NAVSEA's Failure

Who provides the quality assurance for the Navy?  Who insures that that Navy gets what it pays for?  Who shepherds new ships through construction and into the fleet?  Who monitors readiness in the fleet? 

The answer, of course, is NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems Command).

How are they doing?  Well, given the deplorable state of the fleet, one would suspect that they are not performing their duties very well.  Let’s take a closer look.

Among other duties, NAVSEA is responsible for the INSURV inspection program which is sort of a spot check intended to determine the readiness of ships.  Thus, if the pattern of INSURV inspections shows that the ships are generally ready, we can feel confident about the fleet as a whole.  With that in mind, the 2010 report from the Fleet Review Panel of Surface Forces Readiness, headed by VAdm. Philip Balisle (the famous Balisle report, as it’s referred to publicly) stated that of the then 14 Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, only one could get underway and fully execute the mission.

Capt. Robin Rusell, speaking for NAVSEA’s Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21) was quoted,

“What we had was a naval sea systems organization that was … not as responsive as it could have been.”

NAVSEA should have been inspecting the ships and loudly proclaiming the fact that the MCM fleet, at least, was almost completely idled due to lack of maintenance.  Instead, the INSURV inspections gave no hint of the state of the MCM fleet.

As the fleet continued to deteriorate, many other ships failed INSURV exams.  Of course, a ship’s failure is not NAVSEA’s fault.  Their job is simply to inspect and evaluate the ships.  However, the INSURV failures became so frequent and embarrassing that the Navy resorted to classifying the results.  Further, the inspection was eventually changed from a pass/fail event to an advisory report with no failure attached.

More recently, NAVSEA has been providing “helper” exams to give ships such as the LCS and LPD a better chance to “pass”.  NAVSEA is totally missing the point that their mission is not to pass ships but to provide a realistic assessment of the condition of ships so that Navy leadership can address problems.

On a related note, cross-decking of crew and materials is a common pre-inspection practice.  Vital needs that a ship is lacking are borrowed from another ship for purposes of passing the inspection and then the materials are returned after the inspection.  Again, this completely misses the purpose of the inspection which should be a come-as-you-are event.  If you fail, you fail and that gives Navy leadership the opportunity to provide corrective assistance to the ship in question.  Cross-decking just covers up the problem.  It’s up to NAVSEA to minimize this practice so as to obtain a more realistic assessment.  Inspections should be unannounced.

NAVSEA is also responsible for conducting acceptance trials of new ships and determining whether the ships are complete and functional.  With the LPD-17 program, NAVSEA failed badly even at this most basic function.  As documented in a CRS report (1), the Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with 1.1 million man-hours of additional construction needed to complete the ship.  LPD-18 was accepted with 400,000 man-hours remaining and LPD-19 was accepted with 45,000 additional man-hours needed.  In fact, two years after LPD-17 was delivered, the report notes that 138 of 943 ship spaces remained unfinished – 15% of the ship was incomplete two years after acceptance.

The LCSs were accepted in similar unfinished states.

C’mon, now.  It doesn’t get any simpler than this.  Is the ship complete?  NAVSEA couldn’t even do that correctly.

Commenting on one of the many LPD-17 mechanical problems, a 20-May-10 memo from Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command had this to say related to NAVSEA’s performance.

“Inadequate Government [ed.: NAVSEA] oversight during the construction process failed to prevent or identify as a problem the lack of cleanliness and quality assurance that resulted in contamination of closed systems.”

The memo goes on to cite a long list of oversight, maintenance, and training failures for which NAVSEA was responsible.  The entire LPD program was a case study in failed acquisition, construction, acceptance, maintenance, and training.

You’ll recall that NAVSEA traces back to 1966 when BuShips was disbanded.  The loss of the Navy’s General Board - BuShips combination was an event that the Navy has never recovered from and many of today’s current problems can be directly attributed to this loss.  NAVSEA has been a disappointment, to say the least.  A cursory comparison of the DOT&E annual reports to NAVSEA’s responsibilities reveals just how poorly NAVSEA has performed.  The Navy needs to abolish NAVSEA and return to the General Board / BuShips model.

Before we leave this topic, let’s consider why NAVSEA has failed so badly.  The reason is that NAVSEA falls under the Navy’s chain of command.  Thus, NAVSEA marches to the orders of Navy leadership.  That’s hardly a situation that encourages reporting of the unvarnished truth.  Indeed, there is much evidence, direct and indirect, that Navy leadership has, indeed, exerted undue influence on NAVSEA. 

Contrast NAVSEA’s conflicted organizational arrangement with that of Director, Operation Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) which is responsible for performance testing of the military’s systems.  The stunningly critical, honest, and effective (by comparison, at least) DOT&E reports clearly demonstrate the advantages and benefits of having the quality assurance functions divorced from the organization being evaluated.

Abolish NAVSEA !

(1) Congressional Research Services, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, March 16, 2011

F-35 Destroyed By FOD

An F-35 has been destroyed as a result of an in-flight FOD mishap involving bats.  The aircraft was struck by a flock of bats and ingested several into its engine resulting in a crash that destroyed the aircraft.  The pilot safely ejected. 

Navy officials blamed the accident on the aircraft’s extreme stealth.  Bats, who navigate using eco-ranging, a form of radar on a different frequency, are apparently blind to the F-35’s presence due to its extreme stealth and see the giant aircraft as having a return the size of a mosquito, the bat’s favorite food.  The bats then instinctively swarm the aircraft, attempting to capture and eat it, resulting in engine ingestion and subsequent damage.

The manufacturer is reportedly working on a blip enhancer tailored to the bat’s frequency range for use during take-off and landing.  It is hoped that the enhancer will enlarge the aircraft’s return to the size of a hawk, a predator of the bats, and scare the bats off.  When asked why they couldn’t just make the aircraft appear its normal size, a Navy spokesman said,

“You have to remember, the F-35 is so inherently stealthy that it’s just not possible to enhance the return much above that of a small hawk without resorting to external power pods.”

The Navy spokesman went on to note that the F-35’s extreme stealth over the entire electromagnetic spectrum has caused numerous unanticipated problems.  In a surprise piece of news previously unreported, the spokesman stated that several F-35’s have been lost on the ground when the aircraft were parked in and around hangars without taking careful note of GPS storage co-ordinates and ground crew on the following shifts couldn’t find them.  The spokesman said,

“It’s a bit embarrassing but we have lost several aircraft.  We know they’re out there, in and around the hangars, but we just can’t find them.  We’re hopeful that someone will eventually bump into them.”

Well, there you go.  I guess even stealth has its downside.

Dual Band Radar

I’ve had this post in the works for a bit and a comment by “Nick” prompted me to post it.  Thanks “Nick”!

The Navy has been developing an active array Dual Band Radar (DBR) for some time, now.  The radar operates over two distinct bands utilizing a single software suite and control interface.

AN/SPY-3 X-band – provides horizon search and detection of low altitude targets and offers illumination and data unlink/downlink for Standard and ESSM missiles.  The radar was originally intended to have three array faces.

VSR S-band (SPY-4?) – provides volume search and tracking.  The radar was originally intended to have three array faces.

The two bands can operate in multiple modes and are intended to fill the roles of separate radars for air traffic control, target illumination, tracking, surface search, and navigation, thus eliminating multiple legacy radar units.

The radar system is intended to operate with minimal operator input.  In theory, this would eliminate operate mistakes or ineffective actions due to human threat assessment and response. 

You’ll recall that the radar was intended to be installed in the Zumwalt and Ford classes.  As it happened, the S-band half of the system was removed from the design of the Zumwalt class as a cost reduction move.  Now, the Navy reports that the DBR will only be installed on the Ford and future ships of the class will receive a new, as yet unspecified radar.  Navy spokesmen have suggested that the termination of the system is based on “economics and need”.

ComNavOps has long questioned the need for a cutting edge radar system for a carrier that has no area air defense missile system and is constantly surrounded by Aegis cruisers and destroyers.  Apparently, the Navy now agrees.

I have not seen any cost figures for the DBR but given the hype the system has received from the Navy, to terminate its production must indicate that the system is very expensive.  One Navy spokesman stated that the system was on the order of $500M and that selection of an alternate system for subsequent Fords would produce savings of $180M (1).  As an aside, simple arithmetic suggests, then, that the replacement radar would cost on the order of $320M.  Hopefully, this won’t be an F-22/35 case where the cheaper replacement turns out to actually be more expensive.

The Navy has suggested that the DBR replacement radar will be a simpler, off-the-shelf system that will be fitted to multiple ship classes.  If so, this is a step in the right direction.  ComNavOps has long advocated simpler systems that meet only the class requirements and no more – in other words, no Aegis on patrol boats, to engage in a bit of hyperbole for the sake of dramatic impact.  A carrier has no need for a world class DBR so why give it one?  All that would do is add cost.  While the decision to eliminate the DBR from the Ford class is a good one, the original decision to include it is an example of very poor decision making, devoid of tactical usefulness and ignorant of cost considerations.  This is just one of many reasons why the Ford cost has escalated to $13B and additional construction and costs are being deferred to post-delivery in order to get around the Congressionally imposed cost cap.

The Ford DBR will, therefore, be a one-off radar system.  You’ll recall what happened to the Enterprise’s original radar system?  We’ll undoubtedly see the DBR removed from Ford sometime down the line.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2015/03/17/peo-carriers-cvn-79-will-have-a-new-radar-save-180m-compared-to-dual-band-radar

War Funds Used for Maintenance

The Virginian-Pilot newspaper recently published an on-line article describing the Navy’s use of war funds to repair submarine propellers (1).  You’ll recall that the war funds are the Overseas Contingency Operations funding which was established in 2001 for the purpose of funding operations directly related to the global war on terror.  The fund is separate from DoD funding.  The article points out that use of war funds for construction or maintenance is inappropriate. 

I don’t normally like to simply point to articles without offering any analysis but, in this case, I have no independent information to verify the report and, therefore, no analysis to offer.  However, given the pattern of fraudulent Navy accounting practices, the article strikes me as completely believable and, if true, is well worth a read.  I leave it to you to read the article (1) and draw your own conclusions.  This is hardly the first accusation that the military has begun using the account as a slush fund to pay for all manner of things other than anti-terrorism operations.

(1) http://hamptonroads.com/2015/03/navys-use-war-funds-repair-sub-propellers-questioned

What's Wrong With This Picture?

Our uniformed military leadership is currently parading in front of Congress, pleading for more money and inferring (actually, flatly stating) that all of the military’s problems are the fault of sequestration.  Yes, funds are tight (only on relative basis – the military is still very, very well funded) and, like every family in America, the military is being asked to live within a budget.  Like every family in America, they’ve had to make some hard decisions.  The difference is, every one of their decisions has been wrong.

Depot level maintenance is lagging far behind with backlogs approaching 150 aircraft.  Depot manning is woefully understaffed.  Parts inventories are severely depleted.  That’s all due to bad decisions made by the military.  Congress didn’t tell the military to let depot capability wither.

But the F-35 is fully funded.

The Marines have told Congress that 20% of their aircraft are grounded awaiting parts and maintenance.  Congress didn’t make the decisions to short maintenance and parts inventories – the Marines did.

But the LCS is fully funded.

Surge capability has vanished to the point of non-existence.  We are barely getting a reduced level of deploying units out the door.  There are no parts and no training for the surge forces.

But 22 admirals are getting a second star.

The fleet is steadily shrinking.  Worse, our combat power is being replaced by useless LCSs, non-combat JHSVs, questionable MLPs, and hospital ships.

But the Ford CVN is fully funded.

We have significant sea billet gaps.  Minimal manning has proved to be an abject failure resulting in ever worsening maintenance problems, task overload, and spectacular ship performance failures (the Port Royal grounding, for example, was due, in part, to a shortage of personnel).

But the number of admirals is at an all time high.

Tactical training has all but ceased and the Navy is desperately trying to re-establish some form of training (in the middle of the desert!).  Our commanders have no idea how to tactically handle individual ships or task groups.  No commander has ever practiced combat ops for a multi-carrier group.

But we are at an all time high in diversity, cultural awareness, and gender sensitivity training.

What’s wrong with this picture?

Funds are tight, at least compared to the bottomless well of funding that we used to enjoy, and military leadership is making all the wrong decisions and putting the available funds into all the wrong areas. 

Consider fleetwide maintenance.  Navy leaders are standing before Congress, right now, stating that because of sequestration, maintenance will deteriorate and that Congress needs to allocate more funds.  Well, maintenance has been deteriorating for a couple decades – long before sequestration happened.  The truth is that the Navy long ago opted to short maintenance in pursuit of new construction.  The decision to cut depot funding occurred many years ago.  Sequestration may have exacerbated the problem but it certainly didn’t cause it.  Maintenance problems are a voluntary, self-inflicted problem that is wholly the responsibility of Navy leadership.  It is simply lying to stand before Congress and blame maintenance problems on Congress and sequestration. 

What’s wrong with this picture?  What’s wrong is Navy decision making and priorities.  Navy leadership has failed America.

Cooperative Strategy - Review

The 2015 update to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower” has been released.  As with its predecessor, it is largely a meandering statement of naval desires that is not a strategy in any way, shape, or form.  That said, let’s take a bit closer look and see if there is anything of interest in it.

One of the items that stands out is the statement describing our overall military requirements.  The combat requirements for the U.S. military have steadily shrunk over the years from fighting two major conflicts and containing a third to the current requirement to fight one major conflict and contain another.  Sadly, the decrease in requirements has been based on after-the-fact rationalization of decreasing capabilities rather than some kind of logical, strategic based requirement.  This is, frankly, a worrisome devolution of our national will and military capacity.

On a positive note, the document actually states the name of potential enemies, China included!

The document elucidates five essential functions:

All Domain Access – This provides recognition of the increasing importance of cyber warfare in all its forms.  The Navy is currently highly dependent on data flow, networks, and communications which are increasingly subject to disruption.  While it is encouraging that the Navy now recognizes the importance of this broad area of warfare the reality is that it is only lip service, at the moment.  The Navy is not conducting data, comm., and network denied training, is not challenging itself to find its own weaknesses, and is not aggressively pursuing offensive cyber warfare.  Recognition is a good first step but the time is long overdue to begin practicing what is preached.

Deterrence – This correctly identifies our core combat power (carriers, subs, Marines, etc.) as the key to deterrence (to the extent that one believes deterrence is a real phenomenon) and yet fails to reconcile that recognition with the reality of a shrinking fleet, carrier and submarine shortfalls, and increasing numbers of non-combat vessels like LCS and JHSV.  Additionally, deterrence can only work if the enemy believes we have the will to use our deterrent forces – something that we have been severely lacking of late.  Rather than back down from Chinese forces, for example, and allow an Aegis cruiser to be chased off on the high seas, we need to steadfastly counter aggression even at the risk of escalation.  Rather than accept highly risky harassment from Russian and Chinese aircraft we need to aggressively counter these moves even at the risk of escalation and combat incidents.

Sea Control - This section blandly states the obvious and offers nothing.

Power Projection – See the preceding.

Maritime Security – This is the one area where cooperation with smaller foreign naval forces makes sense since this function is best conducted by patrol type vessels.

One positive item stood out regarding the relationship between offensive and defensive aerial threats.  The document seems to recognize the self-defeating path of ever more complex weapons as counters to increasingly sophisticated cruise and ballistic missile threats.

“…greater emphasis on force-wide, coordinated non-kinetic capability and counter-targeting techniques as opposed to engaging each threat with increasingly expensive kinetic weapons. In short, we must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than countering individual weapons.

Barring a Star Wars type of breakthrough in laser employment, defensive systems are on the losing end of the cost effectiveness curve versus aerial threats.  Recognition of this reality requires that we focus on shorter range kinetic defenses, much greater emphasis on electronic countermeasures (soft kill options), and a willingness and capability to attack the source of aerial threats rather than dealing with the result, meaning incoming weapons.

The document’s recognition of this is commendable.  What’s needed now is suitable doctrine, tactics, and equipment to implement this modified approach to dealing with incoming threats.

And, finally, of course, there is the ever present Pentagon Buzzword Bingo!  What military document would be complete without it?  Some examples,

“Cross-domain synergy is achieved when these elements are synchronized, providing Joint Force commanders a range of options in all domains to defeat anti-access/area denial strategies.”

“Modernize the Navy’s total force personnel system with a holistic strategy that evolves the All-Volunteer Force, creating more agile and family-friendly career paths in line with 21st Century social and economic realities.”

So, if this document isn’t a strategy, what is it?  Well, I can best describe it as a sales and marketing brochure aimed at securing Congressional funding for the Navy’s acquisition wish list.  There’s nothing wrong with that but an actual strategy would sure be nice!

Cooperative Strategy - Foundational Principles

The 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower has been updated and we’ll be taking a look at various aspects of it.  The document starts by flatly stating two foundational principles. 

The first is forward presence.

“First, U.S. forward naval presence is essential to accomplishing the following naval missions derived from national guidance: defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response. … “

Forward presence is a debatable but valid approach to achieving the Navy’s goals.  Forward presence implies several things such as increased costs for forward basing and maintenance, an acceptance of a certain degree of inefficiency due to multiple, disbursed storage, maintenance, and training requirements, and a degree of vulnerability of bases and ships to initial attack due to proximity to enemy long range ballistic and cruise missiles.  Properly implemented, it also offers the ability to respond quicker to crises and promotes a degree of local familiarity with geography, climate, oceanic conditions, and enemy forces and tactics that would be unavailable to surge forces.  It also offers the theoretical possibility of deterrence through presence although history suggests that the reality of that is suspect. 

Most significantly, it offers the possibility of head to head confrontational containment, if we have the will to do so.  For example, China’s steady encroachment across the East and South China Seas, backed by localized small scale military force, could be countered by similar counter-encroachments by U.S. naval forces as long as we are willing to accept the risk of small engagements.  It is this ability to apply counter-encroachment that is the most valid justification for, and use of, forward presence.

This principle is also notable as much for what it precludes as what it includes.  It rules out the concept of home-based naval forces (sometimes referred to as a nodal strategy) that operate via the surge mechanism as the primary means of naval employment.  Similarly, it rules out the various concepts of cadre/reserve/garrison approaches that would have the bulk of our forces home based in some type of reduced status and only responding to a crisis as necessary.

The second foundational principle is global naval cooperation.

“Second, naval forces are stronger when we operate jointly and together with allies and partners. Merging our individual capabilities and capacity produces a combined naval effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. By working together in formal and informal networks, we can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interests. Maximizing the robust capacity of this global network of navies concept, we are all better postured to face new and emerging challenges.”

This is pure and utter bilge water.  While there is nothing wrong with cooperating with allies, the belief that some kind of magical global naval network can exist and provide an enhanced level of naval might is pure fantasy.  We’ve seen in the past that every country has its own objectives and priorities and those only rarely coincide with ours.  How many times have we been denied overflight rights by allies?  How many times have we been denied basing and operational rights by allies?  How many times have allies balked at joining us in military operations? 

Further, with the exception of the UK, Japan, and, possibly, Korea, what other country has naval power significant enough to be worth attempting to cooperate with?  I’m sorry but teaming up with countries whose most powerful vessel is a patrol boat doesn’t gain us anything.

Even partnering with the UK, Japan, and Korea has limitations.  The UK has very limited numbers and no significant naval aviation capability.  Japan is a localized force only, though a powerful and capable one.  Korea is completely occupied with their own defensive needs.  When it comes to meeting our global needs and responsibilities, these countries are marginally helpful but hardly significant global participants. 

I’m all for naval cooperation but to make some kind of nebulous global naval network a foundational principle is idiotic.  As with any country, our needs and requirements must be met by our own resources.  Dependence on foreign assistance is a sure path to disappointment, as history has amply demonstrated. 

A better version of this foundational principle is that America’s Navy stands alone.  As such, the Navy must be sized to meet all its needs and requirements on its own.  If, in a given situation, we can obtain assistance from an ally, so much the better but to count on such assistance as a foundational principle is just pure fantasy and folly.

A country and a Navy that would count on global cooperation as a foundational principle is a country and a Navy that is setting itself up for disappointment and defeat.  No other country has our interests at heart and we should, therefore, count on no one but ourselves.  The Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower document is flawed from the very start because of this misguided principle.