Sunday, April 19, 2026

Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 
The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/
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36 comments:

  1. AnonymousApril 19, 2026 at 11:48 AM

    The U.S. military could, at least in theory, patrol the Strait of Hormuz with recognizance aircraft (whether piloted or drones) and U.S. Southern Command is still destroying speedboats in the Eastern Pacific with impunity. In addition, the U.S. military has demonstrated the ability to, at least temporarily, surpress Iran's anti-air capability. So, given that actions speak lounder than words and the simplest explanation is the best: I think the U.S. military believes that Iran retains a creditable anti-air capability when not under acute pressure from U.S. airpower.

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 19, 2026 at 5:51 PM

      "destroying speedboats in the Eastern Pacific"

      ??? The eastern Pacific would be the west coast of the US.

      "U.S. military believes that Iran retains a creditable anti-air capability"

      No evidence of that, whatsoever!

      Delete
    2. AnonymousApril 19, 2026 at 8:41 PM

      "??? The eastern Pacific would be the west coast of the US."

      You are forgetting everything South of the United States. U.S. Southern Command itself has identified the locations of the majority of their strikes as in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. If you look at locaations in the lists of the strikes, while some of the strikes have been in the Caribbean (particularly the earlier ones), the majority have been in the Eastern Pacific (e.g. Western coast of Columbia, etc.).

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsApril 20, 2026 at 10:45 AM

      Quite right. I did forget about that.

      Delete
  2. G2milApril 19, 2026 at 11:54 AM

    I keep pondering the idea of using LHDs as motherships for Mark VI patrol boats. It could carry over a dozen of these with a crane to carry some on deck. Each would have 2-4 LCUs with fold out helo platforms for H-60s and Marine attack helos. These LCUs would carry diesel and ammo for the boats and aviation fuel for the helos that operate from the LHD. This would allow an LHD to push out helos and patrol boats hundreds of miles into the danger zone and sustain them there for days then rotate back to
    the ship. Also great for CSAR.

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    1. AnonymousApril 20, 2026 at 4:53 PM

      This could work: is it a better (effect, risk, cost) than simply blanketing the area with low cost fixed-wing armed reconnaissance aircraft? We lost a lot of capability when air-frames like the S-3, A-1, OV-1, and OV-10 were retired.

      GAB

      Delete
  3. AnonymousApril 19, 2026 at 5:51 PM

    I wouldn't mind going into a description of the missions my Navy would be prepared to do and the types of ships I would have in my Navy, and how it differs from our current Navy...

    ...but to avoid sucking the oxygen out of the room, I will just say that we have built the wrong surface navy.

    We have built a navy that is optimized to do only one thing, aircraft carrier strike group.
    All we have are CVNs and high-end, high-price Burke escorts.

    Of course, they can be pressed into service to do other jobs. But they clearly are not the right ships for the tasks that we need done right now.

    How could the Navy leadership, uniformed and civilian, not foresee that the Global Order was disintegrating? Don't any of those dipshits ever read a book?

    They should have foreseen the need to be able to perform a blockade...and now the Navy has been tasked with performing blockades against Venezuela, Cuba, and the Strait of Hormuz....besides escorting and/or protecting ships in the Strait and previously off Yemen.

    These people get paid pretty well to anticipate future needs, and what do they concentrate on?
    Unmanned fantasy BS, ready for service in the fleet at an unspecified date in the future.

    This stupefying lack of vision is completely unacceptable.

    Lutefisk

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    1. AnonymousApril 20, 2026 at 8:28 AM

      Now we have a mine mitigation issue in the Strait of Hormuz.
      https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/the-navy-sends-in-the-robots-to-clear-hormuz-of-mines-1c107caa
      1) "The U.S. military is using sea drones to help clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines that might be lurking there, in a quiet effort to ease Iran’s stranglehold on the waterway and begin reopening it to commercial shipping. "
      2) Read where Navy will send the two remaining Avenger class mine sweepers as well,. ( War Zone )
      In a prior post, the undersea drone approach was indicated to be slow mine mitigation !
      PB

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    2. ComNavOpsApril 20, 2026 at 10:49 AM

      "Now we have a mine mitigation issue"

      Your linked article is behind a paywall. That aside, there has yet to be a confirmed spotting of mine. I'm inclined to believe there are no mines and that was just an attempt to scare ships away. If there are mines, they're clearly very few in number and nowhere near any established shipping lane.

      Delete
  4. AnonymousApril 20, 2026 at 8:55 AM

    Personally I think that US assets where in the area. They didn't intervene as there is a temporary cease fire in place and because the US administration is trying to put pressure on a number of countries for a military intervention to protect their shipping (or exthorthing something), is the US did it there would be no pressure on those countries.

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  5. number9April 20, 2026 at 10:04 AM

    The Fleet Structure page describes one possible BB design as mounting a mixed secondary battery of 8x 6" guns and 2x 5" guns. The majority of other warships you describe mount a primary or secondary battery of 5" guns.

    My question is, any particular reason for a mixed secondary battery? And is the 5" gun still good enough to equip the rest of the fleet?

    I would be inclined to agree that a larger gun is preferable for a BB secondary battery. The Army seems to prefer a big shell like 155mm. It leaves a lot of room for shell design such as guidance packages; range extenders like sabot shells, base bleed, or rocket assistance; remote mining or cluster payloads; while still maintaining a large effect on target. NGFS needs are likely similar to what the Army needs.

    I would think, the concern is mixing more unique ammo/gun types than strictly necessary into the Navy, and whether the 5" gun is appropriate for cruisers and destroyers. It seems a 5" gun is good enough for killing enemy warships. However, you've written many times about the inaccuracy of 5" guns against modern light targets, like Boghammer-type boats and aircraft. It seems, then, that trading away rate of fire for effect per shell would make them worse at a task they are already bad at, which is little concern.

    Alternatively, if the 5" gun is still a necessary compromise, I would think that a BB should mount an all-5" secondary battery. The entire battery could use the same magazine, and the Navy would only have to procure parts and ammunition for one fewer type of gun.

    Do you have any posts on the subject already? I did look, but I think these questions cover the gaps in what I've read.

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    1. number9April 20, 2026 at 10:16 AM

      I feel I should clarify: I understand that a silly game can be played in which you then look at the 8" gun, and say, my goodness that has even more bursting charge than the 155mm! And so on, until you come to the conclusion that the only gun good enough for any ship in the Navy is the biggest gun you can design.

      I only ask because your battleship is listed with a 6" gun. Otherwise, I would have assumed that the 5" gun armament for most warships is just a case of "don't fix what isn't broken," that 5" shells are sufficient for Navy needs.

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsApril 20, 2026 at 10:55 AM

      As you note, a 6" gun/shell is significantly more effective than a 5". For a battleship for which land attack is a primary task, the 6" gun is preferred. A couple of 5" guns provide a smaller, more flexible weapon that can be used for anti-smaller vessel and anti-air.

      I'm not terribly concerned about mixing weapons/munitions. Consider a WWII BB and the number of different gun types (16"/5"/40mm/20mm). Not a problem. BBs have plenty of room.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousApril 20, 2026 at 5:51 PM

      Bigger guns tend to bring longer range, greater accuracy, and shockingly higher capacity (weight of fire), particularly with respect to cargo rounds (cluster munitions). Rocket assistance, sub-caliber rounds, etc. trade capacity and effect for range. The 155mm is probably the best all-around artillery caliber and is essentially a universal choice for armies, but…

      Naval rifles have fallen far from their dominance of land artillery. As a practical example, the Soviet 1950s era M46 130mm field gun (still in Russian/Israeli/Finnish/NK use with a serious number still in Russian reserve) was a formidable piece of hardware; it out-ranged USN guns smaller than 8" and throws a 33 kg (73 lbs.) HE shell to a range of ~27,000 meters. It also had a host of munitions including AP. If that was not enough of a challenge, it was extremely accurate, and it had a burst rate of fire of 8 RPM and a sustained ROF of 5 RPM. Thus, a battery six M46s could put as many as 48 RPM shells on target in a minute; an artillery battalion 18 of could pump out 144 rounds in a minute. This target would have overwhelmed a squadron of 5”/54 armed ships and challenged even a Des Moines class cruiser with automatic 8” rapid fire guns.

      The USA fielded the air transportable M107 175mm howitzer as a division or corps-level weapon and considered it as a counter to the M46 Soviet gun. The USN was also planning to adopt the 175mm (see Dr Friedman’s books), but the Army cancelled the gun; apparently it lacked the desired accuracy for counterbattery work. Ultimately the Army converted its M107s into M110 203 mm (8”) howitzers. I believe there is a lesson there. It also explains the need for rapid area suppression MRLs like our M270 and HIMARS systems.

      GAB

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    4. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 7:02 AM

      "I understand that a silly game can be played in which you then look at the 8" gun, and say, my goodness that has even more bursting charge than the 155mm! And so on, until you come to the conclusion that the only gun good enough for any ship in the Navy is the biggest gun you can design."

      That would be a silly game, indeed. It might be valid if guns had only one mission and only one target type and every ship, regardless of size, could accommodate any size gun, but none of that is the case. There are many gun missions, many target types, and ships are limited as to what type of gun they can physically mount and service.

      There is, for example, a distinct difference in missions and targets between a 6" and 5" gun. Moving up, an 8" gun has missions and targets distinct from, say, 6" guns. And so on. That's not to say there isn't overlap but each gun has its own mission set.

      Delete
    5. number9April 21, 2026 at 8:29 AM

      I guess the more important part of the question, which is answered somewhat obliquely, is why 5" guns are good enough for the rest of the Navy but not the BBs? If the 6" gun is needed for the firepower against land targets, wouldn't it also be needed for the cruisers and destroyers to have an effect on their targets?

      Regarding the BBs using their 5" gun for anti-air and small-ship defense. You have plenty of posts calling out the 5" gun for incidents like Vincennes. It seems like a 57mm or 76mm gun could be better suited to these tasks.

      So, for a cohesive dissenting opinion, here's my suggestion: split the secondary battery into single mounted 8" guns for NGFS, 4-6 76mm guns for engaging small surface threats, and 6-8 57mm guns for air defense. Extending that philosophy, perhaps destroyers and cruisers should also carry 1-2 76mm guns and upgrade the 5" compromise gun to a proper 6" gun, with all the range and payload that implies.

      I can think of weaknesses with the suggestion, just trying to provoke discussion. GAB, thoughts?

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 8:50 AM

      "why 5" guns are good enough for the rest of the Navy but not the BBs?"

      There are several aspects to the answer.

      1. Inertia. The Navy established the 5" gun as the best general purpose gun in WWII and has simply maintained that ever since.

      2. The 5" gun IS a good general purpose gun. It can provide certain types of ground fire support, can engage ships currently in existence (no ships have armor) and inflict significant damage if not outright sink them, can engage soft targets such as small boats, oil rigs, soft targets on land, etc and can provide lightweight area bombardment while mounting large enough magazines to be effective for extended combat periods. It can also function in the anti-air role though the success rate would be very small (if a missile is coming at me, I'll use a 5" gun if I've got it, regardless of odds!).

      3. It allows a decent size magazine for extended engagements and comes with a reasonable weight impact for cruiser and destroyer size ships. For example, if you're going to install heavier 6"/8" mounts/magazines on Burkes, what are you going to remove from the Burke since it can't take any more weight?

      Delete
    7. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 8:56 AM

      "Regarding the BBs using their 5" gun for anti-air and small-ship defense."

      5" guns are NOT the primary anti-air or small boat defensive weapons. Standard, ESSM, RAM, and CIWS are the primary anti-air weapons but a 5" gun CAN be used in the role to add to the primary weapons. For example, we just recently saw a Burke 5" gun shoot down a drone in a real engagement, according to reports (begs the question, where were the other weapons?). Similarly, the 5" gun is NOT the primary defensive weapon against small boats. ESSM, RAM, and CIWS are although the 5" gun is, theoretically capable in the role and, like anti-air, can add to the primary weapons.

      Beyond that, 5" would be a good choice for close range engagements of all types, soft targets on land, oil rigs, or damaging ships that we don't want to sink. Very handy to have a couple 5" guns available.

      Delete
    8. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 9:00 AM

      "6-8 57mm guns for air defense."

      57mm has no demonstrated, effective anti-air capability. Standard, ESSM, RAM, and CIWS are far superior choices.

      "single mounted 8" guns for NGFS, 4-6 76mm guns for engaging small surface threats"

      8" loses volume of fire and is overkill or unsuited for many tasks. 76mm is fine for small surface threats but is useless for added ground fire support which is, after all, a major mission for a battleship!

      Delete
    9. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 9:03 AM

      One final thought on my selection of 6" for a proposed BB as opposed to 5" ... In WWII, we had dedicated 8" and 6" cruisers so BBs didn't need to mount them. Today, we have no gun ships so a BB, whose major missions includes ground fire support, NEEDS as many larger caliber guns as possible. Hence, 6" as the secondary battery and a couple 5" for more general purpose tasks while still being able to contribute to fire support (which a 76mm can't do).

      Delete
    10. AnonymousApril 24, 2026 at 9:03 AM

      A lot of the debate about naval artillery calibers, rockets vs. ‘tube,’ preparatory fire in advance of/during a landing vs. counter-battery vs. targets destruction is somewhat shallow. Obviously certain weapons are better suited to certain tasks than others, but there are many fundamental questions that go unasked and many assumptions that should be kicked before decisions are made. Here are a few observations:

       Command and control of ‘fires’ are at least an order of magnitude of importance more than the specific system types. Shooting into an environment with friendly forces (aircraft, ships, troops, and other national assets) requires fast, effective coordination.

       The greatest effect of fires is almost always the effect on enemy moral. Modern doctrine in the West pays lip service to effects on enemy moral and tends to characterize effects based on percentages of casualties, rather than what is needed to break moral. Even with all of our technology and surveillance systems, we generally cannot identify every enemy position or type. This is wasteful and negligent; extraordinary effects achieved by artillery theorists like Georg Bruchmüller in WWI often in a few hours (versus days), and for a fraction of the expenditures of ammunition that allied forces would use. By WW2 the British ‘Terror concentrations’ and American ‘Time on Target’ fire plans advanced the art, but our doctrine does not explain adequately or emphasize how to break enemy moral without mass slaughter. This is time intensive when we rather advance, and logistically intensive, to say nothing of the moral implications.

       No one system can do it all, a complementary grouping of range of short, medium and long-range systems is needed. For example, for vertical envelopment, we need to shoot HLZ up to and beyond 150nm, as well as enemy artillery systems, and reserve forces, that can affect the assault.

       One frequently unaddressed issue for naval fires is the requirement for sustained suppressive fires, and the attendant ammunition expenditure, even in the case of ‘unopposed amphibious landings.’ Traditionally, a destroyer supporting a battalion amphibious landing beach (x2 destroyers +a CL or CA cruiser for a regimental landing, x2 +a CA or BB for a division), would need to fire for about 30-minutes pre-H-Hour, plus firing for about 15-minutes+ during the actual landings. Do our minimally manned ships have the man power to sustain this rate of expenditure? Do our ships have the ammunition capacity to achieve this? During the Vietnam war USS Lynde McCormick DDG-8 emptied her magazines twice and burned-out her gun barrels, while off the coast of Hue city during the Tet offensive. Three or five Gunners mates per mount cannot sustain that level of fire.

      GAB

      Delete
  6. ExJuniorSailorApril 20, 2026 at 8:49 PM

    While the negative assessment here, and many times over past posts and years, about our supposedly omniscient sensors and networks, is pretty solid- it's tough to evaluate this decision/situation, without more info. Do we still have heavy air/sensor presence over the Strait and Iranian coastline? Do we have any? Are the Navy and AF standing down after the previous sortie tempo to catch up on maintenance before strikes begin again? How important is maintaining the ceasefire to our military and civilian leadership? What are the current ROEs? Are they dependent on civilian ship nationalities? There's just too many questions without answers to truly make a judgement here. Myself... yes... Id of liked to see those speedboat vaporized within minutes. But... it could've been a failing... and it also could've been a deliberate choice. And its probably an event that may not get us a public answer for days, weeks, or years.

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 21, 2026 at 6:57 AM

      "Do we still have heavy air/sensor presence over the Strait and Iranian coastline?"

      We're fighting a still alive and sporadically kicking enemy so if we don't have extensive coverage then we're either criminally incompetent or woefully material-deficient. We've stated publicly and repeatedly that we want the strait open and that means instantly neutralizing any threat that pops up and that starts with sensors so, again, if we don't have complete coverage then we're utterly incompetent or deficient.

      To your second, somewhat implied point, are we selectively allowing some attacks to proceed for political purposes? Who knows, but it's very hard to imagine that's a viable strategy given that unhindered passage through the strait and the impact that has on world oil markets is a paramount concern. Also, allowing Iran the public relations victory of being able to say they control the strait argues very strongly against it being a deliberate decision on our part to allow the attacks.

      My overall assessment, based on the logic of the current situation and the pattern of past sensor performance throughout the years, is that we simply didn't see the attacking boats and when we finally did (or heard about it on the merchant ship's radio distress calls) we didn't have any firepower in position to do anything about it. This tells me, yet again, that basing our future warfare on vast sensor/weapon networks is a stupendously stupid decision. We're basing our future warfare on a concept PROVEN to be badly flawed. That's insane.

      Delete
  7. AnonymousApril 21, 2026 at 8:49 PM

    This is a bit OT I guess, but there are reports of large scale mine laying by Iran in the Strait and the Gulf more generally. Maybe true, maybe not.
    The Brits, Europeans and Japanese say they’re willing to help with de-mining efforts post-conflict by deploying various ships, drones, and technologies to - apparently - clear the mines one by one.
    Wondering if we couldn’t use a brute force approach and drop a few thousand cheap bombs to blast these narrow shipping channels clear. I reckon the blast waves from a one ton HE bomb would set off any nearby contact fuzed mines, and as a minimum scramble the electronics of anything more sophisticated.
    Obviously we wouldn’t want to Tsunami the Omanis in the process.

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 22, 2026 at 9:46 AM

      "Maybe true, maybe not."

      There has yet to be a single verified report of a mine being found.

      Delete
  8. AnonymousApril 22, 2026 at 10:23 PM

    According to an article in Washington Post there could be 20 Iranian mines in the Strait
    "Three officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the discussion’s sensitivity, said lawmakers were told that Iran may have emplaced 20 or more mines in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for the movement of Middle Eastern oil through the Persian Gulf. Some were floated remotely using GPS technology, which has made it difficult for U.S. forces to detect the mines as they are deployed, the senior defense official told lawmakers." Their source also believed it could take up to six months to clear these mines. About one mine per five days. Obviously not hard facts but nevertheless not very impressive...
    IED

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 23, 2026 at 6:27 AM

      I've read articles claiming anywhere from zero mines to hundreds. As yet, there is not a single verified instance of a mine. Even the article/passage you cite uses the word "may".

      Delete
  9. AnonymousApril 23, 2026 at 7:18 AM

    Absolutely. My concern was the expected pace of mine clearance

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  10. AnonymousApril 23, 2026 at 12:00 PM

    I agree with CNO here that, since not a single mine has been verified, there's a good bet that threat is illusional.

    Related, I saw the president posted today that the Navy is "sweeping" (his quotes) mines and that he ordered the pace tripled. We all know the USN has little to no sweep capability. In which case, are we conducting illusionary sweeping of imaginary mines! What a situation.

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 23, 2026 at 12:32 PM

      "conducting illusionary sweeping of imaginary mines"

      On the plus side, we'll be successful !

      Medals all around!

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsApril 23, 2026 at 12:39 PM

      " a good bet that threat is illusional."

      Consider the logic. From hour-one, we sank anything that moved so Iran had no opportunity to lay mines to any significant degree. To believe that they managed to surreptitiously lay any significant number of mines flies in the face of any likely reality. Possibly, they could have dropped a few mines off some fishing boat, near their own shore, which is not a serious threat. Again, to believe that they managed to cross the 20-50 mine wide strait to the Oman side, lay a significant number of mines, and escape, all unseen, defies logic. The fact that not a single mine has yet been spotted again suggests that none, or an insignificantly few, have been laid.

      The media and, shamefully, some naval observers just seem to want to build this into some sensationalistic story that doesn't exist.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousApril 23, 2026 at 7:03 PM

      I've seen another commenter suggest, years ago, that declarations of mines are almost as good as actually laying the minefield. International law requires you to declare where you've laid your minefields, it doesn't require you to actually lay those mines for real. The other party has to respect your declaration and treat it as if you actually laid those mines, and has to commit to a minesweeping effort.

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    4. ComNavOpsApril 24, 2026 at 8:21 AM

      "declarations of mines are almost as good as actually laying the minefield"

      This is true to a large degree but only due to psychology. It's like a crowd facing a person with a gun but only one bullet. He can't do any significant damage to the crowd and yet no one will move for fear of being the one person to get shot. Similarly, a few mines in the strait are an insignificant ACTUAL threat to the 150 or so ships the normally traverse the passage every day and yet the psychological fear paralyzes shipping traffic.

      If a WWII planner was told that his invasion force might face a handful of mines, he'd laugh and say, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead."

      Delete
  11. AnonymousApril 23, 2026 at 7:01 PM

    I am not a naval officer but am very familiar with artillery and NGF. 5” guns have similar effects on target to 105mm howitzers but are longer ranged. Since 105s are considered only appropriate for anti personnel and inadequate for armored vehicles, should we not consider a bigger gun for NGF to attack ships or shore buildings?
    Both 155 and 203mm / 8 inch are much more effective against hardened targets and use a common deep seat fuze system.

    One of the most effective anti-armor system is DPICM which can be used against a ship also.

    5 inch guns are too small to fire DPICM. 155s have 88 bomblets. 203mm / 8 inch guns have 180 bomblets which should get the job done.

    I don’t think we have the ship building capacity or funding to build new battleships but a converted container ship made into monitor type platform with 8 x 155mm and 6 x 203mm mounted on the deck and 4 HIMARS / NSM pods for long range / ship defense should be formidable fire support platform for a Regiment size landing team.

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    1. ComNavOpsApril 24, 2026 at 8:17 AM

      "should we not consider a bigger gun for NGF to attack ships or shore buildings?"

      Absolutely. All of this was conclusively settled in WWII. That's why we had 8" gunned cruisers and 16" gunned battleships. We've foolishly abandoned that capability and need to regain it.

      "monitor"

      Monitors have existed throughout history until fairly recently. I assume they disappeared when the modern 16" gun battleship arrived since the BB could do everything the monitor could plus much more. That said, since we no longer have BBs or cruisers, a monitor may make sense. It would require a careful CONOPS to ensure a useful fit into our force structure.

      A really nice discussion comment! Thank you!

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    2. AnonymousApril 24, 2026 at 3:41 PM

      Naval gunfire suffers from skip unless they use reduced charge. Therefore a comparison of capability is apples to oranges

      Howitzers are designed to spray a target in fragments while naval guns are designed to penetrate it directly.

      The 5 inch isn’ta good gunfire support gun

      Delete

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