One of the reasons I started this blog was that I had
observed far too many misconceptions involving naval matters. I’m not talking about differences of opinion
but factually incorrect beliefs that had taken on an air of ‘truth’ and
acceptance due to sheer repetition with no one challenging the fallacies. One of my goals for this blog is to remove
the mystery and misunderstanding from these commonly accepted but incorrect
beliefs. Doing so allows us to have
discussions that are based on fact and can, therefore, be more logical and
productive.
Here’s a partial list of some of the misconceptions we’ve
corrected, so far, along with links to the relevant posts - a compendium of
myths, so to speak. In no particular
order,
Torpedoes – Most
people believed that torpedoes were miracle weapons that would sink any ship,
instantaneously, with a single hit by breaking the ship’s back by suspending
the ship over a giant bubble of air.
Torpedoes, while seriously dangerous weapons, cannot one-shot kill a
ship much larger than a corvette and the bubble-back-breaking phenomenon is
purely a myth and does not exist even for a small vessel.
See, “Torpedo Lethality Myth”
Explosive Effects
– Most people believe that explosive filler weight is the only thing that
determines damaging effects. In reality,
containment, in the form of thicker walls, determines the degree of damage for
a given weight of explosive filler.
See, “Explosive Effects”
Armor - Most people seemed to believe that armor would
sink a ship under its weight or, if not, would slow the ship to that of a
drifting barge. We demonstrated that
every WWII warship had armor appropriate for its class while maintaining 30+
knot speed and fantastic range. We also
dispensed with the belief that the main function of armor was to provide total
immunity to every weapon, past, present, and future. In reality, the purpose of armor is to
mitigate damage and allow the ship to stay in the fight, effectively, for
longer periods.
See, “Armored Ship Misconceptions”
See, “Armor for Dummies”
Escorts – So many
people have grown up never seeing more than three escorts for a carrier that a
common belief had sprung up that that was all that was needed for a carrier in
war. We analyzed the historical escort
requirements and the current escort needs and determined that we need around 38
escorts for a carrier group.
See, “Escorts”
Kinetic Energy –
There was – and still is! – a widespread belief that kinetic energy, alone,
will vaporize a target. This belief has
been applied to supercavitating torpedoes, Mach+ missiles, naval shells, and
any other weapon that ‘goes fast’. We’ve
analyzed the kinetic energy effect of several of these weapons and found that
the kinetic energy contribution ranges from insignificant to present but not
terribly damaging. Kinetic energy is,
typically, simply not all that much of a factor.
See, “Supercavitating Torpedo Kinetic Energy”
Rail Guns – Related
to the kinetic energy misconception, most people believed that rail guns would
instantaneously vaporize anything they hit.
We demonstrated that rail guns actually have a very small and limited
target set that they could be effective against. We noted the bullet and paper analogy which
applies to soft targets and renders rail gun projectiles nearly useless against
such targets. Even a modern, unarmored
ship is likely a soft target for a rail gun and nearly immune to significant damage
from a rail gun.
See, “Rail Guns in Combat”
Helicopters – We
disproved the common assumption - almost article of faith - that every ship must have helicopters, a
flight deck, and hangar. We noted that helos
require a 1/3 larger ship to accommodate flight deck, hangar, and support
facilities.
See, “Does Every Ship Need aHelicopter?”
Deployments –
Most people believed that ships would conduct deployments during war, just as
in peacetime, and that we would need the traditional 4 ships to support 1
deployed ship. We debunked that belief
by examining the conduct and missions of the Enterprise during the first full
year of war.
See, “War Deployments”
Sequestration –
The Navy tried to sell us on the idea that sequestration was the root cause of
the Navy’s problems and we thoroughly debunked that notion.
See, “Sequestration is Not theProblem”
Looking at the list of myths and misconceptions we’ve
debunked and corrected, it’s amazing how much misinformation and erroneous
beliefs were impacting naval discussions and preventing us from reaching
correct and logical conclusions.
Fortunately, we are now better equipped to examine and discuss naval
matters.
See, “Armor for Dummies”
Do you still feel strongly about "Steel is Cheap and Air is Free?" Obviously there is no free lunch but I've been doing a lot of research about shipbuilding and it seems like there might be some wiggle room.
ReplyDeleteThe first example is the Korean and Japanese AEGIS destroyers. They have very similar stats to a Burke and many of the same systems, yet they are much cheaper. Given how much the weapons cost, that suggests a pretty radical cost reduction on the basic ship/hull. And since they use similar amounts of steel and their shipyard workers get paid about the same as ours, that is all coming from labor hours and overhead. I know you've had several posts about overhead, but based on a lot of the sources I'm reading our workers have much lower productivity per hour because they aren't organized well and our shipyards lack some of the automated tools Japanese and Korean shipyards have. So steel is cheap, but in the US case the labor hours to install that steel are really high.
Supertankers have a lot of steel and air and are pretty cheap considering, but obviously not built to Navy standards.
The other wrinkle is speed. Engines are expensive and the engine size increases 8x for ever doubling in speed given the same hull shape. Speed was critical in many engagements in WWII and the Russo-Japanese war. And it still has value for deployment speed, running away from torpedos, etc. But is it still worth it to spend so much on engines and limit design freedom in the hull to get a few extra knots? Is 20 fine instead of 30? Part of why super tankers are cheap is that they only go 12-15 knots and have much smaller engines than a Burke even though they are massive in comparison.
The crux seems to be you have to get enough real competition in our shipping industry to force investment in modern tooling and techniques. Historically the US shipbuilding industry has always been completely backwards except a few wartime bursts like WWI and WWII. Probably because we've always had cabotage laws that protect shippers and ship builders from competition. So only wartime demand can disrupt the ship construction industry. And then maybe the most important question is how fast the ships need to go. There are obvious cuts like helicopters but having a ship that is faster than you need is absurdly wasteful and the LCS might be the most extreme example of that.
Curious what you think about these topics.
My main sources have been a paper examining how we built liberty ships and then a textbook on ship production.
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.129.5520&rep=rep1&type=pdf
https://www.amazon.com/Ship-Production-Soft-Cover-Richard-Storch/dp/0939773570
"Do you still feel strongly about "Steel is Cheap and Air is Free?"
DeleteI've presented the actual, itemized, cost data for Burkes and it irrefutably shows that the major cost item, by far, is the basic hull. So ... yes, I stand by it ! It's not even debatable - it's just a simple fact. The costs are what they are as documented in the Navy's budget docs.
You’re raising an interesting point, and I’m wondering if we could maybe learn a few lessons from the experience of automobile manufacturing in the 1970s.
DeleteBack then (and to me it doesn’t seem too long ago), Detroit was making 4 pretty crappy cars per year for every worker, and the cliché was that Ford and GM were really just huge employee retirement funds with a small manufacturing business somehow tacked on the end.
Then Japanese companies like Toyota built new factories in the South, throw out Detroit’s antiquated work practices, and built 15 cars per employee, and better cars too.
Maybe we should invite Japanese and Korean shipyards to build brand new greenfield sites in the United States, give them all the work visa waivers and guarantees they need, in return for recruiting, training and skilling up a whole new workforce, and then use their home country methodologies to design and build a new generation of warships for the USN.
"I've presented the itemized cost"
DeleteYes, that is my point in that the majority of that is labor rather than steel and our shipyard worker labor productivity is abysmal compared to the industry leaders. If you look at a Korean Sejong class AEGIS destroyer, the cost for the Burke flight II equivalent was under $1 billion. The BMD/flight III version will be $1.16 billion. These ships have almost all the same armaments, size, speed, turbines, etc. as the Burke and we know from your itemized list that the weapons and electronics alone are quite pricey. So if they flight II cost <$1 billion then all that cost reduction had to come out of the general ship. Which means their steel and air is a lot cheaper than ours! Of course it is really the labor because they use modern management techniques and tooling. This gets back to my comments a few weeks ago where the US has more shipyard workers than Japan and nearly as many as South Korea yet we produce a fraction of the output.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sejong_the_Great-class_destroyer
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2021/april/9927-south-korea-will-buy-three-more-aegis-destroyers.html
"few lessons from auto manufacturing"
DeleteFrom what I've learned so far shipbuilding is much more like a construction project than manufacturing because each ship takes so long and they are all a little different. But there are some similarities in managing material flow (keeping inventory low) and subcomponent manufacture. So trying to assembly line it won't work and its been tried many times. A lot of American shipyards actually went broke trying assembly line techniques in the 1970s and 80s. The main lessons I've gotten so far is that Asian shipyards are ruthless in planning their labor to minimize it and make good use of tools like automated steel cutters when manufacturing subcomponents. US shipyards mostly build ships like we built Liberty ships in WWII.
I think just transplanting Asian shipyards won't work because a huge part of it is the supplier network. Both Japan and South Korea build ships in very small clusters where you have several shipyards and a very thick supplier base all nearby. Economists call this agglomeration and it is critical for productivity and quality. Since our shipyards mostly build for the government they have to consider politics. And that means lots of shipyards in different districts where we can't get an agglomeration. I have a few ideas for how we might overcome this, but they aren't fully formed yet.
A more fundamental problem is that US ships are built slowly almost one at a time. That is a craftsmanship approach, not production. I think the advantage of time and cost savings comes with volume. A rather poor analogy is the innovative Yankees making cheap clocks that came up with a lathe/milling machine that would cut gears for dozens of clocks at one time, instead of filing them out one by one. It only worked because they were building hundreds of them. And location may not be so much of an issue with volume. In Denver CO 800 miles from the sea and a mile above it, there was a shipyard building destroyer escorts - in pieces that were shipped by rail to the west coast, welded into bigger pieces, then welded into a ship.
DeleteDon,
DeleteDefinitely part of it. As ComNavOps has pointed out many times, we’d be better off with a greater number of more specialized ships. And that we might be better off if we assume shorter ship lifetimes and don’t plan for mid life overhauls.
Both of those tactics should decrease artisan labor and increase production labor.
"A more fundamental problem is that US ships are built slowly almost one at a time. That is a craftsmanship approach, not production."
DeleteIt's worse than that! Not only is each ship almost a one-off build, we make it even more challenging by issuing a constant stream of change orders DURING construction! This results in significant amounts of tearing out and rebuilding what's already been built. This is concurrency of design and construction and it's become standard in naval construction.
ComNavOps, As well, I suspect that everyone with the authority or influence (and a wish list) issue change orders (with no thought of the impacts elsewhere). In either case the best approach might well to be a longer design period with the changes incorporated, or to build a prototype (relatively) fast and cheap, then find out what is wrong with it. Then lock in the design.
Delete"the best approach might well to be a longer design period with the changes incorporated"
DeleteThe Fletcher class production is a fascinating study. The class evolved throughout its production run BUT CHANGES WERE NOT MADE ONCE CONSTRUCTION ON A SHIP BEGAN. Any desired changes were held until the next ship and then incorporated PRIOR to the start of construction.
History is telling us how to manage a production run but we stubbornly refuse to listen.
Thats a seemingly small adjustment, but makes immense sense!! Of course, the production timelines have grown so much that a change would be implemented years later, rather than weeks. But its still a wiser course.
Delete"a change would be implemented years later"
DeleteTwo hulls get laid down each year at our peak peacetime Burke production rate. Then it takes 3-4 years from laying the keel to commissioning. So you would only need to wait ~6 months to add a capability on the next ship, but it would take a few years to commission the capability.
It is actually faster to limit change orders and wait until the next model. The South Korean's take about 2.5 years on their slightly larger AEGIS destroyer. So you can shrink the time to get the new capability in service with a more efficient shipyard and less change orders. The construction industry, software development, and power grid interconnection queues are just a few examples where this is also true.
Finally, things go faster if we simplify the designs. What if our Burke was just an anti-air platform and only had a radar focused on likely threats? Delete the helicopter, space/ballistic missile radar, etc. With fewer systems there are also fewer chances for unforeseen conflicts or missing specifications that require change orders. We further shorter the iteration time.
I think peace time build rates could easily be less than two years and closer to one with additional changes in requirements. I'm not sure its worth it to compact it much more than that because you start running into issues keeping your shipyard worker utilization high. But during wartime you'd sacrifice efficiency for speed.
Again, nothing that hasn't been said on this blog before, but it is important because it impacts our Navy in every phase.
"only had a radar focused on likely threats?"
DeleteYou're inadvertently (or maybe intentionally?) touching on some very important, closely related issues. If we design for only a 15-20 year service life - as I keep calling for and some people keep resisting! - then we'll build more ships, overall, and, more importantly, we'll have more opportunities to insert new technology.
In just 15-20 years, our technology will not become outdated. The enemy can no more introduce sweeping changes into his technology, overnight, then we can. It will take him years to introduce new technology and with just 15-20 year service lives, we'll never be very far out of date with our technology responses.
We MUST return to 15-20 year service lives. After all, it's not as if we're maintaining our ships anyway, right? Since we've proven we don't want to maintain ships then it's only logical to design them for very short lives where the lack of maintenance isn't that big of a deal.
"start running into issues keeping your shipyard worker utilization high"
With shorter 15-20 year service lives, we'll be building more ships and, thus, keeping shipyard workers busier! See how this all fits neatly together?!
Totally agree...
DeleteThe budget and urgency was different then, but we only have to look back to our last DD class to see whats possible. Those pics showing 5 or 6 Spruances fitting out at the same time are a reminder of what better acquisition practices can yield...
"radar"
DeleteYes, besides the obsoleting factor radar is one of those power law situations like speed. EM energy decays so quickly that equipment power and size go up exponentially. So if most of your engagements are going to be within 50 km and having a bigger radar will only advertise your position then we can shrink them a lot without losing much combat effectiveness. Jamming energy also decays at the same rate so it easy for a jammer to degrade long range signals with little power. They'd have to have a lot of power close to the ship to take radar offline close to the ship, which starts becoming less realistic. Having the less powerful radars along with some other changes opens up the opportunity for a second-class air defense ship that can supplement carrier group air defense, escort convoys, or supplement island defenses. Like a Spruance/Perry situation.
"shipyard utilization"
Yes, definitely. I think shorter service lives to build more ships is a key part of the solution. And the commercial ship industry agrees with this where ships are basically expendable. They get scrapped after 10-15 years. It makes total sense when the engine is near end of life and the construction process is so efficient that the steel going into the ship makes up a large portion of the purchase cost. A super tanker weighs many times what a Burke does but is <5% of the cost! If we can make the changes you mention then we are closer to that ideal where the steel is a large portion of the cost and our weapons are depreciated so scrapping or reserve fleet service makes sense.
Ship building requires different amounts of labor at different points. So if you compress the timeline too much then at some points you don't have enough workers and others you have excess. Even commercial shipyards building dozens of much simpler ships per year take over a year for this reason.
Wow - no myths concerning unmanned (oh I am sorry..."uninhabited") vehicles. I always got the notion you felt there were many misconceptions about them and their perceived effectiveness.
ReplyDelete" I always got the notion you felt there were many misconceptions about them and their perceived effectiveness."
DeleteQuite right. However, that falls more into the category of debatable and the conclusions are dependent on what the [non-existent] CONOPS for their use are. I've also stated, many times, that I can see very productive uses and needs for unmanned vehicles - just not the uses the Navy sees!
Plus, I had to draw the line somewhere. In a sense, this entire blog is an exposition of the myth that the Navy has any idea what it's doing.
This is one of the main reasons I read and recommend this blog. There are a lot of sites that parrot back manufacturer claims, Navy brass comments and 'conventional wisdom.' There are few that question, push back, and dig deeper. This site does!
ReplyDeleteThis blog does a fantastic job of looking at the Navy through fresh eyes.
ReplyDeleteLutefisk