The US Navy is building a fleet of small unmanned vessels to act as pickets and outer escorts for carrier and surface groups despite having no evidence, whatsoever, that the unmanned vessels can effectively carry out their task. Since the Navy refuses to conduct any actual experimentation to validate the concept prior to committing to production, is there any other source of information that might allow us to assess the concept? Of course there is and it’s our most reliable source … history! Specifically, it’s the battle for Okinawa and the role of the Kamikaze and the US Navy picket ships.
Okinawa was a major battle for both the US and Japan. US losses during the 3 month battle were steep with 768 aircraft lost in addition to staggering naval losses.(5) From Wikipedia:
At sea, 368 Allied ships—including 120 amphibious craft—were damaged while another 36—including 15 amphibious ships and 12 destroyers—were sunk during the Okinawa campaign. The US Navy's dead exceeded its wounded, with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks. (5)
Just as astounding to us, today, was the magnitude of the forces assembled for the battle. Consider this partial Allied naval order of battle at Okinawa (1)
US Navy combat ships:
11 fleet carriers
6 light carriers
22 escort carriers
8 fast battleships
10 old battleships
2 large cruisers,
12 heavy cruisers
13 light cruisers
4 anti-aircraft light cruisers
132 destroyers
45 destroyer escorts
Amphibious assault vessels:
84 attack transports
29 attack cargo ships
LCIs, LSMs, LSTs, LSVs, etc.
Auxiliaries:
52 submarine chasers
23 fast minesweepers
69 minesweepers
11 minelayers
49 oilers
Royal Navy combat ships:
5 fleet carriers
2 battleships
7 light cruisers
14 destroyers
The 265 US combat ships, alone, nearly equals the size of our entire present day fleet and that was just the force for a single operation. We’ve truly forgotten the size of the force necessary to wage total war.
Japan, too, fielded a large force, mainly aerial, along with the battleship Yamato, a cruiser, and several destroyers. During the course of the battle, Japan launched 10 large scale kamikaze attacks against the US Navy Fifth Fleet guarding the Okinawa amphibious invasion fleet. Each attack consisted of hundreds of aircraft. For example, the first attack consisted of 355 kamikaze aircraft and 344 escort fighters and lasted for five hours. The US Combat Air Patrol (CAP) did an amazing job but could not stop every attacker.
Twenty-two kamikazes penetrated the combat air patrol shield on April 6, sinking six ships and damaging 18 others. Three hundred fifty U.S. crewmen died. (2)
Only 22 attacking aircraft managed to penetrate the aerial defenses but the damage they did was enormous.
What was the overall result of the kamikaze attacks?
The Japanese fell short of their goal of “one plane one ship,” but sank 36 American warships, and damaged 368 other vessels at Okinawa. The Navy’s losses were the highest of the Pacific war: 4,907 sailors and officers killed, and 4,824 wounded. Japan lost an estimated 1,600 suicide and conventional planes at Okinawa. (2)
The sheer number of attacking aircraft represented what we would, today, call a saturation attack intended to overwhelm the defensive capacity of the US fleet.
The Navy’s answer to the kamikaze saturation attacks was to establish a ring of radar picket ships around the island and the invasion fleet extending out as far as 80 miles. The pickets provided early warning, fighter direction, and direct engagement. Each picket ship was tied to a circular station of 5000 yds radius.
Wikipedia describes the Okinawa radar picket system.
A ring of 15 radar picket stations was established around Okinawa to cover all possible approaches to the island and the attacking fleet. Initially, a typical picket station had one or two destroyers supported by two landing ships, usually landing craft support (large) (LCS(L)) or landing ship medium (rocket) (LSM(R)), for additional AA firepower. Eventually, the number of destroyers and supporting ships were doubled at the most threatened stations, and combat air patrols were provided as well. In early 1945, 26 new construction Gearing-class destroyers were ordered as radar pickets without torpedo tubes, to allow for extra radar and AA equipment, but only some of these were ready in time to serve off Okinawa. Seven destroyer escorts were also completed as radar pickets. The radar picket mission was vital, but it was also costly to the ships performing it. Out of 101 destroyers assigned to radar picket stations, 10 were sunk and 32 were damaged by kamikaze attacks. The 88 LCS(L)s assigned to picket stations had two sunk and 11 damaged by kamikazes, while the 11 LSM(R)s had three sunk and two damaged. (3)
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Okinawa Picket Stations |
Note: Some picket diagrams show a 16th station located near station 12.
Understanding the basics of the situation at Okinawa, what can we learn that is applicable to today’s Navy? The foundation of any analysis is the recognition that the Kamikaze was the functional equivalent of a guided anti-ship missile. The guidance, obviously, was in the form of a human pilot and the ‘missile’ was very powerful, rivaling a modern guided missile in terms of destructive impact. This functional equivalency allows us to assess the attacks and defense in modern terms. Further, the dynamic of the Kamikaze and the picket ships gives us insight into the Navy’s plans regarding its unmanned picket/escort vessels.
As you recall from previous posts, the Navy intends to procure two types of unmanned vessels. One will be a small version which is intended to act as a picket for a larger group by providing surveillance and reconnaissance – much the same as the picket ships did at Okinawa. The second will be a somewhat larger vessel which is intended to stay with the main group and act as a missile barge.
So, what does the Okinawa Kamikaze and picket ship scenario tell us about the Navy’s plans for its unmanned vessels today? There are several lessons, factors, and considerations for us.
Lethality – We need to recognize that today’s anti-ship missile will be every bit as lethal, if not more so, than the Kamikazes. In fact, the situation is far worse today due to the complete absence of armor on modern ships. The Okinawa picket ships routinely absorbed multiple hits, kept fighting, and often survived. Does anyone seriously believe that a Burke, FFG(X), or LCS can take multiple hits and not sink? Astonishingly, one of those ships is actually designed to be abandoned at the first hit! A missile attack against our ships will be devastating and we need to factor that into our ship designs and cost and we need to accept that naval battles will involve a significant degree of attrition. The lethality will absolutely stun us.
Saturation – The Kamikaze was used as a saturation attack with each of ten major attacks consisting of several hundred aircraft. This is a lesson we have completely forgotten. Peer warfare requires huge numbers of munitions – dwarfing any estimates we may have. This was demonstrated time and again in WWII and Korea where munition expenditures far exceeded predictions. We’ve become so used to the small Tomahawk strikes against unresisting targets that we’ve come to believe that peer warfare will involve the same minimal usage of weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. We’ll see unimaginably massive expenditures of weapons against us and unbelievable salvos launched against our fleets. We absolutely must come to terms with this reality because it drives our ship design sensor and weapons density, fire control capacities, sensor design, armor considerations, etc. Ships with one CIWS will not survive saturation attacks. We must heavily arm our ships – far beyond anything imagined by today’s designers.
Defensive Guidance/Sensors - Defending ships at Okinawa did not possess any weapon guidance comparable to the Kamikaze pilots and this put them at a huge disadvantage. The defending weapons were optically (and radar, to a degree) aimed and fuzed to a marginally successful degree. The mismatch in technology between the advanced [human] guidance of the Kamikazes and the unguided defensive weapons mimics and demonstrates the consequences of a loss of defensive sensors and fire control in modern engagements. Given the very limited number of sensors and fire controls on modern ships, it is all too easy to imagine a ship being blinded early in an engagement and being unable to continue fighting even though the weapons, themselves, might still be available. We desperately need to increase the number of sensors (redundancy) and types of sensors on our ships. For example, we should have much more extensive, physically distributed EO/IR sensors tied into the fire control system as well as a separate, technologically dissimilar type of radar as a backup to the Aegis arrays. The Aegis arrays are large, exposed targets and likely to be seriously damaged and degraded from almost any hit. Consider the Burke destroyer that was involved in the collision with a commercial ship. One of its radar arrays was, apparently, rendered completely inoperative and that was from a waterline collision, not a missile hit. In like fashion, the Port Royal’s arrays were reportedly rendered inoperative when it gently nosed aground off Pearl Harbor. That doesn’t bode well for the combat resilience of the Aegis system. We need sensor redundancy and backups.
Armament – The use of picket ships mimics the Navy’s desire for advanced screens of unmanned vessels. The pickets succeeded in their mission but were devastated – what does that suggest for today’s unmanned vessel screens? The picket ships were heavily armed and armored but were still devastated. The Navy, in contrast, envisions the unmanned escorts being unarmed. They’ll be quickly eliminated in any combat which will transfer the burden of their functions back to the manned escorts who won’t be trained or proficient at the functions and certainly won’t be properly positioned.
Armor – The Okinawa picket ships were all armored to varying degrees. Again, the Navy envisions completely unarmored, unmanned vessels as pickets. Not only will the unmanned vessels be quickly eliminated but the absence of armor ensures that weapon expenditure by the enemy to do so will be absolutely minimal. One of the major benefits of the Okinawa pickets was that they soaked up so many of the Kamikazes. Imagine if each picket had instantly sunk from a single hit. The remaining Kamikazes would have been able to continue on to the amphibious ships, the true targets of the Kamikazes, instead of being wasted against the pickets.
USS Aaron Ward After 6 Kamikaze and 2 Bombs
Weapon Density – The number of weapons on the picket ships was incredible and that redundancy allowed the pickets to keep fighting even after taking multiple hits. The USS Aaron Ward is an outstanding example of a ship that was able to keep firing despite taking half a dozen or so Kamikaze strikes and a couple of bomb hits. Even the ships that would make up today’s core group have very limited numbers of defensive weapons. While the VLS numbers are large, and quad packing makes the missile inventory numbers even larger, we’ve shown that the number of VLS weapons that are actually usable in an engagement is limited to around four. Beyond that, the number of close in weapons is nearly non-existent. Burkes have a single CIWS. Many ships have a single RAM/SeaRAM. We need to greatly increase the number of defensive weapons installed on our ships.
Picket Spacing – One of the aspects that jumps out from looking at the diagrams of the picket locations is the distances involved. For those of us who have grown up looking at Navy PR photos of ships sailing side by side, the idea of spacing is foreign to us. The Okinawa pickets were located 20-80 miles (mostly 50-80 miles) from the center of the defended area. Translating that to modern terms is difficult but one way to sort of get a handle on it is to compare the Okinawa distancing to the speed of the incoming attackers. Obviously, the faster the attacker, the farther out the picket has to be located in order to provide sufficient warning. At Okinawa, the pickets were, generally, 50-80 miles from the center point of the defended area which puts them at distance equivalent to 25% - 40% of the attacking aircraft’s speed (assuming 200 mph). For a modern high subsonic (assume 500 mph), anti-ship missile that would, proportionally, place pickets at 125 miles – 200 miles. That seems unbelievable to us, today, but facing supersonic or high subsonic missiles, those are the kinds of distances required to provide sufficient early warning and engagement.
If the Navy intends, as they say, to place unmanned vessels as escort pickets for the main groups, the pickets will need to be 50-200 miles out which places them well beyond any AAW support from the core group. As we stated earlier, being unarmed and unarmored, they’ll die quickly and easily. I’m pretty sure the Navy hasn’t thought this through.
The Okinawa picket stations were positioned close enough to allow continuous tracking of attacking aircraft but were too far apart to provide mutual gun support. Given today’s longer ranged anti-air missiles, mutual support may be possible but only if many, many more pickets are used due to the greater required distancing from the escorted group and only if the pickets are armed. Again, this reminds us that we’ve completely forgotten just how many ships are required to form a survivable group. We’ve grown up seeing a carrier escorted by three ships when the combat-reality is that we will need 30+ ships and that’s before we factor in any distant picket requirements.
Countermeasures - Japan did attempt radar countermeasures, employing chaff and radar reflective kites, though with limited success. Today, sophisticated radar countermeasures would, undoubtedly, be employed and would greatly decrease the effectiveness of radar pickets.
Expendability - It was understood that the pickets would be spotted and attacked. Recommendations were made that the picket ships be the smallest possible ship that could perform the function so as to make losses ‘acceptable’.(4) This is a concern for us, today, given that our smallest surface ship is the multi-billion dollar Burke. Even the future frigate is a billion-plus dollar ship and cannot be considered expendable. The Navy’s vision of small unmanned vessels may be appropriate in terms of cost, if they can resist the temptation to gold plate them.
Summary
Future naval warfare will, without a doubt, feature massive, saturation missile attacks and the US Navy has not devoted any attention to the problem. The Chinese Type 055 destroyer/cruiser, for example, has 112 VLS cells that can be loaded with anti-ship missiles. Okinawa offers historical lessons that we can apply to our defensive efforts. The Navy plans to employ unmanned picket vessels to accompany and escort carriers and surface groups but the pickets are going to be unarmed and unarmored. A peer enemy will have hundreds or thousands of missiles available for attacks and unarmed/unarmored pickets won’t stand a chance and will be quickly eliminated leaving the core group with no early warning and no early engagement.
The Okinawa pickets provided early warning but also early engagement and fighter direction assistance. In other words, the pickets were not just passive observers, they were active combatants and, as such, managed to tie up many of Kamikaze aircraft that penetrated the CAP screen. We need to give serious thought to reconfiguring our pickets beyond their purely passive sensing role and make them combatants. That requires arming them with short/medium AAW weapons and building them with an appropriate degree of armor. The Okinawa pickets clearly demonstrated the value of armor.
Given the relatively small number of kamikaze aircraft that penetrated the CAP, the damage and destruction they wrought was stunning and modern anti-ship missiles are likely to be even more destructive given the unarmored and weakly built ships that make up today’s fleet. We need to alter our ship design philosophy and start designing ships for combat, not peacetime cruises.
The Okinawa example pointed up the need for massive numbers of ships to stand up to high end saturation attacks and to compensate for sunk and damaged ships. Okinawa, alone, involved over 600 ships, not counting hundreds of additional, lesser craft such as LCIs, LSMs, LSTs, LSVs, etc. This one operation used 2-3 times more ships than the entire current US Navy. We’ve forgotten what is required to wage high end war.
Frankly, the Navy’s vision of unmanned, unarmed, unarmored picket/escort ships is ludicrous and combat-useless. They’ll be instantly eliminated in any attack without accomplishing anything. Only if we can make them powerful enough and tough enough to survive long enough to accomplish their purpose will they be combat-useful. However, this requires a complete rethink of the entire concept. Unfortunately, just like the LCS, the Navy has already committed to the design and acquisition of a fleet of unmanned vessels without any understanding of their capabilities and vulnerabilities. As with the LCS, we’re committed to buying a fleet of worthless vessels. Is the Navy truly incapable of learning from their mistakes? It would seem so.
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Related side note:
The radar picket system was established to provide early warning and early defense against the kamikaze saturation attacks. The ultimate development of radar picket ships was the high speed, nuclear powered submarine USS Triton which could perform picket duty and dive when threatened. The obvious problem with this tactic is that the pickets could be kept underwater and ‘mission killed’ by a single aircraft. In addition, a submarine has no anti-air capability and cannot engage the attack, only warn of its approach.
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(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okinawa_naval_order_of_battle
(2)History News Network website, “Kamikazes at the Battle of Okinawa”, Joseph Wheelan, 6-Mar-2020,
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/174496
(3)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_picket
(4)Naval History and Heritage Command website, “Battle Experience Radar Pickets and Methods of Combating Suicide Attacks Off Okinawa”,
(5)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okinawa#Military_losses
Good post, but what are you trying to achieve : invade China (or part of it), keep the South China Sea opened, stop China invading Taiwan (or Japan, or South Korea) ?
ReplyDeleteIf you are trying to invade China proper (or bits) maybe you need all the stuff you advocate but if you are trying to do any of the other things maybe it is possible to do it differently from this :
- Strike fixed targets in China with cruise missiles (supersonic ones maybe), that isn't too expensive and gives a lot of firepower.
- Use the carriers with to establish local air superiority to protect your assets, for that you would need fighters that have longer range than what is in service now or will soon be so that you can keep them safe from Chinese attacks (I agree that is a dodgy point, because long range fighters are difficult to engineer and tankers are too vulnerable).
- Don't use expandable drones but expandable satellites in the 100-300Ibs size, that would imply having a robust launch capability (based in the US), basically make satellites like sonobuoys in ASW and if the other sides destroys them then the amount of orbiting debris would very soon make the whole world interested.
- Use submarines to deny access in the China sea itself, smaller ones than Virginias, something like the Swedish A26.
These are only ideas ...
Considering there is no way a war between China and the USA that includes the US striking mainland China that doesn't go nuclear I would say the world will be very interested long before China uses low yield nukes to destroy US satellite swarms.
DeleteI am afraid that the lessons of old will have to be relearned the hard way. Unfortunately, that may require the US to take a good thrubbing.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/frigate-class-125.html
ReplyDeleteIs the German F125 or Meko A-400 if exported.
Each half of the ship can fight independently. It is designed with two islands, two radars, etc.
Each half has a gun - 5" at the front and a CIWS for the rear. Each half has air defense and anti submarine.
The F125 is one of the largest and most expensive frigates in the world and is underarmed for the size and cost. Photos show a single gun forward and one RAM forward and one RAM aft. I do like the fore/aft redundancy although I'm not sure how extensive that redundancy really is. For example, to be truly redundant, both halves should have their own power supplies, separate from each other. It does no good to have redundant equipment if it's all tied to a single power source.
DeleteThis is not a great candidate for expendable picket duty. One of the lessons to come out of Okinawa was that the pickets should be the SMALLEST vessel capable of doing the job due to the high risk and expendability of the mission.
The ideal picket would be a SMALL ship with LOTS of medium (ESSM) and short (CIWS and SeaRAM - NOT RAM) range AAW along with a moderate radar fit (TRS-3/4D, for example).
So 4 SeaRAM, 4 CIWS and 4 quad MK 57 VLS (got to get something out of the research cost of the Zumwalt's) for 64 ESSM's on the smallest hull you can ideally WW2 Destroyer escort size?
DeleteI would hope modern off the shelf power plants would allow decent speed and size while being smaller than those used in WW2 era DE's to leave enough displacement for all the sensors.
Does that sound about right?
That's somewhere in the ballpark.
DeleteI studied the A-400 when it was being offered (no one bought it and it's gone from the web). It does indeed have two engine rooms.
DeleteThe German Navy really underarms it's ships and doesn't like sonar or even medium range missiles. The A-400 was a ship the rest of the world expects. ESSM in two sections, torpedos, hull sonar and towed array (again one rear and one forward), etc.
It also had a bow thruster so could lose both props and still move.
DeleteI was looking at rough designs for modern pickets, and somthing along the lines/size of a Brooke/Garcia frigate fit pretty well. Could probably even be shrunk into Bronstein sized hull. Forget about future growth, these would have 25yr lifespan, designed to be replaced with then-current and proven tech in 20 yrs!!
DeleteTRS or downsized AEGIS, around 24 VLS cells, two centerline superstructure-mounted(upnhigh) amidships CIWS, fantail Searam, single 76mm, no sonar or helo facilities. Single screw for simple, cheap propulsion. No reason you cant turn them out for $500M in quantity...
Even after much thought, I cannot add to or dispute any of what you wrote. Brilliant article!
ReplyDeleteThank you!
DeleteOne of the potential weaknesses in the modern picket is that, if you accept the 50-200 mile spacing, they'll be well out from the protective Aegis umbrella. Yes, I know that some Standards theoretically have sufficient range but not in any real world combat situation. Are there any other solutions to that problem, that you can see?
Before reading this article, I would have suggested the following: An oversized (but as small as possible) Sea Hunter, Phalanx fore and SeaRAM aft. Eight to sixteen ESSM in the Mark 29 GMLS Mod. 5 mounted in an upright position to function like a VLS (to save space without requiring a larger hull). Of course, I would ensure the proper software be included so that all of these would be able to also hit surface targets.
DeleteOff the side would be two Mark 32 Mod. 15 launchers containing six Mark 46 torpedoes, for ASW.
Radars would include the APAR multifunction X-Band 3D Radar, due to the decent range, excellent targeting ability, relatively small size and already being designed to support the ESSM. I would also include the AN/SPS-73 C-Band Surface Search Radar.
Along with the video system used to control the Sea Hunter, I would include the MK 20 Mid-Range Visualization/Laser Rangefinder for visual reconnoiter and targeting.
For ASW, I would mount the AN/SQR-19 Tactical Towed Array Sonar. For mine detection, a bow mounted high frequency sonar.
I would include chaff/flares and a Blow Up Decoy System and Drone ECM. The satellite control currently used on that vessel would be included. Possible satellite loss could be mitigated by not only data transfer but also vessel control being transferred through the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
Since I saw these vessels as “just” drones, I had thought this set-up would be functional, multi-purpose and a pretty hardcore USV warrior before reading your article. Now I’m not so sure. Especially with the distances involved. I assure you, I will be pondering this intently.
Another aspect that I didn't explicitly mention was the CAP engagement time and effectiveness. At Okinawa, the CAP was able to achieve long engagement times due to the slow (200 mph or so) speed of the attackers. Today, with high subsonic or supersonic missiles, the engagement time for the CAP would be very short, meaning that the effectiveness of the CAP would be limited and they could not be expected to significantly attrite the attacking missiles. This further increases the importance of the picket ships and the difficulty of their task.
DeleteWe need to give some thought to the type of aircraft and weapons we're producing. Is the Hornet/AMRAAM effective against missiles? I don't know. The Tomcat/Phoenix was designed to engage bombers and missiles but I don't know whether the Hornet (or F-35) radar and weapons are effective against missiles.
Going by the AMRAAM-ER, it seems like the AMRAAM and ESSM are becoming essentially the same missile, which I hope is a good sign. Although I understand that the Tomcat was an expensive beast to fly, I think retiring it was a downgrade.
DeleteFor the Super Hornet, the APG-79 AESA radar functions for both air-to-air and air-to-ground, so I'm also hopeful that it can direct look-down shoot-down successfully.
This does not answer your CAP engagement time and effectiveness question, which is difficult to answer when using the same aircraft as a fighter and attack. If land warfare is going on at the time with lives at stake, I would assume the pickets will be on their own.
"For the Super Hornet, the APG-79 AESA radar functions for both air-to-air and air-to-ground, so I'm also hopeful that it can direct look-down shoot-down successfully."
DeleteThe problem for any aircraft trying to intercept supersonic or high subsonic missiles is not so much the radar but the geometry of the intercept for the intercepting missile.
Unless you get lucky and happen to be positioned in a head on intercept, the intercepting missile will be faced with a side (to whatever degree) shot against a target that it only has a relatively small speed advantage over. Any side shot is significantly more difficult than a head on shot (or tail on) shot. Combine that with a minimal speed advantage and you've got a low probability of kill.
It's all about geometry of the intercept. As a crude approximation, the pK (probability of kill) is a linear function of angle-off: the greater the angle, the less the pK and the intercepting aircraft hasn't got the speed to achieve a significantly better geometry before it has to launch. At that point, the intercepting missile has a low pK challenge. The intercepting aircraft is likely to only get a single shot before the attacking missile is out of range.
That was a long-winded explanation of why I see the CAP as having a very difficult and not very successful task.
" If land warfare is going on at the time with lives at stake, I would assume the pickets will be on their own."
DeleteThis is a fallacy born of forgotten lessons. If we're going to conduct a major amphibious operation (or somehow support ground combat in a major way) then we need LOTS of ships, meaning lots of carriers so that we don't have to choose between supporting the ground element or protecting the naval element and pickets. One carrier isn't going to work. What's needed, AT A MINIMUM, is a 4-carrier group to provide picket support and surface ship defense plus, AT A MINIMUM, another 4-carrier group to provide ground support.
If you have to choose between ground support and naval protection then you haven't got enough ships for the operation. Look at the number of ships involved in the Okinawa operation. We've forgotten how many ships are needed to conduct peer war. If you have to choose, you've already lost!
Using Okinawa/kamikazes as a comparison is strikingly accurate!!
ReplyDeleteOne thing that occured to me is a comparison of ship vs aircraft speed. WWII ships had some ability to dodge imcoming planes/bombs/torpedoes. Today ships will be lucky to be able to present stem/stern to an inbound threat before it arrives, and that may not be a proper technique as it may mask the threat from point defense systems. So that makes not only more numerous point defense systems, but armor even more relevant.
"that may not be a proper technique as it may mask the threat from point defense systems."
DeleteExactly! We need to make a doctrinal decision about how we want our ships to 'present' themselves to an attack. That decision has to balance the size of the radar return we present (broadside versus fore/aft) against the number of defensive weapons we can bring to bear.
Given the maneuverability (and terminal maneuverability) of the attacking missiles, it's probably a moot point to try to present a particular aspect. If so, I'd go for many more defensive weapons, as you suggested.
Good comment!
In the recent Sinkex there was a shot from forward that just missed. There were three from the side and all three hit. So here is one experiment 0% hits fore/aft and 100% broadside. Of couse it would be good to know about other experiments.
DeleteI believe that 'miss' was a Harpoon... So relatively old tech. Id assume modern asm's with terminal maneuvering would have better last-moment targeting...
Delete@CNO When I referenced a ship changing aspect to an inbound, it was mostly to show the lack of time to respond to an attack. Id assume that part of being a CO is knowing your fields of fire for your point defense systems and that there are well-planned doctrinal maneuvers when a threat appears. I recall the old WWII ship identification flash cards, and they showed battery fields of fire. Wonder if we even train to recognize our own ships capabilities today, or if diversity training has taken precedence. Considering the lack of even proper navigation and seamenship of late... "The world wonders?..."
DeleteAlthough Okinawa is a good example to start from I wonder if there might not be additional value in looking at the projections for the air-sea battles associated with the Olympic landings.
ReplyDeleteAs noted in previous comments the speed of aircraft in WW2, combined with the long transits from Japan to Okinawa meant that US forces had fairly significant amounts of time available to them for detection and interception.
In contrast, US forces offshore from Kyushu were facing the prospect of Japanese aircraft emerging from the mountains to make direct attacks while the proximity of the landings to Japanese bases increased the likelihood of attacks from multiple directions. The dramatically reduced response time were expected to produce significantly higher losses to US forces, and this was prior to the post-war discovery that the Japanese had a lot more aircraft than US intelligence believed to be the case.
Arguably the situation of saturation attacks combined with very short response times implicit in the Kyushu scenario is directly applicable to a modern environment in which US forces will be confronting large numbers of supersonic (or faster) missiles in a potentially challenging EW environment. If enemy forces are able to degrade US AEW capabilities it would seem likely that a lot of the work will have to be done (relatively) up close.
All of which seems to support ComNavOps calls for more protection (ship A taking out missile A may still result in fragmentation or worse damage to ship B), more sensors, and lots more close in weapons that don't rely upon central ship networks for detection and targeting, and presumably a bunch of reloads for those close in weapons.
Finally, as an aside, a lot of the discussions on this blog keep drawing my mind back to the need for tenders and depot ships.
" very short response times"
DeleteI've repeatedly stated that most attacks will be detected at the radar horizon (15-20 miles) and the subsequent engagement window will be very, very short (4 SAM shots and that's it).
I like your comparison to Kyusu/Olympic but I haven't seen any US Navy plans to counter the aerial threat. Have you come across any? I've seen the general plans for the allocation of divisions of troops and so forth but not air defense planning.
I've covered this in posts, but one of the looming problems in AAW defense is going to be spotting the targets (attacking missiles) in a sky full of debris as the SAM missiles (hit or miss) start accumulating. I've stated that we need not a better Aegis that can spot a mosquito at a thousand miles but a better engagement radar that can distinguish a real target at 5-15 miles from a sky full of debris. Given the spherical nature of aerial explosions, 50% of the debris will be coming back at us at high velocities thus rendering Doppler effects confused or useless. The Navy has not even begun to think about this problem as far as I can tell.
"drawing my mind back to the need for tenders and depot ships."
Spot on!
Excellent comment!
The US sent all that against an already nearly beaten Japan who was far from a 'peer' adversary.
ReplyDeleteIf China strikes I have a terrible vision the losses the US Navy will sustain in the first 24 hours will make Pearl Harbor a joke.
Especially as it's not going to be US ships sitting in harbor where they can be raised and medical attention for the crews is nearby.
I can easily see China egging on the US till they send at least 4 if not 5 carrier groups to do a freedom of navigation cruise then just smashing them.
Have we even tried to work with unmanned pickets? I mean, maybe there's some unforeseen problems and USN seems determined to go for it before we even know if it works! Radar height will probably be lower than on a manned DDG, won't that pose some problems in terms of performance and range? What about power? Will the radar always be on? If not, who decides when to turn it on and off? Or are we just going to be emitting all the time? What about the radar itself? We not going to put an AEGIS on board so my guess is as soon as Chinese pick up the signals of an TRS or SPS-49: "HEY LOOK , there's the American picket line!"
ReplyDeleteI think the idea has some potential and should be tested extensively but we know that's not USN way of doing biz anymore....
"Have we even tried to work with unmanned pickets?"
DeleteNO! But, that hasn't stopped the Navy from wholeheartedly committing to a procurement program for them!
Technology advancements would change how future wars to be conducted. People enjoyed past glorious victories could refuse change. For instance, Japan's Yamato battle ship became a strategic blunder as air carriers had become key in navy battles.
ReplyDeleteFor today's superpowers, Reconnaissance becomes the most important part as they have many ways to attack once they can locate and track the other side's ships. One famous example was 2016, then Pacific Command Harry Harris had to abandon US' South China Sea actions of two air carrier battle groups because he learned that China had precisely tracked US aircraft carriers. So, if he attacks China's newly build islands, ... you know.
So, use unmanned ships and drones could be important parts of future navy warfare. However, drones have their own weaknesses to be address, for instance, communications while they are in enemy's territories (our signals much weaker than enemies'). Both US and China are exploring how to use unmanned ships. You can Google the web and find that China is actively pursuing this front.
Technologies have advanced, people refuse to use smartphones could end up with lots of inconveniences. Generals still insist on what they have learned in schools and past glories could lead the nation into ruin.
Outstanding analysis. Much more meaningful and instructive than the fluff on USNI.org.
ReplyDeleteThere is a very serious need for some form of "missile dodge", ultrafast lock degrading or decoys or whatever else (ECM?).
ReplyDeleteOh, and whoever came up with the idea of ships "designed to be abandoned after one hit" needs to be tarred and feathered.
PS: Forget defending a carrier group for a second, what's the plan from when China fires a thousand missiles at Guam and Pearl each?
They don't have a thousand missiles that can reach either, and the risks of "misunderstanding" the nature of Pearl-bound missiles fall disproportionately back on the Chinese homeland.
DeleteThe ability to layer AAW sensors and shooters is absolutely key. The Department of the Navy clearly sees ground forces on the First Island Chain as the outer-most layer, filling the role of unsinkable radar pickets. I still think a few other intermediate layers need to be fleshed out in operational concepts.
ReplyDeleteOur Navy insanely placed 30mm Bushmaster II autocannon systems on the LPD-17s, LCS and now Zumwalts, but they have no anti-air capability! Not even 30mm rounds with a proximity fuze. They are just for small boat engagement.
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mk44_Bushmaster_II
Bring back the Bofors from World War II! There is a 40mmm gun in service with Sweden on an APC with its own compact radar and proximity fuzed rounds, so it can still operate should Aegis get knocked out or jammed. Swap for these ASAP to help down drones and missiles.
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/lvkv_90_l4.jpg
"it can still operate should Aegis get knocked out or jammed."
DeleteSpot on. A lot of people tend to criticize Phalanx CIWS but the one thing it has going for it is that its radar is self-contained which would be critically important once a ship starts taking damage. Same goes for SeaRAM.
"40 mm"
I assume you're referring to the 40L70? I'm not that familiar with it. Is it responsive enough to be able to effectively deal with high subsonic, maneuvering (terminal evasive maneuvers) missiles?
The Italians have a nice 40mm CIWS. Oto Melara fast forty. Has its own self contained radar, twin L70 40mm Bofors, rated at 600-900 RPM.
Delete"The Italians have a nice 40mm CIWS."
DeleteDo you know if it's ever been tested against missiles?
Here's the only test information I could find from a quick search. It's from NavWeaps website and it's for the twin Compact version:
Delete"Tests conducted by the Italian Navy in 1976 indicated this weapon had 30% chance of destroying an incoming sub-sonic missile outside of 900 meters (1,000 yards)."
www.navweapons.com has good info on all the oto melara 40mm mounts. According to their site, the fast forty can kill supersonic missiles up to 3000 meters with PFHE rounds. At 1000 meters automatically switches to APFSDS rounds.
Delete"According to their site, the fast forty can kill supersonic missiles up to 3000 meters"
DeleteIt is important to distinguish between manufacturer's claims, which are largely false, and actual test data which is always unrealistically optimized but more correct than manufacturer's claims.
In this case the NavWeaps 'claim' is a manufacturer's claim and, with 99% certainty, is misleading, bordering on false. As proof, I've described and documented failure after failure of manufacturer's claims on this blog.
Personally, I highly doubt that any gun can intercept a supersonic missile with any significant success. I await any realistic test results with great anticipation. Let me know if you come across any. All the manufacturer has to do is put a gun on a barge at sea and fire a supersonic missile at it and see what happens. That they don't, tells me pretty much all I need to know.
Been looking at a bunch of videos from Armenian Azerbaijani conflict, not sure if its bad training or what but its not looking good for ground crews of Russian SAMs on either side really, they getting wasted bad.
DeleteIt really makes one wonder about SAM effectiveness by manufacturers, these aren't that old or obsolete so why they getting killed so bad by drones?!? Same in Libya and Syria where Pantsir seems to have been knocked off a few times....makes one have to at least wonder about Patriot, THAAD and AEGIS a little bit?!?
The big difference is a 40mm gun has twice the range of a 20mm, so more engagement time. But I agree, hitting a fast moving missile head on will be difficult. My point is the current 30mm guns with no radar can't even try. The only good options I see is to mount six small .50 cal (12.7mm) gatling guns on the rails on each side. With six eyeballed aimed guns firing 33 rounds a second each, that will put a wall of bullets in missile paths. Manned by battle stations crewmen.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAU-19
Or get serious with a NAVROC system that is sure to work;
https://www.g2mil.com/NAVROC.htm
"The Okinawa pickets were located 20-80 miles (mostly 50-80 miles) from the center of the defended area. Translating that to modern terms is difficult but one way to sort of get a handle on it is to compare the Okinawa distancing to the speed of the incoming attackers."
ReplyDeleteThat is a clever way to look at it. It all comes down to reaction time and does the defender have enough time to detect and launch enough missiles to defeat an incoming threat.
But, if most attacks are going to be detected at the radar horizon range (~20 miles), you'll need quite a few ships for that outermost ring to provide sufficient coverage. At 200 miles away from the defended area, to cover a 180° sector would require 16 ships (assuming each is spaced every 40 miles). Obviously, more ships will be needed to provide sufficient overlap/backup and reinforce the more likely avenues of attack. Plus, there will likely be one or two more inner rings to provide additional defense requiring additional ships.
If unmanned pickets can be made to work, they could free up crewed ships to reinforce critical areas and allow them to maneuver in order to respond to new threats.
"you'll need quite a few ships for that outermost ring to provide sufficient coverage."
DeleteYes! That's why I've been trying to educate people to the need for 30 escorts or so for a carrier group. We've forgotten how many ships are needed for a group to survive in naval combat.
Many people - not you, of course - have strongly doubted my statement that 30 escorts or so are required. This post, and others, as well as history, are demonstrating just why so many escorts are needed.
You'll recall I did a post on escorts demonstrating the need for large numbers of escorts and that was without considering dedicated pickets. See,
Escorts
"If unmanned pickets can be made to work, they could free up crewed ships to reinforce critical areas and allow them to maneuver in order to respond to new threats."
You didn't quite say it but I'm pretty sure you see it - the implication of your statement is that we need lots of pickets, not just for area coverage but for the expected attrition. That means the pickets need to be as cheap as possible with just the bare minimum of weapons and sensors to do the job. I'm thinking the smallest possible hull that can fit around 4x CIWS, 4x SeaRAM, 32 ESSM in an 8 cell quad-pack VLS, and a basic TRS-3D radar (maybe 2x for redundancy?), or equivalent; no helo, no flight deck, no sonar, no gun, no nothing else. This is a pure AAW picket. If we want to add additional functions then the cost skyrockets and we can't have the numbers or expendability we need.
I was wondering what your vessel would look like. You are definitely a fan of the SeaRAM/Phalanx, as am I. Although I would like some ASW capability if possible, this is mainly due to my brain trying to turn this drone into a ship. I'm slapping my gray matter around as we speak.
DeleteDo you think the L3 Harris vessel would function with your layout?
https://www.marinetechnologynews.com/news/awards-unmanned-vessel-contract-604107
"Do you think the L3 Harris vessel would function with your layout?"
DeletePossibly. It would just be a matter of packaging the required weapons and sensors to see if they can fit on the available hull space.
Going a bit further, though, a picket/escort that is going to be exposed to significant enemy attack and have little support ought to be as stealthy as possible to reduce enemy missile target locks (making the missiles more susceptible to decoys and EW). I'm not talking about anything exotic, just maximum stealth shaping along the lines of the Visby. By comparison, the L3 Harris looks to be only slightly stealthy. Of course, fitting the weapons would negate some of the stealthiness which would suggest some sort of stealth 'pods' for the weapons to be mounted inside and exposed when firing. Obviously, that begins to add complexity and cost so … Anyway, the point is to mount the required weapons while making the vessel as stealthy as reasonably possible without driving up the cost.
Now, the opposite approach also has potential merit. Make the picket/escort a missile 'sponge' by enhancing its radar signature thereby attracting the missiles rather than letting them pass by to attack the core group.
This all gets back to AAW/escort doctrine and how you want to defend. The Navy should be exercising this all out to see what works best but I see no signs that they're even thinking about it.
"mainly due to my brain trying to turn this drone into a ship."
DeleteThat would be the other end of the spectrum where you defend by building a very capable, very stealthy, very armored ship to stand and fight a swarm of missiles. It would, conceptually, be a Burke (with more close in weapons) with armor. The problem is that would result in a $3B ship and simply can't afford to build the requisite numbers and we couldn't afford to lose them - and we will lose ships in the face of missile swarms of hundreds of missiles. I've toyed with this idea and the concept of a Burke with something like 32 VLS (128 ESSM), 4 SeaRAM, 8 CIWS, better stealth, 3x TRS-3D (or equivalent), and extensive armor would make for a formidable AAW ship - a floating AAW battery. It's interesting to contemplate.
"Of course, fitting the weapons would negate some of the stealthiness which would suggest some sort of stealth 'pods' for the weapons to be mounted inside and exposed when firing."
DeleteGood idea. I would also contemplate making the CIWS itself stealthier. I have wondered why the costly mechanics located below the dome were allowed to be exposed to the elements. Covering this area with removable plates would solve this as well as directing radar signals away from the sender with correct geometries.
Because it works very well, little hardware has changed since it came out in the 1970's. I would retain most features of the Phalanx Block 1B Baseline and install the new electric gun, tested by Raytheon, allowing the system to fire at varying rates to conserve ammunition when engaging such targets as small boats.
The main change that I would make is to replace both the scanning radar and the tracking radar with the AN/MPQ Sentinel. This would make the dome smaller and, being phased array, the dome could also redirect radar return.
https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/anmpq-64-sentinel/
If it turns out that this unit is not sufficient for scanning, I would place separate, fixed units containing the KuRFS radar. This system could also be used to support other weaponry as well.
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/kurfs
Making these changes would not only improve these vessels, but would also make these weapons better suited for such ships as the Zumwalt.
"Now, the opposite approach also has potential merit. Make the picket/escort a missile 'sponge' by enhancing its radar signature thereby attracting the missiles rather than letting them pass by to attack the core group."
DeleteHow about the best of both worlds: Make the picket stealthy and tow a radar reflecting "raft" behind the vessel.
"raft"
DeleteYep, that could work. Of course, unless you can shoot down all the incoming missiles, the raft wouldn't last long so you'd have to be able to rapidly stream more of them!
How about giving that cheap, dumb raft a second duty: Stock it full of DLF-3B containers that would be launched one by one at the first sign of such a mass attack.
Delete“The existing DLF-3B, also known variously as the Inflatable Decoy System 300 (IDS 300) or Floating Decoy System 3 (FDS3), consists of launchers on the ship’s deck, each containing an un-inflated hexagonal decoy. When fired, the lid of the launch canister, which also includes the inflation system, pulls the decoy out and into the water.”
“After the decoy inflates, the lid acts as a drag anchor to keep it relatively stable. The decoy itself is made of a highly radar-reflective material that confuses and distracts incoming anti-ship missiles. It may even be enough to “seduce” the incoming threat to home in on and hit the decoy directly. It can remain afloat for more than three hours.”
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26899/us-navy-destroyers-and-royal-navy-ships-use-these-big-blow-up-anti-ship-missile-decoys
"You didn't quite say it but I'm pretty sure you see it - the implication of your statement is that we need lots of pickets, not just for area coverage but for the expected attrition."
DeleteAgreed, but I'd double up on the ESSMs. If you need 3 or 4 to guarantee a hit, you're run out pretty quickly in a saturation attack.
But, unlike WWII, where most of the pickets were pointed towards Japan, Okinawa today would need 360° coverage given the range of today's weapons and the ability to deliver them. And, ASW defenses would be equally important as one or two SSGNs could get close and launch a sneak attack.
@ComNavOP
ReplyDeleteAre you familiar with the AIR-2 genie weapon system?
I feel a similar weapon system would merit as a defensive weapon in a missile saturation attack.
I had forgotten about that one but, yes, I'm somewhat familiar with it. While such a weapon would be effective against massed missiles (or aircraft), the downside of venturing onto the slippery nuclear slope is obvious.
DeleteThe concept of dealing with a mass of targets using a single weapon is valid, however. A better choice might be a non-nuclear generated EMP pulse which the military has, at least, done some development work on, if not produced an actual weapon. Were such a weapon available, one could imagine pickets being armed with defensive EMP missiles. Of course, the pickets would have to be EMP shielded, also!
Thanks, that was a good reminder of a nearly forgotten weapon!
See this Chinese unmanned ship - smallest ship with AESA radar and VLS which can launch several different missiles. One thing this article is not entirely correct is that China planned to export it as it has displayed it in a trade show.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-s-unmanned-mini-destroyer-out-on-sea-trials
“For example, we should have much more extensive, physically distributed EO/IR sensors tied into the fire control system as well as a separate, technologically dissimilar type of radar as a backup to the Aegis arrays. The Aegis arrays are large, exposed targets and likely to be seriously damaged and degraded from almost any hit.”
ReplyDeleteThis is a big reason why I favor putting the APAR/EMPAR/SAMPSON and SMART-L/S-1850 combination on our mini-Burke escorts. Given the durability and reliability issues with Aegis, we need something else as an alternative. I haven’t seen or heard much durability/reliability data for the European systems, but at least if one system goes out, the other can cover part of the lost capability. Plus, if the bad guys figure out how to jam Aegis, we are in a world of hurt. I like redundancy in everything.
“We need to greatly increase the number of defensive weapons installed on our ships.”
I would think the standard should be 2 SeaRAM, fore and aft, and 4 Phalanx, 2 port and 2 starboard—more for larger ships, maybe down to 2 and 2 for corvette-sized (and I would build some corvettes and even smaller missile patrol boats).
“We must heavily arm our ships–far beyond anything imagined by today’s designers.”
This always concerned me about the Russian ships. Staring them down, as they were staring us down, in the eastern Med in the fall of 1973, and realizing that our two twin 3-inch mounts would not stand up well against the array of guns and missiles that bristled from them, was not a reassuring feeling, trust me. Later on, we learned that Russian sailors were so poorly trained, and their maintenance was so bad, that most of those guns and missiles probably didn’t work, but I wouldn’t count on that from the Chinese. All the electronics and IT in the world is great, but without ways to put warheads on their foreheads, and to keep them from doing it to us, it doesn’t really amount to much combat capability.
“mutual support may be possible but only if many, many more pickets are used due to the greater required distancing from the escorted group and only if the pickets are armed.”
But we can’t build enough $2B Burkes to do it. We need smaller and cheaper, and lots of them. Last numbers I saw, Navy is looking at 104 large surface combatants (22 Ticos and 82 Burkes, or replacements) and 52 small surface combatants (20 FFGX and 32 something else, maybe worthless LCSs or more worthless unmanned ships), I would propose, for less money, 20 multi-purpose cruisers, 40 AAW destroyers (Burkes or similar), 60 GP escorts (FFGX or similar, with different sensor and weapons suit), and 80 ASW frigates (like ComNavOps’s ASW escort). The ASW frigates would have air search and quad-packed ESSMs—I’m thinking TRS-3D/4D, and 32 VLS cells (32 ESSM quad-packed, 12 ASROC, and 12 anti-surface missiles), 2 RBU-type launchers, at least 2 SeaRAM and 2 Phalanx, a 3-inch gun and a helo. Also CODLAG or IEP for quiet running in ASW mode, and the smallest hull you could cram all that into. The Navy would probably spend $1B to build a 5-6000-ton ship to do that. My target would be Gearing-sized, for half the cost.
Employment concept would be one escort squadron (1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, 4 ASW frigates) per each 2-carrier CVBG and each SAG/HUK group (battleship and ASW carrier). Placement from in to out would be cruisers, AAW destroyers, GP escorts, with ASW frigates in outer ring. For a 4-carrier CTF with a battleship group, that would mean notionally 30 escorts, which could be supplemented with corvettes.
“As with the LCS, we’re committed to buying a fleet of worthless vessels. Is the Navy truly incapable of learning from their mistakes?”
Sadly, apparently so.
I would limit unmanned drones to surveillance and intel for now. I would use small manned ships instead of the Navy’s unmanned warships. My proposed cruiser would be Des Moines sized, with a large central area for launching and recovering small UAV, UUV, and USV.
“I'm thinking the smallest possible hull that can fit around 4x CIWS, 4x SeaRAM, 32 ESSM in an 8 cell quad-pack VLS, and a basic TRS-3D radar (maybe 2x for redundancy?), or equivalent; no helo, no flight deck, no sonar, no gun, no nothing else. This is a pure AAW picket.”
ReplyDeleteManned or unmanned?
I like where you are going, but my concern is that stuck out by themselves on picket station with no ASW capability, the bad guys can just send out a sub or two and lay waste to your whole picket system. At 125 miles out, they’d be too far to benefit from any ASW capability in your main group.
Per the article referenced by Anonymous, the 50-foot Chinese drone JARI “has a phased-array radar, a sonar suite, a deck gun, two close-range air defense missiles, two vertical-launch silos for small anti-air/anti-ship missiles and two torpedo launch tubes.” I’d man that and grow it a bit, maybe up to Visby size (239 feet, 640 tons), and grow the numbers of launchers. Fully tricked out, the Visby would have Sea Giraffe, hull mounted sonar, towed array, VDS, 1 × Bofors 57 mm Mk3, 8 × RBS15 Mk2 anti-ship missiles, 4 × 400 mm torpedo launchers for Torped 45 torpedoes, 127mm rocket-powered ASW grenade launchers, 2 × 6 127 mm ALECTO anti-submarine rocket launchers, 12 × Umkhonto SAM, and a helicopter pad. I think Visbys could actually work pretty well in the picket role, if we give them a better air search radar and give up the helo pad, VDS, and towed array.
"send out a sub or two and lay waste to your whole picket system."
DeleteOkay, so let's give them six ASW helos, a flight deck, a powerful hull mounted sonar, a VDS, a towed array, VL-ASROC, triple torpedo tubes, an undersea combat control software suite, ASW command and control centers, sonar consoles and operators, and P-8 control and communications facilities. That should only double or triple the cost.
I just do not understand this obsession (by everyone, not just you) with making every ship a do-everything, win the war single-handed ship.
C'mon, think this through. If a group (carrier, surface, or amphib) is big enough to warrant an extensive picket system such as the post discusses, what else will it have? That's right, it will have submarine escorts (subs to with every carrier group - or, at least, they used to) to clear the path and support the pickets. It will have ASW helos available. It may have P-8s available. If an enemy submarine wants to announce it's presence by torpedoing a cheap, small, unmanned picket vessel (assuming we don't turn it into an ASW-bulked up Burke) then that's great. We get a free location data point on a sub and, if we're competent, they lose a submarine. An excellent trade in my book.
The same discussion applies to anti-ship missiles on a picket. Why? We have plenty of anti-ship options if an enemy ship opts to reveal itself to sink a picket. The picket doesn't need to be an anti-ship platform.
What do you think a 'fully tricked out' Visby would cost the US? We know the barely tricked out LCS costs around $600M when all construction costs are included. We know the FFG(X) will cost $1B+. A fully tricked out Visby is going to be in the $1B+ range. That's not a cheap or expendable vessel and it can't be procured in sufficient numbers.
By the way, do you realize what your fully tricked out picket ship doesn't have? AAW! Twelve SAMs is not a useful load against a swarm of missiles. The main job of an AAW picket is AAW and you've given it 12 SAMs and no close in weapon systems. You've described a decent territorial waters patrol vessel but it's not a AAW picket!
Let the picket be a picket and let other ships and aircraft fight the rest of the war!
"Okay, so let's give them six ASW helos, a flight deck, a powerful hull mounted sonar, a VDS, a towed array, VL-ASROC, triple torpedo tubes, an undersea combat control software suite, ASW command and control centers, sonar consoles and operators, and P-8 control and communications facilities. That should only double or triple the cost."
DeleteNo, let's not. I put forth Visby as a relatively cheap ship, cheap enough to be built in numbers, that could take care of itself in an AAW or ASW environment. The Swedes built them for $184MM. Let's bump that up to $250MM apiece. And I talked about giving up the VDS and towed array in exchange for a better AAW radar. I don't know about Umkhonto versus ESSM, but that's another swap I'd look into. The problem becomes when you want to add to the AAW capability without giving up anything else in return.
Start with a Visby, add 30% for USN general principles, then adopt the rule that to add anything you have to take something away.
The Osprey class MHCs were supposedly based on the Italian Lerici class. But the Lericis were 600 tons and the Ospreys were 900 tons. Let the Navy do that to the Visbys and you're right, it would end up costing $1B. But impose some discipline and I think you could bring it in a lot less.
And if you're going to use the task force subs to guard the pickets, then you're wasting a lot of capability that could be more useful elsewhere. All I'm proposing to do is to give them enough defensive ASW to protect themselves, or at least to give the bad guys pause before sending subs out to sink them en masse.
Delete"The Swedes built them for $184MM."
DeleteNo they didn't! The Swedes, like every other country, subsidizes and plays various accounting games to seem better than they are. Regardless, even if the Swedes built them for free, the US can't. The LCS is the low end price data point and the FFG(X) is the more likely data point. That's $1B+. To believe the US can build a Visby for $250MM each is pure fantasy. I believe we can build cheaper ships than we do now and even I don't believe we can build a fully tricked out Visby for that price!
"if you're going to use the task force subs to guard the pickets, then you're wasting a lot of capability that could be more useful elsewhere."
DeleteWhat's more useful than protecting a carrier group, surface group, or amphib group?! We've always assigned subs to carrier groups because it's a good use of subs. If we have more sub tasks than subs then we need to build more subs instead of allowing our sub fleet to dip into the 40s, as we're doing.
I find it hard to believe that a 3000 ton ship sets the low end of the price range for a 600 ton ship, even though the 600 ton ship is much better tricked out for useful combat purposes.
DeleteIf we can't build a Visby for a lot less that $1B, or even half that, then we have serious procurement problems. I agree that we have serious procurement problems, just have a hard time believing they are that bad.
Delete"I find it hard to believe that a 3000 ton ship sets the low end of the price range for a 600 ton ship"
DeleteWell, here's another data point: the JHSV (Spearhead) costs $180-$200M per and that's a non-stealthy, aluminum, ferry with no radar, weapons, sonar, or any of the other things you'd like. Switch to steel, compartmentalize it for survivability, add some Kevlar, greatly structurally strengthen it, redesign it for extreme stealth (ala Visby), add all the stuff you want … what do you think is going to happen to that $200M price tag? Then, gold plate it like the Navy always does. $$$$$
"If we can't build a Visby for a lot less that $1B, or even half that, then we have serious procurement problems."
DeleteWe just built a Ford for twice the cost of a Nimitz and the exact same performance (or less!). Yeah, we have serious procurement problems.
We just built an $8B+ Zumwalt with fewer VLS than a Burke and no main weapon system. Yeah, we have serious procurement problems.
"Then, gold plate it like the Navy always does. $$$$$"
DeleteThat's the part that I don't do. I don't know exactly what the Swedes got for $184MM, but my guess is that whatever it is is more capable than an LCS. Of course, I realize that's kind of a gimme putt.
Until we do some serious reorientation of our procurement, I don't trust us to get a rowboat for under $1B. But that doesn't mean it can't be done. That just means that the USN can't do it.
"Well, here's another data point: the JHSV (Spearhead) costs $180-$200M per and that's a non-stealthy, aluminum, ferry with no radar, weapons, sonar, or any of the other things you'd like."
DeleteAt 1500T, it's also 2-1/2 times as big as the Visby.
"more capable than an LCS. Of course, I realize that's kind of a gimme putt."
DeleteLove it! :)
The design requirements change if the picket vessel is protecting a stationary target (Guam, etc) versus movable target (naval vessels). Large barges or spar type vessels with station keeping thrusters or moorings could be used for protecting stationary targets.
ReplyDeleteCost could be much lower if the propulsion equipment is kept to a minimum. Spar vessels could be manufactured from spirally wound steel or concrete.
MW
"The design requirements change if the picket vessel is protecting a stationary target (Guam, etc) versus movable target (naval vessels). "
DeletePotentially, yes, and that's a good point. The question then becomes whether sufficient weapons and sensors could fit on a smaller, barge type vessel.
Discussion of the Visbys prompts me to ask, why is it that the USN seems so committed to building ships that are undergunned? The Visbys at 1/6 the size have way more firepower tan an LCS. I know that is also a criticism of the Zumwalts, but going back to my day that Knoxes and Perrys were criticized the same way. Compared to the contemporary Kashins, Sovremennyys, and Udaloys, which were bristling with guns and missiles, they both looked pretty Spartan. Now, they both turned out to be pretty good ASW platforms, and that was instrumental in winning the Cold War, but I don't have such hopes for the LCSs or Zumwalts.
ReplyDeleteI know part of the reason is that our ships have more spares and workshop spaces, and those along with a more technically trained crew allowed us to keep our stuff working better than the Russians did. And I know part of it is habitability. That potentially offers benefits in morale and retention. But the Europeans have similar habitability concerns (the jokes about cappuccino and gelato bars on the Italian FREMMs), and they don't build combat-empty ships like the LCSs and Zumwalts.
So what does it take to get the Navy back to a "warheads on foreheads" mode?
There is much to like about the Visby but be cautious about assessing its weapons load. It was delivered with minimal weapons: a 57mm gun, 8x anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, and ASW grenades and that's it. Planned/hoped ALECTO ASW and Umkhonto SAM systems were cancelled. I don't know what, if anything, has been added over the years but the delivered ship was pretty minimal with the lack of AAW being particularly noticeable. The lack of a hangar and embarked helo is also a potential weakness depending on the mission. The flight deck is fairly small and may or may not meet USN standards for operating a SH-60 type helo.
DeleteYou know I'm no fan of the LCS or anything else the USN has built recently but we have to be fair and note that the Visby (which I'd take in a heartbeat over the LCS!) is not exactly bristling with weapons.
Had I been designing the Visby, I'd have tried very hard to work in a SeaRAM or CIWS (though mounting those would impact stealth unless they could be internally mounted somehow, like the RBS missiles). I'd have been willing to sacrifice the flight deck to mount more weapons since a flight deck with no hangar is of limited value, especially in USN overseas use. A flight deck-only in home waters makes sense since the helo can base out of a land base and just lily pad on the ship but in an overseas use, potentially far from any US base, the flight deck, by itself, is useless.
Visby has a near-mythical reputation among US naval observers but the reality is a bit different. Still, a nice ship for Sweden's home water use.
I note the use of WinNT for the ship's operating system. That's a money saver but it wouldn't fly in the USN and for very good reasons!
"why is it that the USN seems so committed to building ships that are undergunned?"
DeleteVisby discussion aside, your main point is spot on. The weapons density (and 'caliber') of our ships is pathetic.
I don't mean to imply that I think the Visby is perfect. For one thing, it is probably too small to be trekking across the Pacific, or even Atlantic, so it may not fit our deployment needs. But I do think it is a sad commentary that the Swedes have packed more firepower into a 600T hull than we did into a 3000-4000T LCS. As you note, they weren't delivered with all designed capability installed. And their design weapons mix may not be what works for us. And I'm not sure that a 600T hull can be a viable platform for a TRS-3D/4D. But I don't think it's a terrible starting point. If they can do that, then we ought to be able to do a lot better than the LCS.
DeleteI understand and, without a doubt, there is much to like about the Visby. As you say, it would make a good starting point for a USN design.
DeleteI found this picture fascinating.
ReplyDeletehttps://m.imgur.com/r/interestingasfuck/kiTaGZ4
I cannot imagine a modern vessel standing up to damage in this way.
Excellent graphic!
DeleteSome of my colleagues at the lab and I had a meeting (aka, a group of computer nerds having lunch in the meeting room with this article broadcast onto the board) and came up with some ideas that you may be interested in. Unfortunately, other than extensive use of the DLF-3B Inflatable Decoy System, my “raft” idea was rejected for the following reasons:
ReplyDelete1. Towing such an item could interfere with the regular workings of the towing vessel.
2. It would constantly broadcast the location of the towing vessel and draw missiles both toward the raft and… toward the vessel. Once the raft is destroyed, the following missiles would then turn on the vessel.
Thus, I would like to remove that idea from your consideration.
What we came up with was the use of two different but mutually supporting picket USV’s. The first, and most numerous, would be those as you described. The second would be an unarmed, radar reflective stealth ship. I know, that doesn’t make sense but I’ll explain. The USV that we proscribe is not new; it was built as a manned vessel, was somewhat tested and could be quickly created and deployed fairly cheaply.
The Sea Shadow was a Small Water Area Twin Hull (SWATH), prototype catamaran-style ship. Built and tested in the 1980’s by Skunk Works, it was a successful design. Unfortunately, it was ahead of it’s time and the design was never expanded upon other than using the data learned toward other programs. I think it’s time has come.
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/history/sea-shadow.html
Imagine a Sea Shadow with doors that can be raised, exposing banks of Octahedral Radar Corner Reflectors. When these doors are open, the vessel would light up like a spotlight to all radar generating platforms and could appear to be a destroyer or even a carrier if the ORCR units were designed correctly (the sizing would determine the return).
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corner_reflector https://www.duckworksmagazine.com/07/howto/radar/index.htm
In a mass attack, when the missiles were closing in, the doors could be released, eliminating this radar return. The USV would then return to “stealth mode” and change direction, leaving the missiles to impact harmlessly at the last known location.
Bear in mind that many modern missiles has a terminal optical imaging capability and could still find the target though likely at a reduced rate.
DeleteThat is why the majority of the USV's would be armed as you described, with both types working in concert. If there were 30 armed versions, then maybe 10 of these. The armed versions would lie within the avenues of attack, funneling those missiles into kill zones.
DeleteAt the end of the day, if some get hit, during a mass missile attack we would lose some drones based upon 1980's tech and containing radar corner reflectors that I could literally build in my garage. A USV like this would probably cost about as much as a couple of Predator Drones. It would certainly cost less than the potentially hundreds of missiles fired against them.
Delete"both types working in concert."
DeleteAh, I understand now. Thanks.
Of course, the DLF-3B Inflatable Decoy Canisters that I mentioned previously should be used extensively. Another unit that would be a perfect match for this vessel is the AN/SLQ-32 (V)7 SEQUP Block III.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36880/the-navy-is-about-to-sail-with-its-next-big-leap-in-shipboard-electronic-warfare-systems
In the article above, it states “Northrop Grumman's latest iteration of the long-running AN/SLQ-32 Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) family of electronic warfare systems, which are designed to defend ships against anti-ship missile attacks, provide enhanced situational awareness across the electromagnetic spectrum, and, in some cases, execute other electronic warfare functions, is about to hit the sea.”
Start jamming and, as the home-on-jam missiles are closing in, turn off and jig as previously described. Toss in recessed chaff/flare dispensers and viola.
Such USV’s could also help protect other vessels in other situations. For example, you probably agree that the LCS needs all the help that it can get…
"as the home-on-jam missiles are closing in, turn off and jig as previously described."
DeleteBear in mind the speed differential between a missile (many ARMs are supersonic) and the ship. Unless the 'jig' occurred very, very far out, the ship couldn't move far enough to get out of the effect zone.
For example, when a high subsonic or supersonic missile pops over the radar horizon, the ship has only 60 sec or so to evade, depending on the missile's speed. That's not enough time to move very far away from a missile seeker head field of view.
Even at 14 knots, there should be some difference between where the system shuts off and where the missiles will impact.
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