Constellation Fraud

The Navy assured us that the Constellation class frigate would be a zero risk, on-time, on-cost, romp through the park to build since it was, essentially, a copy of an existing Fincantieri FREMM design.  There would be only minor, inconsequential changes – the color of the paint, perhaps, or an extra bulkhead or two for greater compartmentalization – that would have no impact on the design or production of the ship.
 
Of course, when the concept drawings were released, it turned out that the ship had been heavily modified and actually bore little resemblance to the parent FREMM design.  The Navy had lied to Congress and the public by presenting the frigate as a minor variation of an existing design when, in reality, it was a nearly brand new design with little in common with the so-called parent.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes from the parent design as those are readily available on line.
 
So, how’s all that working out?
 
USNI News website reports that the ship construction and delivery is going to be delayed at least a year.[1]  Construction began in Aug 2022 and the Navy is now hoping for delivery in 2027.  Far more likely is a 2028-9 delivery.  That’s a five to seven year delivery for what the Navy claims is a minor tweak of an existing design!
 
This babbling, incoherent, pointless statement from Andy Bosak (deputy manager for the frigate program) tells you everything you need to know about the state of the program.  The Navy has no idea what’s happening, no idea how to fix it, and no idea when the ship will be delivered. 

We are doing our analysis, as the Navy does, of doing deep dives of causes and effects and various different levers of which we can pull within that shipyard,” he added. “And we need to, as a program, work with our leadership, kind of figure out what we want to do. And from that, we will make that assessment as to what the actual schedule impact is of where we are. And that effort is ongoing.[1]

The builder, Fincantieri, blames much of the delay on labor shortages, welders, in particular.  No doubt this is a factor but I suspect there are other, far more impactful problems.  For example, 

… Fincantieri … wrestled with Americanizing the FREMM design for two and half years before it hit the 80 percent design completion and could begin fabrication on Constellation in 2022.  The modification of the design altered almost every drawing of the FREMM and required review from NAVSEA … [1]

The labor situation was well known before Fincantieri submitted a bid and the before the Navy awarded them a contract so that should have already been factored into the schedule.  What wasn’t factored in was the extent to which the Navy would modify the design.  The modifications sent ripple waves of disruption spreading throughout the program, culminating in the major schedule slippage we learn about now.  Undoubtedly, the schedule will slip even further.  We’re likely looking at closer to a two year schedule delay for a ship that was supposedly a knock off of an existing design.
 
The Navy knew all this and understood what deviating from the parent design would mean. 

"[The Navy] and the shipbuilder agreed that design maturity was probably the single biggest factor we could do to reduce the risk of production,” former program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton said in August of 2022.[1]

So, knowing full well what a modified (immature) design would do to the production schedule, the Navy went ahead and completely redesigned the ship anyway.  Not only is the Navy complicit in the current problems, they are the proximate cause of the problems!
 
Here’s yet another example of the ‘minor, insignificant’ changes the Navy made: 

… testing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock found that the modified design did not meet service standards for operating in heavy seas, necessitating design changes that ate into the schedule margin … [1]
 
“We were already into the functional and detail design when that report came from Carderock – something of a surprise because the parent design didn’t really have that,” Vandroff (Mark Vandroff, Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s chief executive officer) said.[1]

That was a surprise to you, Mr. Vandroff?  Seriously?  You completely changed the design to the point that it is a brand new, never before produced design and were surprised to find that created new problems?  You’re not an engineer, I’m assuming?
 

 
Conclusion
 
This program has been nothing but fraud and deception piled on fraud and deception from the very beginning and now it’s coming home to roost.  The Navy tried to hide a completely new ship inside the shadow – and lies – of an existing ship and now they’re acting surprised that the fraud is impacting the production schedule.
 
We need to also keep cost in mind.  Schedule slippages of this magnitude don’t come free.  The cost is going to skyrocket and the Navy will, again, act surprised and attempt to blame the builder.
 
By the way, do you recall that the Navy claimed that the follow on ships (2-20) would cost less than $800M?  Yeah, they said that.  Here’s the quote from RAdm. John Neagley:
 
“The follow-on objective cost for FFG(X) is $800 million. We think we can get below that.”[2]
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), on the other hand, estimated an average cost of $1.2B per ship.[3]
 
As it turns out, the actual budgeted costs are around $1.1B-$1.2B, and that’s before the inevitable cost overruns, costs associated with schedule slippages, deferred completion costs for incomplete delivery, etc.  The true cost will be somewhere in the $1.5B+ range.
 

 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “First Constellation Frigate Delayed At Least a Year, Schedule Assessment ‘Ongoing’”, Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, 11-Jan-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week.
 
[2]Breaking Defense website, “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 12-Jan-2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/
 
[3]CBO website, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate”, Oct-2020,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675