Question: What has
5000 thumbs, no tanks, and 4 howitzers?
Answer: A MEU.
This highlights the problem with the current Marine MEU: it’s
not capable of anything but very light, low end combat. It just doesn’t have the firepower. No tanks.
No heavy mortars. Very few
artillery and what there is, is towed which is not considered survivable on the
modern battlefield.
Tell me again, why do we have MEUs?
Don't worry! Uk Army has more generals than tanks, navy has more admirals than battle ships.
ReplyDeleteIt's just damn irresponsible and stupid not to have heavy mortars (120mm) as part of the TO&E. Cheap to produce, including ammo, easier to transport than towed howitzers and take less manpower to crew. The whole new MEU is just a screwed up mess from the start. If you're going light get some kind of fire support system like the Russian NONA K 120mm gun/mortar system that can be used as indirect and direct fire system or mount the 120 NEMO on that wheeled piece of junk amphib they use now.
ReplyDeleteEight years ago I posted an article explaining what the Marines really needed.
Delete1. A 120mm mortar carrier
2. A SPAAG
Neither have appeared, and nothing else new of any value.
https://www.g2mil.com/AAV-Variants.htm
"1. A 120mm mortar carrier
Delete2. A SPAAG"
Spot on!
After the two vehicles you mention, additional needs include a Combat Engineering Vehicle armed with a howitzer to assist in breaching obstacles and fortifications, self-propelled artillery, and a light assault tank for anti-infantry.
For those who think the 155mm howitzer is great. It is after it gets set up, but that takes 10-minutes and needs lots of manpower and space. An AAV mortar can stop and fire within a minute while under armor protection. Watch this vid:
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDM_zqkpK1U
For a simple breach gun, I've pondered mounting an old single shot navy 5-inch (127mm) gun on a Marine truck. The ammo is easily available.
Delete"For those who think the 155mm howitzer is great. It is after it gets set up"
DeleteI've often read that any stationary piece of equipment on the battlefield is living on borrowed time due to counter-battery fire, UAV spotters, etc. It's shoot-and-scoot or die. I'm not a land combat expert so I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on the shoot-and-scoot versus fixed location question?
You are correct. For the past 30 years, small counter-battery radar can detect enemy rounds soon after they are fired and plot the location of the source within a seconds. I consider towed artillery obsolete.
DeleteEven for mobile 120mm mortars, I've considered using computers and adjustable fins to allow rounds to fired in a curved shot to baffle radar.
But drones are a huge threat. Each armored mortar or howitzer carrier needs a SPAAG escort. As I noted in that article, SPAAGs are also great infantry support platforms. They are more important than tanks on the modern battlefield.
"Each armored mortar or howitzer carrier needs a SPAAG escort."
DeleteThat's a fascinating idea. Do you see towed artillery as obsolete due to counter-battery and UAVs or do you see it as viable but with altered tactics, as you described? I note that even a SPAAG escort vehicle would be of no help against counter-battery fire unless it were given C-RAM type capability.
Most everything is obsolete because of fiber optic missiles that have been around for two decades. The US military has none. They can't be jammed and can fly low to avoid radar.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTUxjGxIfzU
"The US military has none."
DeleteMy understanding is that TOW missiles are wire-guided. Is there a problem with that compared to fiber optic?
120mm mortars are not effective against anything other than unprotected infantry.
DeleteMarines need more firepower and it needs to be with them, not stateside.
Marines need to replace MEUS with forward deployed battalions on bases near hotspots (Gitmo, Philippines, Bahrain, Cyprus) with truck mounted 105s or 155s that can be brought in on C130ss, HIMARS, and Super Hornets or F35Cs (not F35Bs) with C130 tankers at shore bases to provide the air support. LPDs should be floating taxis to take Marines from their base to the landing beach and not be used as floating hotels.
Carriers CVNs could carry 40 or so Marines to do stuff ashore. I'd like to take two older cruisers to deploy as a peacetime intervention task force. Dump the ASW crews who can be added back in wartime to make room for some Marines. Have two MH-60s that can carry Marines or act as attack helos. So you have them and four 5-inch guns. Can carry the RRCs but I'd like to carry two Mark VI boats topside somehow, maybe atop some empty VLS cells. So at least you have a raid/rescue force.
ReplyDeleteAnd Marines could deploy airmobile battalion size forces (1000 Marines) like they did until a few years ago with quick support from the deployed MPF ships. Much, much cheaper than MEUs and the amphibs would be ready in CONUS to deploy quickly with a big force when needed rather than all broke down. Maybe move some into the reserve force.
"Carriers CVNs ... two older cruisers to deploy as a peacetime intervention task force."
DeleteYou lost me a little bit. Are you suggesting using CVNs as the Marine-carrying component of a CVN+2x-CG intervention force? I fear I may be misunderstanding.
"four 5-inch guns"
Again, you've lost me a bit. Are you suggesting new build, four-gun cruisers, backfitting more guns onto existing Aegis cruisers, or something else?
"And Marines could deploy airmobile battalion size forces (1000 Marines)"
Would that be different from the Army/AF rapid response forces or just in addition to them?
Perhaps the way to force change is for the Army to stand up units that are tasked with doing what the Marines used to do and with the weaponry they used to have. Nothing like staring at your replacement to motivate change.
DeleteI'm saying simply adding some Marines give carrier groups some peacetime intervention capability that they once had. The two cruiser task forces could operated independently filling the "show the flag" joint exercise stuff MEUs now do.
DeleteAh, I see. Now I understand. Thanks.
DeleteAnd let's have some fun and train a 40-man platoon of sailors from each cruiser to augment the Marines. This was common in the old Navy, sending armed "blue jackets" ashore.
DeleteHere is a great scene from a movie showing Marines landed ashore from Navy warships backed up by bluejackets.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLFFNtpZfnE
"This was common in the old Navy, sending armed "blue jackets" ashore."
DeleteOf course, today with minimal manning and the severe at-sea billet gaps, Navy crews are significantly short-handed to begin with. I'm not sure we have enough sailors to send companies ashore and still safely operate the ship!
We can't seem to safely operate the ships we have with the crews we have.
DeleteLet Marines do "Marine stuff".
Boat Guy
"Let Marines do "Marine stuff"."
DeleteThe Marines currently seem to be floundering, looking for a core mission. What, in your view, should 'Marine stuff' be?
I think we really have reached the point where USA has to wonder, why are we spending so much money on USMC because what makes the USMC special anymore?!? If it's just some infantry with fancy expensive F35Bs, we could fold that infantry into some US Army special unit and give the F35Bs to the Navy or USAF and save some time and money.....what is so unique anymore about the USMC?!?
ReplyDelete"what makes the USMC special anymore?!?"
DeleteThat's the crux of the matter. Honestly, there's nothing special about the Marines anymore.
Agreed. The spend on the amphibious ships alone is huge. That money could be better spent on other types of ships or shipbuilding resources.
DeleteI would like to see a post comparing US and Chinese fleet sizes, with all the less than useful classes stripped out of the count. LCS, Zumwalts, maybe the Fords and the amphibs, plus whatever the Chinese have in service but is effectively obsolete deleted from the count.
DeleteIt would be enlightening for Congress to get a look at the same data. Probably cause some heart attacks!!
"post comparing US and Chinese fleet sizes"
DeleteThis has been done by many people. There are lots of graphical comparisons available on the Internet. Search, for example, 'Chinese versus US fleet size' and you'll get lots of comparisons. Here's one such example to get you started: Naval Comparison
Most importantly, how many ships can China deploy into WestPac in 30 days compared to the US Navy? China rarely does long deployments and has newer ships, so I'd guess they could have 90% in action. The US Navy? With the 2-3 week transit time and the logistics problems, maybe 20%?
DeleteI agree with G2Mil. There are lots of examples like the one you mentioned ComNavOps, but I haven't found anything with the junk stripped out on both sides, and also with the likelihood of ships actually being available. That would be the interesting numbers, and why it might be worth a post analyzing who, what, where. Would be even more interesting if it was applied to varying scenarios where the advantage in US carrier power mattered a lot, or the large number of Chinese missile boats mattered a lot.
DeleteJust a thought.
" I haven't found anything with the junk stripped out on both sides,"
DeleteCome on, now. You're got to put a little effort into it, yourself. The individual breakdowns by ship type are there. It's a trivial exercise to subtract whatever you consider 'junk' to get the numbers you want to see.
I also don't find numerical comparisons to be all that helpful. For example, we have more carriers but in the likely combat area near Taiwan and the first island chain, China has hundreds/thousands of land base aircraft and, therefore, no need for carriers. So, a comparison of carrier numbers would be pointless.
"how many ships can China deploy into WestPac in 30 days compared to the US Navy? "
DeleteI get the point you're making but the real question is how much EFFECTIVE FIREPOWER (explosions) can either side apply to the combat area? Whether that firepower comes from ships deploying within 30 days, submarines launching cruise missiles from a thousand miles away, B-2 bombers, or whatever, is irrelevant. It's how much firepower can be brought to bear in the combat area. Of course, given that the likely combat area is Taiwan and the South China Sea, China's proximity to the area puts the US at a disadvantage in terms of firepower applied to the area.
The next issue, then, is EFFECTIVE firepower. For example, it doesn't matter how many ships China can surge into the area if the US forces are standing a thousand miles off and lobbing cruise missiles. The Chinese ships won't have any targets to attack. In this instance, the US may have something of an advantage in that valid Chinese targets are, literally, everywhere. Conversely, there are few US targets for the Chinese to attack. The Chinese must defend EVERYTHING whereas the US has almost nothing to defend (Guam, maybe?).
This is why it can be misleading to focus on fleet numbers or aircraft numbers or whatever other measure of military forces. The numbers by themselves mean little. They have to be connected to a strategy and a geophysical reality.
Just something to think about.
The Marines are correct that MEUs have played valuable roles in the past, but the secret is they always had 30 days or more notice of their mission. This means MEUs can work up and be ready for action, but held ready at Little Creek and San Diego on 72 hour alert for a year. They may deploy for week once or twice for a local exercise, but no long fuel burning/ship stressing overseas deployments loitering in the ocean.
ReplyDeleteThis has a huge advantage because missions very greatly: near peer war, embassy evacuation, humanitarian assistance. The MEU can be tailored for the assigned mission with the correct equipment and manpower before it departs.
DeleteThis system means the Marines and Amphib navy will have the ready resources to deploy a second MEU within a couple weeks or an entire MEB (with around 12,000 Marines) within a month. Right now, the 7-month continual MEU overseas deployments mean everything gets worn out so during a crisis nothing more can sent.
DeleteI wouldn't have any marines floating around in a boat.
ReplyDeleteThree marine divisions; one on the east coast of the US, the second on the west coast, and the third deployed in the pacific between Okinawa, Hawaii, and my new naval base at Mindanao.
Divisions would be partly in Stryker vehicles and partly light infantry. The light infantry would do initial amphibious assaults with AAVs and then the Stryker units following along later via landing craft.
Indirect fire would lean heavily on 120mm mortars as they can be mounted in Stryker vehicles. They would still need 155mm artillery, preferably mounted on some kind of wheeled vehicles (lots of countries have examples).
Each division would also get a battalion of medium tanks like the army's new M10 Booker with a 105mm tank gun.
These marine divisions would basically fill the niche of amphibious naval infantry in the light to mid type of fights, complementing the army's assets.
Marine aviation would be just the helicopters and lift assets to afford air mobility along with close air support of navalised A-10s and modern A-1 Skyraiders (for permissive environments).
Lutefisk
Your idea(s) is fine ... in the abstract. Now, in reality, where do you see any reasonable chance for a light to medium amphibious assault? This is the issue I keep bringing up in this type of discussion. I simply can't foresee any reasonable, strategically likely scenario where we would want to conduct an amphibious assault. And, of course, if there is no reasonable scenario then one has to ask why we want to maintain significant amphibious forces? Think about it and let me know where you anticipate a real world scenario. I did a post on this but, for the life of me, I can't recall the title to offer a link.
Delete"Think about it and let me know where you anticipate a real world scenario."
DeleteUnderpinning my thoughts on this is that I don't think that we have ever done an amphibious assault against a peer enemy, not even on D-Day.
Nazi Germany was certainly a peer adversary. They had top-notch fighter aircraft, tactical and strategic bombers, under sea they had highly effective submarines, above they had everything from E-Boats to top-tier battleships, and on land they had best in class armor.
But none of those were factors in Normandy.
On those beaches we faced dug-in infantry in prepared positions backed by mortars and artillery.
Formidable, but not as bad as it could have been.
So unless we've achieved local sea and air superiority, I don't think amphibious assaults would be on the table.
Assuming that we've met those criteria, I could see us doing amphibious assaults in a range of situations.
To me the amphibious assault is just one possibility to do a forced-entry. If airborne (parachute drops) or air mobile (helicopter-borne assaults) are not viable, amphibious is a possibility. Amphibious assault, if designed correctly, should also be a heavier type of entry than the airborne possibilities.
An example would be in the Philippines, if Chinese light forces have partnered with Filipino rebels to control one or several islands in the archipelago.
Or retaking Saudi oil fields from Iranian forces. Or a landing near Singapore, or in the Baltic, or Lebanon.
Or an invasion of Cuba, or maybe Sri Lanka.
My Marine Corps would have the three divisions split between leg infantry and Stryker mounted infantry.
The leg infantry would be similar to the army's light infantry units. They would ride the AAVs into the beach and seize the sand and push inward as far as they could. They would also be the infantry that would ride in helicopters for air mobile assaults.
The Stryker mounted infantry would follow on in landing craft after the initial beach assault. The Strykers provide mobility, protection against enemy small arms, and a platform to carry heavier infantry supporting weapons.
These marine divisions would have support firepower with heavy mortars, artillery, and air defense units comparable to their army counterparts.
They would also have a battalion of 40 ton medium tanks, similar to the army's M10 Booker, sporting a 105mm tank gun.
That force mix should afford the marine divisions with the mobility and firepower to be able to do a lot of useful things on the battlefield, not just amphibious assaults.
I would utilize the LHAs as helicopter airfields, with air assault infantry and helicopter gunships flying from their decks (and they could stay 25 miles off shore).
The assault infantry would need to be on some kind of smaller ship, equipped with a well deck and self-defense armament so they can get in close enough to launch the AAVs and landing craft.
One of the things that would be necessary would be ships that can provide naval gunfire support. That we don't have that is a near criminal dereliction of duty on the part of the navy.
To keep the cost of maintaining this capability somewhat reasonable, I would limit the number of amphibious ships in the active fleet.
There would be no marine ready-units floating around on boats.
Instead, each marine combat and combat support unit would need to qualify for amphibious assault every 24 months.
And I would only maintain the number of ships needed to perform that training in the active fleet. The others would be laid-up in reserve.
The marine corps divisions would not be an additional cost to the DoD as I would reduce the army's light divisions in proportion to the amount of marine corps infantry.
Lutefisk
Oops, sorry for the double posting.
DeleteLutefisk
Heavy mortars are just 81mm mortars with marginally wider effective casualty radius. They are a good replacement for 81mm mortars and should be on ACVs but they are too light and short ranged for proper fire support against anything but light infantry.
ReplyDeleteM777s are effective but they cannot get ashore or move once ashore. Too few 53K to bring them ashore and insufficient LCACs (if you are lucky that they work) to bring MTVRS to tow M777s.
HIMARS have been pulled off to make space for a future NMSIS if we ever get missiles for them.
F35s are sortie limited.
SOLUTION: 120mm on ACVs. C130 with HIMARS as fly in element. Buy HMMWV mounted 105mm systems like the Hawkeye that can be lifted ashore by 53Ks as both gun and mover at the same time.
Wouldn’t much of this light infantry posture be ok if the doctrine was that they operate only within range of NGS.
ReplyDeleteWe don't have any NGS to speak of so .........
Delete