We have become an apologist society. We excuse and rationalize every failure,
often doing so even before the attempt is made.
For example, in past criticisms of CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations), I’ve encountered the apologists
who say that the CNO can’t really do anything so I shouldn’t blame them. ‘The System’ is at fault, not the individual.
Nonsense!
From a comment I made a while ago to a reader who was
apologizing for a specific CNO’s lack of accomplishments, comes this (note, I
won’t identify the reader as I have no wish to embarrass them):
"is
our current system such that even the best qualified CNO will be limited as to
how much change they can affect?"
My answer … Of course not! A properly motivated and directed
(meaning focused on the proper priorities) CNO could turn the Navy around in a
heartbeat. Here's a few day one items that could be implemented with no input
from Congress or anyone else:
1. Eliminate the use of waivers. Period. No exceptions.
That, alone, would immensely improve training, safety, new ship completion,
ship quality, and readiness by forcing actions to be completed instead of
waived.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
Day two items that might require some input from others:
1. Fire 80% of flag officers
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
I could go on endlessly but you get the idea. All it takes
is a Trump-like CNO who has a clear, combat-focused mentality and has the
courage to act.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
I am not an uncritical admirer of President Trump but I do find his energetic radicalism appealing. He'll make mistakes, of course, but the man who doesn't make mistakes doesn't make anything. As for senior officers in the USN: compare and contrast.
ReplyDeleteTrump is nearly eighty - an old man in a hurry. He's rich, can't stand for re-election, and is uninterested - presumably - in finding a retirement job on the board of a defence contractor.
"his energetic radicalism"
DeleteIs it radical to cut government bureaucracy, eliminate waste, etc. or is it simply returning a small bit of sanity to an out of control government? But, we're not going to discuss the politics. Whether you agree or disagree with his policies, what he's doing that directly links to military matters is establishing policies and implementing them without wasting time or caring who might be offended. We need that type of approach from our military leaders at all levels. We desperately need a Trump-ish CNO who has a vision for the Navy and will implement it immediately. No more admiral-chaired study groups. In fact, no more admirals!
Start by doing the items I listed for day one and then start tackling the bigger issues.
"Is it radical to cut government bureaucracy, eliminate waste, etc. or is it simply returning a small bit of sanity to an out of control government?"
DeleteIt's radical BECAUSE it simply returning a small bit of sanity to an out of control government.
Is it possible or practicable to cancel the Fords?
ReplyDeleteIs there any data on the costs of cancellation vs. remediating the known issues with the catapults etc.
We need this information to make an informed decision.
"We need this information to make an informed decision."
DeleteNo, this is just procrastination or timidity about making a decision. We have long since had all the information we need, even in the public domain.
"costs of cancellation"
That's amusing. The last Nimitz cost something on the order of $9B. The Fords cost something on the order of $15-20B each. Whatever cancellation costs there might be (and I doubt there's anything significant - for example, we can reuse most long lead items on the next carrier class) are dwarfed by the $6-10B savings from cancellation.
Get off the sidelines and make the decision. Poop or get off the pot.
The USS Ford is on its second deployment and loitering in the Adriatic sea like as it did on its first deployment. I suspect it needs to remain near NATO shore airbases due to its arresting gear being off line frequently.
DeleteIf they could fix the problems they would have done so a decade ago. We might rename them LHAs for F-35 VTOLs and helos and move to the next design.
Ford was alongside for several days in Marseille, it's now operating northwest of Sardinia. In case of diversion to airbases to due to arrestor issued the many spotters around air bases would have reported it. I haven't found reports about diversions from spotters.
DeleteIf EMAL worked as planned, then USS Ford would be a shinning star. So the bottom line is - technology development failure.
DeleteLet's see China's 003 Fujian as it is about to wrap up its sea trials. Let's check one year later since a few success launches don't mean a success. If type 003 Fujian's EMAL works, then, what can we say? other than ask EMAL to be re-designed to see if it then works.
EMAL of the two ships are different - USS Ford - A/C power plus fly wheel energy storage; type 003 Fujian - D/C power plus super capacitor as energy storage. Each path has its pro/con but let's see.
We'll never know whether China's EMALS is a success or not. They simply don't release that kind of information and what they do release is propaganda.
DeleteYou can find out a couple years later on type 003's deployment. If it is in active duty, then, likely its EMAL works. If it is mostly stay in port and costal training, you know something wrong.
DeleteAnother is to look type 076's sea trial since it has installed one same EMAL.
"If it is in active duty, then, likely its EMAL works"
DeleteNo. Just as the USS Ford is on active duty and deployments despite having what we know to be a badly flawed EMALS, so too will the Chinese have their carrier deployed, if for no other reason, than to save face as a propaganda effort.
Unless, they actually rip it out, we'll never know how well it works. The only reason we know about the Ford's EMALS problems is the DOT&E reports that have been made public. China has no public equivalent of the DOT&E reports.
If it is deployed under threat from US, then, we can say its EMAL works. USS Ford has only deployed in area where it is safe. Regional powers like Iran have no ability to hit a moving ship far away.
Delete"If it is deployed under threat from US"
DeleteWhat threat? You're starting to make things up.
Regarding rust on ships I think the problem ist not regarding to green coatings. European regulations regarding this are very stringent, still european ships are still in very good condition even after long deployments while using more and more environmentally friendly coatings. How much of the rust abourd US ships is due to coatings and how much ist due to wrong materials and deffered mantainance?
ReplyDeleteThere are a lot of factors impacting corrosion control. The bottom line is the Navy no longer cares about it.
Delete> 7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
ReplyDeleteWhat is the purpose of action 7?
Many of the other actions will increase manpower requirements. 7 seems like it will discourage retention. If you want to attract and retain skilled sailors, it seems like the CNO would have to offer more "comforts" (and money) rather than taking them away.
We've discussed this extensively. You need to peruse the archives and come up to speed. I'll attempt to briefly summarize.
DeleteCrew comforts are a requirement ONLY because the Navy insists on nearly year long deployments. We need to abandon deployments and revert to home basing.
Crew comforts are a proven lethal hazard in the event of damage. The Fitzgerald and McCain collisons unfortunately proved this and sailors died. Read the investigation reports.
Regarding retention. The type of sailors you want are not influenced by comforts. If they are, you don't want them. The people we want are those who join for a sense of purpose, belonging to a greater whole, service to country, and are looking for a meaningful challenge. Further, your postulated link between recruitment/retention and comforts has been disproven by historical data. Over the last decade or so, comforts have increased astronomically and yet recruitment/retention has plummeted. Interestingly, since Trump took office and public perception about the 'manliness' of the Navy has changed, recruitment has skyrocketed even though the level of comforts have not changed - again disproving your postulated link.
So, logic, safety, and data all disprove your contention. Time to modify your thinking.
The Navy trains up crews before deployment so should spend more time in port while deployed. This wears less on crews and ships. Does the Navy still use the "steaming days" metric? This forced task forces to go to sea to burn up their allotment of fuel even though no real training exercise is involved, also known as cutting circles.
Delete"Regarding retention. The type of sailors you want are not influenced by comforts. If they are, you don't want them. The people we want are those who join for a sense of purpose, belonging to a greater whole, service to country, and are looking for a meaningful challenge."
DeleteThese people no longer exist. These values have been bred out of american society over the last 50 years.
‘Recruitment has skyrocketed disproving etc…’
DeleteLikely improved because of the shaky job market, higher college tuition costs vs Voluntary Education opportunities for enlisted men, increased pay and the Future Sailors’ Preparatory Course helping recruits with their fitness and grades etc.
Not sure about ‘manliness’..
Good news anyway regardless of causality.
Shipboard life is about doing your job and looking out for your shipmates not having a good time. Liberty is for having a good time and raising hell.
ReplyDeleteFrom my experience, having women on combat ships is a mistake.
ReplyDeleteSeparate birthing and bathrooms costs money/space to create. The basic biology of having young men & women together creates its own set of problems. From personal experience, the presence of women in combat roles creates a lower level of unit cohesion vs when the ship was all-male.
A honest CNO could prove or disprove this concept by designating some ships as all male or all female and seeing how they perform.
And before some of you wag your fingers at my line of thought ask yourself which is more important, sensitivity and sexual harassment training or training to enhance combat readiness?
"prove or disprove this concept by designating some ships as all male or all female and seeing how they perform."
DeleteThe Marines did exactly this experiment a few years back. They assembled all male, all female, and mixed units and ran them through an extensive series of tests and exercises. The results were what you would expect. The all female unit was horrific. The only real surprise was just how much the women dragged down the performance of the mixed unit. The results are readily available online, if you're interested.
There is no reason to believe it would be different with ships.
I didn't know about the Marines already having run that test. I'll have to look it up, thank you
DeleteI would suggest no deployments over 30 days unless approved in writing by the fleet commander and none over 60 days unless approved in writing by the CNO.
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
You're missing the entire issue around deployments. It's not a question of time period, it's a question of value. A one hour deployment that's worthless and has no purpose is a complete waste. Conversely, a year long mission with value (meaning a specific objective) is worthwhile.
DeleteAlmost by definition, deployments are worthless in that they have no worthwhile objectives. They just sail around accomplishing nothing. No deployment, no matter how short, is worth doing.
As far as written approvals by the CNO, do you think the deployments are currently being conducted without his knowledge and that some kind of written approval process will bring them to his attention and prevent abuses? He knows about every deployment now! That means he already approves every deployment of whatever length.
The only viable solution is ending deployments ... period. Missions only, and those should be few and far between. The rest of the time is home porting with intensive maintenance and training.
"The only viable solution is ending deployments ... period."
DeleteI don't want to be tripping over terminology, I'm trying to use the navy terms that I'm not familiar with.
In the army we called it 'going to the field' or 'field problems'.
I'm not sure what the navy equivalent would be, 'sea problems'?
Regardless, I am in total agreement with your mission concept.
Ships should go out to sea with a purpose, and not longer than 30 days.
Commanders have to answer for why ships would extend beyond that or it is a reprimand on their evaluation.
Hopefully you have good people in those positions so it doesn't become an issue...but if it does then they are relieved of command.
I think that would only need to happen once and that nonsense would stop.
Circumstances may arise that require a ship/ships to stay out longer...but those would be rare exceptions and signed off formerly by the leaders taking responsibility. If they abuse that responsibility there will be career repercussions.
Like any law/regulation/rule it's all about the enforcement.
Lutefisk
Oops....formally not formerly.
DeleteLutefisk
"In the army we called it 'going to the field' or 'field problems'."
DeleteI don't know the Army but my impression is 'going to the field' is for the specific purpose of training. The Navy's deployments are NOT training. No one really knows what they are. They just sail around aimlessly on the off chance that a problem arises in their region.
If you're actually describing missions for the Navy rather than deployments, then the mission will dictate the time at sea. You're at sea exactly long enough to accomplish the mission so there is no length issue. Trying to put an arbitrary length on the mission before it's ever even conceived is wrong. The mission is what the mission is.
Does that make sense?
It makes perfect sense, and I think that we are in total agreement.
DeleteNavy ships go out to do some specific training. I would also have them on a wartime footing (sans weapons hot) every time they leave port. Treat the time at sea as potentially full of foes.
The 30/60 day limitations would be a way to put guardrails on the training to break the habit of long cruises which seem to actually degrade readiness and damage retention.
Lutefisk
No one really knows what they are. They just sail around aimlessly on the off chance that a problem arises in their region."
DeleteWell, I suppose the point of deployments is to show the flag and intimidate folks into staying peaceful. I doubt anyone here thinks the amount of wear and tear we put on the fleet and our sailors for this purpose is worthwhile. Conventional deterrence is questionable at best, and that's generous. I think a fully maintained and capable fleet, able to be anywhere on the globe in 14 days, in force... is a much better and more serious deterrent. Smaller problem children, like Iran, would know they'd gone too far somehow when they turn on the news and heard, " Well Sally, it appears as if four aircraft carriers and their escorts, as well as replenishment ships all left after dark last night, and the piers at Norfolk Naval Base are almost completely empty"...
Even China would have to be concerned if they were being provacative, and then the majority of PacFlt just dissappeared into the blue. A larger more capable force than what we can currently scrape up within the deployment model is... rather weak. Ending deployments is an instant (ok.. almost) force multiplier.