Monday, April 21, 2025

USS Massachusetts vs. Jean Bart

One of the lesser known engagements of WWII involved the gun duel between the US battleship USS Massachusetts and the French battleship Jean Bart.  The allies wanted to deny the use of the French battleship to the enemy and executed an attack by a small naval force.  Here’s a brief summary of the engagement.
 
At about 0700, as the Massachusetts, Wichita, and Tuscaloosa were preparing to engage French shore batteries, Tuscaloosa approached the entrance to Casablanca Harbor and reported that her scout plane was being fired upon, two French aircraft were closing, and two submarines were standing out from the harbor.
 
The cruiser subsequently shot down one of the French aircraft. The formidable French shore battery known as El Hank (four 8-inch guns) opened fire and straddled Massachusetts with its first salvo.
 
The unfinished and immobile French battleship Jean Bart opened fire with her operable forward quad 15-inch turret from pierside in Casablanca Harbor and hit a couple hundred yards from Massachusetts. Massachusetts received the “play ball” code at 0704, and she and Tuscaloosa concentrated their fire on Jean Bart. Massachusetts fired nine full 16-inch gun salvos (9 x 9 = 81 rounds) and hit Jean Bart five times within 16 minutes. The first shell hit in an empty magazine.
 
The last shell to hit glanced off the number 1 turret’s armor and bounced into the city, apparently without exploding, as it later became a souvenir at French navy headquarters. The hit, however, jammed the drive train of the turret and put Jean Bart’s main battery out of action for eight hours. Jean Bart’s 15-inch guns had sufficient range to reach the landing area at Fedala, but Massachusetts’s quick action eliminated that threat. El Hank, however, was not easily silenced and would dog U.S. ships all day, despite hundreds of rounds fired its way.[1]
 
The French warship able to fire just seven rounds at the U.S. battlewagon before the turret rotating mechanism jammed. USS Massachusetts‘ heavy 16-inch projectiles caused significant damage to the Jean Bart, although few actually exploded because they had been fitted with fuses manufactured a generation earlier. Had they had exploded; it is likely Jean Bart would have been crippled.[2]

This action again demonstrates multiple lessons such as the value of concentrated firepower, armor, etc.  I won’t belabor those as we’ve covered them many times.  Instead, I’d like to focus on one aspect of this action that jumps out and that is the concept of risk and reward.
 
USS Massachusetts




Jean Bart post WWII - note the unique 4-gun turrets

 
Risk/Reward – There is no avoiding the fact that risk and reward go hand-in-hand in combat.  People and equipment must be exposed to risk in order to accomplish anything worthwhile.  We’ve forgotten this and have come to believe that we can conduct wars without risking anything. 
 
For example, the idea of sending a ship to conduct a one-on-one duel with another ship that is supported by land batteries, is highly risky and not something we’d even consider today.
 
The corollary to risk/reward this is that losses will occur and we have to be willing to accept them and be able to absorb them.  This is the polar opposite of today’s military philosophy.  Today, we’re building staggeringly expensive ships and aircraft that we are loathe to risk because we can’t absorb their loss and can’t replace them in any useful time frame.  This risk aversion means we can’t accomplish anything worthwhile.  We have expensed ourselves into an almost unwinnable position.
 
We need to stop building ‘unriskable’, irreplaceable assets and return to simpler, single function assets that can be produced quickly and in quantity and that we’re willing to send in harm’s way.
 
 
 
_____________________________
 
[1]Rebellion Research website, “Operation Torch : The Naval Battle Of Casablanca, 8–10 November 1942”, Admiral Samuel J. Cox, USN, 17-Oct-2021,
https://www.rebellionresearch.com/operation-torch
 
[2]The National Interest website, “Navy Battleship Massachusetts vs. France’s Battleship Jean Bart: Who Won?”, Peter Suciu, 15-Jan-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navy-battleship-massachusetts-vs-frances-battleship-jean-bart-who-won-208607

11 comments:

  1. Possibly another lesson might be that as late as November 1942 the USN was not fully prepared to fight a serious war, and was lucky to have avoided a major fleet action. USS Massachusetts was commissioned in May of that year, but supplied with shells for the main battery that had aged and ineffective fuses: as if nobody in charge realised that fuses are delicate mechanisms which do not last forever. How many other battleships were in the same predicament? One would hope that this lesson has been learned by the modern USN, and that all US warships are fully supplied with functioning gear. On the other hand ...

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  2. The Russians have had a two tier system of weapons production for years. (Victor Suvorov/ Inside The Soviet Army). The high end model for first line Russian forces and the "monkey model" for export and reserve forces. Same weapons system to the eye but differs in that the fire control system, sensors and other features are simpler (ie. man loading vs. autoloader). Simpler systems that are cheaper to produce in quantity and simpler for the less educated to operate. In a protracted conflict how long is all this high end and expensive equipment going to last. (lack of spare parts / EMP / normal operational wear and tear). We need more monkey models, keep the high end equipment for enhancers to the quantity equipment. Another aspect is education, most people don't even want to work or learn a skill anymore, and those that do will be in short supply. Quantity does have a quality of it's own.

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  3. Re comment above: of course I meant, the USN was lucky to have avoided a major fleet action that was dependent on battleships. If you can count Pearl Harbor as a stroke of good luck ...

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    1. Pearl Harbor most definitely was a tragic but ultimatley beneficial incident in that it forced the US into a carrier-centric mode of naval warfare instead of seeking a battle line engagement that likely would not have ended well.

      In addition, rather than losing the battleships at sea, they were lost in our main Pacific repair facility and several were recovered and converted into semi-modern BBs that provided outstanding fire support during amphibious assaults and did well at Leyte.

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    2. Dead right, but as far as I can make out the situation was: USN entered their part of WW2 with battleship main guns firing shells that usually didn't work, submarine torpedoes that very rarely worked, and aircraft torpedoes that were not at all likely to work. I suppose that the admirable victory at Midway was due to the fact that if you have a dive-bomber that doesn't work, that will become spectacularly obvious during peacetime training. Query: how much of the current USN inventory is in the dive-bomber category?

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  4. return to single function assets that can be produced quickly and in quality. Couldn't agree more. Go back to simple easy and cheap to build single purpose warships. Cheap rotating radar, cheap engineering (diesel/ diesel electric drive), box launchers (ASW/ SSM/ SAM). a semi manned gun system ( like the old 5/54 frog eyes). Components can be built all over the country and shipped to assembly area's for final assembly and launching.

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  5. "...return to simpler, single function assets that can be produced quickly and in quantity and that we’re willing to send in harm’s way."

    Start with ASW, which we needs lots and lots of.

    ASW frigate like a Spruance-influenced Perry (w/helos) teamed with Gearing-esque ASW destroyers (no helos).
    Both optimized for ASW with only self-defense AAW.

    Lutefisk

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  6. Torch was a white-knuckle gamble all the way. Launching an assault with green troops from England and transatlantic from the US to land at three widely separated points at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca. Among the wild risks taken was when the attack transport Thomas Stone was disabled (either torpedo or bomb). Her troops were scheduled to be in the first waves landing in Oran. She launched her troops in landing craft a day early from 150 miles at sea.

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    1. One fear was that Axis friendly Franco in Spain would feel threatened and seize Gibraltar and send more troops into Spanish Morocco to fight the invaders. This is why Casablanca was included as an alternative port.

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  7. What do we have in the USN that can be considered expendable in modern naval warfare?

    Loading up Indy Class LCS's with 8-16 NSM and perhaps x2 SeaRam units?

    Or the UK tier's of Type 31's and then Type 26/45's?

    Perhaps 2-3 tiers of electronics/sensors, like the top of the line seen in AB Ft III's and Sea Giraffe's for tier 2? Or even just multiple drones eg x12 in 3-4 shifts for 3-4 sided visual detection 50nm radius from the ship?

    Given how modern warfare seems to be very missile centric, unless development of 8 inch guns returns, or even superfiring 5 inch guns, I don't see how much cheaper it can get, which means everything is still going to be pricey and hence risk averse behaviour will continue

    Andrew

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