In a previous post noting the deployment of the Lincoln
strike group (can you really call a carrier and three destroyers a strike
group?), reader ‘BA 1959’ posted a comment asking where all our destroyers are
since they certainly aren’t escorting our carriers. This is an excellent question and it
illustrates one of ConNavOps’ overarching themes which is that the Navy should
be home based, training and maintaining, instead of on deployment or, worse,
trapped in the useless phases of the interminable deployment cycle.
How come the Lincoln is deploying with just three
escorts? Well, partly it’s the fault of
a hopelessly lost Navy leadership that either foolishly thinks carriers don’t
need more escorts or believes that destroyers are better employed on worthless
tasks like show-the-flag, pirate chasing, freedom of navigation exercises,
forward presence, trading one-at-a-time shots with the Houthis and praying that
a stray missile doesn’t get through, etc.
Think about it … if the Navy were home ported and engaged in
continual training and maintenance, every ship that wasn’t in dry dock would
have been available to surge as an escort for the Lincoln. That,
in a nutshell, is the justification for home basing the fleet.
Home Basing
Let’s consider the example of Pearl Harbor. Many of you think the Pacific fleet has
always been based in Pearl Harbor but that’s not the case. Pearl Harbor did not become a functioning
naval base until 1919 and, even then, did not have any permanently based
ships. Instead, the fleet was home based
in San Pedro, California.
It wasn’t until 1940 that the Pacific fleet, under Admiral
James Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, was ordered (by President
Roosevelt) to make Pearl Harbor its home
port. Richardson was vehemently
opposed. When he queried Admiral Stark
about why the fleet was being moved to Pearl Harbor, Stark replied,
Richardson believed the fleet could not begin hostilities
from Pearl Harbor.
Our ship utilization priorities are badly misguided. We
desperately need to return to a home basing concept and get the fleet back into
shape in terms of maintenance and training, the product of which is
readiness. The Lincoln example is just
the latest example that hammers home the wisdom of that approach.
_______________________________
You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs (sic) going into the East Indies.[1]Even then, the President and Admiral Stark, among many others, believed that forward presence would provide deterrence. We know how that turned out. The result was WWII in the Pacific and a disastrous defeat for the Navy. Deterrence has never succeeded.
Richardson wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, cautioning him that should the fleet need to move west, “it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.”[1]Richardson testified to Congress that, in his opinion,
… the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. I further stated that we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.”[1]What came of Richardson’s concerns?
In January 1941, Roosevelt prematurely relieved Richardson of command and replaced him with Admiral Husband Kimmel.[1]Richardson understood what Roosevelt and others did not: that deterrence doesn’t work and that the fleet needs to be home ported where it can train, maintain, and prepare for war. In fact, there is a very good case to be made that forward presence increases the likelihood of conflict rather than acting as a deterrent (see, “ForwardPresence – Deterrent or Provocation?”).
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fdr-bluff-relocating-us-fleet-to-pearl-harbor
I've wondered myself what the true reasoning behind the incredible shrinking battle group was.
ReplyDeleteI have to agree (although whether Pearl specifically could remain for major basing or not is debateable) with the idea. I'd certainly get the Washington group out of Japan. Bringing the fleet home would improve their readiness by improving their maintenance status, as well as keeping the ships' odometer from spinning like fans, potentially extending a ships useful lifespan (although the Navys track record here is sketchy at best).
I wonder how hard it'd be, and how long it'd take, to turn the "three ships=one available" situation into somthing more useful. Can we alter or change the maintenance, training, and deployable cycle we have into somthing better? Obviously with the shipyard logjam, we couldn't have all ships "up" at once, but could we somehow tinker, and maybe flip that to 2/3 ready, or more? And maybe that's possible just because the crews can do more themselves because they aren't off sailing all over?
We could leave a small destroyer squadron at Yokosuka, Japan as a symbol of our alliance, but a huge carrier that is stationary in port most of the time and within easy range of thousands of Chinese missiles that can strike in 10 mins seems "unwise". We have access to hundreds of airfields in WestPac, we don't need a carrier there.
DeleteAgree that a CVN in Japan is low hanging fruit for the Chinese, and I think a Chinese war kickoff would center around it, rather than Taiwan. The problem with leaving anything in Japan, or anywhere, is that it's exactly that- a symbol. Otherwise, worthless. I'd throw in completely with CNO here,and say better "symbols" might be a more functional, ready, and capable Navy. Carrier groups that sit pierside, but occasionally sail, 3-5 carriers strong with a proper sized escort, at 100% capability/capacity, is a stronger symbol. Large multi-LHA groups that conduct rapid "load and go" exercises, then sail to some testing ground island and put multiple MARGS ashore like they mean it. That'd be a good symbol.
DeleteShowing that MOST of our forces can surge at full capability, on very short notice, IMHO, shows more symbolic strength than anything we're doing piecemeal today. The fact that the Navy has been striving for 50 combat capable ships, and can't manage to, tells.us we're doing somthing drastically wrong.
I'd further suggest that, of we brought every ship stationed.in Japan home tomorrow, it wouldn't change a thing. Japan, S Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian states aren't going to flip and cozy up to China the next day. Their ideology and plans won't change. They might think about increasing their defense budgets (good), they might let old rivalries die and forge stronger bonds with each other (good), they might even create a WestPac version of NATO (good). And once they see us get our act together, that'll make everyone feel more secure than all of our "symbols" now do...
Delete"carrier that is stationary in port most of the time and within easy range of thousands of Chinese missiles"
DeleteClearly, the presence of a carrier in Japan has not had any deterrent effect as the Chinese have gone ahead and annexed the entire E/S China Seas. One can't help but ask, why we have a forward based carrier if it has no deterrent effect and is exposed to a quick kill at the onset of war?
The Japan based carrier has no strategic/operational/tactical value and, at this point, is just a questionable PR action. A $15B+ carrier is an enormous risk for a highly questionable PR benefit.
"as a symbol of our alliance"
DeleteOne of the problems we have is that we're all too often using our military for purposes other than military action. We need to stop using the military as a symbol and start using it in strategic, operational, and tactically beneficial ways. Statues, plaques, and commemorative coins are symbols. A carrier is a priceless military asset, not to be hazarded for no good reason.
Here is a great article from seven years ago that I thought might wake up the Admirals.
Deletehttps://warontherocks.com/2017/02/has-china-been-practicing-preemptive-missile-strikes-against-u-s-bases/
It has overhead photos our ships in port and airfields in Japan, and shows Chinese training ranges in the desert with the exact same layouts marked as targets, with craters!
And there is a recent report from Rand that estimated 90% of our aircraft based in Japan and Guam would be destroyed on the ground during the first week!
This should be no surprise since half our aircraft in the Philippines were destroyed on the ground on day one in 1941, and those airmen had several hours notice that war had begun!
"I think a Chinese war kickoff would center around it, rather than Taiwan."
DeleteBear in mind that 'reunifying' Taiwan is a Chinese cultural imperative. In addition, Taiwan CANNOT be allowed to exist as a forward base against the Chinese in any war. Taiwan will be the first objective in any war. China can't allow it not to be!
Now, if you're referring to, literally, the first ten minutes of a war, yes, China might hit the Japan based carrier as an objective that supports their Taiwan objective. However, that means 100% ensuring that Japan immediately enters a war against China. I would think the Chinese would do everything they could to keep Japan neutral. If they could do that, if they could get Japan to declare neutrality, that eliminates the carrier since it is forbidden for a neutral country to allow war operations by any foreign forces in its territory. The carrier would either have to sit out the war or leave and make a run for US territory which would allow China to pick it off at leisure as it crossed the 12 mile territorial water limit.
Something to think about.
Yes, I was thinking about the first minutes and hours of a move on Taiwan. It's possibly the biggest immediate external threat to such a move, if the Chinese felt that we would actually enter a Taiwan conflict. Being struck in port, or at sea just depends on how worried they are about Japan's inclusion in the fray. The political and propaganda aspects of a mission killed CVN, vs a possible sinking (or maybe just an EMP-based attack??) with large loss of life might also help determine the in-port vs at sea question. Either way, I'd imagine a strike on the CVN, and the kickoff of air ops against Taiwan would be simultaneous...
DeleteI'm aware of forward basing in Rota and Japan, but otherwise aren't most (all) remaining ships based in the US? If so, is home basing a change in where the ships are stationed, or is it really mostly a change in how ships are "deployed" from their existing bases? For training and more available time for maintenance instead of steaming all over the world as a single ship, never how it they would be deployed in war? Do we need more stateside bases?
ReplyDeleteAs used in this discussion, the phrase "home basing" refers not to a ship's technical home base but to the ship's operating area. For example, a carrier group on a year long deployment technically has a home base in the US but spends the entire year deployed around the world. That's not home basing - that's global basing!
DeleteBy the way, the US Navy maintains bases in
Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central (EURAFCENT)
Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH)
Navy Region Japan CNRJ
Naval Forces Korea (CNRK)
Joint Region Marianas (JRM)
Bahrain - Support Activity Bahrain, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command - U.S. Fifth Fleet Command Maritime forces
Cuba - Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Diego Garcia
Djibouti - Camp Lemonnier
Greece - U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Crete
Guam - Naval Base Guam, NCTS Guam
Italy - Naval Air Station Sigonella, Naples Naval Support Activity, Naval Hospital Naples Italy, NCTS Naples
Japan - Atsugi Naval Air Facility, Misawa, Air Base (Air force), Sasebo Fleet Activities, Yokosuka Fleet Activities, Naval Hospital Okinawa, Commander, Fleet Activities Okinawa, Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific
Korea - Commander Fleet Activities Chinhae
Poland - Naval Support Facility REDZIKOWO
Puerto Rico - NRTF Aguada, Navy Reserve Center Puerto Rico (NRC PR)
Romania - Naval Support Facility DEVESELU
Singapore - Singapore Area Coordinator (SAC)
Spain - Rota Naval Station
I've got a post coming shortly on how/why the home basing would work. Stay tuned!
Here's an article I wrote long ago about the stupidity of basing four amphibs and minesweepers at Sasebo. If war with China was likely, they'd wisely flee to Hawaii, leaving families behind? They are sitting ducks. Move the minesweepers to Guam and the amphibs back to the USA.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/sasebo.htm
We have many forward-exposed forces that are attractive targets for a day-one 'Pearl Harbor' type attack. For example, the maritime prepositioning ships are attractive and defenseless targets whose loss would cripple our efforts to quickly respond to a crisis.
DeleteIt would be easy and common sense to move those from Guam (Tinian) to an inner Loch at Pearl Harbor or the far side of Australia. They currently have zero protection.
Delete"It would be easy and common sense to move those from Guam (Tinian) to an inner Loch at Pearl Harbor or the far side of Australia."
DeleteThat would make sense if the objective of those ships was survival. However, their purpose is the immediate resupply of a MEU (or any other forces) due to their FORWARD positioning. So, we can ensure their survival by removing them to safety but that would negate their stated purpose. Bit of a dilemma, isn't it?
Of course, one has to question the value of a MEU, today, anyway. As currently outfitted, configured, and operated, they serve no real purpose. If we eliminate the MEU in favor of global Army/Air Force rapid response units, we can then eliminate, or move to safety, the prepositioning ships without negative consequences.
A MEU is supposed to have enough supplies for 15 days of combat, so Hawaii is close enough, and needed ships would likely deploy if a MEU might need help.
DeleteArmy/Air Force units need a large safe airfield to deploy to, and the USAF can only gather enough transports to land and sustain a single light US Army brigade.
Army/AF rapid response can make use of extremely minimal landing fields. From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example,
Delete"The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters)."
In addition, the Army has many airborne (paratroop) units that can be air dropped. Once upon a time, we could air-unload large vehicles like the M551 Sheridan. In fact, we once had Army/AF units whose mission was airfield seizure for follow on forces. Whether we still train for that as a mission, I don't know (I hope we do!).
The other problem is location. Unless there's a long build up of a crisis, which does happen, it would be pure dumb luck for a MEU to be within useful range. It might well take many days to get a MEU together (MEUs no longer operate together but regionally dispersed) and on site. In contrast, an Army/AF airborne unit can land anywhere in the world within 24 hrs.
Rather than an afloat MEU, which accomplishes nothing, I'd rather see the Marines be land based but aerial transported, like the Army/AF. Of course, that raises the question, why do we need Marines ... but that's another topic.
And move the subs and that tender from Guam to Hawaii. Look at this photo of a $10 billion target area that any of hundreds of Chinese missiles can hit in 15-mins. A sub base is good, but don't homeport the subs and their families in potential war zone.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/turmoi9.jpg
Build some sub pens on Guam (like the Germans had in France) to hide and protect visiting subs too.
"fulfill ongoing commitments"
ReplyDeleteCDR Chip, I've addressed this before. Unless you can document a treaty or some other type of formal commitment that binds us to a deployment, this is a false statement. We have no commitments. The deployments we do are of our own choosing.
I'm deleting your comment as factually incorrect. You may believe and state that we SHOULD be doing deployments but the fact is that there is no formal deployment commitment that I'm aware of. Please stop making this incorrect statement.
P.S. The options you offered were fine. Feel free to repost them, if you wish.
The commitments to which I was referring may not exist in the form of specific treaty or contractual obligations, but the USN very clearly took on the role as defender of the world's sea lines of communication (SLOC) after WWII, and fulfilling that mission clearly requires some level of presence. We may be able to maintain a higher state of readiness by staying close to home port and maximizing training and maintenance (and I think that point is at least debatable) but you can't do anything in San Diego to deter pirates in the Indian Ocean. For some things you have to be there.
DeleteSo there may not be a treaty or other formal agreement that binds us to a deployment, but there is plenty of long-standing custom and tradition that binds us. Therefore, I reject the idea that my original comments were factually incorrect, although at this point I don't think it's worth a debate.
In my active duty time, we deployed for many multi-national exercises that were little more than PR photo ops with little or no training value to the US ships involved. We did one with the RN and Iranians (we were friends with the
Shah back then, and the Iranian parties didn't have much alcohol but the caviar was outstanding) called Midlink, where we realized that we had to slow down our operating tempo so the Iranians could keep up, but the Brits had to slow down theirs for us. We also performed several goodwill deployments where our mission was once explained to me as, "be good, show the flag, and feed the *******s." I agree that neither of those contributes materially to the training and readiness of US ships, but they are pretty much part and parcel of our commitment to defend the free world's SLOCs.
At any rate, my larger point was that an operating tempo that kept 100+ ships deployed was much easier to maintain with a 500-600 ship fleet than it is with a 280-300 ship fleet. You could maintain that tempo in the former case with the average ship gone 2-3 months of the year, where in the latter case it requires an average of about 5 months per year. And those extra 2-3 months deployed reduce training and maintenance time significantly.
I see three options:
1. Cut back on commitments. Just say no. The significant danger here is that China (or, less likely, Russia, given the current status if its fleet) would be more than happy to fill in the gaps.
2. Get our allies to pick up some of the commitments. NATO in Europe, India in the Indian Ocean, and Japan and Australia in WestPac should be able to cover a lot of them for us.
3. Grow the fleet. Get back to 500-600 ships, where that 100 deployments could be covered with 2-3 months per ship per year.
"San Diego to deter pirates in the Indian Ocean. For some things you have to be there."
DeleteThen you send an appropriate vessel like a Coast Guard cutter or a Cyclone patrol boat, not a major warship.
Again, however, that's not a treaty requirement on our part. Perhaps we would do well to allow (force) some other country(s) to battle pirates. There is no requirement for us and us alone to safeguard the world. However, the rest of the world will not shoulder their share of the burden if we keep doing it for free. We need to return the fleet to home ports and get ready for the China war. The rest of the world can chase pirates as their contribution to safeguarding the sea lanes.
"So there may not be a treaty or other formal agreement that binds us"
Then stop saying it. You can offer all the opinion you wish about whether we should or not but do not present it as fact. Hopefully, I won't have to address this again? Right?
"custom and tradition that binds us."
Custom and tradition are not binding and, in fact, change all the time. Ask the Marines who have abandoned decades of custom and tradition in just a few years!
"they are pretty much part and parcel of our commitment"
No. They are highly debatable political gestures. Worse, the actively degrade our material readiness (wear and tear on the ships, aircraft, and equipment) and training (trained skills lapse when not practiced regularly - that's why sports team practice constantly instead of just once ever).
"average of about 5 months per year"
Unless you've seen some numbers I haven't, the average deployment length is on the order of 8 months. Of course, it all depends what you term a deployment. Certainly, for our major vessels (carriers, amphibs, and their escorts), deployments are on the order of 10+ months.
"I see three options:"
The fourth option, of course, being to stop doing deployments altogether. This is the only option that makes sense.
Perhaps because your experiences have defined your paradigm, you seem wedded to the deployment concept which has produced no demonstrable benefits and a LOT of degradation of the fleet. I know it's difficult but you need to do a serious analysis of your paradigm and objectively assess the benefits (almost none!) and harm (LOTS!) of deployments and the deployment model. Good luck!
"The fourth option, of course, being to stop doing deployments altogether. This is the only option that makes sense."
DeleteQuery: Suppose the USN stops deployments altogether. How do you expect China to react? Suppose they decide to fill the vacuum by making extensive worldwide deployments (which is what I think they would do). Is that a good thing or a bad thing?
"There is no requirement for us and us alone to safeguard the world."
DeleteWe pretty much took that on after WWII. It worked pretty well. Truman bribed up an alliance to keep the Soviets out of western Europe, and 40 years later Reagan applied enough economic pressure to bring down the Evil Empire. Perhaps it worked too well. When the Berlin Wall fell. it was time for a new paradigm. Ross Perot said that in the post-Cold-War era, economic power would be more important than military power, and had a number of specific proposals to put the USA in a position of economic dominance. But we didn't change. China did, and began to extend its influence over South Asia and Africa, now extending to Latin America and even Europe. Meanwhile we are running around the MidEast, plinking goat herders in pickup trucks and trying to bring western ways to people who don't want western ways. While we are destroying lives and limbs of out 20-somethings, not one Chinese soldier has suffered so much as a hangnail.
We need a complete rethink of what we are doing. A homeport model may make sense for the USN. But if we go that route I think we risk turning the world over to China.
"Suppose they decide to fill the vacuum by making extensive worldwide deployments ... . Is that a good thing or a bad thing?"
DeleteWell, let me answer that by asking what world wide deployments have gained us? Aside from wearing out our fleet into hollowness, what have we gained? Has it stopped Chinese annexation of the entire E/S China Seas? Has it deterred China from world wide expansion of bases and establishment of international trade routes? Has it stopped the Houthis from attacking shipping? Has it prevented piracy? Has it made other countries like us who were previously unfriendly? Has it deterred Russia from annexing Crimea and invading Ukraine? Has it deterred Iran from its nuclear ambitions? Has it deterred Iran from attacking shipping? Has it reined in NKorea?
What has our global deployments gained us?
On the flip side, we've worn out our fleet, spent untold billions floating around on pointless cruises, hollowed out our Navy, cost us several ships in groundings and collisions, exacerbated tensions with China, exacerbated tensions with Iran, arguably made the Middle East a less stable place, and made the US Navy a laughingstock about ship corrosion control, among other negative effects.
So, why not let China take on all those negative effects. Let them wear out their ships, hollow their armed forces, and become the subject of tensions and ridicule while we stay home and rebuild the fleet and improve our readiness.
Seriously, how can anyone think our deployments are a good thing?
"We need a complete rethink of what we are doing. A homeport model may make sense for the USN."
DeleteAnd yet you want to cling to the old paradigm. I'll give you some small credit in that you seem to vaguely grasp that what we're doing isn't working but you're afraid to abandon the past and try something better.
The answer isn't more ships on deployment, as you've often suggested, but NO ships on deployment.
Here's a historical rationale for you to consider. One of the major reasons for the US to have begun world wide patrols after WWII was that ONLY forward deployed ships could offer any rapid response to a crisis. THAT IS NO LONGER THE CASE! We can now land an Army/Air Force unit anywhere in the world in less than 24 hrs. Naval deployments are no longer needed to provide rapid response. That, alone, pretty much eliminates the rationale for afloat MEUs and most deployments!
When and where have I ever suggested more deployments?
DeleteI tend to agree with you that staying in homeport and doing maintenance and training should improve the readiness of the Navy's ships. At least it should in theory, although my own active duty experience was that every ship I deployed on came back from deployment in a better state of training and material readiness than when it left.
But that has to be balanced against the geopolitical considerations of the 21st Century world. This is where I say we don't have a clue how to proceed. Economic power is the key in this world. China has figured that out. We haven't. I say we should have national goals to lead the world in manufacturing (including shipbuilding), energy, and agriculture. I think we need to drop a bunch of deployment requirements, and count on our allies to pick up the slack. And we need to enlarge the fleet, from 280-300 to 500-600, to reduce the pressure upon individual ships to deploy. I don't think the geopolitical situation allows us to abandon deployments, but we need to rein them back to something manageable that permits adequate training and maintenance opportunity.
So I want fewer/less deployments, not more. But I don't think we can totally eliminate them.
"When and where have I ever suggested more deployments?"
DeleteRead carefully. I didn't say you've called for more deployments. I said you've called for more ships on the deployments. You've repeatedly stated that additional carriers and escorts would provide deterrence against China.
"What has our global deployments gained us?"
DeleteForty years without World War III, for one thing, until Reagan was able to apply economic pressure that ended the Evil Empire. For another, free flow of goods over worldwide sea lines of communication (SLOCs), enabling unprecedented long term growth of free world economies. We basically undertook to defend the free world and worldwide SLOCs when our allies were too depleted from WWII to do so for themselves. You can, and probably will, argue that worldwide deployments did not achieve that alone, and they didn't achieve it alone. But they were clearly significant contributors.
Since the Berlin Wall fell, we have needed a new paradigm, I'll agree with you (I think) there. What I would propose is that we simultaneously 1) pass off a lot of commitments to allies, who have vested interests in their particular areas and the resources to defend those interests, and 2) increase the size of the USN to 500-600 ships, without breaking the bank, by building a few of the top-of-the-line multi-purpose ships that the Navy seems to want while fleshing out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose and dual-purpose ships. Those two steps would greatly reduce the negative impact of deployments for the fleet.
Of course, the first time we suggest passing commitments to allies, the press is going to scream that we are, "destroying NATO," but in fact we would be strengthening it.
"Read carefully. I didn't say you've called for more deployments. I said you've called for more ships on the deployments. You've repeatedly stated that additional carriers and escorts would provide deterrence against China."
DeleteWhat I've said is that a single destroyer doing a FONOP in the SCS is pretty useless. If you're going to do a FONOP, send a CVBG as asign that you mean business.
"Forty years without World War III, for one thing"
DeleteThere is absolutely no evidence that our global actions prevented WWIII. Even on a more limited scale, in the decades since the end of the Cold War, not a single document has emerged indicating that the Soviet Union had any intention of initiating a war or invasion of Europe.
I presume you know the difference between correlation and causation?
This is becoming a pattern. Please stop presenting opinions as facts.
"free flow of goods over worldwide sea lines of communication (SLOCs)"
Again, there is absolutely no evidence that any country or actor would have inhibited those SLOCs in the absence of our naval presence. Indeed, a brief consideration and application of logic suggests that there was no country or actor that would have benefited from interrupting the SLOCs so, therefore, there is no reason to believe such interruption would have occurred.
Once again, you are free to believe, as a matter of opinion, that we had something to do with maintaining SLOC but please do not attempt to present it as fact.
"the press is going to scream that we are, "destroying NATO,"
I have called for the US to get out of NATO. The threat for which it formed is gone and, as clearly demonstrated by Ukraine, Russia is a minor threat, easily dealt with by Europe if the need should arise. Further, dropping out of NATO does not prevent us from helping Europe with arms and armed forces should the need arise so there is no downside and much upside (reduced presence in Europe and increased European responsibility for their own defense).
"What I've said"
DeleteWhat you've said is that multiple carriers would offer effective deterrence as opposed to the single carriers we currently deploy. You've explicitly stated that more ships would discourage the Chinese from their E/S China Sea expansions. How, exactly, additional ships would accomplish remains unexplained.
"If you're going to do a FONOP, send a CVBG as asign that you mean business."
Yet another statement explicitly calling for more ships to be deployed. Again, how, exactly, a carrier group would indicate to China that we 'mean business' when you, I, China, and the US all know we'd never use the carrier, remains unexplained and unfathomable. In fact, we'd be far more likely to surrender the carrier in the face of a threat than to use its firepower! I remind you of the Iranian seizure of our riverine boats who had overwhelming firepower by comparison and yet surrendered without a shot to three Iranian sailors. Yes, a couple of dozen US sailors with overwhelming firepower superiority surrendered to three Iranian sailors. Is surrendering a carrier really that ridiculous a notion in today's Navy? But, I digress ...
So, far from actually wanting to cut back on deployments and commitments, your statements are consistently calling for more ships to be deployed though without any explanation how they would be any more effective than the numbers we have now. The entire 7th Fleet is in the China/Pacific theater. If they aren't deterring China, how many more ships do you want? What magic number will suddenly become a deterrent when the dozens we have there now aren't? What number will suddenly make the Chinese stop what they're doing? You need to stop falling back on your paradigm and try to think this through logically, objectively, and analytically.
Well technically we have AFAIK no binding commitments to go to the military defense of any country including our treaty allies.
DeleteEven the much referenced Article 5 of the NATO Treaty doesn’t oblige us to do anything other than consult and consider what is best to be done.
Nevertheless if we failed to come to the party in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member state our credibility would be permanently shot.
So it’s not all about our legal obligations, but more around the expectations that we have over a period of eight decades encouraged our friends and allies to have in our willingness to come to their aid in the event of a crisis, and our willingness to honor those ‘informal’ obligations.
"Article 5"
Delete"“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
Unless your goal is to be a lawyer, Article 5 imposes the reality of an attack on anyone is an attack on us and, as a practical reality, obligates us to use force to respond.
" if we failed to come to the party in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member state"
Who, other than you, has suggested that????
"willingness to come to their aid"
Again, who, other than you, has suggested that we wouldn't or shouldn't aid a friendly country?
CopmNavOps, this is a great site, you do a wonderful job maintaining it, and I want to keep participating.
DeleteI think you've misunderstood or misconstrued a number of my comments. I really don't think we are very far apart. But at this point, I think trying to set the record straight will shed more heat than light.
Therefore I plan to drop this and move on to other issues.
"I think you've misunderstood or misconstrued a number of my comments"
DeleteAnd I think you've misunderstood, or failed to grasp, the problem.
The issue is quite simple. You need to clearly delineate facts from opinions. I insist that statements of fact actually be factual. In the realm of opinion, you are free to speculate at will. Adhere to that simple requirement and you'll have no problem.
For example, the statement, 'we are bound to conduct deployments' is factually incorrect and will not be allowed. Simply adding the phrase, 'in my opinion', as in 'in my opinion, we must conduct deployments' is perfectly acceptable.
If it's not a fact, don't present it as such.
If it's an opinion, present it as such.
Carry on!
Well, the statement, "in my opinion we must conduct deployments," would have been factually incorrect, as that is not my opinion at least with respect to the current level of 100 deployed ships out of a fleet of fewer than 300. On the major point, I am in total agreement with you that we can't sustain that level without continuing to degrade the fleet further. I feel so much so that I have in fact proposed two options to address the problem--convince our allies to take on more commitments, reducing our number of deployments, and/or increasing the size of the fleet. In mathematical terms, decrease the numerator or increase the denominator to reduce the impact per ship.
Delete"in my opinion we must conduct deployments," would have been factually incorrect, as that is not my opinion"
DeleteIt most certainly is!
You consistently stated that we have an obligation to conduct deployments, an obligation that began after WWII.
Here's a statement you just made:
"So I want fewer/less deployments, not more. But I don't think we can totally eliminate them."
You still want deployments though, as a recent and welcome modification of your stance, you're now saying you'd want fewer.
That's offset by your belief that we should have more ships on deployment. For example, you just stated,
"If you're going to do a FONOP, send a CVBG as asign that you mean business."
That's more ships deployed, not less.
“Unless your goal is to become a lawyer…”
DeleteTreaties are signed by politicians but they’re drafted, very carefully indeed, by very good lawyers.
Article 5 could have formally and unequivocally committed the United States to military action in the event of an armed attack on a NATO member. But the lawyers in the State Department made sure that, as in every other mutual defense treaty that we’ve ever signed, it did nothing of the sort but instead made sure that we get to choose how to respond if Article 5 is triggered. Maybe with military force; maybe not.
I’m not really disagreeing with you - I’m saying that it’s about more than specific and precisely defined legal obligations. It’s about the expectations that we’ve spent the 80 years since WW2 setting and encouraging, and the signals that we send to our friends and allies if or when for example we decide to pull back our troops or cease forward deployments of the Navy.
"signals that we send to our friends and allies if or when for example we decide to pull back our troops or cease forward deployments of the Navy."
DeleteI have no idea what, if anything, you're arguing for or against.
Setting that aside, the signal we should be sending is, 'it's long past time for Europe to stand on its own two feet and not be dependent on the US continually looking over its shoulder'. We should be sending the signal that we have larger concerns than a non-existent European threat; we're concerned with China, the major threat to the world today and that the US will be leading the way against that threat but we first have to divest ourselves of pointless deployments in Europe. We should be sending the signal that it's long past time for other countries to start paying for their own defense.
If that causes concern among European nations ... good! Maybe they'll start looking after their own defense. We're not Europe's babysitter anymore. They're all grown up and need to start acting like it.
Now, did you have anything substantive to offer?
"You consistently stated that we have an obligation to conduct deployments, an obligation that began after WWII."
DeleteWhat I've consistently said is that we took on the obligation after WWII to protect the world's sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The fall of the Berlin Wall meant it was time for a change in paradigm, but we didn't. Ross Perot said (I believe correctly) that in the post-Cold-War era, economic power would be more important than military power. To me that means dominating the world in industry/manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. Since this is a naval/military board and not an economic one, I'll leave that at that.
"You still want deployments though, as a recent and welcome modification of your stance, you're now saying you'd want fewer."
Wanting fewer is not a modification. I have been discussing for some time proposed options to reduce the impact of deployments by passing commitments to allies and by building more ships.
"That's offset by your belief that we should have more ships on deployment."
No, I don't believe that. My comment about sending a CVBG through instead of a single destroyer on FONOPs is made because a single destroyer is pretty much useless where a CVBG would show some serious intent. I agree totally with you that if that CVBG went through with the USN's recent surrender mentality, it would lead to a most unfortunate end. But that strikes me as a problem with the surrender mentality and not with CVBGs.
As for the inference that calling for a CVBG instead of a single destroyer is a call to deploy more ships, no. A current USN CVBG is apparently 4 ships, a carrier and 3 escorts. I've proposed a CVBG of 2 carriers, 10 escorts, and 2 UNREP ships (1 oiler and 1 dry cargo). That's 14 ships. The USN has 100 ships deployed. I would think the rest of its commitments could be handled with fewer than 86 shups.
ComNavOps, I am wondering something. My idea of deployments is sending a force large enough to accomplish a specific mission, do that mission and come home, not to send a bunch of smaller ships out independently. I wonder how close that might be to your mission concept.
DeleteI have proposed three kinds of formations:
- CVBG, 2 carriers, 10 escorts, 2 UNREP ships
- SAG/HUK, battleship, ASW carrier, 10 escorts. 2 UNREP ships
- ARG/MER, 5 smaller amphibs, 1 UNREP ship, 4000 Marines
Currently the USN has 103 deployed ships. There are 2 carrier strike groups and 3 ARGs deployed. Per my formation structure, that would be 43 ships deployed. Add a SAG/HUK group covering the GIUK gap and that would be 61. That is substantially less than 103, but probably way more than missions would require.. Even if you add 20 submarines, that's still only 80% as many, What are all those other ships doing?
I think the USN must simply be sending ships out willy-nilly. Particularly as we go to more single-purpose or dual-purpose ships, I don't think it makes much sense to send ships out independently. I remember that sailing around the Indian Ocean independently in a FRAM I can in 1971 was a very lonely feeling. I think the proper deployment approach should be to identify a specific objective and send out the appropriate force to accomplish that objective, and then come home. I would see fewer ships deployed in a few larger formations that would deploy for shorter periods of time.
I'm not sure how that differs from your mission concept.
ComNavOps, I am wondering something. My idea of deployments is sending a force large enough to accomplish a specific mission, do that mission and come home, not to send a bunch of smaller ships out independently. I wonder how close that might be to your mission concept.
DeleteI have proposed three kinds of formations:
- CVBG, 2 carriers, 10 escorts, 2 UNREP ships
- SAG/HUK, battleship, ASW carrier, 10 escorts. 2 UNREP ships
- ARG/MER, 5 smaller amphibs, 1 UNREP ship, 4000 Marines
Currently the USN has 103 deployed ships. There are 2 carrier strike groups and 3 ARGs deployed. Per my formation structure, that would be 46 ships deployed. Add a SAG/HUK group covering the GIUK gap and that would be 60. That is substantially less than 103, but probably way more than missions would require.. Even if you add 20 submarines, that's still only 80% as many, What are all those other ships doing?
I think the USN must simply be sending ships out willy-nilly. Particularly as we go to more single-purpose or dual-purpose ships, I don't think it makes much sense to send ships out independently. I remember that sailing around the Indian Ocean independently in a FRAM I can in 1971 was a very lonely feeling. I think the proper deployment approach should be to identify a specific objective and send out the appropriate force to accomplish that objective, and then come home. I would see fewer ships deployed in a few larger formations that would deploy for shorter periods of time.
I'm not sure how that differs from your mission concept.
"I wonder how close that might be to your mission concept."
DeleteI would venture to say that your concept and mine have nothing in common. You've recently started to substitute the word 'mission' for deployment but you don't appear to have actually changed your concept. For example, you describe some kind of modified deployment model but, as you say, "that would be 46 ships deployed". Those are your exact words, not mine. So, while you occasionally use the word mission, you're still focused on traditional deployments. In my mission world, there would be ZERO ships deployed and only occasionally would any ship(s) be on a mission. There just aren't that many legitimate missions to be had.
"My idea of deployments is sending a force large enough"
Again, you're using the terminology 'deployment'. You can't get away from it! It's your paradigm!
You are also focused on neat packages of ships as you often describe and, even in this statement, you reference a 'large enough' force. In contrast, a true mission model uses only what's needed. That might be a patrol boat or it might be the entire fleet, depending on the mission requirements. For example, you mentioned FON ops and stated that a carrier group should do it. Given the worthlessness of the FON to begin with, I wouldn't do it and, if I somehow had to do it, I'd use the single smallest ship I could. See how there's nothing in common between our concepts? They are polar opposites. The only commonality is that they both involve ships.
You are so deeply embedded in the deployment paradigm you can't even recognize it. It's tough to recognize and break out of a paradigm ... that's why it's a paradigm!
Paradigm breaking question: If the deployment model is so desirable, why has it resulted in a hollow fleet at the lowest level of readiness in my lifetime and Russia, Iran, China, and NKorea running wild, expanding their territories, exporting terror, and harassing the world's shipping?
What kind of mission would only call for a patrol boat?
DeleteAnti-piracy, anti-smuggling, anti-drug, harbor protection, Iranian anti-swarm and harassment protection, interdicting Chinese 'fishery' vessels in the Philippines, and merchant ship escort in the Middle East, to name just a few.
DeleteAny other questions?
ComNavOps, I guess the bottom line is that I just don't take as dim a view of deployments as you do. As far as deterrent impact, we cannot say for sure how effective deployments have been because we have no way to know what would have happened without them. I also see a positive impact in terms of showing our allies that we support them seriously.
DeleteI would significantly reduce the number and length of them, in order to free up inport time to address the training and readiness issues. I would think 50 ships deployed (instead of 100) out of a total fleet size of 500-600 (instead of 300) would provide sufficient training and maintenance opportunity. I would propose to reduce the number of deployments by getting our allies to take over more of our current deployment activities and I would propose to increase the number of ships by building fewer of the multi-purpose ships that the USN seems to want, and fleshing out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose and dual-purpose ships.
I think we will just have to agree to disagree.
"I just don't take as dim a view of deployments as you do"
DeleteWell, I see, and can quantify, the negative consequences of deployments such as deferred maintenance, hollowed fleet, decreased readiness, very small 'surge-able' fleet, stressed crew life due to separation, high wear rates on ships and equipment, etc.
On the other side of the ledger, there are no quantifiable benefits. To be fair, that's something that's very hard to quantify so, instead, I look at overall results and I see Russia annexing and invading Crimea and Ukraine, Iran is running amok mining and seizing ships right in front of us, China has annexed the entire E/S China Seas and is expanding beyond the first island chain, and NKorea is flinging ballistic missiles all over the region, including into Japanese waters. That tells me that our deployments have no positive deterrent effect.
Balanced against that, the only positive aspects of deployments that you can offer are vague feelings you have that other countries see us as 'serious' ... despite the fact that we refuse to use our forces to stop any of the ill behaviors we encounter. Does anyone think we're serious about stopping Iran from mining and seizing ships? Does anyone think we're serious about confronting China?
So, you're welcome to continue to believe in deployments but at least have the objectivity to acknowledge that you're doing so without any positive proof, whatsoever, of their effectiveness or usefulness, and in the face of a LOT of negative proof. If you do that and still believe in deployments then at least you're being honest that your support is baseless and based only on feelings about how you'd like the world to be rather than how it is.
As you note, it is difficult to quantify the impact of deployments and presence, because we have no way to know what the results would have been otherwise. I worry that abandoning deployments altogether would open the door for an expanding PLAN to become a worldwide power in our place.
DeleteIt seems to me that, "the fact that we refuse to use our forces to stop any of the ill behaviors we encounter," is more a function of our overly risk-averse approach. If we sank a few Iranian motorboats harassing ships in the Straits of Hormuz, I am pretty sure Iran would back down. But we don't, so they won't. I would agree that deployments without resolve are pretty worthless.
I agree that deployments could and should be cut back. 100 deployed ships out of 300 is absurd. 100/300 equals a third of our ships deployed at any time, on average, or the average ship being gone 4 months out of the year (and clearly some ships would have to be gone far more than that in order to make the average work). If we could pass off half of our deployment commitments to allies (NATO in Europe, India in the Indian Ocean, and Australia and Japan in WestPac), and could increase the size of the fleet to 500-600 ships by building a few of the expensive all-purpose ships that the USN wants and fleshing out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships (and we did basically that in the 1980s), then we could reduce the numerator and increase the denominator in that 100/300 fraction to 50/500 or 50/600, and I believe that would be sustainable from a training and maintenance viewpoint.
I agree that ships need far more time in home port to catch up on training and maintenance than the current deployment schedules allow. I like the operations tempo that you outlined for ships in home port that you outlined in the other thread about bringing ships home.
"I worry that abandoning deployments altogether would open the door for an expanding PLAN "
DeleteThis is an example of a vague, unfounded fear controlling your thinking. This may come as a surprise but China is going to become a global naval power whether we conduct deployments or not. The only way to prevent that is to physically and kinetically confront them and prevent them from leaving the E/S China Seas. I assume you're not suggesting that? If not, deployments won't prevent China from expanding their naval presence so, yet again, we're back to asking what the benefits of deployments are?
This is just the 'comfort' of your paradigm speaking. We've always done deployments so you can't imagine not doing them.
You're almost, sort of, kind of, tip-toeing up to the edge of no deployments but you can't quite bring yourself to take the final step. Perhaps some day?
In the meantime, why don't you pick out one deployment area that you think is actually worthwhile and try to articulate the benefit that would come from it? I'm not talking about some vague, 'it would make someone feel good' type of benefit but, rather, something semi-solid even if not quantifiable.
I'll give you an example although it's one we would never do: a deployment to the Philippines to forcibly confront and prevent Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. This would entail physical harassment of Chinese vessels including the use of weapons against Chinese vessels violating territorial waters outside the procedures of Innocent Passage. Of course, this would require Philippine agreement which is also unlikely. That notwithstanding, that would constitute a worthwhile and productive deployment. As I said, though, we're far too timid to do that.
So, what's your worthwhile deployment example? I suspect you can't come up with one but let's see.
"In the meantime, why don't you pick out one deployment area that you think is actually worthwhile and try to articulate the benefit that would come from it?
DeleteI'll give you an example although it's one we would never do: a deployment to the Philippines to forcibly confront and prevent Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. This would entail physical harassment of Chinese vessels including the use of weapons against Chinese vessels violating territorial waters outside the procedures of Innocent Passage. Of course, this would require Philippine agreement which is also unlikely. That notwithstanding, that would constitute a worthwhile and productive deployment. As I said, though, we're far too timid to do that."
Funny you should mention that. That is precisely the kind of deployment I have in mind.
I think a lot of our difference is that you are thinking of deployment as the kind of willy-nilly, sail about smartly but do nothing affairs that US deployments have become. I'm not.
"I think a lot of our difference is that you are thinking of deployment as the kind of willy-nilly, sail about smartly but do nothing affairs that US deployments have become. I'm not."
Delete"I'm not"
Well, yeah, you are because you have the order reversed. You're thinking constant, continuous deployments whether there's a reason to be there (wherever there is) or not and then, if something happens that we can take action against/about, you'll do it (although, some of your past comments indicate a hesitation to take any action but we'll ignore that for the sake of discussion). In other words, you're thinking deployment first, action second if something just happens to occur. 99% of the time, you'd be aimlessly sailing in circles waiting for something to happen.
In total contrast, I'm thinking action/mission first and then deploy (deploy in the sense of sail to the mission area, execute, and RTB). In other words, give me a reason, first, and then I'll deploy. The other 99% of the time, I'll be home, training and maintaining.
Our differences are fundamental not semantics or definitions. We could not be further apart on this!
"How come the Lincoln is deploying with just three escorts?"
ReplyDeleteThis strike group goes to Middle East. There isn't much threat on their journey. As long as USS Lincoln don't sail close to Iran (won't), they are safe. This is not facing another superpower.
The USS Cole was safe ... until she was hit with a terrorist bomb.
DeleteThe USS Stark was an innocent, non-combatant, bystander until it was hit with two Exocet missiles.
In today's world, you're always just a moment away from combat.
That aside, you recall the timeless adage: Train like you fight, fight like you train? We're not going to be fighting with just three escorts so why are we training like that? NOW is when we should be training like we'll fight. NOW is when we should be preparing for war.
What's the point in fighting? China has the advantage in hulls. China has the advantage in industry. China has the preponderence of force in the SCS and Taiwan Strait. Trying to fight there is foolhardy, pointless, and will lead to lost ships.
DeleteSure, America can give China a bloody nose - but China can regenerate that lost strength faster than America can, with more shipyards that anually are putting more combat hulls in the water than America has.
"What's the point in fighting?"
DeleteThe American colonists could well have asked that question ... but they had the fortitude and determination that was needed.
You also badly fail to see the correct overall geopolitical and military status of China and the US. This is not a geopolitical blog so I'll leave it at that.
"This is not facing another superpower."
DeleteBetter hope the Russians and Chinese have not been helping Iran with better IRBMs. Also, so be really clear, we all need to hope the the Iranians don't have access to Chinese real-time satellite ISR data. I know this has been a huge bone of contention on this blog, but even the US military, who are famous for not recognizing an emerging threat, are now say the Chinese can target large warships in real time. Perhaps that is only over WestPac as a function of their geostationary RORSat, or maybe its the newest LEO constellations.
The issue of industry does need to be addressed, however.
DeleteAs it stands, America has more institutional knowledge in building large surface combatants than China. However, that institutional knowledge is limited to a couple of DDG yards and the single CVN yard.
China trails us in CVN construction to be sure, but they have significantly more yards than we do, and have been putting more DDGs and FFGs into the water on an annual basis than we do.
It is therefore conceivable that, assuming an even 1:1 trade between our ships and theirs, China would be in a better position to regenerate their naval strength than we do. In absolute numbers, we have more major combatants than the Chinese, but that was a gradual building program over 30 years; meanwhile the Chinese are on a crash build program to catch up to us as fast as possible...
At present in terms of total force numbers, we still have more major combatants than the Chinese; however fighting in Chinese waters, in the Taiwan Strait, lets them leverage their corvettes and missile boats, giving them additional missile shooters. By necessity, this would require us to fight in and around the Spratlys, at the more southern regions of the South China Sea, which puts the PLAN at a stronger range disadvantage and forces them to sortie with their DDGs and FFGs, as these are the ships that have the range and endurance to get to the SCS and back after engaging in combat ops.
On the other hand, if they're making the fight about Taiwan, then that forces us to be fighting in their waters, where they can bring their whole fleet to bear under the cover of land-based aviation. It's a tricky question.
I would argue that the USN isn't sending out carriers with sufficient destroyer escorts is because we have no destroyers. Burkes are light cruisers and the USN likes to operate them as such. In role they have a lot more in common with an air-defense oriented light cruiser such as the Atlanta-class or Worcester-class.
ReplyDeleteGiving today's situation, China's long-range missiles capable of hit moving ship - DF-21D, DF-26 plus ship and air launchable YJ-21, even Guan is not safe. Not to mention, hypersonic weapons DF-27 described by Pentagon (China is still silent on this) could hit Hawaii (looks only on fixed position for now). Furthermore, China's military R&D progresses fast thus you keep hearing new weapons.
ReplyDeleteForward deterrence works only on enemies much weaker than you, not on an enemy on your pal.
Instead of forward deterrence, Pentagon can learn from China to develop long range missiles (not as slow as subsonic LSRAM) flying fast supported by long range reconnaissance (unmanned very fast drone like WJ-8). This allows Navy to get better supports at home ports.
ReplyDeleteI'm guessing you're referring to the Chinese WZ-8?
DeleteIF we brought the Japan-based carrier back home- Do we have pier-side space to park it in San Diego? I know Coronado can handle 2; can't remember if I've ever seen 3 tied up at the same. time.
ReplyDeleteYeah, maybe- I think I recall seeing Ranger, Kitty Hawk and New Jersey all tied up.
Everett WA had a CVN until 2015, so one can go there. My preference is to rebalance the fleet by cutting two CVNs to free funds for more aircraft, subs, and surface combatants.
DeleteCut two CVNs...?
ReplyDeleteI can certainly see a need to get the airwings back up to that 90-ish aircraft like they used to be. And, I can see more subs being useful. But with China being the principal threat- not sure how reducing the CVN count is, imho, anything but a bad idea. 11, to 9, minus one in RCOH is 8. Assuming we don't do somthing smart like move an additional one.or to CVBGs to the west coast, that's 4 per... So we'd only get our ideal 4CVN battlegroup if all 4 were combat ready simeoultaneously. What's the likelihood, even if they were all home-based like the post suggests?
While the price of the @&%#$ Fords, and economic feasibility in general, is making it harder, or impossible, I'd say we need to increase the count to 12...
"Cut two CVNs...?"
DeleteJust a reminder, the author of that comment, 'G2mil', gave us a 4-part series with his rationale and alternatives on reducing the carrier count by two. Check it out, if you'd like to refresh your memory. See, "Scrap Two Carriers"
If you disagree and think we should increase the carrier count, perhaps you'd like to guest author a post explaining your rationale? This is a sincere offer to allow you to present a contrasting perspective. Let me know if you have any interest.
This article is about the Lincoln only having three escorts, whereas carriers had 2-3 times that number in the recent past. With more anti-ship missiles and drones buzzing about, more are needed. And since Tomahawks appeared, destroyers can make long-range strikes too.
DeleteEveryone expects a major war in the Middle East. The US Navy had almost a year advance notice and all it can do is deploy two to the region? And one was borrowed from the Pacific. Given the ultra-high costs, complex maintenance that takes months if not years to accomplish, huge crews, and provides a massive target, scrap two carriers.
Actually CNO, yes I'd very much like that opportunity. Unfortunately, I'm moving my shop, project cars etc now and over the next week, so I won't likely be able to dedicate much time to it til that following week. I was in the midst of an expose on the Tico-modernization fiasco for another media, here and there, but it'll wait. So yes, with a lil time to screw together some numbers and whatnot, I'd gladly accept. Thank you so much for the offer.
ReplyDelete"Even then, the President and Admiral Stark, among many others, believed that forward presence would provide deterrence. We know how that turned out. The result was WWII in the Pacific and a disastrous defeat for the Navy. Deterrence has never succeeded."
ReplyDeleteYet, without Hawaii, Yorktown would not have been repaired in time for the Navy's decisive win at the Battle of Midway six months later.
We're talking about forward presence and deterrence, not after the war has started.
DeleteI take issue with CNO statement "deterrence has never worked". First, as a rule, I never use the word "never", as it is very difficult, if not impossible to prove that something "never" happened. Deterrence is a perfect example of the "dog that didn't bark". How does one know that an enemy has been deterred from a certain act. Only through supposition (e.g. Secretary of State says Korea not in our defense perimeter and soon afterwards South Korea is assaulted) or rarely, outright admission by the foe either in real time or in historical documents that it was deterred by a certain policy.
ReplyDeleteOne also must consider what one is trying deter. Pirates in enclosed waterways can be deterred from further action by strong naval action, but not by mere presence without will to act. Will an existential (in their opinion) Chinese priority (Taiwan) be deterred by FON ops or forward basing of a carrier. Probably not. Did nuclear weapons and the probability of them being used keep the Soviets from invading Western Europe in the 1950's. I think so.
Anyway, smart deterrence that defines WHAT it is deterring and has a realistic chance of succeeding combined with actual will and ability to USE that deterrent force is a rational part of a defense policy. Useless forward projection, unenforced red-lines and weak or absent response to provocation is surely the opposite of deterrence and is more like cat-nip to the enemy.
"Deterrence is a perfect example of the "dog that didn't bark"."
DeleteRead the following post and then you can revise your faulty belief:
"Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved"
"presence without will "
You're repeating the substance of numerous posts. Do you have anything new to offer?
There is a big question out there on whether carriers are going to be survivable in a major conflict re ballistic missiles launched from shore. Right now, nobody knows as its never been done. But if you really can get the targeting information, its a lot easier to do a mass time-on-target strike from shore as opposed to any other delivery platform.
ReplyDeleteI think that retiring the SSGNs without replacement is insane. We should be building lots more of them.
But the real problem is what we are trying to deliver. Why on earth are we still using 40 year old cruise missile technology?
We need a high-supersonic (terminal phase), stealthy, heavy cruise missile with a 1000lb payload and a range of at least 1500 miles. And it needs to fit in existing VLS cells. And there needs to be an air launched version of it to go with the surface ship launched and SSGN launched versions.
If we had that, a lot of the other problems would either go away or be minimized. And we need to be able to build a lot of them quickly, so no frills.
It would also be nice if we had the same capability in a ballistic missile.
"There is a big question out there on whether carriers are going to be survivable in a major conflict re ballistic missiles launched from shore."
DeleteIt's not really a question for anyone who's studied the technology and operational art of war. Carriers are completely survivable to the extent we want them to be.
Consider: In WWII, we didn't immediately park our carriers off the coast of Japan. Why not? Because they wouldn't have survived at that time. We had to roll back the Japanese defenses, first. We did that by using carriers judiciously to support our offensive roll back operations.
Similarly, in a war today, we won't park our carriers within range of overwhelming land based missiles. Instead, we'll roll back the Chinese defenses by judiciously using our carriers to support our offensive roll back operations.
" nice if we had the same capability in a ballistic missile."
One of our major weapon gaps is the lack of naval ballistic missiles. It is a mystery to me why we haven't developed those since we're no longer bound by any treaty.
"Instead, we'll roll back the Chinese defenses by judiciously using our carriers to support our offensive roll back operations."
ReplyDeleteI would like to see a post, perhaps one of your fiction series, envisioning how you see that progressing. I'm having a hard time seeing it in light of the 1000M+ Chinese A2/AD zone and our limited offensive reach.
" I'm having a hard time seeing it in light of the 1000M+ Chinese A2/AD zone and our limited offensive reach."
DeleteYou've got two mistaken beliefs in one sentence!
A thousand mile defensive missile requires a thousand mile sensor and the Chinese don't have that. Anything that might function as a thousand mile sensor, like the recon version of the H-6 bomber, would be rolled back with far flung outer fighter sweeps and cruise missile attacks on the bomber bases.
A thousand mile zone has a front edge. You start there by destroying any bases or units at that edge. Then, it's just a 900 mile zone which, again, has a front edge. You destroy anything there and then it's just an 800 mile zone ... You get the idea, right? This was, essentially, our WWII Pacific campaign concept. We rolled the Japanese forces back towards Japan.
While this is going on, our subs clear the seas and then establish 'gates' at the first island chain gaps to prevent Chinese subs or surface ships from entering the Pacific, thus clearing the seas for our carriers to maneuver freely and undetected.
By the way, we have thousand mile cruise missiles, if bordering on obsolete, and they can be further extended in range by launching close up from subs (we need more SSGNs!).
I can go on describing this but I've given you at least the glimmer of how this would occur and I've described many other aspects of this throughout the blog. Peruse the archives.
"A thousand mile defensive missile requires a thousand mile sensor and the Chinese don't have that."
DeleteI'm unconvinced. We don't know for sure what they can do, but those whose job it is to know are concerned that targeting large surface combatants is now a done deal. Even the Army now believes they are operating under a microscope in IndoPac. Its partly the new generation of LEO optical ISR sats, plus the geostationary synthetic aperture RORSat, plus AI interpreting the data many orders of magnitude faster than a human can.
So its quite possible, if not likely, that we are up against DF-21s with a 1700km range, and DF-26s with a 4000km range.
https://www.army.mil/article/272865/new_army_space_vision_actualizing_multidomain_operations
"This reinforces guidance outlined in Army Field Manual 3-0 emphasizing commanders and their staffs require an increased understanding of the space domain and the Army can no longer assume it can operate unobserved."
https://spacenews.com/why-space-force-is-growing-more-alarmed-by-chinas-eyes-in-the-sky/
“Paired with data from other Chinese surveillance satellites, Yaogan-41 could provide China an unprecedented ability to identify and track car-sized objects throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region and put at risk numerous U.S. and allied naval and air assets operating in the region,”
"One that has caught the Space Force’s attention is an advanced optical imaging satellite launched in December, Yaogan-41. With an estimated resolution of 2.5 meters, it brings a significant improvement over previous GEO optical satellites capped at 15-meter resolution. This level of visual fidelity would allow China to spot vehicles, aircraft, and vessels across wide regions.
Another is a GEO-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging satellite, Ludi Tance-4, that can see through clouds and darkness. Paired with the optical resolution of Yaogan-41, China now potentially has persistent visual and radar surveillance over strategically important areas like the Indo-Pacific."
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/challenge-joint-space-operations
"the PLA now possesses significant space-based ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; and targeting capabilities, as well as terrestrial and/or space-based electromagnetic, directed energy, and kinetic counterspace capabilities, which can create uncertainty for U.S. joint force commanders and are difficult to counter."
"I'm unconvinced."
DeleteBecause you're letting your imagination (and, likely, TV shows) dictate your reality. People seem to think that every satellite in orbit is directly connected to the firing button of a missile for instantaneous launch upon detection. That's just not how it works. Even in the event that a satellite can capture an image that contains a target, that image still has to be downloaded, analyzed, referred through layers of bureaucracy to operations planners where it will be weighed against hundreds/thousands of other targets and priorities. Weapons inventories have to be weighed against the worldwide target demands. A decisions has to be made, by a human, to prosecute or not and then orders have to sent out to the firing unit which, again, is not hard wired into the launch button. Eventually, a weapon may be launched but by then the target is many hours, likely days old.
Further, people seem to think that every millimeter of the world is monitored in real time and when a Chinese soldier scratches his butt, an alert is instantly generated across the entire military keeping everyone informed. Again, it just doesn't work that way. 99% of the world is not monitored in real time. A great example of this is the Malaysian flight that vanished a few years back from one of the most heavily travelled and monitored flight lanes in the world. The flight had radar, transponders, and satellites monitoring the area and yet it simply vanished and no one could determine where it went. To this day, we've never found it. Despite that kind of real world evidence, people still want to believe that the entire world is monitored in real time.
Further, satellites will be targeted in a war. The surviving satellites will be tasked with high priority missions such as monitoring the other side's nuclear status. There won't be any satellites looking for an infantryman digging a latrine on some deserted island in the South China Sea.
You can read all the manufacturer's claims and believe that know how many squirrels are on an island, in real time or you can grasp how these systems work and what the reality is.
You might also ask what the Army's priority is? It's ensuring - and enlarging - their budget slice. How do they do that? By building up the enemy's capabilities so that they can go to Congress and say, hey, look, the enemy has superhuman capabilities and we need more money to match them.
When war comes with China and the fighting spans the globe, no one is going to be monitoring every square millimeter of the world's surface.
We, in the West, have a tendency to scare ourselves into paralysis instead of grasping reality.
"Because you're letting your imagination (and, likely, TV shows) dictate your reality."
DeleteOh really? I am quite happy to put my qualifications up against yours in this area. I don't watch TV, I read. Mostly tech publications. I understand the kill chain involved in satellite ISR pretty well. I also understand how fast things have changed in the last few years. If you haven't been reading up on the last two years of Chinese satellite ISR changes you are way behind the curve. AI solves the image or radar return processing problem. As I'm sure you are aware, once you teach an AI system the basics, it learns as it goes. CSGs have patterns that make them fairly easy to identify even on radar from geostationary orbit. That is going to have to change. Just add horsepower to get faster results, and China has easy access to horsepower despite US sanctions. The Malaysian flight might as well have been 50 years ago in terms of how fast things have changed since. The first launch of the new satellite constellation with the ultra high resolution imagers was December 2023. The Chinese continue to launch military or dual-use satellites like crazy. Not quite at the pace of Space X with Starlink, but the same general idea. We are very quickly going to run into the same problem with Chinese ISR that they would have with Starlink. Simply too many satellites to destroy to make it all go away. That said, Kessler Syndrome will kick in early enough that nobody will be able to use low earth orbit for decades, and the damage will be so great that no one can safely get through LEO to get to geostationary.
I gave you three decent references, non-political and non-manufacturer, you gave me opinion. As you remind CDR Chip, there is a difference between facts and opinion. The references I provided believe it to be a fact that China can acquire a CSG, track it in real time, and kill it with a DF-21D barrage. I'm not going to argue with them. Because their logic is faultless. You acquire a CSG leaving port, then stay on it. You don't search for it in the middle of the Pacific.
If you want to fact-check me, a Google search is "Chinese satellite ISR" The results are fascinating and you can disappear down a rabbit hole for days following them up. Absolutely fascinating.
And seriously, if you don't think the Chinese are interested in where the US carriers are at all times, I have a bridge to sell you. On any putative target list, I bet carriers as a class are at least in the top 20.
One of the things I don't understand is why we aren't paying more attention to decoys. Suppose we had decoys that looked enough like a CVBG to fool the space based sensors. Probably difficult for imaging optical sensors, but maybe have all the decoys, and also the regular ships, emit obscurants? How does it then tell which is which.
DeleteSeems like an actually useful thing for weak unmanned vessels to do.
Bob, that is fascinating. I would never have thought of it. It has occurred to me, and I have read that the Chinese satellite ISR are multi-spectral, as in they also have infrared sensors on those satellites. So any decoys also have to be multi-spectral. Doesn't seem insurmountable.
DeleteOne thing that did come to my mind is that stealth aircraft that are stealthy from the forward aspect are not nearly as stealthy from directly above. Think F-35, B-2, B-21. Yes, I do know they use radar absorbent coatings which make them a maintenance nightmare, but the something the size of a heavy bomber presenting a somewhat larger, flatter image has to be a better target than a frontal view. Not to mention the infrared from the exhausts on the top of the wing.
George, RE: multi-spectral ISR. According to CNO in this post:
Deletehttps://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/04/alternative-stealth.html
we already have multi-spectral obscurants. Another alternative might be to use inflatable decoys. I believe I've seen inflatable dummy tanks used by the Ukrainians that are indistinguishable from real ones to much better than 2.5m resolution. In this case you would definitely need to address the multispectral problem, as you mentioned.
Of course with inflatable decoys, you'd also need to address the need for them to be robust against bad weather.
"Because you're letting your imagination (and, likely, TV shows) dictate your reality."
DeletePlease understand I am grumpy about this as this blog is supposed to be not about personal attacks.
So you are suggesting I watch Oprah and I'm dumb as a stump?
I am really seriously grumpy about this. From my point of view you there is no justification for calling me out like that.
If you don't like my facts/commentary, you are free to do so. But don't attempt to trash my reputation in the process.
Two common sense options that are ignored.
ReplyDeleteWhy has our Navy refused to mount Tomahawks on carrier aircraft? This was proven in tests decades ago with A-6s. This would greatly increase carrier strike range or safe stand off range.
Why do we still have tens of thousands of military family members is potential war zones like Okinawa, Sasebo, and Korea, who need support from thousands of American civilian workers. Okinawa has 13 DoD schools for military children! If Okinawa is attacked, thousands of American servicemen will rush home to ensure their family is okay. If war threatens and our ships foolishly homeported at Sasebo are ordered to sail to Hawaii, will some crewman refuse to abandon their families and refuse to sail?
We need to return to one-year unaccompanied tours to these places, and allow longer tours for 0-4s and above without children, or slowly build new facilities in the Marshall islands or Australia. This would also save billions of dollars each year. We had some 5000 American civilians captured in the Philippines in 1942.
I was just watching a video on the defense of Guam from CSIS made the end of July. Somewhat similar problems with 6000 service members and 170,000 civilians.
Deletehttps://www.csis.org/events/defense-guam
Agree with you about Tomahawks on carrier aircraft, but the broader issue is why are we still using Tomahawks? Both the Russians and Chinese are way ahead of us. A modernized Pershing would look pretty good too!
One limitation is the strange love for MK-41 launchers that can't hold big missiles. Our newer cruiser and maybe destroyer designs should have mostly MK-41s, but add a dozen new larger launchers for longer range missiles.
DeleteWhat about an updated SPRINT missile? Not great range, but at Mach 10 it could instantly blast a ship or land target.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dl9Ovwmnxw
"Why has our Navy refused to mount Tomahawks on carrier aircraft?"
DeleteI have no idea. However, I'll offer a few thoughts about it that may or may not be relevant and applicable.
- Tomahawks are big and heavy which greatly reduces the flight distance/endurance of the carrying aircraft. Thus, we might only be able to add a hundred or two hundred miles to the thousand mile missile range. Is that worth it?
- Tomahawks are big and heavy. An aircraft can likely only carry one or two. As we've analyzed on this blog, a single carrier can only mount about half a dozen strike aircraft, if even that. Half a dozen aircraft carrying one or two missiles each is utterly ineffective. Even a 4-carrier group could only mount a strike of around 20-30 aircraft which, at two missiles per aircraft, is still a very marginal effectiveness when most worthwhile targets would require hundreds of missiles.
- Tomahawk missiles take up magazine space while offering marginal benefits.
Just some thoughts I have. I don't know what the Navy thinks.
"why are we still using Tomahawks?"
DeleteIn theory, we have the LRASM cruise missile but the Navy is acquiring only very small quantities and has abandoned the vertical launch version. The reasons for both decisions are unknown and puzzling unless the Navy knows that the missiles are nowhere near as good as they're claimed to be?
Two stage Tomahawks would be better. Use the sub-mach cruise for the range, but as it approaches the target that likely has air defense, fire off a solid fuel Mach 5 warhead at it. Since its flight would be very short, the hypersonic skin heating problem will not exist.
DeleteI can absolutely see this, but please don't call it a Tomahawk. Use a turbofan first stage for near Mach 1 long range, then separate the 2nd stage to get at least a highly maneuverable warhead to at least Mach 3+ for the terminal phase.
DeleteI suggested a modern Pershing earlier. One of its neat tricks was a 25G pull-up after reentry, than a glide phase before a terminal dive. Add some modern electronics to make it wiggle on its attack path, and it would be a nightmare for fire control computers to defend against.
"Why do we still have tens of thousands of military family members is potential war zones like Okinawa, Sasebo, and Korea, who need support from thousands of American civilian workers."
DeleteWhy have any forward-based soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines. No bases outside USA territory. We can defend them.
So Pacific Fleet would be homeported in Pearl, San Diego, and Puget Sound. Atlantic Fleet would homeported in Norfolk, Mayport, and Groton. With fewer deployed ships, the need for foreign based shore support would be reduced. Put a tender in Guam, in Diego Garcia, and somewhere in Europe (Rota or Naples, or maybe a return to Holy Loch if we are to make a big deal about Russian subs in the GIUK gap again) to provide availability for deployed ships. And protect all those bases (and advanced facilities) by converting the LPD-17 class to the ABM/BMD ships that HII has proposed on the same hull (with larger and more powerful radar and 288 missile cells). One or two of those off each of those bases and advance facilities should provide reasonable safety and security.
"One or two of those off each of those bases and advance facilities should provide reasonable safety and security."
DeleteIs that true? If you were China and you were planning to attack, say, Guam but it was defended by one or two BMD-LPDs, what would you do? You know exactly where the ship(s) is. Would you send a sub to put a couple torpedoes into it just before your ballistic missile attack? It wouldn't be very difficult, would it? Is it wise to concentrate the entire base defense in one (or two) ship? Is it cost effective to build a billion dollar ship and then pay the yearly operating costs? Can we maintain such a ship given that we don't seem to have any interest in maintaining any of our other ships?
These are sincere questions about the concept of 'defender' ships. I'm on the fence about this. Tell me how you think this would work and what you think China would do about them and how you'd see us protecting the ships. What are the advantages and disadvantages? Opportunity cost alternatives?
I may do a post on this if I can solidify my thoughts. Pitch me your thoughts. It would be helpful.