Hornet Upgrades

As we’re all painfully aware, the F-35 has been in development for two decades and is still years away from front line service in any effective manner (notwithstanding the Marine Corps’ PR stunt proclaiming a fictional IOC).  The danger with such a protracted development is that by the time the aircraft reaches squadron service, its technologies may be obsolete.  Most of us recognize this danger and worriedly track Chinese and Russian aviation developments to see what capabilities they’ll have when the F-35 enters service.  However, there is another F-35 “enemy” whose technological capabilities should have been vastly overmatched by the F-35 but are rapidly catching up and may surpass the F-35.  Who is that enemy?  It’s the F-18 Hornet.  Yes, the lowly, basic, non-stealthy Hornet is rapidly gaining capabilities to rival or surpass the F-35. 

We know about the Advanced Super Hornet with conformal fuel tanks that would add 260 miles to the combat radius according to flight testing, enhanced stealth with a 50% reduction in frontal RCS, longer range, advanced cockpit avionics, and an enclosed weapons pod.  What else is being done to improve the Hornet?  Well, here are a couple of new technologies.

Harris Corp., Government Communications Systems Division, has received a $29M contract for the procurement of 138 Distributed Targeting System (DTS) kits for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G (1).   DTS provides enhanced targeting capability for the Super Hornet. It is part of the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F Network Centric Warfare Upgrades program and the F/A-18E/F Flight Plan, which is intended to ensure that the Super Hornet remains ahead of emerging threats in coming decades.

DTS increases pilot and aircrew situational awareness and precision targeting when engaging air-to-ground targets, in part by using geo-registration technology.  Geo-registration technology compares images taken from tactical sensors with an onboard imagery database to produce highly accurate target coordinates.

From a Flight Global website article (2),

"The distributed targeting system allows you to self-generate GPS-quality mensurated coordinates onboard the airplane autonomously," Morley [Captain Frank Morley, Program Manager for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G] says.

“That means that the Super Hornet will be able to use coordinates generated by its sensors, for example its Raytheon APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar or its Raytheon AN/ASQ-228 Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod, and compare that to a precise onboard imagery database to generate precise weapons quality coordinates.”

Now doesn’t that sound a lot like the F-35’s vaunted sensor fusion technology?  The biggest difference is that the DTS is being produced today rather than being just a never-ending developmental project.

In addition to the DTS, the Hornet has an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor in the works.  IRST is a passive, long-range sensor that searches for and detects heat sources.  The system can simultaneously track multiple targets and provides air-to-air targeting capability.  Being a passive sensor, IRST does not give off radiation and is harder to detect as well as being immune to radar jamming.

“Meanwhile, the Boeing is about one year into a development program to field a new infrared search and track (IRST) pod that should be fielded on the Super Hornet fleet by late 2016, Morley says. Developed in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, the new sensor is an evolution of the Northrop Grumman F-14D Tomcat's AN/AAS-42 IRST camera. Boeing upgraded the Tomcat's camera technology for foreign F-15 sales, Morley says. The variant of the sensor that will be added to the Super Hornet is a further development of Boeing's F-15 developments.”

“For the Super Hornet, the USN opted for a podded-solution. A pod avoids retrofit costs, Morley says. An internal system would require modifications to the aircraft's outer mold-line and avionics hardware changes, which would require extensive testing. Nor does the USN need the pod for every mission, Morley says. The IRST is only required for air-to-air focused missions like fleet air defence or air superiority. As such, the USN will only buy about 170 pods, which it will use only as needed, Morley says.

One of the unique design features of the new IRST pod is that it is built into an external fuel tank. Because the aircraft's centerline station is the optimum position for the IRST pod, it has to take the place of the Super Hornet's ever-present drop-tank.

In order to preserve the Super Hornet's range, the USN opted to have the sensor built into the forward half of the fuel tank. That way, some two-thirds of the fuel is still available for use.” (2)

IRST completed its first flight aboard an F/A-18 Super Hornet in February.

Further planned upgrades also sound like the F-35 sensor fusion (2).

“…one of the most important planned capabilities will be better multi-sensor integration (MSI). The aircraft will eventually be able to correlate all of the disparate information generated by the radar, ATFLIR, electronic warfare systems and data-links into one clear tactical picture …”

A Global Aviation website report sums up the Hornet’s development (3),

“Other F/A-18E/F Super Hornet next-generation capabilities included in the flight plan are advanced fused sensors, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Counter Electronic Attack (CEA), Distributed Targeting System (DTS), Multi-sensor Integration (MSI), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), IP-Based Linked Networks and advanced air-to-ground and air-to-air precision weapons operating on an open-architecture backplane.”

Again, the key difference between the F-35 and these Hornet technologies is that the Hornet’s are in production or nearly so and are being fitted to capable, combat ready aircraft.  By the time the F-35 is ready, it may find itself struggling to keep up with the Hornet rather than the other way around.

(1)http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5575

(2)Flight Global Website, “USN developing new Super Hornet upgrades”, Dave Majumdar, 28-May-2012

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usn-developing-new-super-hornet-upgrades-372392/

(3)Global Aviation Report, “Navy’s IRST System Successfully Completes First Flight Aboard F/A-18”, February 19, 2014

http://globalaviationreport.com/2014/02/19/navys-irst-system-successfully-completes-first-flight-aboard-fa-18/

The Death of Military Strategy

USNI News website has posted one of the best articles ComNavOps has read in a while.  The author discusses the “Death of Military Strategy”, as he puts it (1).  He lays the blame on the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review’s (2) adoption of capabilities-based planning in lieu of actual strategy.

As the author describes it,

“Because of an “uncertain” global environment in which the Soviets no longer acted as a global counterweight, no more would DOD plan to fight an actual enemy. Instead, it would plan to deal with a collection of enemy capabilities.”

And there you have it:  neatly summed up and tied together, the author has identified the root of today’s failures in acquisition, training, doctrine, planning, tactics, force structure, and pretty much everything else.  We’ve stopped acting according to the guidance of a coherent strategy and, instead, gone off in pursuit of technology for its own sake.  Whether any given piece of technology will actually help us against a specific enemy or in a specific scenario has become irrelevant. 

Will the LCS help us in the Pacific?  Who cares – it’s new technology and that’s what’s important.

Will the F-35 support our military needs?  Who cares – it’s new technology and that’s what’s important.

Will the laser or rail gun actually support our doctrine (to the degree we have any) and tactics?  Who cares – it’s new technology and that’s what’s important.

Will the Zumwalt’s gun actually be useful in amphibious assaults?  Who cares – it’s new technology and that’s what’s important.

What does the author think of capabilities-based defense planning?

“As a defense procurement strategy, it was intellectually lazy and simple to execute—instead of studying an adversary and dealing with the unique challenges inherent in fighting a specific enemy, it would instead ignore the necessity of accounting for cultural, geographic and strategy aspects of any given opponent and concentrate on technology instead. Capabilities-based planning (CBP) was in. A strategy oriented on a potential enemy was out.”

Well, that’s putting it nicer than I would.

Now, is any of this new?  Of course not.  ComNavOps has been preaching the lack of, need for, and problems inherent with the lack of a coherent military strategy for a long time.  Still, it’s nice to see someone else jump on the bandwagon.

To support his argument, the author documents the best known example of actual military strategic planning which was the Soviet threat in Europe.

“This [capabilities-based planning] was in striking contrast to the approach taken 20 years earlier. In 1981, The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) unveiled a radical revamping of Army doctrine, by then in development for four years. Titled AirLand Battle, the concept was developed to deal with the preeminent military challenge of the time: how to fight the Red Army and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, where NATO faced a combined arms challenge backed with large numbers. This strategy was successfully sold to the Army, the DOD, Congress and the American public and became the concept that drove acquisition, training and force posture and led directly to the combined arms force that fought in Desert Storm.”

“AirLand Battle was not designed in a vacuum or against a generic adversary, and while it relied heavily on technology, the concept never lost sight of the context. Any direct conflict with the Soviets would have Europe as the central battlefield, if for no other reason than Europe was the only place with opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in proximity. The terrain, the approaches, and the doctrine, equipment, logistical tail and support structure of the Soviet war machine was well characterized, exhaustively researched, and continually updated. The Army knew who it was going to fight and where, and set about answering how the joint force was going to accomplish that task.”

Consider the two key statements in the preceding paragraphs.

1. “…while it relied heavily on technology, the concept never lost sight of the context.”

2. “The Army knew who it was going to fight and where, and set about answering how the joint force was going to accomplish that task.”

The first recognizes that technology does not drive acquisition, planning, doctrine, etc. – strategy does.  Technology is useful and important to the extent that it supports the strategy and only to that extent.  Technology that doesn’t support the strategy is useless (and a costly waste!).

The second sums up everything right about a strategy-based approach.  You know who you’ll fight, where you’ll fight and, therefore, you’ll know exactly what you need in order to fight and win.  This ensures that you don’t wind up with technology that isn’t particularly useful such as the F-35 in the Pacific.

I’m running the risk of simply repeating the author’s article but it’s worth quoting one more passage.

“In embracing CBP, we have become focused on a fog bank—the nameless, faceless adversary who may be technologically advanced and may even be a “near peer” in a similarly undefined way. But that adversary has no connections to any geography, culture, alliance structure or fighting methodology. That adversary has no objectives, no systemic vulnerabilities, and no preferred way of fighting. Instead, the enemy is a collection of weapons systems that we will fight with a (presumably) more advanced set of similar systems, in a symmetrical widget-on-widget battlefield on a flat, featureless Earth.”

Can the author paint a picture, or what?!  This is exactly what happened with the LCS.  We developed a technology to deal with the vague threat of the “littoral” without ever defining who that littoral enemy was, where he was, and what specific threats he presented.  As a result, we wound up with a vessel that was of no specific use in any specific scenario.  We simply hoped that the LCS would, at some time, prove useful after we got the ship into the hands of the sailors so that they could tell us what it could do (remember that infamous line from Navy leadership?).

I’ll end it here, rather than continue to repeat the author’s article.  Please follow the link and read it.  It’s well worth it.

(1)USNI, “Essay: Capability-Based Planning and the Death of Military Strategy”, Col. Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF, August 5, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/08/05/essay-capability-based-planning-and-the-death-of-military-strategy

(2)Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30-Sep-2001,

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf

LCS Module Update

GAO’s 2015 annual weapons assessment report contains some interesting tidbits about the LCS modules (1).

ASW Module

Regarding the ASW module,

“Program officials report that currently the [ASW] mission package is 5 tons too heavy to fit within the parameters reserved for the packages.”

This is probably the most mature and useful module if only because the Navy abandoned every aspect of the original module and is now using proven, existing components:  a Thales variable depth sonar, a multi-function towed array, and a standard Navy helo.  The challenge is whether they can get the components to integrate in an effective manner.  Of course, the LCS can never be an effective ASW platform due to inherent structural problems that impact ASW performance:  the vessel is not quieted and optimized for ASW and the ship’s self-noise from the water jets not only precludes a hull mounted sonar but makes the ship an acoustic beacon for miles around.  Add to that the lack of an onboard ASW weapon and you have an extremely mediocre ASW platform.  Further, the inability to operate two helos (yes, some reports credit the LCS-2 version with the ability to operate two but that is questionable due to flight deck structural weaknesses) severely limits the extent of available helo ASW coverage. 

The Navy is currently contracting with three companies for ideas on how to reduce weight in the ASW module without removing a key component.  You know the process when things go through contracts and studies.  It will be years, yet, before we see a functioning ASW module.

MCM Module

Regarding the MCM module,

“The Navy has accepted five MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim—or threshold—requirements and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2015.”

As we know from various reports, the MCM module has proven particularly troublesome with most, or all, of the module components failing to meet their performance criteria.  Thus, the Navy’s continued purchases of MCM modules is puzzling, to say the least.  I guess it’s analogous to buying F-35s that are not ready.

Further, the Navy just announced that the MCM module would not reach its scheduled IOC in September due to across the board reliability issues discovered during testing.

“… LCS Mission Modules Program Manager Capt. Casey Moton said Thursday at a Mine Warfare Association lunch that across-the-board reliability problems in the two start-to-finish mine clearance runs in the technical evaluation led the program to extend the evaluation for several months rather than move prematurely to IOT&E.”

Independence, LCS-2, has been testing the MCM module for how long, now?  Since the mid-70’s, it seems like.  Despite all that work, the module reliability is still unacceptable.  How bad must the reliability be, to be unacceptable to the Navy?!  They’ve accepted barely built ships and F-35’s that have no combat capability.  For them to balk, it must be really bad!

It appears that IOC will be pushed back another year or so.

ASuW Module

The Navy has dropped the plan to use the incredibly short ranged and lightweight Griffon missile in favor of the Hellfire missile.  While there is nothing wrong with the Hellfire, it is still a lightweight, short range missile.  Wiki lists the range as 550 yds out to 5 miles.  It is doubtful that range holds for a surface, vertical launch.  The effective range will likely be more like 3-4 miles.  Also, note the minimum range.  If a target gets inside 550 yds the LCS will have to engage with guns which have, thus far, proven problematic.  The 30 mm guns have had a succession of maintenance and performance issues and the 57mm gun is inaccurate above 10 kts or so due to ship vibration.  Further, the guns are optically aimed and are not linked to radar in the ship’s fire control system.

USNI News has some disturbing news even about the Hellfire missile testing. (2)

“The program office began tests on a research vessel at the end of February against ‘high-speed maneuvering targets out off the Virginia Capes.’  That testing wrapped up in June, and based on the results, the office has to do ‘some tweaking – it’s really that level, tweaking – to the missile seeker and such.”

When you factor in the military’s ridiculously positive spin on testing – every test is an unqualified success, no matter how bad (remember the fabulously successful F-35B tests on the Wasp that actually barely achieved 50% availability? – you get the sense that the Hellfire has some serious issues integrating into a vertical launch system.  “Tweaking”, with the slight negative connotation it has, must indicate that the missile failed badly!  Getting a missile that is designed to launch horizontally to launch vertically, tip over, and acquire its target, is not a trivial feat without mid-course guidance.

The missile will have to undergo another set of tests several months down the road.

Here is GAO’s summary assessment in their typically bland style.

“The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work successfully together to achieve results. For example, none of the mission packages for any increment have achieved interim requirements on the Independence variant, or meet its threshold requirements for either seaframe.”

Remember, also, that the IOCs that the Navy is trying so desperately to achieve are not for the desired modules but for very stripped down versions that simply allow the Navy to field a bare minimum (many would say less than minimum) capability as a PR event.  The desired modules that the Navy sold the LCS program on are many years down the road or, more likely, will never be achieved.  Go back and read the original module descriptions to see just how much the modules have been dumbed down in the quest to get something, anything, fielded.  We’ve largely forgotten the grandiose promises made and have come to believe that the current, anemic versions of the modules are what was always intended.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  As a group, the modules are an utter and colossal failure.

Perhaps the most important point in the report, though, is this one,

“The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet full mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed, demonstrated, and integrated with either seaframe class.”

The LCS’s value and effectiveness, whether you support it or not, is predicated on the performance of its modules just as a carrier’s value is based wholly on its air wing.  An LCS without an effective module is just an overgrown Coast Guard cutter, if even that.  GAO points out that the Navy is proceeding full speed with seaframe acquisition in the absence of any useful and effective module.  The only module that even theoretically exists is the ASuW module and, let’s be real, an ASuW module that consists of a couple of machine guns and a RHIB is hardly useful or effective.

Worse is the Navy’s laser like focus on seaframes.  While the modules languish, seaframe construction continues unabated.  It would be nice if the Navy put the same effort into the modules as the seaframes and it would be even nicer if the Navy would recognize the importance of the modules.  No module, no useful LCS.  If the Navy isn’t careful, half the LCS seaframes will reach their end of life without ever seeing a useful module.  What a waste that would be (assuming you don’t consider the LCS to already be a waste!).

(1)Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions – Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs”, Mar 2015, GAO-15-342SP

(2)USNI, “LCS Anti-Sub Warfare Package Too Heavy; 3 Contracts Issued For Weight Reduction Study”, Megan Eckstein, July 30, 2015

http://news.usni.org/2015/07/30/lcs-anti-sub-warfare-package-too-heavy-3-contracts-issued-for-weight-reduction-study

What Might Have Been

What Might Have Been

An anonymous reader recently made a comment suggesting that the “B” model of the F-35 should have had different requirements and capabilities than it currently does.  Though he didn’t explicitly state it, the implication was that those differences would have led to a cheaper aircraft that would have been fielded sooner.

Note:  The reader commented anonymously.  I’d love to give proper credit which is why I encourage everyone to offer at least an informal username in the body of the comment text.

This is an intriguing idea and got me thinking about what the “B” should have been.

Let’s start with the most obvious consideration: the “B” is strictly for the Marines (I’m looking only at US application, now).  That means that, by definition, it’s not intended for air superiority, carrier group defense, deep strike, or maritime reconnaissance.  It’s intended for Marine ground support.  In other words, it’s intended to operate over a land battlefield.  That means that it doesn’t need exceptional speed, huge range (it will operate in close proximity to land forces), high degrees of stealth, exceptional maneuverability (I guess it achieved that one!), or 360 degree sensor fusion (let’s face it, that’s an A2A requirement).

What it did need was survivability to operate over a battlefield.  That survivability could take the form of armor, like the A-10, reduced size, reduced IR signature, enhanced ECM, redundant controls, and a moderate degree of stealth.  Stealth is only marginally useful in this role since the immediate low level battlefield threats are more IR and visual.

Another requirement should have been precision organic targeting.  Depending on external laser spotting, for example, is a very iffy proposition in high end combat.  The ground troops are going to be far too busy and pressured to conduct leisurely laser spotting.  The aircraft would need whatever onboard laser, IR, or visual targeting capability that could be had.  The ability to find and designate targets with minimal guidance from ground troops would be critical.

Hand in hand with onboard targeting should have been downward directed ISR.  Sensors designed to find and identify enemy troops, vehicles, armor, and artillery would be highly beneficial and would allow the aircraft to not only engage targets but guide friendly troop movements and strategy.  The ability to independently assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of the ground battle would be key.  JSTARS and similar aircraft have some of this capability so it’s not a total reach of fantasy.

All of this requires maximum endurance (time over target).  The ability to loiter and develop a ground picture and remain available for ground troops is paramount.  Passing overhead once at Mach 17 is nowhere near as useful as being able to loiter and develop an understanding of the ground situation and monitor changes over time.  That type of understanding would be of great benefit to the ground commander – perhaps more beneficial, even, then weapons on target.  This requirement further suggests consideration of a two seat aircraft allowing the backseater to develop the ground picture and coordinate with ground forces without having to be distracted by actually flying the aircraft.

Finally, the “B” should have had a significant weapons payload.  The weapons should have been a combination of high volume, suppressive fire like rockets as well as precision missiles like Hellfire and small guided bombs.

So, what does this give us when we assemble these requirements in one package?  It suggests that the F-35B should have been a fairly basic and straightforward airframe, possibly a two seater, possessing moderate stealth, great endurance, maximum IR signature reduction, armor and redundancy, and average speed and maneuverability.  It should have featured ground-directed sensing systems and the ability to interface with ground commanders.  Weapons should have been plentiful (maximum use of hardpoints since stealth would not be an emphasis) with a combination of precision and area suppressive munitions.  It should have had no emphasis on A2A beyond self-defense.

In short, the F-35B should have had far more in common with the A-10 than with the current F-35B.

Turbine Repair

We’ve been looking a bit at repair and maintenance costs.  Here’s an interesting one.  Huntington Ingalls Inc. has received a $6.7M contract for repair of the number two ship’s service turbine generator on USS Nimitz (CVN 68).  Work is expected to be completed by October 2015. 

That seems like a lot of money for repair work on a single generator!  I wonder what the cost of a new one is?

You know, we talk about preserving the industrial base as a national strategic priority.  I wonder if we shouldn’t really be trying to expand the industrial base rather than preserve it.  Preservation at the current levels leads to a lack of competition which leads to higher prices.  Maybe we should be encouraging smaller companies to enter the defense industry with the idea of expanding the supplier base and promoting more competition as they grow.

Of course, we aren’t going to produce another nuclear carrier construction company overnight but there are lots of small companies that operate around the fringes of the defense industry and only need some financial encouragement to expand.  Over time, we could see several new companies grow into the defense industry.  We issue far too many sole source, non-compete contracts to be comfortable with the current situation.

UAV Price Point

Insitu Inc., has received a $78M contract for the procurement of six low-rate initial production Lot IV RQ-21A Blackjack unmanned aircraft systems.  That equates to $13M per aircraft.

To refresh, the Blackjack is a small UAV of a bit over 100 lbs and a payload of around 40 lbs.  This is a really tiny aircraft!

What’s the relevance, here?  Well, there is a school of thought that claims that UAVs, be they UCLASS/UCAV or whatever, will be significantly cheaper than corresponding manned aircraft.  That’s absurd, of course.  If they’re corresponding then the cost would correspond, also.

In any event, here’s a data point.  A 100+ lb UAV costs $13M each.  If that cost scales up to, say, a Predator size UAV which is 20x the weight, the cost would be $260M each.

The point is that UAVs are not going to be cheaper than manned aircraft for comparable capabilities.  Logic dictates that they can’t be and here’s an actual price point that supports that conclusion.

Face it, people.  UAVs are just as expensive as manned aircraft. 

OK, that’s sobering but not exactly earth-shaking.  Is there more to this story? 

 

RQ-21 Blackjack

Yes, one of the concepts for UAV utilization seems to be a willingness to throw UAVs at high value, high risk targets.  Well, from a pilot safety perspective that’s certainly valid.  However, we see that the type of UAV that can cover a thousand miles and return, carry a significant payload, and have a significant degree of stealth so that it has a chance to survive to reach its target will be very expensive.  Will we really “throw” $200M UAVs at targets where we expect high attrition rates?

Bad to Worse?

It has been widely report that around 20% of Marine Corps aircraft are grounded awaiting maintenance.  What aircraft are these?  They’re mostly Hornets but also include Harriers, MV-22s, and helos.  In other words, they’re older, legacy aircraft.  Compared to modern F-22/35s, we could go so far as to say they’re simple and basic machines.  And yet, 20% are grounded awaiting maintenance.

OK, that’s not a good situation but what’s the point?

Consider that 20% figure and the “simpleness” of those aircraft and ask yourself what the maintenance situation will be like when the Marines convert to the F-35, a vastly, hugely, immensely, greatly, stupendously [alright, that’s enough adjectives to covey the meaning] more complex aircraft.  Do you think maintenance availabilities will increase?  Of course not!  If we can’t keep “simple” machines running, how will we keep profoundly more complex machines running?  The incredibly more complex F-35 will suffer even worse maintenance availability. 

Adoption of the F-35 by the Marines will exacerbate an already deplorable maintenance situation.