Friday, August 14, 2026

Memo From the President On Shipbuilding

The Navy is currently a flaming hot mess.  It’s not even debatable and I won’t bother listing all the problems.  President Trump appears to recognize this to an unknown, but significant, degree and has issued a memo calling for various actions to improve naval shipbuilding capabilities and capacities.
 
The memo is a fascinating blend of solid, beneficial concepts and technical and legal challenges.  It also fails to address, or even mention, the root cause of the Navy’s shipbuilding woes.  Let’s take a closer look.
 
The very first sentence recognizes and states the problem (well, one of the problems) quite forcefully and succinctly.
 
The United States Navy has experienced a series of shipbuilding setbacks stemming from overly complex designs and iterative design change procedures …[1]

In plainer terms, it states that the Navy’s ship acquisition process is a steaming pile of crap and, very importantly,  identifies at least a couple of the major contributing factors.  Excellent!
 
It goes on to say,
 
The Department of War shall restore both capacity and competition to the maritime industrial base ,,,[1]

That’s nice but it’s like calling for world peace – a noble goal but pointless without specific, effective actions and none are listed.  Miss America calls for world peace every year but I’m pretty sure it’s still a problem.
 
We then see a vague recognition of part of the problem.
 
It will use proven, reliable, and affordable technologies and ship designs …[1]

This is saying that the days of trying to incorporate non-existent, leap ahead technologies are over.  That’s a great sentiment which I heartily endorse.  Now, ruthlessly enforce it.  However, there is also a potential pitfall here.  If we never incorporate new technology, we’ll never advance.  There needs to be a corresponding directive to make use of one-off prototypes specifically to evaluate and develop new technologies.
 
Now, here’s a stunner.
 
Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President, … a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of CVN-81 ...[1]

This has long been one of the President’s pet peeves and he appears to be trying to act on it.  I fully support this but the inertia and incompetence in Navy leadership is not going to take this lying down.  This will be vigorously opposed .  Unless the President has the complete agreement and backing of SecNav and CNO, this will not happen.  A great way to get such agreement and backing is to start firing people until people can be found who are on board with the President.
 
The memo repeatedly calls for foreign involvement in the shipbuilding process, both directly and indirectly.  This is a concept that has some appeal, under certain, limited circumstances, but has a great deal of potential to run afoul of legislative roadblocks.  Beyond that, what the President is calling for has been attempted and resulted in the spectacular failures of the LCS and Constellation.  Repeating a set of actions and expecting a different outcome is the definition of insanity.  This needs to be very carefully thought out and managed and the Navy has emphatically demonstrated they have no such management capability.  Wholesale firings of the existing flag ranks would go a long way to solving this.
 
Another major problem is addressed.
 
The Navy shall not impose iterative design changes upon the original mature parent designs within the above programs implemented pursuant to the plans developed under subsections (a) through (b) of this section. No changes from parent designs shall be made without the approval of the Secretary of War ,,,[1]

This is recognizing the destructive impact of the Navy’s never-ending change orders.  Again, though, the embedded inertia of incompetent leadership will make this nearly impossible to enforce.  Remember , the Constellation was going to a parent design with only minor changes and, yet, before it was cancelled, almost all commonality with the parent design had vanished.  I enthusiastically support this but it will require ruthless enforcement.  My suggestion is that any program manager who proposes a change order be summarily fired.
 
Here’s one of the major challenges that we mentioned above.
 
… for purposes of waiving the general prohibition on Armed Forces shipbuilding in foreign shipyards.[1]

The President is going to find that getting Congress to go along with any attempt to utilize foreign shipyards is going to be poorly received and strongly opposed.  There are also practical concerns with technological security.  Still, under certain circumstances this could be beneficial.  I’d prefer to build up our own shipbuilding capacity rather than rely on foreign involvement.
 
The memo calls for establishing a new public shipyard for maintenance and support.  Challenging but outstanding!
 
Here’s another good idea.
 
… establish a Component Repair Center to receive new and refurbish old components and parts as required by the submarine repair industrial base.[1]

Outstanding!
 
And finally, a major, major action calling for a gutting and rework of NAVSEA.
 
Reforming Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall submit to the President, through the Director of OMB and the APNSA, a review of NAVSEA, including recommendations for implementing personnel, organizational, and structural reforms. The objective of these reforms should be to: introduce results‑based accountability for NAVSEA leadership, determined by speed of delivery of vessels and systems; reduce bureaucracy and red tape; eliminate competing priorities among different NAVSEA components, which often result in delayed, cost-prohibitive, or overly complex vessels and systems; and prevent NAVSEA from imposing redesigns or iterative design changes upon original mature parent designs.[1]

This is saying what ComNavOps has been saying for some time – that NAVSEA is a failed organization of total incompetents.  Outstanding, outstanding, outstanding!
 
 
Discussion
 
This memo has lots of good stuff in it and the Navy would be far better off if they can be implemented.  The reality, however, is that any changes will be actively opposed and unless SecDef and SecNav are willing to engage in wholesale firings, most it will never occur. 
 
I’m also dismayed that SecDef Hegseth did not implement all of this on day one of his tenure.  This reinforces my belief that he is a failure, perhaps not as bad as some but certainly a major disappointment.  One could read this memo as a criticism by the President of Hegseth and interpret it as Hegseth failing to the point that the President felt he had to step in and take over.
 
The aspect of all this that the memo failed to address is that the root cause of the Navy’s failures is irredeemably incompetent leadership from the flag officers.  That is what the memo should have led with and the solution is easy – fire them all.  Since Hegseth refuses to engage in wholesale housecleaning, the actions called for in the memo will be vigorously opposed and Trump and Hegseth will have only themselves to blame for their disappointment when this fails to materialize.
 
Let’s hope for the best but the sad reality is that most of this is a fantasy because they won’t take the necessary first step of mass firings.
 
 
 
_________________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “Presidential Memo: Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base”, staff, 13-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/13/presidential-memo-rebuilding-the-united-states-navy-and-americas-shipbuilding-industrial-base

11 comments:

  1. As I said with respect to war, it's impossible to separate from politics. In the practical sense, "fire them all" is the easiest and the president certainly has the authority. Exercising that option as a naked and dramatic display of power could lead to a loss of that power.

    A speculative possibility is that this declaration of intent will lead to a politically safer method of eliminating many admirals. It might be politically impossible to fire them outright, but if they refused to follow orders, leak their gripes, or simply resign in protest, there's a pretext that even died in the wool bureaucrats can't dismiss (in fact, it's their natural methodology).

    And yes, I think firing/cashiering the 80% of the GOFOs that should be would provoke a massive political crisis simply because the 40% of the country that hates Trump is (mostly) willing to fight literally anything he does. You can see this in the response to this memo. People are trying to say the Ford works well, when it's patently obvious it does not.

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    1. To correct myself there it looks like the latest MSAR says the Ford was able to generate 172 sorties/day over 4 days where the goal was 160.

      https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/PB_2027_MSARs/CVN_78_MSAR_FY2027_PBv2.pdf

      Is that a reasonable demonstration? I don't know, but I guess it's not patently obvious that it doesn't work. If they have it working to the point they can conduct normal operations at a higher level than the Nimitz's, that's pretty good.

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    2. "Is that a reasonable demonstration?"

      Unlikely. Few (none) Navy demonstrations are. I was unable to see the numbers you cited in the reference (probably just missed them in the mind-numbing number of tables and data!) so I'm unable to assess the situation. That aside, the issue has always been the reliability, as measured by the Mean Time Between Failure, not an instantaneous capability. Could Ford generate a hundred-plus launches in a very short time period? Possibly. Could it sustain it over the course of a mission/deployment? Not according to the only publicly available MTBF data we have. In fact, the MTBF was so bad it seemed highly unlikely that the performance goal could ever be achieved barring some kind of miraculous improvement DOT&E said as much in the last report that they had data for.

      By the way, 170 launches over four days isn't much. That's around one launch per aircraft in the wing each day. Not much of a stress effort! In theory, with four cats and around a one minute launch interval, it should be possible to generate hundreds of launches per hour. Of course, we'd run out of aircraft after just 40 or so!

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    3. 170 per day for 4 days = 680 launches.

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  2. Bye Bye NAVSEA, welcome back BuShips.
    Notice the AAG was left out of rip out and replace for the Fords in our future, does this mean it works?
    The only foreign ships the Navy will buy will be Maya or Sejong the Great class, since they're deluxe Burkes, ;-)

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    1. "AAG was left out "

      I did notice that. All reports indicate that the AAG is an even bigger failure than EMALS. I assume (well, hope, actually) that AAG is included but simply wasn't listed in a brief memo. Heck, if the memo listed everything wrong with Ford, it wouldn't be a memo - it would be a book!

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    2. "The only foreign ships the Navy will buy will be Maya or Sejong the Great class"

      While this is a popular and appealing notion, do you see the immense difficulties associated with trying to do that? Aside from legal issues, there is security. How do we get a foreign yard to build a ship without revealing to them our technical secrets? I assume that any foreign yard is riddled with Chinese (among others) spies.

      Hand in hand with that is the specific equipment and software. We would need to specify all new US equipment, computers, and software. I suppose we could have a foreign yard deliver an empty shell of a ship but then we'd spend twice as much ripping holes in it to install equipment in already sealed compartments. That doesn't seem wise.

      As I said, the notion might be appealing to some but the practical difficulties are almost insurmountable.

      The concept might work for non-critical, generic vessels like cargo ships but it would be very difficult to have a foreign yard build a warship. Think about the reverse. Would China allow us to build a warship for them and see all their secrets? Of course not!

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    3. My suggestion was in fun, under the theory that any foreign
      ship will be modified into a Burke or Burkette by the Navy.
      Might as well start with the IJN's Maya, a deluxe Burke
      with better paint.
      Check SeaForces.org for Maya fit out, it is all USN.

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  3. Several years ago, I was researching the USS Ford problems and found comments by someone who recently left the program. He wrote that the flywheels are the problem. As I recall, there are 12 of them. The system works great, but after a couple months they begin to break and can't be fixed at sea.

    So the system can pass tests and produce good numbers during the first month, but into a deployment the overall launch capability begins to degrade as the flywheels break. After a few go down, its time to head home.

    I just googled this issue and found this from 2017.

    Animats on June 7, 2017 | parent | context | favorite | on: How not to build a ship: the USS Ford

    The EMALS system's big problems seem to be with the motor-generator-flywheel system used to power them. The ship doesn't generate enough power to drive the catapults directly from ship power. They have to wind up a flywheel, and then dump that energy using a generator when launching aircraft. The hardware for that weighs 12 tons. Whatever problem they're having has resulted in damage to the motor/generator windings, requiring pulling out the rotating component. This is apparently a difficult repair.
    That has to create huge stresses on the windings. You wind up the flywheel, and then suddenly apply field current to activate the generator. They may be trying to ramp up field current slowly to reduce the stress. Some articles mention problems with a voltage regulator causing machine damage. Maybe the rotating machinery can't take a full-power turn-on.

    Details on the system seem rather vague. Some published articles say there are four motor-generator-flywheel sets; others say only two. Isolating failed units electrically for maintenance is apparently difficult. Unclear why.

    This unit "passed factory acceptance testing" in 2008.[1] These problems should have been discovered and fixed years ago. The manufacturer is Kato Engineering, part of Emerson Electric, acting as a subcontractor to General Atomic. They make a range of generators for various applications. So this is coming from a company with a long history of making generators. But generators are usually continuous-duty, not something that experiences shock loads like this flywheel rig. Apparently nobody insisted on some serious testing like running this thing through 50,000 cycles into a dummy load.

    The linear motor of the catapult itself seems to be working OK.

    The new arresting gear shouldn't have been a problem. That's mostly a paddles-in-water brake, something that's centuries old. How did that get screwed up?

    Overall, the Ford series of carriers uses electricity for functions that, on other carriers, involve piping steam around. Most newer Naval ships are Diesel or gas turbine powered, and don't generate steam as a by-product. Nuclear plants do generate steam, which has been convenient for carrier catapults. The new British carrier series (if it gets built) is to be non-nuclear, and they want to use the EMALS launcher on some of the ships (maybe). That's part of a big mess - without a catapult, they have to buy the VTOL/STOL version of the F-35, which has its own problems.

    There's an amusing book, "Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks", by H.G. Bowen, from WWII. Bowen was a U.S. Navy engineering officer and eventually was in charge of most Naval propulsion systems during WWII. He was a real hard-ass on contractors, and often sent back large, expensive items like final drive gears back as rejects. Admiral Arleigh Burke ("31 knot Burke") wrote that his ships wouldn't have been able to go 31 knots without Bowen's work. When it really has to work, you need people like that who can say no.

    [1] http://www.ga.com/emals-motor-generator-passes-acceptance-te...

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  4. Well, it seems like a really lot of nice intentions but what really matters is the hard work and getting into all the details, if not, it's just another letter....

    AS for EMALS, yes, it had issues in the past and probably not great BUT JFK is already in the water, Entreprise is being built already and so maybe Doris Miller could be changed but I doubt it because of all the design changes required which is a lot so this would apply for the next batch really.....I see the USN slow walking this one with the builder to just let this pass them and not really spend much time and effort on this....my understanding is even General Atomic isn't super happy about going back to steam. I think the time to do this was years ago, now, it's going to cost a fortune and extend the timeline for the carriers that already are years late to even more to the right.....

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    1. Agreed. The time for this was a decade ago. I think that if this actually happens, we're going to have to look at some serious life extensions for the Nimitz class. Of course, ending the constant deployments that spin the odometer like a fan would help.
      Mass firings are the only way to fix the mess and turn things around. Even with this memo and the thoughts behind it, I've simply run out of hope that the Navy can pull it's head out of that dark constricted space it's stuffed into. The ignorance, the infighting over personal rice bowls, and the absolute lack of drive to create a force actually meant for combat is no longer a bug, it's an institutional feature.

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