There’s an old saying that generals always prepare to fight
the last war. Nowhere is this truer than
the Ukraine-Russia war. The US (and, to
be fair, the entire world) is preparing to fight the Ukraine conflict for the
next war.
We noted the success Ukraine has had using unmanned surface
drones against the Russian navy and so we are dutifully pushing ahead with
unmanned vessels just as quickly as we can while ignoring the unique factors
that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the inability of manned aircraft to exert decisive
effect and so we’ve begun revising our air doctrine and tactics to reflect this
while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true
one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the impact of small UAVs in attacking individual
soldiers and vehicles so we’ve enthusiastically embraced all manner of small
drones while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true
one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the marked lack of success by tanks and their high
rates of attrition and so we’ve eliminated the entire Marine Corps tank
component and begun moving away from tanks and toward light vehicles while
ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind
example.
There can be no dispute.
When we enter into a duplicate of the Ukraine conflict we will be more
than ready. On the other hand, when we
take on China we’ll be lost, floundering, and wondering why we aren’t better
prepared. It’s because we’re preparing
to fight the Ukraine war, not China.
I agree that we are learning the wrong lessons from the Ukraine/Russia war.
ReplyDeleteBut I have a little bit different take on our preparing to fight the last war.
Since WW2 we have lived in an era of limited war. As long as the Cold War remained cold we didn't have large scale conflicts. Even fairly large fights like Korea and Vietnam were just hot (but deadly) flare-ups that did not exceed the scope of limited war.
The GWOT has been more of the same. Battles against terrorists and non-state actors have changed the way the military fights. The military has simply been adapting to what it has been doing for an extended period of time.
It doesn't require an armored division to fight terror cells.
Much of this type of involvement can be done with precision strikes that may or may not be from a manned asset.
And that is where things start to get a little bit different.
When a manned aircraft gets shot down and the pilots are killed or captured, it is big news. The American public immediately starts to evaluate whether or not the mission that was being performed is worth the costs.
But if a Predator drone gets shot down, nobody really give a crap. It's just money, just a slice of the enormous military budget.
If you are in the intelligence community, or the state department bureaucracy, or the military....you might want to be involved with foreign entanglements that the American public does not see as a vital national interest.
The avoidance of American casualties goes a long way in allowing the agencies quite a bit of latitude in involving themselves in operations that much of the public might see as meddling.
Thus the need for unmanned equipment.
But we seem to be moving into a different paradigm.
When we move into an era of existential, or nearly existential, conflicts, the American public's tolerance for both risk and casualties changes substantially.
Casualties are still mourned, but they are accepted as the price that must be paid to defend the country and to maintain our civilization.
In that environment you don't need or want expensive unmanned equipment with limited capabilities.
You do need and want manned ships, planes and vehicles that are highly effective, that will viciously take the fight to the enemy, and will win total victory.
We are not preparing for that war.
We are preparing for the last war.
Lutefisk
"Thus the need for unmanned equipment."
DeleteThe point that you may be missing (or maybe not - to be fair, you don't explicitly say) is not whether unmanned assets, in a mostly permissive environment are helpful ... they are! The point is that we've begun REPLACING manned, highly capable assets with unmanned, limited capability assets in a quest to prepare for the Ukraine war that we apparently think is the new future of warfare. China will disabuse of that notion fairly quickly when war comes.
"We are preparing for the last war."
You seem to be agreeing with me?
I am wholeheartedly agreeing with you. And I also agree completely with your statement above.
DeleteLutefisk
What have learned from the Ukraine war is the Group Soviet Forces Germany, an army that would have reached Paris in under two weeks is no more. Sic transit Gloria.
ReplyDeleteQuestion for the class, Please define "Total Victory" in the China War.
Will a modern "Ever Victorious Army" march on Peking ?
or what ?
For my part, I've answered this question in, "China War - Setting the Stage" . Check it out and then, perhaps, share with us your answer.
Delete"Will a modern "Ever Victorious Army" march on Peking ?"
ReplyDeleteI don't think a war with China would be with ground forces. The only places I could see it happening is a Vietnam style fight in the Philippines or a conventional war in Korea. Maybe ground forces assistance in Indochina.
A military fight with China would be a navy fight to strangle their economy.
The Chinese economy is dependent on importing resources and exporting manufactured goods. But they don't have a blue water navy to secure those trade routes.
And we have a blue water navy that can shut down those trade routes.
The Chinese economy really needs the US for both its trade routes security and as a market for their export products.
I don't see any reason to have a ground military force anywhere near China.
Lutefisk
“ Have you lived in a cave”
DeleteComment deleted. Your points were fine. If you’d care to repost without the personal insult, you’re welcome to.
ComNavOps
Minor quibble, although it doesn't affect your overall point.
ReplyDeleteThe Marines decided to get rid of their tanks before the Ukraine war started. So while it may be a mistake, it isn't because of Ukraine.
This is true and I knew that as I prepared the post. The Marines, however, have trumpeted with glee the "proof" from Ukraine that their shedding tanks was wise and predictive. Thus, they're using Ukraine to justify their decision to shed tanks and not consider bringing them back. So, yes, you're correct but I used the example anyway for the reasons described.
DeleteThe Army also seems to be moving away from heavy tanks (M1) towards lighter "tanks" (M10). Again, not a direct result of Ukraine but fits the trend.
The Army isn't replacing the M1 Abrams with the M10 Booker. The M10 is going to Stryker units to replace the Stryker MGS as an assault gun organic to the Infantry Brigade, to provide direct fire support. Current practice is to slice tanks away from Armor divisions nd attach them as fire support guns to IBCT on an ad hoc basis.
DeleteWhile it does look like the Army is buying more M10 than M1, it should also be noted that there are some 10 thousand mothballed Abrams hulls in the desert, left over from the post Cold War drawdown. That's where the Army has been getting their tanks for the last 30 years - pull them outta the desert and reurbish them in the factory.
Haven't I seen reports to that the Russians have been doing the same, pulling tanks and other vehicles out of storage for use in Ukraine, and perhaps burning through their entire inventory?
DeleteYes. The difference is that the Russian tanks are in significantly worse material condition and have worse crews because they burned their instructor cadres as immediate reinforcement instead of training new crews.
DeleteAnyhow the other difference is that that 10 thousand tank reserve in the desert is to buy time for Lima to ramp up the production line for new tanks. It only makes a couple dozen new Abrams a year to keep the instituional knowledge alive because we frontloaded our production 40 yars ago. The Russians cant make new tanks anymore.
"While it does look like the Army is buying more M10 than M1"
DeleteThe question is how is the composition of armored units changing? I don't know since I don't follow land combat but it seems as if the Army is moving away from heavy tanks toward the M10. Not a one-for-one replacement but a change in composition. Maybe yes, maybe no?
Business Insider reports that Russia has a single tank factory that is producing around 20 tanks per month.
Delete"The question is how is the composition of armored units changing? I don't know since I don't follow land combat but it seems as if the Army is moving away from heavy tanks toward the M10. Not a one-for-
Delete1one replacement but a change in composition."
The composition of armor divisions is NOT changing. The M1 is still in use in Armor divisions.
No M10s are going to the armor divisions. It is purely going to outfit the INFANTRY brigades that either have no fire support vehicles, or were using the Stryker Mobile Gun System. It has a 105mm rifled gun, which was already surpassed by the 120mm smoothbore gun as an antitank weapon 30 years ago. This gun is getting HE-frag rounds for fire support use. At best, it can engage enemy IFVs, and suppress enemy long enough to disengage (because no tank likes taking rounds). If it's lucky, it can kill a tank from the rear.
The Abrams is on a weight loss program, yes, but that's intended to.come from an overall revamp.of systems and their placement. The biggest causae of weight growth has come from adding new shit to.one side that requires you to add a counterweight so the turret can turn. Same problem the wide SEWIP Burkes have.
Like others, generals rely on what they know than unknow. Wars are life and death thus people do whatever. You can "predict" but just like financial advisors who predict the future. Furthermore, change courses mean lots of money in stake. In today's environment, every weapon has many upon many live in its food chain - from your Congressman to union workers.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, China's military industry food chains are much shorter than US. They can re-direct resources much easier. Yes, they also have corruptions, but bribes only go to top generals than a long food chain.
Furthermore, how future wars to be fight also depend on your potential enemies as how they think. You cannot just brainstorm among your top advisors but forecast how others will evolve. What new weapons will they develop and how will they think that future wars will be.
This will help the US Navy fight future wars. But this seems odd:
ReplyDeleteA Navy first: USS Chosin tests resupplying rapid-fire launch system at sea
"At-sea rearming has been intermittently tested by the U.S. over the years but became a top priority for Del Toro in 2022, as the threat of conflict with China loomed. The rearming mechanism uses a crane that can lift and rotate 25-foot missile canisters vertically, then lowers the explosives into the launchers, which are small openings in the ship deck."
Is this poorly worded, or do they insert the cannister with missile then insert and attach the warhead?
The advantage of a cannister is that it comes "factory wrapped". If they open it and screw around with attaching a warhead while underway that brings up a host of safety and reliability issues.
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-10-11/navy-resupplying-rapid-fire-launch-system-at-sea-15478342.html
There is no need to do this underway. Just a system where ships can be reloaded in a calm bay while at anchor.
G2mil
I think that's just poorly written. Similarly, the 'small openings in the ship deck' presumably refers to the VLS cell - an extremely odd way to describe it. The article's author seems to have no familiarity with Navy systems.
DeleteAs always, there is no practical benefit to reloading at sea.
A better description of the test, with some accompanying photos, is here:
Deletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/10/u-s-navy-holds-first-tram-at-sea-vls-loading-test/
I wonder if you could expand upon your belief that there is no benefit to rearming at sea.
DeleteBefore commenting I read the “A century of replenishment at sea” by Commander J Lukacs and noted that replenishment at sea of fuel, stores and ammunition was introduced and advanced to a high degree of efficiency during ww2. However it was Spruance who identified that the primary restriction on keeping his 12 carriers and escorts on station was not fuel but ammunition.
Post war the need to replenish missile stocks was studied and
eventually STREAM introduced.
However later developments seem to concentrate upon Carrier ammunition replenishment only.
Is this because the design of current missile equipped ships and the installation of missile silos up front ruled out traditional replenishment methods or was it a doctrinal/design led decision.
As an “amateur” it would seem logical to believe pulling a ship out of the line to rearm at sea a relatively short distance away would
be advantageous to ensuring that escort ship numbers available to the carrier group remained high at all times and enable the carrier group to keep a constant pressure on the enemy but I would be grateful if you could let me know your reasons as to why re-stocking ammunition at sea brings no benefits and any information on the subject I should read.
"I wonder if you could expand upon your belief that there is no benefit to rearming at sea."
DeleteI've discussed this many times throughout the blog. Feel free to make use of the archives.
There are two main reasons:
1. Navy's don't put to sea and stay there during a war. That's not how they fight. Instead, they execute a mission and then return to base. THAT'S when they reload/replenish. See, this post for a real world example of how the USS Enterprise operated during WWII: "War Deployments"
2. An escort group simply can't expend enough missiles to warrant reloading at sea. Do the math. Each ship has 96 VLS cells. With a mix of quad packed ESSM and Standards, that gives each escort something on the order of 150 SAMs plus whatever RAM/SeaRam/CIWS. Now multiply that by 20 or 30 escorts and the group has something on the order of 3,000 - 4,500 SAMs plus many hundreds of RAM missiles. If a group has gone through enough of that inventory to warrant reloading at sea, then they've been engaged in unimaginable battles that they have no business engaging in and they desperately need to return to base!
When you execute a mission, you might engage in one battle which only requires a small handful of missiles relative to the available inventory. If you're fighting more than one battle then you've lost any element of surprise and need to retire immediately.
Note: Replenishing/rearming a carrier is a different story. Air wings DO burn through the available inventory in short order.
Note: Ammo usage in WWII was a different story. The anti-aircraft guns of the time were wildly inaccurate and ships would go through tens of thousands of rounds of ammo in a single engagement. That DID require rearming on occasion although the preferred approach was still to RTB. Today, we'll only expend 0-4 missiles per incoming missile.
Whatever hypothetical scenario you're thinking of, do the math.
You're correct that there's no real benefit to rearming defensive missiles, but surely our ships are not going to be carrying defensive missiles only, are they not?
DeleteAs you yourself have noted, the purpose of the carrier air wing is to provide air power to defend the battlegroup, and the purpose of the battlegroup is to fire cruise missiles to attack the enemy. Surely, being able to bring reloads closer to the fight would enable us to maintain a higher attack tempo?
"surely our ships are not going to be carrying defensive missiles only, are they not?"
DeleteIt depends on the mission. An escort mission only requires AAW, for example.
"Surely, being able to bring reloads closer to the fight would enable us to maintain a higher attack tempo?"
Think that through operationally and tactically. If you conduct a strike mission, what's the general plan? It's to reach your launch point UNDETECTED, launch, and then leave the area (meaning a thousand miles away!) on your way back to base. Lingering guarantees counterattack and, likely, sunk ships as enemy aircraft, missiles, ships, and subs will speed to the area. Hanging around to try to launch more missiles is a guaranteed disaster. So, hanging around to reload missiles is a guaranteed disaster.
How long does it take to reload missiles? From the videos I've seen, one missile per hour seems about right. You'd have to hang around for days to reload the entire VLS.
Reloading just a handful of missiles is useless. As you recall, we used somewhere around 80 or so cruise missiles to conduct a PARTIAL attack on an UNDEFENDED Syrian base a few years ago. We would need many hundreds to successfully attack a defended target. A handful of reloads is absolutely useless.
Think operationally and tactically.
You're looking at it from the wrong perspective, friends. All potential naval bases we could use in a fight with China are within range of their ASBMs. These are prime targets and will certainly be eating ballistic missiles from the Chinese in short order. These are fixed, known positions, and if the Chinese wait for our ships to pull in and reload, they can get our ships AND the bases. All you need is one satellite pass to confirm that ships are tied up dockside, reloading missiles.
DeleteNow, even if they restrict themselves to just conventional ballistic missiles (the Chinese CLAIM "No First Use", but the Chinese are notorious for lying), they still have enough weapons to neutralise our regional bases, and that means no reloads.
Don't think about reloading at sea as increasing the op tempo or attack tempo. Think of it as a resiliency measure. It's the modern interpretation of the Ulithi Atoll forward base. Ships pull in to the atoll, and the reload ship reloads them there. Even if our bases are destroyed, we can still have some measure of reload and resupply for our warships.
Otherwise, we'd have to rely on the carrier's air wing to conduct attacks, and that's a pretty iffy proposition.