Friday, April 24, 2026

Satellites - Single Point of Failure

One of the worst things you can have in combat is a single point of failure;  a linchpin upon which an entire operation depends.  If it fails, you lose everything.  For example, let’s imagine a ship has several types of sensors and all are operated off electrical power that ultimately passes through a single cable.  That cable would represent a single point of failure.  Sever the cable and all the sensor systems would be rendered inoperative by a single component’s failure.  We have seen examples in industry and the military where supposedly redundant, independent systems have failed because of an unrecognized single point of failure.  In our example, we might be tempted to proudly proclaim that we have set up multiple independent sensor systems.  After all, they’re physically separated.  They use different frequencies.  They each have their own cooling systems.  Those that need motors each have their own.  Completely independent;  nothing in common ...  except for the single power cable that no one thought about and did not recognize as a single point of failure.
 
Our military is currently constructing a single point of failure on a very large scale in the form of satellite communications.  Consider the vast number of systems that all depend on satellite communications:  drones, weapons, command and control, sensors, and on and on.  If we lose satellite communications, we lose … well … a huge chunk of our entire military capability.
 
You might be tempted to argue that satellite communications are not a single point of failure because we have dozens/hundreds/thousands of satellites and no enemy could possibly eliminate all of them.  Setting aside the highly debatable nature of that assertion, think, what do all satellites have in common?  That’s right, a very small number of control/communication stations … approaching a single point of failure.  It doesn’t matter how many satellites you have if they all depend on a very few control stations.
 
Think further, what do all control stations have in common?  An even smaller number of software programs that run them.  If an enemy can hack/virus the software (we’ve seen that it’s almost impossible to prevent hacking of military or commercial networks and programs), it instantly renders all the control stations and their associated satellites useless.
 
Well, none of that could ever happen, you say.  Except that already has and we have at least one public example.
 
A global outage across Elon Musk’s satellite network ​affecting millions of Starlink users had left two dozen unmanned surface vessels bobbing off the California coast, disrupting communications and halting operations for almost an hour.
 
The incident, which involved drones ‌intended to bolster U.S. military options in a conflict with China, was one of several Navy test disruptions linked to SpaceX's Starlink that left operators unable to connect with autonomous boats, according to internal Navy documents reviewed by Reuters and a person familiar with the matter.[1]

Think even further.  What if a key individual (a single point of failure, by definition!) were to shut down or sabotage the entire satellite system, perhaps motivated by bribes/payoffs or coerced by Chinese threats against him or his family?  Couldn’t happen, you laugh?  How about this:
 
Reuters reported last year that [Elon] Musk unexpectedly switched off Starlink access to Ukrainian troops as they sought to retake territory from Russia, denting allies' trust in the billionaire.[1]

There you have a single (non-military!) individual shutting down a satellite system because he disagreed with the military and geopolitical actions.
 
Think further still.  The single point of failure doesn’t have to involve destruction of assets, cyber attacks, or rogue villains.  It could be as simple as routine mechanical/software failure.  Here’s an example.
 
In April 2025, during a series ​of Navy tests in California involving unmanned boats and flying drones, officials reported that Starlink struggled to provide a solid network connection due to the high data usage needed to control multiple systems, according to a Navy safety report of the tests reviewed by Reuters.[1]

Given the complexity of modern systems, sometimes you don’t even know why a system failed.
 
In the weeks leading up to the global Starlink outage in August, another ​series of Navy tests was disrupted by intermittent connection issues with the Starlink network, Navy documents reviewed by Reuters show. ​The causes of the network losses were not immediately clear.[1]

Now let’s close with one of the dumbest statements I’ve heard in a while, courtesy of Mr. Bryan Clark at the Hudson Institute.
 
Despite the setbacks, the upside of Starlink – a cheap and commercially available service – outweighs the risk of a potential outage disrupting future military operations, said Bryan Clark, an autonomous warfare expert at the Hudson Institute. “You ​accept those vulnerabilities because of the benefits you get from the ubiquity it provides,” he said.[1]

In peacetime you might accept the occasional failure because the downside isn’t all that serious.  It’s not life or death … just inconvenience.  In war, it most certainly is life and death and you can’t afford systems with known single points of failure and a known, not insignificant, failure rate to begin with.
 
 
Discussion
 
Given our overwhelming dependence on satellites, do you think the Chinese are going to allow us to continue to use them, unhindered?  Of course not!  They’ll attack them physically, electronically, digitally (software), and via human operator vulnerabilities.  Anyone want to bet that there aren’t Chinese agents embedded in the military or Starlink?  One way or another, I’d be very surprised if we have many operating satellites two weeks after the war starts.
 
We see that satellite communications could be disrupted in a variety of ways:  physical destruction, cyber attacks, software viruses, sabotage, and routine failure, among other methods.  Does it make sense that so much of our military, current and future, has, as its very foundation, satellite communications?  Would any sane individual purposely build a system with that many known, anticipatable vulnerabilities?  And yet we’re doing exactly that.  Worse, we’re increasing our use of, and dependence on, satellites instead of decreasing it.
 
Consider that the military, some years ago, recognized GPS as a significant vulnerability.  All of our navigation and most of our weapons depend on GPS.  GPS was recognized as a single point of failure and the military, to their slow and belated credit, has set about mitigating that dependence.  We’re now designing systems that use alternates to GPS.  We knew we couldn’t accept a single point of failure, like GPS, and yet we’re intentionally and enthusiastically embracing satellites as a single point of failure.  That’s baffling.
 
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]Reuters website, “Exclusive: Starlink outage hit drone tests, exposing Pentagon’s growing reliance on SpaceX”, David Jeans, 16-Apr-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/starlink-outage-hit-drone-tests-exposing-pentagons-growing-reliance-spacex-2026-04-16/

14 comments:

  1. "You might be tempted to argue that satellite communications are not a single point of failure because we have dozens/hundreds/thousands of satellites and no enemy could possibly eliminate all of them."

    Kessler Event. That's when debris in an orbit starts running into other stuff in orbit (satellites/ other debris) causing more debris until the orbit is unuseable. It's like a cosmic pinball machine racking up points like mad. Even adding more satellites for redundancy doesn't help, they just turn into more debris. The worst part of it is that enemy action isn't even necessary to cause it. It just needs that one loose bolt too many.

    The good(ish) news is that sat's in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) like Starlink, while are still subject to Kessler Events, the orbits themselves should clear up in a year or two rather than in decades or centuries.

    Trondude

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. China knows this as well as we do. The choice for them is do they gain more from initiating such a cascade destruction which would include their own satellites (If they have any in the same orbital) or more from allowing our satellites to exist along with theirs? And, of course, we face the same choice although I have not heard any discussion of initiating such an event from Western militaries and, I suspect, we are far more heavily reliant on satellites, at this point, than China is but that's pure speculation on my part.

      Delete
  2. Yep, and the US military is fighting over whether or not to build the E7 Wedgetail. If Iran can destroy AWACS planes, you better believe anyone can. The more redundancies, the better.

    Andrew

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "The more redundancies, the better."

      Yes, IF those redundancies are survivable and effective. The E-7, as one example, is not survivable and would have to operate so far removed from the battlefield as to be ineffective.

      Delete
    2. While that's true, the problem is that they want to replace conventional AEW with satellite-based AEW

      Aside from how this is leaning into the same problems you've identified in this blog post, satellite-based AEW has not been tested, has not been experimented with, and has no proof of concept. It is being pursued simply because the powers that be have decreed that satellites will replace aircraft AEW and the onboard battle management staff.

      And this isn't even getting into the physics-related problems with satellite orbits and persistence....

      Delete
    3. "problem is that they want to replace conventional AEW with satellite-based AEW"

      I very much hope that you haven't equated my rejection of the E-7 with my somehow supporting the military's other surveillance methods! Off hand, I'm hard to pressed to think of ANY current battlefield AEW/surveillance approach by the military that I think is viable. Lest you think I'm just criticizing the military without offering solutions, I would remind that I've proposed using the B-2/21 as a passive AEW/surveillance platforms and described how to use swarms of small, stealthy UAVs for battlegroup surveillance.

      The only current, potentially viable surveillance method I'm aware of is the RQ-170/180 drones and it's not even a certainty that they exist (probably do) and are being used to perform surveillance. If they do exist and are being used that way then great and we should have many more of them. Even then, that contributes to surveillance but is NOT AEW aerial battle management so there's still a glaring capability gap. Let's face it, the giant, lumbering, non-stealthy AWACS and Hawkeye are not viable in today's combat.

      Delete
  3. A related vulnerability are the undersea fiber optic lines that carry the bulk of world communications including internet.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That's an excellent point. Even more vulnerable than satellites, I would think.

      Delete
    2. Yes, we have many vulnerabilities that are single or near-single points of failure. The giant shipbuilding lift cranes are yet another example. We have very few of them and taking out one would eliminate an entire shipyard. Big Blue, for example.

      Delete
    3. The undersea cables are certainly a vulnerability though more of a social and financial one than military, one would hope. I hope the military is not dependent on commercial cables but I fear the worst.

      Delete
  4. Just to tie in with the previous post about networked all seeing sensors war fighting concept as well, I just read this article

    https://theaviationist.com/2026/04/26/report-claims-iranian-f-5-bombed-us-base/

    I'm not sure how many of those bases have layered defenses, but I do hope that all of them have SOME sort of air and missile defense, even points defense.

    Should we take this article as wildly inaccurate and only two bases were hit, which I doubt since there's been some official mentions of them apparently, then all the more the current concept of operation should be reviewed.

    - Loc

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You have raised a very important aspect that I'm carefully keeping an eye out for more information on. When we hit Iran, we had to know with absolute certainty that Iran would hit back. We knew the targets they would aim for, what types of weapons they would use, and pretty much when the attacks would occur. In short, we were as well warned and prepared as is possible. There should have been little to no successful hits against us and yet there were. Even just the publicly acknowledged hits were too many. What I don't know is how extensively those bases and facilities were protected and what the defensive success rate was. For example, if Iran launched a hundred missiles at one base and one missile got through, that's an excellent defense even if the base suffered damage from the one missile. On the other hand, if Iran launched one or two missiles and one got through, that's very poor defense.

      We lack the information to draw any conclusion.

      Delete
  5. " We knew we couldn’t accept a single point of failure, like GPS, and yet we’re intentionally and enthusiastically embracing satellites as a single point of failure. That’s baffling."

    It's especially baffling since GPS is ALL ABOUT SATELLITES, yet even though we now know we need to address GPS, we're still going full tilt toward other dependencies on -- wait for it -- SATELLITES!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It's truly hard to believe that the collective military can be as stupid as they act. The individuals are not idiots and yet, collectively, they consistently make the worst possible decisions. Baffling.

      Delete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.