The Navy’s famous Top Gun school was established to teach air combat. To that end, a cadre was established whose job was to live, breathe, and eat enemy tactics, doctrine, weapons specifications and performance, and every aspect of the enemy’s thinking and capabilities. This knowledge was distilled and disseminated to the students.
The key was that we had a group that knew everything there was to know about the enemy and this allowed us to prepare effectively for combat.
Now, from a War On The Rocks website interview with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Berger, we get this horrifying statement:
GEN. DAVID BERGER (47:05): When I was a captain, I went to Fort Benning, to the Army captain course for infantry officers. And for that school period, that seven-month period, we had templates that could tell you exactly what the Soviet Union military, how they were going to operate. Situational templates, doctrinal templates. That’s how we wargamed. And you kind of knew them inside out, from their weapon systems all the way to how they would operate. And it was very predictable. We don’t have anything like that now. We don’t have anything for, in other words, the pacing challenge, we don’t have the equivalent of that, that’s usable. How are they organized? How do they think? How do their leaders developed? We don’t have the equivalent of templates. We don’t have them right now. I don’t know what that looks like, but we need it. I sense we have to figure that out. If you’re actually going to fight against an adversary, you’ve got to know how they’re organized. Not just their weapon systems, but how they think, how they make decisions. [1]
Are you kidding me? What have the various Marine Commandants been doing for the last two decades? What have you been doing during your term, Gen. Berger?
The General has publicly emphasized his focus on gender issues, diversity, and many other non-combat topics but where is the emphasis on analyzing the enemy? Where is the Marine Corps Top Gun school? Who in the Marines is living, breathing, and eating Chinese military thinking and performance?
The short answer, according to the Commandant, is no one. It appears not to be a focus for the Marines.
Berger appears perfectly willing to remake the Marine Corps despite, by his own admission, having no concept of China’s capabilities, doctrine, goals, organization, etc. This begs the question, how did the Commandant come up with his new concept if he had none of the required background information about the Chinese military?
As we constantly note, you can’t build a ship without a Concept of Operations. Similarly, you can’t build a Marine Corps with no concept of your enemy’s capabilities.
It is painfully obvious that the long line of recent Commandants have failed the nation and the Corps, badly, and Gen. Berger ranks right up there with the worst of them. When the Commandant of the Marines publicly admits that he has no idea what the Chinese military is capable of it is time for him to step down or be fired.
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[1]https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/general-berger-on-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/
Just wow... We gave up firepower and armor, and are now chasing EABO with the LAWS, using this supposedly brilliant and well-considered plan, to fight an enemy we are clueless about??? How is this not front page news?? You couldn't write fiction this absurd...!!!
ReplyDeleteWe keep hearing that they are "war gaming" everything and all these new weapons are required but then USMC General just admits that they have no clue what or how the Chinese are up to?!?!?
DeleteWhy isn't this a scandal?!?!?....rhetorical question......
"USMC General just admits that they have no clue what or how the Chinese are up to?"
DeleteSo … how did they represent the Chinese side since they have no information about them?
Doesn't that make the supposed war game results totally invalid?
"So … how did they represent the Chinese side since they have no information about them?"
DeleteThey represented them in the way which would produce the desired result, such as "We need more money for X".
Standard military procedure, really.
That has be one of the saddest and most criminal statements from someone inside US DoD of all time!!! Seriously?!?
ReplyDeleteThis is what we get for $750 billion a year: "we have to clue about our enemy and we have no clue about what we are doing!" Maybe the general figures he'll get another $10 to $20 billion because Congress will feel sorry for him??!??
Since it has given up its amphibious mission, what is the point of having a Marine Corps?
ReplyDelete"UnknownFebruary 2, 2022 at 5:24 AM
DeleteIt didn't so much give up landings, as the procurement system failed yet again. "
I deleted the rest of this comment because it was just an unsupported and incoherent rant.
However, the opening statement, about the procurement system being a reason for Marine Corps 'failure' (however that's defined) has the potential for an intelligent thesis. I invite 'Unknown' to rewrite the comment and logically develop the thesis. I eagerly look forward to a rational discussion of a possible link between 'failure' and procurement. I hope I hear from you.
Because of a WWII Navy/MC turf battle the US Navy operates all watercraft as well as beach control craft. So the LCACs, the boats, and the beach master craft are sailor stuff. The Marines own things that go ashore and doctrinally can drive inland-- currently the AAVs (which are supposed to go away) and the MCV replacement.
DeleteWith the budget failure of the early 00s AAV replacement, the Corps was going to pay for contractor upgrades/lifespan extenders for the AAVs. But they were really pricey. So instead HQMC tasked their maintainers with squeezing out another few years on the cheap. That failed stunningly and publically.
The rebuilds were made much worse by the Corps' insistence on a first term and out model for their enlisted. They had E3s with a year out of school working under the supervision of E4 and 5s trying to hold down all the tasks that the army or navy would spread out between 4 levels of NCO supervisors and specialty warrant officers.
So AAVs are done.
That leaves the MCVs. Except they don't swim as good as they were supposed to, and the towing option doesn't work. The defense contractor is willing to fix both issues, for a lot of money. Oh, and it it will take a long time to fix.
So now America is faced with the reality that the army who wants to leave landing operations and divest their craft and their landing ships, is in a better place to carry out landings than the Navy/MC.
By 'MCV', I assume you mean the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)?
DeleteThe ACV does, indeed, have performance issues which should have been found and corrected long before any production contracts were issued. That aside, the more puzzling question is why the Marines are even purchasing ACVs given their public pronouncement that they are out of the opposed landing business. That being the case, there is no need for an ACV and the inland troop transport mission could be much better performed by a dedicated armored personnel carrier (APC) which, in turn, also seems unnecessary given the Marine's focus on small unit, missile shooting from hidden forward bases.
With recent developments, one can't help but wonder why the Marines continue to exist.
You also correctly point out the Marine's failure to maintain their existing AAVs to acceptable safety and performance standards. Those failings are well documented in the fatal AAV sinking incident investigation report. A small positive from that incident is that several officers have, or are in the process of, being punished. From a Stars and Stripes article,
"In the wake of the sinking, the Marine Corps punished three commanders, including the former commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, Maj. Gen. Robert Castellvi; the commanding officer of the 15th MEU, Col. Christopher Bronzi; and the commanding officer of BLT 1/4, Lt. Col. Michael Regner.
Three Navy officers also received administrative punishments, including the commander of the Navy's amphibious task force, the captain of the Somerset and the ship's tactical action officer.
Yet another Marine commander, Lt. Col. Keith Brenize, is facing a board of inquiry at the Marine Corps Headquarters in Quantico, Va., where a panel of officers will determine whether he also shares responsibility for the sinking."
"That being the case, there is no need for an ACV and the inland troop transport mission could be much better performed by a dedicated armored personnel carrier (APC)"
DeleteThe ACV _is_ a dedicated APC though. The ACV participants were the STK Terrex and Iveco SuperAV, which are already in service in their originating countries of Singapore and Italy, and were designed and purchased as APCs to serve the Singaporean and Italian armies.
Unless you're thinking of Boxer, but Boxer's a 40 ton vic, directly comparing it to 25 ton vics like Terrex and SuperAV is a bit apples to oranges. It's like directly comparing a Fletcher to a Wickes because they're both destroyers, but one's a WW2 design massing 2500 tons and the other's a WW1 design massing 1100 tons.
The USMC is well suited for fighting the Chinese in the south Pacific.
ReplyDeleteGiven the Chinese still struggle to push any serious firepower other than submarines out side of the "Second Island Chain" (Philippines, Indonesia, Japan), that's not exactly something that is currently relevant.
DeleteI also doubt the Chinese will be replicating the Imperial Japanese strategy of 1941-42. That is just a waste of resources.
China's push to control several island chains, such as the Solomons, indicates that you are incorrect.
DeleteAdmittedly, as CNO stated, it's hard to know what threat the Marines should prepare for when we don't even know what their job is...
ReplyDeleteBut even a football team that can't put together their game plan because they don't know who their opponent is can still work on blocking and tackling.
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Does that also imply the US Army no longer has such information at hand as well (noting Berger was talking about doing an Army course at Fort Benning)?
ReplyDeleteIt's funny cause all these exercises are meant to have a Red force replicating enemy forces in terms of at least tactics.
More and more I think they are just glorified photo ops.
"Does that also imply the US Army no longer has such information at hand..."
ReplyDeleteWhat do we know about the Chinese Order of Battle?
We felt we had a pretty good handle on what the Soviets would do.
They had perfected their way of fighting during The Great Patriotic War, and then held about 4 bazillion large scale exercises to practice.
Even if they would have changed things up on their way to the Fulda Gap, there was at least an understanding of what they were expected to do.
What info is out there to inform about the Chinese war fighting system?
The war with the Nationalists doesn't seem to pertain much to modern fighting.
And I question how much their ass-kicking by the Vietnamese will shed light on their intended tactics now.
Have we been able to observe their large-scale exercises?
Are there any Chinese military publications in which they discuss their tactics?
But even without knowing those things, the Marines can certainly work on the basic things.
Individual skills, fire and maneuver tactics, combined arms co-ordinations.
Those things are universal no matter what the enemy's tactics are.
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Chinese experience in Vietnam is not really relevant.
DeleteFirstly it was 42 years ago. The Chinese military has changed a lot (for better or worse). Any officers that served during that period have largely retired.
The modern PLA is basically a new and totally untested force. (Note lack of combat experience is not necessarily a bad thing as you can learn bad habits in combat - eg American overreliance on airpower over artillery due to uncontested airpower over Afghanistan, Iraq etc etc).
Secondly the Chinese deliberately didn't use their air force and other systems due to keep USSR happy - it was presented to USSR as a limited incursion to punish Vietnam for invading Chinese ally Cambodia.
Note that the battle hardened Vietnamese also suffered large casualties despite being well equipped (especially compared to Chinese army which was still in its early 1960s induced stasis) and with officers who had a lot of combat experience.
There were constant exchanges in early 1980s but these were border skirmishes with both sides limiting their engagements.
@Dead1:
DeleteInteresting.
Unfortunately, none of it demonstrates the kind of operation continuity and consistency that we saw from the Soviets to inform our planning strategies.
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The problem is not limited to the Marines. How much do any of our branches know about what they will face in wartime, and what they will do about it?
ReplyDeleteHow much do they care? They seem far more interested in fighting and winning budget battles than war battles.
DeleteReminds me of Big Army closing down the Asymmetric Warfare Group last year. Because Big Army doesn't see the value in a unit whose remit is to study the enemy and teach lessons learned to the rest of the fighting force.
Delete"How much do they care? They seem far more interested in fighting and winning budget battles than war battles."
ReplyDeleteAnd after 30 years and billions upon billions of dollars spent, we have a navy surface fleet consisting of a bunch of Burkes and a handful of aircraft carriers flying outdated planes.
Not money well spent.
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"And after 30 years and billions upon billions of dollars spent, we have a navy surface fleet consisting of a bunch of Burkes and a handful of aircraft carriers flying outdated planes."
DeleteBut in the case of the Fords, not flying them often.
I think we need a rethink of combat readiness training across all branches, not just the Marines. I have mentioned the Royal Navy trifecta of Perisher (they do it for submarine PCOs, I think we should require it for all PCOs), FOST (basically like what Atlantic Fleet ships used to go through at Gitmo), and Springtrain (as nearly as I can tell, like our old Fleet Problems). I would like to implement all three. And no, these are not just superficial name changes, they are significant steps up in rigor from what we are doing now--Perisher for all PCOs before taking command, FOST every 3 years and prior to any deployment, and Springtrain annually, for all USN ships except those deployed or in major maintenance.
ReplyDeleteSimilar tempo and rigor for the other services.
One thing I will say in Berger's defense:
ReplyDeleteHis changes to the USMC have been silly and I don't think they will work. Nor are they direction the Corps should be going in.
However, at least the man came into the job, had a vision, and made his changes happen. Again, I believe his vision to be wrong, but I don't see anybody else doing anything but stand around.
On the other hand, sometimes inaction is produces a better result than foolish action.
Delete"The General has publicly emphasized his focus on gender issues, diversity, and many other non-combat topics but where is the emphasis on analyzing the enemy? Where is the Marine Corps Top Gun school? Who in the Marines is living, breathing, and eating Chinese military thinking and performance?
ReplyDeleteThe short answer, according to the Commandant, is no one. It appears not to be a focus for the Marines."
Military organizations exist to win wars. To paraphrase Norman Schwartzkopf, to kill bad people and break their things. To be effective, they must know their opposition and have a strategy and tactics to defeat them. If Berger is telling the truth, the Marines obviously have none of those. It's a total lack of focus from what used to be our most focused branch of the armed services.
Or maybe that the focus has shifted from winning wars to advancing careers and winning budget battles.
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DeleteThe Marines have actually been relatively adept at waging budgetary warfare. Comparing headcount in 2021 to 1961, 60 years ago, the Marines have held relatively steady whereas the other branches have all declined significantly in headcount (1)(2):
DeleteArmy - decrease from 858,622 to 471,513
Navy - decrease from 627,089 to 325,802
Air Force - decrease from 821,151 to 320,811
Marines - increase from 176,909 to 184,427
They've done that by staying busy as baby army and baby air force. But that is not a recipe for long-term survival. At some point political pressure will probably force baby army to be rolled into the Army and baby air force split between Navy air and the Air Force. They need a unique mission to survive, and any such unique mission could probably be handled by a smaller Corps. So to focus on a unique mission or two almost certainly means a smaller Corps, which is anathema in bureaucratic circles.
The Royal Marines, faced with budgetary extinction in the 1960s-1970s, became amphibious/commando specialists. I think that's the road for the USMC to follow.
(1)https://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014
(2)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Armed_Forces
Do the Marines even know what they want to be?
ReplyDeleteEABO really seems more like the last gasp of a dying organization than a viable mission. As a former Gator Navy officer, who developed a lot of admiration for the Corps while hauling them around, I find that very sad, and doubly so because I think there are viable missions out there. Those missions would be for a smaller and more elite USMC, and no good bureaucrat likes to see his/her agency (and its budget) shrink. But I think it is high time to rethink the Corps, and a baby army with a baby air force is not what I think it needs to be.
It is a true shame that General Alexander Vandegrift is no longer with us to “clean House” in his beloved Marine Corp. I would pay good money in order to have a ringside seat to said “housecleaning”. Actually, the more I think about it, the less that I desire to be anywhere near THAT operation. Collateral damage would not even come close to describing the sheer carnage, and said carnage would not be limited to the Corp. Ah, no guts, no glory. I WANT to see it happen. I WANT to be there, with popcorn. How far back in the past would we have to go in order to find a CAPABLE Commandant of the Marine Corps?
ReplyDelete