   68               56

Philippines                      28               26

The loss rates are staggering.  Admittedly, many of the aircraft were destroyed on the ground but the loss rates in the air were also appalling.  On the other hand, the aircraft performed its function.  For example, the 30 PBY’s based on Midway found the Japanese fleet and set the stage for the battle that followed.  Thus, as a cheap, plentiful, expendable detection system the PBY was effective.  We had lots of PBYs and could afford to send them deep into potential enemy waters as expendable detection devices.  Locating an enemy fleet was deemed worth the loss of the aircraft.  Does this hold true today?  Are we willing to send $200M P-8’s on one-way missions?  Even if we are, we’ll likely only have around 80 P-8’s after the production run is done.  Note that we lost 82 PBY’s in the first couple years of WWII in just two relatively localized theaters.

PBY Catalina - WWII's P-8 Poseidon

Also note that the preceding discussion is focused on the MPA role, using radar for long distance surveillance.  The situation becomes far worse for the ASW role.  ASW detection does not occur at 100-200 mile radar ranges – it occurs at sonobuoy range.  How will P-8’s possibly penetrate far enough into the battlespace to perform useful ASW without being shot down?  I have no answer for that and, indeed, the answer would seem to be that it can’t.

This suggests a disturbing scenario – that we have spent the last few decades building a military force optimized for uncontested operations and one ill-suited for contested operations.  How will we perform ASW inside the first island chain?  Our own submarines can perform ASW and that is, of course, one of their main functions but that then brings the looming submarine shortfall into much sharper focus.  If submarines are to be our main ASW platform why are we allowing such a shortfall in numbers?.  Far from a shortfall, perhaps we should be increasing our submarine numbers?

All of the preceding also leads to the inevitable question, why do we even have P-8’s if they won’t be effective in war?  Why did we ever begin building P-3/8’s?  That answer lies with the nature of the enemy when long range patrol aircraft were developed.  During WWII, with only very short range surveillance systems available, enemy fleets could be anywhere in the Pacific.  Thus, PBY’s were needed to cover the entire ocean (or, at least, the areas of more immediate concern).  In more modern times, the Soviet Union was also a world-ranging naval force (submarines, in particular).  Thus, again, a patrol aircraft was needed to cover the entire world.  The plus side of this was that while the Soviet Union had far ranging submarines that needed to be detected their SAM systems and fighter aircraft were not present world wide.  Thus, the P-3’s were free to roam the world, hunting for submarines and conducting area surveillance, secure in the knowledge that they were relatively safe.

Today, however, our enemy of interest, China, is not a world ranging naval force (though they are moving in that direction) and is, for the foreseeable future, content to operate largely behind the first island chain.  Thus, we need to go into the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone thus created if we hope to generate useful intel.  This means that our primary ocean surveillance platforms, the P-8 and BAMS (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) UAVs are particularly ill-suited for the mission.

We essentially replaced the P-3 with a duplicate, the P-8 – upgraded a bit, to be sure, but for all practical operational and tactical purposes, the same aircraft.  Over the life of the P-3, the operational and tactical landscape changed immensely from world wide surveillance to relatively small, focused surveillance on A2/AD zones and the threat to the aircraft changed from almost non-existent to very long ranged and lethal.  Despite those immense changes, we simply replaced the P-3 with its duplicate.  Perhaps we should have examined the CONOPS a bit closer and come up with a better means to accomplish the mission – a means that might have been something other than the P-8 or other than an aircraft, at all.

Some will say that the F-35 is how we will obtain our deep penetration intel.  This ignores the reality that the F-35 has neither the flight range nor the radar/sensor range to cover the entire East/South China Seas.  The F-35 might be useful for looking at a specific, tiny spot but it is not a maritime patrol aircraft.  Add to that the likelihood that every available F-35 will be fully occupied trying to establish air superiority and none will be available for generic surveillance work.

Thus, we are left with the conclusion that the P-8 and BAMS will not be particularly useful in high end combat and the question, how will we gather useful A2/AD zone surveillance information?

Post-Delivery Construction Costs for LCS

Here’s another interesting budget item.  Read it and then we’ll discuss it.

“BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair, San Diego, California, is being awarded a $15,589,527 cost-plus-award-fee contract for the accomplishment of post shakedown availabilities (PSA) for USS Detroit (LCS-7) and USS Montgomery (LCS-8).  The PSA encompasses all of the manpower, support services, material, non-standard equipment and associated technical data and documentation required to prepare for and accomplish the PSA.  The work to be performed will include correction of government responsible trial card deficiencies; new work identified between custody transfer and the time of PSA; and incorporation of approved engineering changes that were not incorporated during the construction period which are not otherwise the building yard's responsibility under the ship construction contract.  This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $103,999,092. “

This is showing the hidden costs of ship construction that the Navy is engaging in more and more frequently.  The Navy is deferring portions of construction to the PSA and other post-delivery periods as a means to fraudulently artificially contain and obscure legitimate construction costs.  This contract is somewhere between $15M - $104M for two ships that were supposed to have been delivered complete.

Note the type of work.

“The work to be performed will include correction of government responsible trial card deficiencies; new work identified between custody transfer and the time of PSA; and incorporation of approved engineering changes that were not incorporated during the construction period which are not otherwise the building yard's responsibility under the ship construction contract. “

PSA's are supposed to be for the purpose of correcting deficiencies revealed in trials.  They are not supposed to be used for deferred construction.  You can bet the LCS supporters (both of them) will not include this cost in their construction cost claims.

This is relatively small money for these ships.  The major one is the Ford which is having significant construction deferred until post-delivery because they’ve bumped up against the Congressionally mandated cost cap and this is how they’re getting around it.

This practice is disgusting and is, unfortunately, becoming more and more common.

Ford Update

Let’s check in with DOT&E and see how the Ford is coming along.

The electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear continue to show severe maintenance issues.  DOT&E flatly states,

“Absent a major redesign, the catapults and arresting gear are not likely to meet reliability requirements.”

Maintenance is complicated by an inability to perform repairs on catapult components without shutting down the entire system.

“…the Navy identified an inability to readily electrically isolate EMALS components to perform concurrent maintenance. This inability to readily electrically isolate EMALS components could preclude some types of EMALS maintenance during flight operations, decreasing EMALS operational availability.”

So, the catapult system is unreliable and the design does not lend itself to repair during operations.  Kind of a double whammy, there!  As DOT&E points out, on Nimitz carriers a steam catapult can be isolated and worked on while the other catapults continue to operate – a major operational advantage.

Here’s some data on the EMALS reliability courtesy of DOT&E.  The requirement for Mean Cycles Between Critical Failure (MCBCF) – a cycle is one launch – is 4,166.  That means, on average, there should be one critical catapult failure every 4,166 launches.  The actual data to date show a MCBCF of 340.  That’s not even in the remote ballpark of meeting the spec.  As DOT&E states,

“Absent a major redesign, it is unlikely EMALS will be capable of meeting the requirement of 4,166 MCBCF.”

Think that’s bad?  It’s fantastic compared to the arresting gear.  The MCBCF requirement for the arresting gear is one every 16,500.  That’s a huge number but you really don’t want the arresting gear to fail and, let’s face it, it’s a pretty straightforward piece of equipment.  What’s the actual data?  The actual MCBCF is 20.  That’s a critical failure every 20 recoveries!

Given the launch and recovery problems, I’m guessing that pilots are not yet rushing to sign up for duty on Ford.

The inability to safely launch Hornets and Growlers with fuel tanks continues to be a problem and, as DOT&E points out, precludes normal operations.

“[Testing] discovered excessive airframe stress during launches of F/A-18E/F and EA-18G with wing-mounted 480-gallon external fuel tanks (EFTs). This discovery, until corrected, will preclude the Navy from conducting normal operations of the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G from CVN 78.”

Catapult problems abound, it appears.  Consider this item,

In October 2015, the Navy discovered that one of the three Prime Power Interface Subsystems (PPIS) Transformer Rectifiers (TRs) had been damaged during shipboard certification testing. Two of the three TRs are required for normal catapult operations. The TRs were designed to last the life of the ship.”

Life of the ship?  It came up a bit short!  I hope they bought the warranty option.

DOT&E reports that the failed transformer is 11 ft wide and weighs 35,000 lbs.  Replacement will require cutting a hole in the side of the ship and will take several months to complete.

There are other problems like manning and berthing shortfalls, dual band radar issues, etc. but the items listed here are sufficient to provide a grasp of the magnitude of the problems facing Ford.

Why am I pointing these out?  Let’s be honest and fair.  All new ships and all new systems have problems that are eventually worked out.  I’m pointing these out because they involve developmental systems that were non-existent technology when ship construction started.  They should have remained developmental programs until they matured instead of trying to develop them during production.  It is a near certainty that the Ford will be operating under severe performance constraints for several years.  What good does an essentially crippled carrier do the Navy?  The Navy seems unable to grasp the concept of leaving developmental technology in the R&D realm until it’s ready.  Failure to do so leads to stunning program failures like the LCS, F-35, and Ford.

I’ve said this repeatedly and I’ll keep saying it:  learn a lesson, Navy!

$3000 Laptop Follow Up

Well, the recent post about $3000 laptops caused quite a stir with the overwhelming response being that I have no idea what I’m talking about and $3000 laptops are not only justified but probably a bargain to boot.

You know, I not only post to educate and entertain readers but occasionally to learn something myself.  Maybe this is one of those cases.  Honestly, I had no idea such a laptop existed.  If they are fully justified then I stand educated.

However, I'm disappointed to see the widespread, almost kneejerk reaction to any hint of cost awareness.  On a larger scale, this is what leads to $14B carriers or $200M F-35s.  

Maybe every one of those 2600 laptops has to be absolute, top of the line, throw it in lava and have it still work.  On the other hand, I note that the contract only calls for 450 carrying cases which suggests that most of the computers are not going to be slung around and dropped from airplanes at 30,000 ft but, rather, wind up sitting undisturbed in an office or sheltered area.  It's possible, just barely, faintly possible, that those office laptops could be Dells or even the CF-21 for half the cost.

I also note that the contract calls for a couple hundred spare hard drives.  Assuming they're for failures, that's a 10% failure rate from a $3000 laptop that everyone seems to claim can never fail.  Dell laptops don't have a 10% failure rate within a reasonable lifetime (about three years).  Thus, I see a contract that is paying for a never, ever, under any circumstance, fail, computer that includes a built in 10% failure rate.  So, the common argument from readers that the military can’t afford to allow laptops to fail seems contradicted by the contract, itself.  If 10% are going to fail, anyway, then why not use $300 Dells?

I don’t know enough to argue this further (and neither do any of you) but I can analyze the contract announcement and draw a reasonable conclusion that we might, just might, be over-spec’ing and overpaying.  If not, then great but it’s the failure to ask these kinds of questions that leads to F-35s, LCS’s, and Fords.

Those of you who didn’t at least briefly entertain the possibility that we might have overpaid are either subject matter experts on this (and none of you identified yourself as such) who already know the answer or you are thinking non-critically.  There’s nothing wrong with asking the question – are we over-spec’ing and overpaying – and, based on verifiable evidence, concluding that we aren’t.  There is, however, something wrong with refusing to ask the question.